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Abstract 
This thesis examines the evolution of water provision in Bafatá, Guinea-Bissau, between 2006 
and 2014, including the role of state and non-state actors, policy models and everyday 
practices in shaping the city’s piped supply scheme. The overall aim is to use perspectives from 
a small African city to evaluate understandings of urban water infrastructure circulating in the 
fields of geography and urban studies. Based on ethnographic work in Guinea-Bissau 
involving 11 months of participant observation and 94 interviews with state officials, workers 
in international organisations and the city’s water operator, and water users, this thesis argues 
that the dominance of critiques of neoliberalism and the limited theorisations of the state 
prevailing in current analyses are key limitations for service provision in small cities in poorer 
contexts. To address these weaknesses, this thesis adopts an analytical framework that 
combines the concepts of ‘variegated neoliberalism’ and ‘assemblages’ with an attention to the 
‘everyday’, in order to develop an understanding of a ‘creole’ mode of governance 
characterised by its intermixing of influences. In addition, it draws on anthropological 
explorations of the state that examine state practices and interactions with non-state actors 
without fixing these in pre-conceived analytical categories. This thesis shows that the state has 
shaped water provision in Bafatá not through following policy and regulatory frameworks, but 
through the decisions and practices of governmental officials and their interactions with non-
state organisations. It also demonstrates that development interventions have significantly 
influenced water provision in Bafatá. However, policy models circulating in the city have been 
routinely assembled with and reshaped by alternative logics, motivations and practices, and 
therefore transformed beyond their original agendas. Lastly, water provision is analysed from 
the perspective of everyday water practices, demonstrating the multiplicity of factors shaping 
access to water, including perceptions of quality of water, and the simultaneous disruption 
and continuity of ingrained sharing practices through the introduction of meters.  
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– ONE –  
Introduction 
In March 2010, I moved to Bafatá – a small city in Guinea-Bissau, West Africa – as an 
employee of the Portuguese NGO TESE, to contribute to the implementation of a 
development project, Bafatá Misti Iagu (Guinea-Bissau Creole for ‘Bafatá Wants/Needs 
Water’). Not surprisingly, during the one year I spent in Bafatá working on this project, my 
views concerning cities in Africa, urban infrastructure, everyday water practices and 
development were time and again turned on their head. For instance, while I found myself 
becoming increasingly critical of international development practices, I also tried to make 
sense of the multiple contradicting perspectives meeting in Bafatá – including those of 
practitioners, beneficiaries and various ‘subordinated’ actors who insisted on the benefits of 
development interventions. Simultaneously, I started rethinking my own long-held 
assumptions that cost-recovery and private sector participation in service provision were 
straightforwardly ‘bad’.  
As time went by, I also became mindful of the striking divergences between the ways things 
unfolded on the ground and the discourses and policy models disseminated by NGOs. There 
seemed to be a constant tweaking of ongoing practices as they were written or talked about. 
It looked like debates that filled reports, meetings and conversations in the development world 
had little to say about the motivations, logics and practices of those involved in water supply 
in Bafatá on a daily basis, or the ways water was actually supplied and used in the city. 
Gradually, I articulated these thoughts into various questions. What if we told the story of 
water supply not from the viewpoint of development discourses and practices, but starting 
from the motivations and practices of those working and living in Bafatá? What if the variety 
of motivations and practices emerging around the piped supply scheme became part of 
circulating discourses and perceptions? What if, instead of comparing the reality of Bafatá to 
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supposedly ‘right ways’ of doing things, we drew on the experiences of this city as a valid way 
of doing things? What if we even drew lessons from Bafatá that can help us understand and 
improve water provision in other cities?  
This thesis engages with some of these questions. It examines the evolution of water provision 
in Bafatá, between 2006 and 2014, including the role of state and non-state actors, policy 
models and everyday practices in shaping the city’s piped supply scheme. Notably, Bafatá is 
one among the large number of small secondary cities in Africa which, although commonly 
neglected by urban researchers, house a significant proportion of the urban population in 
Africa. Crucially, these cities experience not only chronic shortages in service provision but 
also specific challenges related to their political and economic subordinate positions, their lack 
of resources and the weakness of state institutions. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to use 
perspectives from a small secondary African city to evaluate and expand understandings of 
urban water infrastructure circulating in the fields of critical geography and urban studies. 
Taking these cities as sites of theory making, it contributes to more global understandings of 
urban infrastructure.  
Based on ethnographic work in Guinea-Bissau, this thesis argues that conventional 
understandings of urban infrastructure in African cities and elsewhere, notably political 
economy and political ecology perspectives, display an over-commitment to critiques of 
neoliberalism. This is a key limitation for investigations of small secondary cities in Africa, 
where other forces and processes are visibly shaping water provision. Academic researchers 
have (to a certain degree) adopted nuanced and situated views of neoliberalism and, following 
postcolonial critiques of urban studies, produced a range of contextualised analyses of the 
neoliberalisation of water in cities across the world. However, there are significantly fewer 
investigations looking into how policy models are adapted, transformed and assembled 
together with alternative logics as they are introduced into different socio-institutional 
contexts, but also translated into practice.  In particular, most existing investigations of 
community-management and public-private partnerships – the policy models most frequently 
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circulating in small cities – tend to narrowly focus on the processes of marketization and 
commodification of water, without looking into alternative drivers and processes beyond 
neoliberalisation. This thesis argues that rather than being taken for granted, the analytical 
relevance of neoliberalism should be turned into an object of inquiry when investigating 
numerous cities across the global south. What other logics and motivations and modes of 
governance are shaping water supply in small African cities? What happens to circulating 
policy models when they land in these cities? Excluded from private investments in water 
supply, how are these cities supplying and using water? 
In addition, this thesis claims that analyses of water provision have typically adopted flawed 
theorisations of states based on western idealisations, which have curtailed their ability to 
make sense of the ways in which states shape urban water supply. On the one hand, the policy 
literature has frequently relied on ideas of neutral, well-functioning bureaucratic states that 
have little relation to the lived realities of states. On the other hand, seeking to de-naturalise 
states, critics of policy views have based their analyses on notions of the state inspired in the 
historic experiences of a small core groups of countries. Therefore, this thesis argues for more 
nuanced views of the state that move beyond Western idealisations of what states should be 
and take into account the multiple histories and trajectories of states. This means that existing 
analytical categories such as ‘state’ and ‘society’ should also be turned into objects of empirical 
inquiry in investigations of water supply.  
To address weaknesses relating to the predominance of critiques of neoliberalism, this thesis 
adopts an analytical framework that combines the concepts of ‘variegated neoliberalism’ and 
‘assemblages’ with an attention to the ‘everyday’ (Baptista, 2013; Lawhon et al., 2014; 
McFarlane, 2011; Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Simone, 2011). It uses these analytical and 
methodological tools to propose an understanding of a ‘Creole’ mode of governance. Here, 
the term Creole refers to the emerging product of “reciprocal activity, a process of 
intermixture and enrichment” (Ashcroft et al., 2000) of the multiplicity of actors, motivation, 
practices and logics converging around the city’s piped supply scheme. Thus, this thesis 
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suggests that while development discourses and practices have fundamentally shaped water 
provision in Bafatá, policy models have been assembled and re-shaped in such ways that new 
meanings and effects have been generated. Often, this has resulted not in the hybridisation of 
neoliberal policies but in the whole reconfiguration of original agendas according to the 
motivations and practices of various actors.  
To tackle limitations relating to flawed theorisations of the state, this thesis draws on 
anthropological explorations of states and investigations of state practices (Gupta, 1995; 
Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; Nugent, 2007; Painter, 2006). These perspectives, it is argued, 
can open the analytical view to more nuanced understandings of states and water provision, 
including the multiple modalities and practices shaping water provision. This thesis, then, uses 
these perspectives to demonstrate that the state has shaped the evolution of water provision in 
Bafatá in significant ways not through enforcing policy and regulatory frameworks, but 
through the decisions, practices and interactions of government officials. In particular, it 
shows the importance of state practices beyond formal bureaucracies. It also demonstrates 
how the state acts in a relational way, through its interactions with non-state organisations. 
The state, then, can be neoliberal, developmental, predatory, benevolent and absent all at 
once.  
Lastly, this thesis argues that investigations of everyday water practices can enhance 
understandings of urban water, challenging totalising critiques of neoliberalisation focusing 
on access, control and inequality. It shows that, contrary to what is commonly assumed, access 
– defined in terms of distance from source and ability to pay – is not the only, or inevitably 
the most important, factor shaping users’ practices. In Bafatá, perceptions of quality of water 
and convenience were revealed to be essential in shaping the ways residents navigate different 
sources and technologies. In addition, this thesis demonstrates that although narratives of 
marketization and commodification could be used to discuss dynamics provoked by the 
adoption of cost recovery principles alongside the use of meters in Bafatá, there are other more 
important processes to consider. These include the disruption of practices of sharing water at 
 17 
the neighbourhood level, but also the collectivisation of water provision with re-distribution 
taking place at the central management level. These processes are essential for the possibility 
of a piped supply scheme in a city where resources are extremely scarce.  
Call for research on small secondary cities in Africa 
A call to focus on small secondary cities in Africa does not aim, in any way, to ignore the 
multiplicity and diversity of such cities across the continent. Rather, it is based on three key 
postulations: the demographic significance of small secondary cities in Africa; their political, 
economic and social specificities, which shape their urban condition; and, the challenges these 
cities face in relation to water provision.  
The problematic of urban service provision in African cities, and elsewhere in the global south, 
has typically been associated with the growing rates of urbanisation witnessed in these urban 
areas. Urban growth has exacerbated the need for investments in service provision in contexts 
where resources are commonly scarce, and state institutions routinely lack the capacity to 
manage or induce a more equitable form of urban development (Parnell and Pieterse, 2014). 
In this context, mega-cities where population growth was most obviously visible have become 
the main object of attention. Much less attention has been paid to smaller cities (Jaglin et al., 
2011). Bafatá, with a population of approximately 30,000 inhabitants and holding the title of 
second city of Guinea-Bissau, hardly fits the category of mega-cities thriving and imploding 
under the pressures of urban and economic growth, on the one hand, and the urbanization of 
poverty, on the other (Parnell and Pieterse, 2014; Véron, 2010).  Yet, it belongs to another 
group of smaller cities that are increasingly recognised as housing a significant proportion of 
the urban population on the continent.  
Recent surveys show that Africa, alongside Asia, registers one of the highest rates of 
urbanisation in the world. Its urban population is expected to increase from 40 per cent in 
2014 to 56 percent by 2050, therefore crossing the ‘magical’ 50 per cent threshold along the 
way (Parnell and Pieterse, 2014; UN, 2014). In particular, West Africa, the region where this 
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thesis’ case study is located, is proclaimed to be the fastest urbanising region in the African 
continent after East Africa, and its population is projected to rise from 44.9 percent in 2011 
to 49.9 per cent in 2020 and 65.7 per cent by 2050 (UN-habitat, 2008). Crucially, and despite 
the attention drawn by mega-cities, the latest UN population estimates for the continent also 
reveal that most urban dwellers in Africa, about 54 percent, live in cities and towns with fewer 
than half a million people, rather than in mega-cities. This is expected to remain the case in 
the next few decades as projections show that most population growth will occur in smaller 
towns and cities (UN, 2014; UNFPA, 2008). And, according to UN Habitat (2008), a 
particularity of the West African region is precisely that urban growth will be mostly driven 
by the expansion of secondary cities (even if the concept of secondary cities remains rather 
vague in this report).  
Scholars reflecting upon population projections in the African continent, such as Potts (2009, 
2008) and Bocquier (2004), have also claimed that most forecasts have overestimated 
urbanization rates.  They argue that in some countries urban growth is now equivalent to 
national population growth, suggesting a decrease in the rates of growth of urban areas and 
lower migration trends into these areas. Most importantly in the context of this research, Potts 
(2009) claims that in some countries, like Ghana, the high levels of urbanization can only be 
explained by the vigorous growth of small and very small towns. Thus, despite the attention 
given to mega-cities, and rightly so, it is also undeniable that smaller cities have enough 
demographic significance to draw considerably more interest than they have to date.  
The notions of ‘small’ and ‘secondary’ cities remain vague and ambiguous (Jaglin, 2014; Jaglin 
et al., 2011; Véron, 2010). Different countries adopt very distinct criteria to distinguish 
between urban and rural regions (Wisner et al., 2015).  Likewise, scholars adopt distinct 
definitions, which place variable emphasis on size of the population, function, administrative 
arrangement, and local economy (Satterthwaite, 2006; Véron, 2010). As suggested by Wisner 
et al. (2015) and Satterthwaite (2006), this thesis will refer to small cities to denote those urban 
centres with populations between 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. Most cross-country 
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estimates use the 0.5 million mark to refer to small cities and, therefore, it is difficult to know 
what proportion of the population currently lives in these smaller settlements. Nevertheless, 
Bafatá is one of the 893 urban centres with populations between 10,000 and 100,000 people 
in West Africa, this compares with 109 cities with over 100,000 inhabitants in the same region 
(UN-habitat, 2008). 
Apart from their demographic significance, another important factor justifying  this call for 
research focusing on small African cities relates to the specificities of these cities (Jaglin et al., 
2011; Véron, 2010). In fact, these specificities are at the heart of this thesis’ aim to use 
perspectives from a small African city to evaluate and expand existing theorisations of water 
infrastructure to address issues of water provision in these cities. As in the case of small cities, 
there are a number of definitions for secondary cities (Roberts, 2014; Smith and Ruiters, 2006; 
Yacoob and Kelly, 1999). I adopt the term ‘secondary’ to denote the specific position of these 
cities within the urban hierarchy. This includes the consideration of their function and role as 
urban centres revealed, for example, in the occupations of the population, or their role as 
main centres for accessing markets, health, education as well as other services (Satterthwaite, 
2006). For instance, despite being a small city, Bafatá is known as the second city of Guinea-
Bissau. It is an important centre for trade, education, services, government offices and 
transport. Also, unlike smaller centres, it houses an extremely diverse population, mixing 
different ethnicities, religions, languages and nationalities. But, most importantly, the use of 
the term ‘secondary’ entails acknowledging the particular position of these urban centres in 
relation to larger political and economic hubs, and the related specific challenges they face 
concerning service provision (Jaglin et al., 2011; Véron, 2010) . Véron (2010) uses the notion 
of ‘triple challenge’ to convey the limited financial and human resources and lack of political 
power, which characterises these cities. This ‘triple challenge’ is perhaps best understood, in 
the context of African cities, in light of the phenomenon of urban primacy (Myers, 2011; 
Pieterse and Parnell, 2014; UN-habitat, 2008). The concentration of population, economic 
opportunities, employment and access to services in one single large city, typically with a 
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population several times larger than the second most populated city, routinely causes the 
neglect of smaller urban areas, with impacts on the resources mobilised to these cities. 
As argued by Robinson (2006), once it was established that the majority of the world’s urban 
population lived in cities of the global south, urban theory, which continued to base its 
essential theoretical constructs in a core group of cities based in the West, faced the risk of 
becoming irrelevant, unless it engaged in a real effort to reinvent itself and work to capture, 
explain, and theorise from cities of the global south. It is thus the argument of this thesis that 
it is now time to focus also on small secondary cities in the African continent. These are cities 
where a significant proportion of the urban population in Africa lives, and is expected to 
continue to live in the next few decades, and where drivers of urban change, which take into 
account the specificities of these cities, remain under-investigated. Thus, while engaging in a 
detailed analysis of one small African city, this research also constitutes a wider call for more 
research on small cities in general. Hopefully, in a few years, researching a small city will be 
accepted as providing an opening to analytical conversations about a wide range of other cities 
without having to justify why this matters. At the time I am writing this work, it remains a 
rather difficult task.  
Thus, examining water provision in Bafatá, and seeking to expand existing analytical devices 
in such ways that they can capture the multiple logics and processes at work in this city, this 
thesis is not only relevant to those, like me, with personal connections to this city. It is also 
relevant to those with an interest in cities in Africa more generally. Whilst not claiming validity 
across all small secondary cities in Africa, the aim of this research is to contribute to a wider 
agenda focusing on these cities as sites of theory-making. What can these cities add to our 
understandings of current neoliberalisation strategies in water provision and, more generally, 
our conceptualisations of neoliberalism? What do these cities tell us about alternative drivers, 
outcomes and processes influencing water provision? Can we find new ways to think about 
these alternative driving forces across diverse cities? 
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 Omissions: Development, Gender 
There are two obvious omissions in this thesis. The first one concerns the lack of engagement 
with debates on the politics of development. As you read through this thesis, it will become 
apparent that international development projects have played a key role in the evolution of 
water infrastructure in Bafatá. Furthermore, many of the processes I explore could have been 
framed in terms of the successes and failures of these development projects. For example, 
David Mosse (2005), Mosse and Lewis (2006)  and Rossi (2004a, 2004b) have developed some 
extremely interesting ethnographies of development aid and practice highlighting and 
explaining the multi-layered disjuncture between policy and practice. And, like this project, 
they have adopted ethnographic approaches to seek more nuanced evaluations of the ways in 
which policies are translated into practice. Whilst acknowledging this work and, in fact, 
drawing on their contributions concerning the potential of ethnographies and the 
consideration of agency in the translation of policies into practice, I consciously chose not to 
frame my research around development research. This is not because I don’t think this would 
be a relevant approach but because I was not investigating development projects but urban 
water provision. In other words, I wanted to explore Bafatá as a city with its own dynamics 
and processes rather than focusing on how it had developed in relation to development 
discourses, policies and practices. For this reason, I have chosen to frame my research within 
the field of urban studies and, consequently, to view development aid and practices as part of, 
but not the fundamental, discourses, agendas and practices shaping the urban condition of 
Bafatá. This has enabled me to consider the ways in which urban space in Bafatá is produced 
through the intertwining of multiple spatialities, whilst maintaining the focus on urban water 
provision in Bafatá, and including a multiplicity of drivers and forces that include but also 
exceed development projects, discourses and practices.  
The second important omission relates to gender. In line with broader development 
discourses, interventions on the piped water network of Bafatá were typically infused with 
gender discourses. In addition, gender relations in general and in relation to water provision 
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in particular were important topics throughout my fieldwork, permeating many conversations 
with many women and men. For instance, out of the almost 50 water users I interviewed, the 
great majority were women. This choice reflected women’s role collecting water for the 
household. Yet, a considerable number of those involved in the management of water 
infrastructure were men. Section 2.5. below discusses how feminist approaches have informed 
studies of water provision.  As suggested by Truelove (2011), gender relations are an important 
dimension of the social relations regulating water provision in the city, and political ecology 
perspectives have routinely ignored the reproduction of water inequalities along gender lines. 
O’Reilly (2006) and Harris (2009) also demonstrate how development projects advocating 
women’s participation in water provision have negatively affected women’s livelihoods, rather 
than fostering their empowerment. In addition, Page (2005) argues that the role of women in 
the production of water has routinely been ignored. These scholars demonstrate that gender 
is an important theme in studies of water provision. On the one hand, the exclusion of a 
detailed analysis of gender relations from this study can be related to my concerns about the 
ways in which gender is dealt with in mainstream development projects. These interventions 
typically reproduce discursive  constructions of women “as stati loci of eternal suffering, [and] 
a privileged recipient of First world concern” (Radcliffe, 1994, p. 26). On the other hand, this 
omission is also explained by an understanding that, as suggested by Madge and Raghuram 
(2006), my own wish to counter development discourses should not simply reproduce 
Eurocentric views of women. Thus, an engagement with gender would require an approach 
that avoids easy assumptions regarding notions of gender relations in Guinea-Bissau. This 
would be a different, and important, project in itself. Nevertheless, during this research I was 
careful in seeking multiple – complementing and contradicting – perspectives relating to 
understandings of water provision that crossed gender divisions.  
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Thesis outline 
The remainder of this thesis is organised into 8 chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 illustrate the 
theoretical constructs at the heart of this research, and introduce the analytical frameworks 
developed to investigate water provision in Bafatá. Chapter 2 argues that political economy and 
political ecology approaches present important limitations for understandings of water 
provision in small secondary African cities. Related to this, it calls for the need to adopt more 
nuanced views of neoliberalism, as conceptualised in the notion of variegated neoliberalism. 
But, it also calls for the need to examine alternative drivers, processes and outcomes. This 
means engaging in a postcolonial post-neoliberal optic and discontinuing the over-
commitment to critiques of neoliberalism in this literature. Here, policy debates on urban 
water can offer some guidance. Section 2.2. examines key shifts in international water policies 
in recent decades. It explores the consecutive privatisation waves, demonstrating the ongoing 
emphasis given to market approaches, private sector participation, as well as the growing 
importance given to the role of the state, as regulator and enabler. Concerns related to state 
weaknesses and the financial constraints faced by many cities are two crucial issues emerging 
from policy analyses, which are often neglected by scholars adopting political economy/ 
ecology perspectives 
Section 2.3. turns to political economy and political ecology investigations of water provision. 
It starts by stressing the rich contributions of this body of work, involving analyses that bring 
forward complex understandings of the processes and impacts associated with the 
neoliberalisation of water. This section then engages with postcolonial critiques of this work, 
which have demonstrated the provincialism of some of the key theoretical constructs 
underpinning such analyses. In particular, it examines how scholars have challenged the 
‘modern network city’ as an assumption at the heart of understandings of water infrastructure, 
and questioned straightforward associations between neoliberalisation and the splintering of 
urban infrastructure. Lastly, this section argues that conventional political economy/ ecology 
approaches have been menaced by an over-commitment to critiques of neoliberalism, which 
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have hindered the consideration of the variety of factors, motivations and agendas shaping 
water provision in small African cities.  
Section 2.4., then, discusses calls for postcolonial perspectives and ‘post-neoliberal optics’ in 
urban studies. In particular, it discusses how the notion of ‘variegated neoliberalism’ can 
support more nuanced analyses of water provision and neoliberalisation. In addition, it 
examines the concept of assemblages and the focus on the everyday as analytical and 
methodological tools that can extend existing analytical frameworks centred on 
neoliberalisation and capture processes that escape existing analytical registers. Section 2.5. 
examines a recent body of work exploring everyday water and sanitation practices in 
investigations of urban infrastructure. It discusses how these approaches have expanded and 
complicated conventional political ecology approaches, namely understandings of water 
inequality and of the ways in which states become involved in everyday practices. Section 2.6. 
summarises the key arguments of this chapter and proposes an analytical framework for the 
analysis of water infrastructure in secondary African cities. This analytical framework 
combines the consideration of variegated neoliberalisms and the use of the notion of 
assemblages, alongside explorations of the everyday, to explore and theorise the variety of 
processes and factors shaping the urban condition.  
Chapter 3 argues that views of the state currently circulating in the literature focusing on water 
provision cannot adequately capture the myriad of ways in which state institutions and actors 
shape water provision in small secondary cities in Africa. This chapter begins with a discussion 
of the divergent, but also similar, views of the state underpinning policy analysis and academic 
research on water provision. It also contrasts these views of the state with empirical 
investigations of African states to demonstrate the flaws of these theorisations of the state in 
the context of small secondary African cities, and even elsewhere. Section 3.2., then, explores 
theorisations of the state in Africa, which have tended to draw on the problematic concept of 
neopatrimonialism. Whilst accounting for important dynamics, such as the informalisation of 
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state power and patron-client relationships, these conceptualisations continue to rely on 
idealised and reified notions of the rational-bureaucratic state.  
Thus, section 3.3. turns to anthropological explorations of states and investigations of everyday 
state practices. It argues that these theorisations of the state can open investigations to the 
variety of ways and modalities through which states shape water infrastructure in secondary 
African cities and, at the same time, can expose the ways in which these processes relate to 
broader processes of state formation. Notably, investigations of everyday state practices make 
visible a range of processes previously hidden from analytical view, including a variety of 
fragmented practices which surpass policy and regulatory frameworks but which cannot 
simply be dismissed as deviations from the normal functioning of the state. Instead, they 
should be draw on to inform more nuanced theorisations of the state that allow for the 
heterogeneity and contradictions inherent in these apparatuses. Explorations of everyday state 
practices allow for state presence to be acknowledged, as it is, without jumping to conclusions 
or relying on pre-existing theorisations concerning the nature of the state. This is in contrast 
to views of the state as a unified, coherent entity, which tend to produce analyses that 
overgeneralise from specific agendas and fail to conceptually allow for the multiple modalities 
of the state.  Section 3.4. discusses the work of scholars adopting more nuanced views of the 
state in their investigations of urban infrastructure. It demonstrates the insights these 
investigations have brought to understandings of the ways in which states shape water 
infrastructure, involving attention to the multiple modalities of the state. Finally, the 
conclusion explores how such theorisations of the state can be mobilised for the study of water 
infrastructure in secondary African cities. 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide the reader with background information for the empirical chapters 
which follow. Chapter 4 presents a discussion of the research methods adopted, which included 
over 90 interviews with a range of different actors involved in water provision, and 
participation observation in different locations – such as wells, hand pumps and standpipes – 
and with different organisations – including Bafatá’s water operator, the Regional Offices of 
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the Water Resources Department and the National Water and Sanitation Group.  This 
chapter also explains the rationale underpinning the ethnographic approach adopted in this 
study and it includes a discussion of data collection and the process of interpretation and 
writing. In addition, it explores how issues of positionality and reflexivity were dealt with 
throughout the research process.  
Chapter 5 introduces the reader to the case study used in this research. First, it provides a brief 
overview of processes of democratisation and economic liberalisation in the country and it 
discusses the dependence of Guinea-Bissau on foreign aid and the normalisation of political 
instability. This is followed by a discussion of institutional multiplicity in a context where the 
presence of the state has remained elusive throughout the colonial and postcolonial eras. In 
addition, chapter 5 describes current water policy and regulatory frameworks in the context 
of Guinea-Bissau and the evolution of water infrastructure in Bafatá between 1974, the year 
Guinea-Bissau became independent, and 2006. The period after that will then be explored in 
the following chapters. Here, the neoliberal turn in national water policies, the dependency 
on foreign aid and the piecemeal development of water infrastructure in Bafatá are 
highlighted. Throughout this chapter, the research questions guiding this thesis are presented.  
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 examine water provision in Bafatá and illustrate the arguments developed 
in previous chapters. Chapter 6 argues that state weaknesses followed by the heavy presence of 
international actors do not simply equate to an absent or neoliberal state in the realm of water 
provision in Guinea-Bissau. It demonstrates how the state works in relational ways, through 
its relations and interactions with non-state organisations. In addition, this chapter shows that 
the state has shaped water provision in Bafatá in significant ways, through the autonomous 
decisions, practices and interactions of government officials.  
Nevertheless, Section 6.2. shows that understandings of the role of the state in water provision 
in Guinea-Bissau cannot be isolated from discourses of state weakness circulating at all levels 
and across all sectors, or the lack of financial and human resources available to the state. In 
the light of long-term state weakness, including its dependence on international donations to 
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finance the sector, this section also demonstrates that in Guinea-Bissau, seemingly neoliberal 
policies concerning the role of the state have acquired new meanings. Moreover, whilst 
neoliberal ideas are an important feature of national policies, they are not the ones producing 
the most visible effects.  
Section 6.3. then examines the relational ways in which the state has shaped the sector in a 
context where states institutions depend on international organisations and NGOs for 
financing interventions. It demonstrates that the state is not only dependent on non-state 
organisations for the implementation of national policies but that it also depends on these 
organisations’ willingness to at least symbolically acknowledge the role of state institutions as 
enablers, supervisors and regulators of the sector. Thus, on the one hand, the expansion of 
state presence in the sector is often hindered by the proliferation of non-state organisations. 
On the other hand, the state itself is constituted through the subtle and informal recognition 
conferred on it by these actors.  
Turning to the ways in which state institutions influenced water provision in Bafatá in recent 
years, section 6.4. shows how various state officials based in the city have been consistently 
involved in water provision in the city. Yet, these state actors have mostly operated in ways 
that exceed policy or regulatory guidelines. It is thus argued that although the state has been 
unable to enforce policy and regulatory guidelines, it has not been absent. In addition, the 
various motivations and agendas behind state practices allude to the multiple modalities of 
the state. Finally, section 6.5. explores the contradictions inherent to the concession contract 
signed between the state and the city’s water operator in 2012. It demonstrates that the legal 
and policy facets of the state do not regulate social life but can serve as devices that conform 
to international NGOs expectations. Overall, this chapter shows that by opening the 
analytical lenses to the multiple modalities and practices of state actors, we can contribute to 
understandings of the various ways in which states shape water provision. 
Chapter 7 examines water governance in Bafatá, focusing on the agency of the practices of a 
variety of actors and their role in re-inventing, appropriating, ignoring and contesting policy 
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models circulating in the city. It is thus argued that the current model adopted in Bafatá 
represents a Creole mode of governance. The term Creole expresses the processes of 
localisation and transformation of circulating models and ideas as well as the ways in which 
this model combines a range of practices, motivations and agendas. Section 7.2. explores the 
period between 2006 and 2010, before the launch of the first development intervention 
targeting directly the city’s piped water network. It shows that the evolution of water 
governance during these years must be understood in the context of the indirect and 
unintended outcomes of development interventions. It also demonstrates how various actors 
appropriated the presence and goals of development interventions, according to their 
motivations: to improve access to water, to access training and income opportunities, and to 
raise the profile of ASPAAB1 (a local organisation and water operator) as a development actor. 
In addition, this section traces the materialities of the system, the lack of resources, the unstable 
patterns of investments, and the ongoing engagements of ASPAAB in a broad range of 
activities and improvisations as the main factors shaping the operation of the network during 
this period. This was an assemblage that sought (and eventually succeeded) to extend 
possibilities within prescribed socio-political configurations.   
Section 7.3. explores the ways in which ASPAAB, with the support of state officials, re-invented, 
appropriated and contested models disseminated by international NGOs and, in this way, 
engendered a Creole mode of governance. First, it shows how the concession contract signed 
between ASPAAB and the Ministry of Natural Resources was appropriated and given new 
meanings that served the needs and motivations of local actors and transcended the original 
agendas. Second, it demonstrates how local actors contested models, ideas and knowledge 
promoted by international NGOS, ignoring the findings of a series of technical studies calling 
for a change in the water tariff. Lastly, it traces the multiple practices re-shaping the 
supposedly ‘strict rule of the meter’, and it examines these practices as a process of embedding 
of the water governance model in place in existing social relations and institutions. This 
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section also highlights the agency of the practices of subordinated actors. Thus, this chapter 
demonstrates that more nuanced views of critiques of neoliberalism and an attention to 
alternative factors, motivations and agendas can in fact contribute to understandings of water 
provision in small African cities.  
Chapter 8, the last empirical chapter, explores water provision in Bafatá from the perspective 
of everyday water practices. Section 8.2. investigates the variety of factors shaping the ways in 
which Bafatá’s residents navigate multiple water sources and technologies. It demonstrates 
that despite the emphasis given to access and control in political ecology perspectives and 
policy analyses, there are many other factors shaping water practices. In Bafatá, perceptions 
of quality of water as well as the convenience associated with other sources were revealed to 
be key factors in people’s decision to not rely on the piped water supply. The continued 
reliance on a multiplicity of sources is seen as a process of ‘splintering from below’ (Bakker, 
2010). Thus, it is argued that understandings of water supply in small cities should recognise 
the multiplicity of sources and alternatives at the heart of everyday water practices.  
Section 8.3. examines the transformations engendered by the introduction of meters on all 
standpipes and home connections in terms of a transition from ‘private-collective’ to 
‘collective-individualising’ modes of supply. Private-collective modes of supply prevailing in 
Bafatá demonstrate that particularistic solutions, such as wells or home connections, can 
become collective infrastructure though ingrained sharing practices. The use of water meters, 
on the other hand, has provoked an incipient transition, where collective-individualising 
modes of supply – entailing the individualisation of use of a collectively provided service – 
have come to co-exist with already existing modes of provision. Although narratives of 
commodification and marketization could be applied to explain this transition, this section 
demonstrates that there are alternative and more significant processes. These include an 
increase in water revenues and the substitution of sharing practices at the neighbourhood level 
with re-distribution at the central management level, which are both key in a city where 
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resources are so scarce.  Thus, this chapter illustrates how everyday water practices can 
complicate, complement and add nuances to current analyses of water infrastructure.  
Lastly, chapter 9 provides a conclusion of the main findings of this research, highlighting some 
of the advantages and limitations of the analytical framework adopted. It also explores some 
avenues for future research. In particular, it discusses how future research adopting more 
nuanced views of the state would be essential to generate better understandings of the role of 
states in service delivery and to inform policies that can improve access to water in cities. It 
also examines the ways in which research across a variety of cities would be required in order 
to develop finer understandings of the factors and drivers shaping the production and use of 
water in small cities across Africa, especially those dynamics escaping neoliberal analytical 
frameworks. In addition, this chapter highlights the need for further research focusing on 
everyday practices and acknowledging the multiplicity of sources and technologies used in 
delivering water in cities. This research would contribute to better understandings of how 
people manage and use these alternative sources, how these alternatives relate to centralised 
services, and therefore contribute to more accurate conceptualisations of water provision. 
Turning to the specific case of small secondary African cities, empirical research exploring a 
variety of case studies would be essential in devising ways to think about the variety of forces, 
processes and outcomes shaping water provision across these cities. This is a research agenda 
that can have great policy outcomes. Therefore, lastly, this chapter discusses some policy 
implications relating to the findings of this research. These include, for example: the need to 
reconsider the roles of the state and legality at the core of policy models; and, the need to 
acknowledge the multiplicity of sources used in cities and therefore follow investments in piped 
supply schemes with investments in public health campaigns and alternative sources.  
Urban infrastructure has been an important topic within the fields of urban studies and 
geography, driving, and contributing to, heated debates on various themes, including the 
configurations of power and forces shaping urban processes; the production and reproduction 
of inequalities and injustice; the challenges faced in moving towards the construction of more 
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just urban spaces equipped with adequate infrastructure; as well as the constitution, and 
disruptions, of everyday life. Whilst acknowledging the rich insights produced by this 
literature, this thesis argues that existing approaches still present important limitations. More 
specifically, it demonstrates how existing conceptualisations of water infrastructure require 
some critical scrutiny if they are to be useful for the analysis of water provision in small 
secondary African cities. Whilst comprising small populations when considered in isolation, 
together these cities house a large proportion of the population currently living on the 
continent. Recent studies also predict that population growth in the African continent will be 
concentrated in these smaller urban centres (Potts, 2009; UN, 2014; UNFPA, 2008). In 
addition to this, small cities in Africa present their own specific challenges related to water 
provision, given their subordinate positions in relation to national and international political 
and economic centres, the “chronic shortage of facilities” (Jaglin et al., 2011, p. 120) and a 
stark lack of resources . Attending to the diversity of secondary cities across the continent and 
their distinctive challenges, opens up a research agenda for understandings of water provision 
that can be enriched with research from multiple ‘elsewheres’. Thus the aim of this research 
is to use the perspective of a small secondary city in Africa to engage with current debates in 
urban studies and geography. This thesis therefore proposes an analytical framework for the 
analysis of water infrastructure in urban regions in Africa, and more generally.  
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– TWO –  
Theorising urban water infrastructure from secondary cities in 
Africa: Neoliberalism, Assemblages and Everyday Practices 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter establishes the broad theoretical content for the thesis. It argues that 
conventional political economy and political ecology approaches, which have dominated 
debates on urban infrastructure, present various limitations for understandings of water 
infrastructure in small secondary cities in poorer contexts. Notably, the pervasiveness of 
critiques of neoliberalism, discussed in this chapter, and the views of the state adopted in these 
analyses, discussed in more detail in chapter three. This chapter thus argues that analyses of 
water provision in small African cities call for both the adoption of more nuanced views of 
neoliberalism, and a post-neoliberal optic that seeks to situate and theorise alternative forces 
shaping the urban condition (Parnell and Robinson, 2012). It develops an analytical 
framework that combines the concepts of ‘variegated neoliberalism’ (Brenner et al., 2010) and 
assemblages with an attention to the everyday to propose an understanding of a ‘Creole’ mode 
of governance, characterised by the intermixing of influences.  
The evolution of mainstream water policies in recent decades exposes the ongoing emphasis 
upon market approaches and private sector participation in urban water supply, followed by 
the prominence of the role given to the state as enabler and regulator. Where neoliberal 
rationales are evident in policy analyses of water provision, these debates also engage with two 
crucial themes – state weakness and the financial constraints faced by many large and small 
cities – which are often ignored by political economy/ecology perspectives centred on 
critiques of neoliberalism. This is discussed in the next section, section 2.2..  
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Political economy and political ecology analyses of water provision in cities across the globe 
have responded to the evolution of water policies, and particularly the emphasis given to 
private sector participation, with detailed analyses of the (frequently negative) processes and 
outcomes constituting the neoliberalisation of water. The important insights developed by 
scholars adopting these approaches are discussed in section 2.3. In addition, this section 
discusses how conventional political economy/ ecology approaches have been criticised for 
the provincialism of some of their key assumptions. In particular, it focuses on critiques of 
conceptualisations of the ‘modern networked city’ as a generalised phase and of the splintering 
of infrastructure as an inevitable consequence of neoliberalisation. In this way, scholars 
investigating a range of cities in the global south have demonstrated the need for more situated 
analyses of urban infrastructure that take into consideration the different trajectories of cities, 
namely the diversity of processes and outcomes characterising neoliberalisation strategies. 
Whilst observing the important questions raised by postcolonial critiques of analyses of urban 
infrastructure, this section ends with a discussion of the extent to which critiques of 
neoliberalism have dominated analyses of water infrastructure. It is argued that the emphasis 
upon critiques of neoliberalism has hindered the consideration of the variety of forces and 
processes constituting water provision in small cities.  
After setting out in some detail the limitations of approaches centred on critiques of 
neoliberalism, this chapter then reviews current debates in urban studies calling for a 
postcolonial turn in the discipline and, more recently, debating the need for a post-neoliberal 
optics (Baptista, 2013a; Parnell and Robinson, 2012). Inspired by this literature, it discusses 
the notion of variegated neoliberalism as an adequate tool to make sense of the ways in which 
small cities are inserted in circulations of neoliberal policies. It is argued that the concept of 
variegated neoliberalism establishes the possibility to analyse how neoliberal policies and ideas 
are transformed and adapted, or hybridised, as they are appropriated and situated in specific 
contexts (Peck et al., 2009). 
 34 
Nevertheless, this chapter also argues that the concept of variegated neoliberalisms does not 
adequately capture the multiplicity of processes shaping water infrastructure in secondary 
African cities. First, this theoretical construct does not account for the transformation of global 
policies and models in such a way that their neoliberal ethos might be, at least partially, 
replaced by new meanings, rationalities and motivations. In other words, it does not provide 
us with the conceptual tools necessary to make sense of the processes through which neoliberal 
policies might become instantiated as ‘something else’, something other than ‘neoliberalism’. 
Second, a neoliberal framework does not offer insights into the range of forces and social 
relations shaping water supply in many cities, including small secondary African cities. 
Although critiques of neoliberalism have largely dominated debates and shaped scholarly 
imagination, their analytical purchase in numerous cities across the global south cannot be 
assumed and should rather be turned into an object for empirical inquiry. In other words, in 
the context of many secondary cities in Africa the predominance of capitalist relations, or the 
specific form of capitalism called neoliberalism, in shaping urban processes should not be 
taken for granted but needs to be investigated and considered alongside other forces shaping 
the urban condition. Urgently, these other forces need critical analytical attention.  
Thus, to find new registers of analysis and produce distinctive analytical devices that can 
account for the experience of secondary African cities (Lawhon et al., 2014), this chapter 
examines the notion of assemblages combined with an attention to the everyday. Section 2.4. 
discusses how this concept has been used by scholars as both an analytical and methodological 
tool to expose the variety of motivations, rationalities and logics shaping urban processes 
(McFarlane, 2011b, 2011c; McGuirk and Dowling, 2009; Rankin, 2011). In particular, it 
explores how this notion has been used by African urbanists to make sense of those processes 
that seem to escape existing analytical registers (Parnell and Pieterse, 2014; Pieterse, 2008; 
Simone, 2011, 2004a, 2004b).   
Recently, scholars have started turning to investigations of everyday practices and 
micropolitics in their analyses of urban infrastructure (Anand, 2011b; Birkenholtz, 2010; 
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Desai et al., 2015; McFarlane et al., 2014; Truelove, 2011). Section 2.5. discusses the 
contributions of this body of work, namely the ways these analyses have complicated 
understandings of the social relations reproducing water inequalities. These investigations 
have also enabled the consideration of a range of factors and practices previously neglected in 
analyses of water supply, and highlighted the multiple and contradictory ways in which 
residents experience the state.  
Lastly, I discuss the analytical framework adopted in this thesis, which combines the concepts 
of variegated neoliberalism and assemblages with an attention to the everyday to propose an 
understanding of a ‘Creole’ mode of governance. The term ‘Creole’ is adopted to illustrate 
the evolving product emerging through the intermixing of a variety of influences. Here, I 
argue that the notion of assemblages associated with an attention to the everyday constitutes 
an appropriate methodological and analytical tool to make sense of the multiple processes and 
dynamics characterising, and shaping, water infrastructure in small Africa cities and which 
escape existing analytical devices. Adopting an assemblage approach to the study of water 
infrastructure, accompanied by investigations of everyday practices, allows for consideration 
of a range of sites, forces and practices, which have been neglected using a neoliberal analytical 
framework. In addition, this approach captures the specific modes of governance that result 
from the ensemble and intertwining of diverse agendas, actors, practices and institutions 
around water infrastructure, and that come to constitute multiple motivations, discourses and 
rationalities.  
2.2. Water policies, private sector participation and the state 
Debates relating to private sector participation have dominated policy discussions on urban 
water supply, and current water policies reflect previous experiences and failures associated 
with private sector participation in water supply in various cities across the globe (Pierce, 
2015). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, during the first wave of privatizations, cities of the 
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global South witnessed successive attempts to increase private sector participation in the water 
sector. According to its proponents, including influential organisations such as the World 
Bank, and in line with neoliberal policies circulating at the time, private sector participation 
would solve inefficiencies inherent to state management, and open the possibility for new 
private finance streams that would then be used in the expansion of services to new areas and 
groups, most prominently the poor (Brookshire and Whittington, 1993; Clarke et al., 2002; 
Franceys, 1994; Winpenny, 1987). In addition, the adoption of market logics would facilitate 
the allocation of a scarce resource avoiding the excesses attributed to previous management 
models. Yet, by the early 2000s, it had become evident, not only to those critical of 
privatisation2 and commercialisation3 initiatives but also to their advocates, that efforts 
towards the increase of private sector participation in the water sector during the previous 
decades had not produced the predicted outcomes. A World Bank report states, “during the 
1990s, the Bank group became more reluctant to lend to government for infrastructure, and 
more willing to support private investment. But getting private participation in infrastructure 
(PPPI) to work well has also proven technically difficult – and politically contentious” (Irwin 
et al., 2005, p. 3). 
For proponents of privatisation, the limitations of the first endeavours to stimulate private 
sector participation in urban water supply were particularly evident in: the documented 
inability to significantly expand coverage to low-income areas; the reduced amounts of private 
investment mobilised to lower-income countries; the rife popular protests; and, the declining 
interest of private companies to invest in these locations (Berthelemy et al., 2004; Irwin et al., 
2005; Izaguirre and Hunt, 2005). In sum, as stated in a report published by the World Bank, 
“The experimentation of the last 15 years introduced various forms of private participation in 
                                                      
2 Privatisation is conventionally used to refer to a number of different processes comprising different degrees of private sector 
participation. For an insightful discussion on the different processes included under the label privatisation see Bakker (2003a).  In 
this text, privatisation will be used in its broad sense referring to the transfer of all or part of the responsibility for the management 
of public services to private actors, thus, moving away from “the assumption, more normative than factual, that the state has a 
primary duty to provide their citizens with sufficient public options to access the above [welfare and primary-good-supporting 
services] services” (Cordelli, 2012). Private actors include for-profit companies but also private non-profit associations, such as 
NGOs, community organisations, and also small ‘informal’ providers.  
3 In this text, the term commercialisation refers to the adoption of market principles and logics (e.g. Full cost recovery) in water 
supply management both by public and private actors. The key point about commercialisation in this sense is that it does not 
require privatisation. You can have the practice of the private sector, but the ownership models of the public sector.  
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water and sewerage, but the frequent (not inevitable) result was popular protests, dissatisfied 
governments and unhappy investors” (Irwin et al., 2005, p. 22). These limitations relating to 
past experiences with privatisation coincided with the beginning of a second era in the 
privatisation of water supply,  which Pierce (2015) has called the ‘strategic retreat’. In effect, 
after reaching a peak in 1997, private sector investment in the sector started declining. This 
was partially explained by the failures of numerous contracts, involving the withdrawal of 
transnational water companies and the cancellation of contracts by national governments 
(Hall, 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Kjellén, 2006; Pierce, 2015). For instance, after its dramatic 
withdrawal from Argentina, Suez – which, according to Goldman (2005), at a certain point 
together with Vivendi controlled an estimated 70% of the world’s water market – stated that 
it would withdraw from most activities in developing countries where risks were considered to 
be too high (Hall and Lobina, 2004). Simultaneously, private companies in general claimed 
that subsidies would be required if they were to operate in lower income countries (Budds and 
McGranahan, 2003).  
At the same time, the realisation of the limitations of past initiatives for private sector 
participation in the water sector in the early 2000s caused the reopening of debates concerning 
the role of the public and private sectors in water supply, prompting policy shifts. Whilst not 
renouncing privatisation, this new set of policies overtly accepted the vital and, in all 
likelihood, continuing role of the public sector (Berthelemy et al., 2004; Irwin et al., 2005). 
This renewed interest in the public sector was supported by at least four main assumptions, 
which demonstrate how certain forms of state activity can be reconciled with neoliberal ideals 
in particular contexts. These included: first, the implausibility of private sector participation 
materialising in lower-income countries in the short- and medium-terms; second, and related 
to the first, the prospect of water systems remaining “substantially in public hands” (Irwin et 
al., 2005, p. ii); third, the accepted need for public subsidies in order to enable the expansion 
of water to poorer, and formerly excluded, areas and to maintain tariffs at affordable levels 
for those on lower incomes; and, lastly, the need to create supportive environments  - 
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adequate, efficient and legible legal and juridical systems – where the private sector could 
operate (see, Irwin et al., 2005). Related to this, a report published by the OECD in 2004 also 
claimed that “a credible regulatory framework, backed by a strong political commitment, is 
also crucial to improving access in the power and water sectors. In the absence of proper 
regulation, profit-maximising behaviour has led privatised companies to keep investments 
below the necessary levels, with the result that rural communities and the urban poor were 
further marginalised” (Berthelemy et al., 2004, p. 105). 
In line with the above, following the failures of the first wave of privatisations in many 
countries and cities, measures were adopted to promote the efficiency and financial 
sustainability of public-run water supply systems, a process often described as the 
‘corporatisation of public services’ (Boag and McDonald, 2010). On the one hand, several 
case studies have demonstrated that processes of corporatisation and internal reforms can 
result in more effective water services (Biswas and Tortajada, 2010; Boag and McDonald, 
2010; Mugisha and Berg, 2007). On the other hand, such measures typically signalled the 
consistent deployment of market approaches to service provision and are depicted, by both 
sides of the privatisation debate, as preparing the field for future privatisations (Berthelemy et 
al., 2004; Boag and McDonald, 2010; Irwin et al., 2005). 
Where some scholars, such as Bakker (2013) and Bayliss (2014), perceive recent changes in 
the strategies of privatisation of urban water supply as mere extensions of earlier phases, Pierce 
(2015, pp. 119–120) argues that there have been “substantive changes in the strategy’s 
trajectory (…) in terms of its geography, its governance forms, and its constituent 
stakeholders”. Hereby, he argues that we are currently in a new era of privatisation that he 
titles ‘shallow expansion’.  In this new era, “many cities and firms have moved from a position 
of strategic retreat to one of shallow expansion by incorporating different governance 
arrangements and actors” (Pierce, 2015, p. 124). On the one hand, strategies similar to those 
adopted in previous waves of privatisation can still be found in certain locations. For example, 
this was the case in Greece and Portugal where the recent privatisation of water utilities was 
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imposed by the EU as part of broader austerity measures imposed in these countries (Pierce, 
2015). On the other hand, there are also new trends emerging. These include the rise of 
negotiations taking place at the city level without involving national governments and, most 
importantly, the increasing role of domestic and small-scale companies in privatization 
initiatives. In this way, a growing number of public-private partnerships entailing small-scale 
providers and emerging in cities across the globe, including small cities, are also included in 
broader understandings of privatisation trends in water provision (Anderson and Janssens, 
2011; Pierce, 2015).  
Nevertheless, despite the attention given to private sector participation by researchers focusing 
on urban water supply, most cities and towns have remained sheltered from such endeavours. 
This was particularly the case during the first waves of privatisation, since international 
companies have centred their activities on a restricted number of cities. For instance, in Africa, 
private corporations have tended to concentrate their efforts on large cities with populations 
above 1 million inhabitants and with significant higher-income populations (Budds and 
McGranahan, 2003). Simultaneously, in many of the cities neglected by the private sector, 
the corporatisation of public services has also not been an option, since state institutions have 
not been involved in the direct provision of water.  
In effect, from the start of the privatisation agenda, and even before multinationals started 
withdrawing from cities across the global south, it was recognised that it would be hard to 
mobilise private sector participation (by international companies) in smaller cities, towns and 
rural areas with very low-income populations. The same way the unattractiveness of lower-
income and smaller cities was recognised so was the inability of the public sector to meet 
demands for water services in these locations (Irwin et al., 2005). Consequently, in these areas, 
international organisations, such as the World Bank and the United Nations, have centred 
their programmes around the promotion of community-based management models and, 
more recently, public-private partnerships entailing small-scale private providers. Underlying 
these initiatives are still the devolution of responsibilities for service delivery to non-state 
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organisations, even if these are different kinds of organisations, alongside the consolidation of 
state capacities to regulate and enable these organisations. This is apparent in the multiplicity 
of decentralisation initiatives, aiming to strengthen local government institutions (see: Jaglin 
et al., 2011; UN Millennium Project 2005, 2005; UN WATER, 2015; World Bank, 2004).  
Recently, there has been a move away from community-based models in favour of small-scale 
private providers (Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Hoang Gia and Fugelsnes, 2010; Jaglin et al., 
2011). This has followed the failures of previous experiences with community management, 
namely in terms of expectations related to the accountability of these models and, most 
importantly, their efficiency and effectiveness. For example, in a review of piped water 
schemes in small towns across different countries in West and Central Africa, Hoang Gia and 
Fugelsnes (2010) claim that failures in performance by community-based organisations have 
led these countries to concentrate on public-private partnerships, including small private 
companies, still accompanied by attempts to improve state’s regulation and support. In 
addition, this turn to the role of small private actors in water provision is also apparent in the 
increasing attention given to informal small-scale private providers, which constitute 
important solutions for water provision in many cities, and in subsequent attempts to 
formalise, and regulate these (Ahlers et al., 2013). Again, these initiatives focus on the benefits 
of private management when associated with an effective regulatory role for the state and, as 
argued by Pierce (2015), they have become an important feature of the more recent wave of 
privatisation. In this way, private sector participation, even if involving a different set of actors, 
can be seen to be expanding to smaller cities and towns. Simultaneously, these processes of 
devolution of service provision in small cities to non-state organisations can also be linked to 
broader initiatives seeking to free both national states and private actors from these loss-
making liabilities and allowing them to focus on larger (more profitable and politically 
significant) cities. 
Neoliberal rationales have undeniably been at the core of international water policies 
advocating the benefits of market approaches and of private sector participation in water 
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provision. The next section, focusing on critiques of the neoliberalisation of water, makes 
explicit the links between mainstream policies in the water sector and the neoliberal project, 
questions assumptions at the core of neoliberal project and highlights the manifold negative 
social, political and economic impacts of such policies. Nevertheless, policy analyses do focus 
on some important issues that are largely neglected by political economy/ecology approaches. 
This is apparent in the attention given to the role of the state, and the related emphasis upon 
the impacts of state weaknesses on water provision. Paradoxically, while arguments related to 
state failures have frequently been used to justify the privatisation of service provision, these 
discussions have also developed some important arguments concerning state weaknesses and 
the impacts of this on water supply. In fact, as will be demonstrated for the case of Bafatá, the 
weakness of state institutions, revealed in the lack of resources but also in their limited 
technical knowledge or administrative capacity, fundamentally affect the ability of state 
institutions in the sector. Notably, although critiques of neoliberal water policies often argue 
for public water services, they routinely fail to account for the technical, administrative, and 
resource limitations of many states, which complicate their involvement in water provision. 
The same could be said about the attention given to the scarcity of resources witnessed by 
many cities across the world, with vital impacts on infrastructure, and which is rarely discussed 
in critiques of neoliberalism.  
However, as chapter 3 will explore, the state being imagined in international policies is a 
rational, bureaucratic state, backed by adequate legal frameworks and effective juridical 
systems, which shows little relation to the historical and situated trajectories of different states.   
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2.3. Political economy and political ecology explorations of  
water infrastructure 
“The conclusion of this experience has to be that clean water and adequate sanitation to the 
poor cannot be provided on market terms, but does require a public or socialised response, such 
as, for example, systematic and structural support or targeted subsidies, greater solidarity and 
a political insistence of socio-ecological equality.” (Swyngedouw, 2013, p. 830) 
Transcending society-nature binaries, urban water supply and the neoliberalisation of nature 
Scholars adopting political ecology perspectives, and seeking to transcend modernist society-
nature binaries, have eloquently conceived urbanisation as a set of socio-ecological processes 
guided by unequal social relations. In this way, this body of work has fundamentally shaped 
the ways in which we think about nature, water and urban space. For instance, seeing 
urbanisation as a process of socio-ecological transformation has led scholars adopting political 
ecological approaches to extend their investigations of urbanisation processes to those regions 
beyond the limits of urban regions and which are profoundly transformed as a consequence 
of processes of urbanisation (Swyngedouw and Kaika, 2014). For example, researchers have 
explored the impacts of infrastructures, such as dams, reservoirs and aqueducts, routinely built 
many kilometres away from cities with the sole aim of providing water to urban dwellers. 
Often, these projects have considerable impacts in these far away regions that have to be 
understood in light of processes of urbanisation and unequal social relations. Thus, this 
perspective highlights the necessary connections between different locations through the flows 
of water and uneven social relations, it calls for researchers to think the relations between cities 
and elsewhere.  
In Bafatá, like in many other cities across the globe, people use various sources and 
technologies, including artisanal sources such as wells, in order to meet their water needs. 
Nevertheless, urban growth will inevitably impact on the availability of artisanal modes of 
 43 
water provision. This can happen through the contamination of ground and surface water, 
the extension of property rights that preclude users from accessing water in previously open 
sources, and the expansion of legal frameworks aiming to regulate water resources for 
environmental, social and political reasons. What this means is that urban growth drives the 
need for piped supply schemes, and therefore processes of exclusion are not restricted to a lack 
of access to a piped supply but also to a lack of access to previously available alternative 
sources. In these circumstances, the decline of alternative sources alongside the lack of access 
to a piped supply symbolises the ways in which some urban dwellers are suffering the 
consequences of urbanisation, whilst not sharing its benefits. As suggested by Bakker (2010, 
2003b), processes of urbanisation drive the need for a piped supply scheme and therefore 
engender shifts from artisanal to industrial modes of production of water. This transition is 
necessarily accompanied by significant transformations in the social, political and cultural 
configurations of power shaping water supply and use. These configurations are essential to 
understand who benefits from processes of urbanisation.  
As argued by Swyngedouw and Kaika (2014, pp. 462–3), adopting an urban political ecology 
perspective, they are “not so much concerned with the question of nature IN the city, but 
rather with the urbanization OF nature, i.e. the process through which all types of nature are 
socially mobilized, economically incorporated (commodified), and physically metabolized/ 
transformed in order to support the urbanization process.” Such perspectives highlight the 
fact that hydraulic infrastructures constitute “socio-physical constructions that are actively and 
historically produced” (Swyngedouw, 2009, p. 56). Thus, researchers have sought to tease out 
what they claim to be the, frequently hidden, “human labour and social power relations 
involved in the process” (Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000, p. 123) of the production of water 
infrastructures and the multiple ways in which infrastructure reproduces economic, social and 
cultural inequalities in capitalist regimes. In this way, a range of investigations have been 
produced of the political, economic, social, cultural and environmental configurations of 
power framing discourses, materialities and the production of infrastructure (see Gandy, 2005, 
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2003; Heynen, 2013; Heynen et al., 2006; Kaika, 2005; Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000; 
Swyngedouw, 2006, 2004, 1999; Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Swyngedouw and Kaika, 2014). 
Seeking to scrutinise the links between capital accumulation, the interests of the dominant 
classes and urban infrastructure, and focusing on the current era, political economy and 
political ecology perspectives frequently situate their analyses in processes of neoliberal 
restructuring and the concomitant privatisation of water. In this vein, Swyngedouw (2013, p. 
828) argues that “[the global water problem] is primarily the result of the fusion of the 
dynamics of water with the power of money in highly uneven ways”. Borrowing David 
Harvey’s (2005) terms, he depicts water privatisation as a form of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ driven by capitalist relations in a neoliberal era, which is inciting the enclosure 
of the commons (Swyngedouw, 2013, 2009, 2005, 2004) but also the private appropriation of 
public goods generated and paid for by states (Bakker, 2013). In these circumstances, scholars 
scrutinise how the immersion of water infrastructure in tactics of capital accumulation and its 
increasing financialisation is shaping access to water in cities around the globe. More broadly, 
these authors scrutinise evolutions in water infrastructure in light of broader processes 
entailing the neoliberalisation of nature, which depict the neoliberal attempt to find solutions 
to environmental, efficiency and equity problems by resourcing to market mechanisms 
(Castree, 2008a, 2008b, 1995).  
Related to the above, critical geographers and urban researchers adopting political economy 
and political ecology approaches have responded to the successive waves of privatisation and 
marketization of urban water supply with a rich body of work, mostly critical of these trends, 
producing “a flurry of scholarship on the privatization of water over the last decade” (Anand, 
2011a, p. 426). Indeed, engaging in geographically and historically contextualised empirical 
research, scholars have produced an extensive literature, which excavates the multiple 
environmental, social, economic, political and cultural impacts of neoliberal reforms in the 
water sector in various cities across the globe (see, for example: Ahlers, 2010; Bakker, 2013, 
2010, 2007, 2003b, Bayliss, 2014, 2003, 2001; Bayliss and McKinley, 2007; Birkenholtz, 
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2010; Bond, 2004; Budds and McGranahan, 2003; Castro, 2008; Hall et al., 2005; Hall and 
Lobina, 2004; Haughton, 2002; Loftus and McDonald, 2001; Smith, 2004; Swyngedouw, 
2005, 2004).  
Bakker (2003b),  Birkenholtz (2010), Jaglin (2002) and Smith (2004), among others, have 
demonstrated that private sector participation and the adoption of market mechanisms in 
urban water supply have typically resulted in the consistent exclusion of the poor from 
mainstream services, and also led to the prevalence and expansion of 2-tier services in many 
cities. What this means it that private sector participation alongside state disinvestment in 
water infrastructure has created double standards in water provision, which reflect users’ 
differential economic and political powers to both finance, under cost-recovery principles, and 
demand water infrastructure. Thus, where advocates of private sector participation focus on 
the mobilisation of private sector investments to finance the expansion of water services to the 
poor and the benefits of market rules in the allocation of scarce resources (Franceys, 2008; 
Whittington, 2003), critics highlight that the main outcomes of such policies have been 
inequality and the consistent exclusion from service provision of the poorest groups in society.  
Proponents of privatisation have often justified the withdrawal of public investments in water 
infrastructure by claiming they amounted to a form of subsidy to the middle-classes and elite 
groups, who tended to be the only ones served by this infrastructure (Franceys, 2008; 
Whittington, 2003). However, opponents of privatisation have rightly noted that privileged 
groups in society have continued to benefit from infrastructure that was already paid for by 
the public sector, whilst poorer groups are being asked to pay the full-price. In addition, they 
argue, state disinvestment will only exacerbate inequalities and necessarily fail to improve 
access for the poor, since, on the one hand, the private sector will not invest where it won’t 
make profits (unless subsidised by the state). On the other hand, where wealthier sections of 
society can withdraw from public infrastructure and devise their own solutions, the poorer 
groups will just be left with inadequate provision (Bakker, 2010; Jaglin, 2002).  
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Hall and Lobina (2004) and Swyngedouw (2005) have also challenged those advocating the 
market’s ability to regulate the allocation of resources and therefore reduce environmental 
excesses. These scholars revealed the ways in which the private sector’s demand for growth 
and short-term profits regularly results in the adoption of strategies which promote increases 
in production and consumption, with obvious negative environmental impacts. Yet another 
concern of various scholars has been the imbalance in bargaining interests between private 
and public actors underpinning many contracts, which frequently hinder states’ ability to 
impose their demands (Bayliss, 2001; Birkenholtz, 2010; Smith and Ruiters, 2006).   
Academic researchers have also explored the impacts of privatisation and marketization 
trends on state citizen relations. Stating the increasing role of multinational companies in 
water provision, Swyngedouw (2005) describes the major shifts in the choreographies of social 
and political power associated with privatisation, involving the increase of private power and 
the concomitant reduction in the ability of citizens to shape water infrastructure. He argues 
that private sector participation has brought the increasing integration of water in global 
financial circuits and therefore tied water provision to investment and financial risks. In other 
words, decisions to invest in water networks, for example to expand coverage, have come to 
be influenced and dictated by fluctuations in global markets or the profit seeking strategies of 
private companies rather than by the needs and demands of urban dwellers.   
Still related to changes in state citizen relations in the context of private sector participation 
in water supply, there are a large number of studies by geographers and urban researchers 
examining the politics of infrastructure in South African cities, where processes of 
neoliberalisation were perceived to be at the core of recent transformations. In one of the few 
academic investigations of water in secondary cities in Africa, Smith and Ruiters (2006) 
explore the evolving power relations between the state, service providers and users in two 
South African cities, where public-private partnerships have been designed for water delivery. 
They argue that in these urban settlements the devolving of responsibilities to private, and 
therefore apolitical and external, actors have coincided with attempts to de-politicise the 
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delivery of services. Crucially, Smith and Ruiters (2006) also establish that being locked in 
political controversies in situations where the state has lost capacity in favour of private actors 
significantly contributes to the decomposing of state institutions’ governance capacities, with 
repercussions on service delivery to the poor. However, these scholars demonstrate that efforts 
to de-politicise water provision have been undermined by political contestation and popular 
resistance, most often enacted through the inability and refusal to pay for water. Particularly 
relevant for this research is the ways in which these scholars perceive everyday water practices 
as forms of resistance that can undermine stated policies and goals, and therefore allow for 
(some) agency in everyday practices.  
Also working on South African cities, Loftus and Lumsden (2008) and von Schnitzler (2008) 
examine how the introduction of water schemes in two townships reconfigured relationships 
with the state by forging links between previously marginalised spaces and local and national 
state institutions. In particular, they explore how these schemes became instrumental in the 
attempts of the post-apartheid South African state to establish a neoliberal consensus. For 
example, von Schnitzler deploys a governmentality approach to neoliberalism to explore the 
introduction of pre-paid meters which she describes as an attempt to produce calculative 
rationalities, providing citizens with “the ability to calculate and engage with cost/benefit 
analysis” (Von Schnitzler, 2008, p. 354). Hereby, she explains how the introduction of meters 
engendered reconfigurations of notions and practices of citizenship and how these devices 
became the terrain in which tensions relating to shifts from citizens, entitled to water, to 
customers, buying their water, were played out. The use of pre-paid meters served to de-
politicise this transition. 
Whilst a popular topic within the development literature, there are fewer case studies 
exploring community-based management, and other smaller-scale arrangements such as 
small-scale private providers, among urban researchers and critical geographers. Typically, 
they are loosely mentioned in reference to the cherry-picking strategies of transnational 
companies, the production of 2-tier systems or the exclusion of the poor from centrally 
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managed networks, but there are few in depth investigations of these arrangements. Yet, 
community-based management and public-private partnership involving small-scale 
providers are not only being promoted in rural areas but also in many smaller cities or even 
parts of larger cities and peri-urban areas. 
Nevertheless, researchers adopting political economy approaches and exploring community-
based water management in a diversity of rural and urban contexts have also noted the ways 
in which these solutions follow market approaches to service provision and neoliberal policies. 
For example, several studies have examined the coupling of community management with 
cost-recovery principles, the expansion of commercial water services to new territories and 
the commodification of water  (see: Cleaver, 2000; Cleaver and Toner, 2006; Corbridge et 
al., 2005; Jaglin, 2002; Mosse, 1997; Page, 2005b, 2003; Harris, 2009). For instance, Jaglin 
(2002), in her very nuanced analysis, traces the increasing use of community-management 
approaches in urban areas tin light of efforts to finance secondary networks. In this way, they 
are seen as a form of contracting out and externalising infrastructural and management costs 
to users. These models are also a way to bring distinct areas into the dominant water 
management system and progressively expand commercial water services. Ahlers (2010), 
Cleaver (2000) and Mosse (1997) have also established that community management systems 
adopting cost-recovery principles can not only be critical in the creation of water markets but 
also in the replacement of traditional norms and customs guiding the distribution of water. 
Yet another important critique of community-based management models has been their 
reliance on romanticised conceptions of community, which overlook local wealth and power 
inequalities that are then reproduced (Bakker, 2008; Cleaver and Toner, 2006). 
Thus, political economy and political ecology investigations of water infrastructure have 
produced a broad range of analysis that have contributed to our understandings of the impacts 
of neoliberal reforms in water provision, namely highlighting the impacts of private sector 
participation and the concomitant commodification and marketization of water. In this way, 
they have provided an alternative view from that being promoted by policy analyses. 
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However, as mentioned earlier, conventional political economy and political ecology 
perspectives present some limitations for the study of water infrastructure in secondary African 
cities.  The next section explores a body of work drawing on postcolonial urban studies and 
comparative urbanism debates to point to some of these limitations and call for more nuanced 
and situated approaches to the study of infrastructure in cities of the south. 
2.3.1. Postcolonial perspectives and urban infrastructure 
Swyngedouw (2005, 2004), one of the key voices in political ecology, states that “most 
international studies demonstrate that the organisation of urban water supply systems can be 
broadly divided in four stages” (Swyngedouw, 2005, p. 84). Each stage encompasses time-
specific cultural, social, political and economic understandings of water and urbanisation with 
repercussions extending from the domestic realm – notions of hygiene and cleanliness – to the 
role of the state in the water sector. Very briefly these stages are: (1) the period up to 1850s 
dominated by for-profit private operators providing water to restricted groups in cities; (2) the 
phase of ‘municipal socialism’ during which universal coverage took precedence over profit 
and the state took over the role of direct provider in Europe; (3) the period entailing the 
‘nationalisation’ of water associated with Keynesian modes of production; (4) the current age 
marked by the successive waves of privatisation and commercialisation of water associated 
with the transition to post-Fordist or flexible modes of production. 
This is not to say that Swyngedouw does not recognise that this periodization is situated in the 
global north, in fact he carried out extensive research in Guayaquil, Ecuador. For instance, 
referring to the period connoted with ‘municipal socialism’,  he writes, “large cities in the 
developing world developed their water systems at a rate that was comparable with and 
occasionally even faster than those for comparably sized cities in the developed world” 
(Swyngedouw, 2004, p. 39) as “countries and cities in the developing world began to emulate 
this model” (Swyngedouw, 2005, p. 84). Or, turning to the current period, marked by waves 
of privatisation and commercialisation of water supply, he argues that this shift was 
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particularly felt in the developing world through structural adjustment programs, which 
forced governments to dismantle states and engage in privatisations (Swyngedouw, 2005, 
2004). On the one hand, in line with political ecology perspectives, this analysis accurately 
demonstrates how water infrastructures and institutions are profoundly connected to political, 
economic, social and cultural shifts at the local, national and global levels. On the other hand, 
this narrative generates questions concerning the ways in which cities in the South, 
particularly secondary cities in Africa, are situated in this account. Notably, the storyline is 
based on the evolution of a small group of Western countries, whose experiences are referred 
to in order to define the four stages. The rest of the world is simply positioned in relation to 
this main narrative.  Can the experiences of ‘the rest of the world’ transcend these 
explanations? The answer to the latter question is obviously ‘yes’. And, scholars adopting 
postcolonial approaches to the study of urban infrastructure in cities of the south have pointed 
out, precisely, the ways in which key theoretical constructs conventionally used in analyses of 
infrastructure are rooted in the North.   
A rapidly growing body of work on postcolonial urban studies and comparative urbanism has 
dissected the roots of urban theory, emanating from a small core group of cities in the global 
north and denounced its ‘parochialism’. Relatedly, scholars have critiqued prevalent analyses 
of cities of the global south for adopting developmentalist approaches focusing on what these 
cities lack rather than what they are; for the hierarchical categorisation of cities according to 
their perceived development stages; and, for their assumption of path-dependent, determinist 
visions of change. Instead, these scholars call for a more international urban field, which takes 
all cities as sites of theory making and accounts for the multiple material and analytical 
linkages between cities (Enwezor et al., 2002; McFarlane, 2010; McFarlane and Robinson, 
2012; Parnell and Oldfield, 2014; Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Pieterse, 2008; Robinson, 
2016, 2011, 2006; Roy, 2005; Watson, 2009).  
Drawing on this thrust of literature, Bakker (2010), Kooy and Bakker (2008a, 2008b), Zérah 
(2008) and McFarlane (2008a, 2008b) have unveiled some ways in which various theoretical 
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constructs deployed in theorisations of urban infrastructure are essentially rooted in the North 
and therefore not representative, or adequate tools for the investigation, of the diversity of 
cities. Crucially, Kooy and Bakker (2008a, 2008b) and Bakker (2010) claim that investigations 
of urban infrastructure continue to “assume the prevalence of the ‘modern networked city’ as 
a generic phase or stage of urban development” (Bakker, 2010, p. 24). In this way, these 
analyses continue to neglect the mismatch between the primacy of a public-private dualism in 
most of the water literature and the “dizzying array of non-conventional and often officially 
unrecognised means such as informal operators, privately operated wells, gifts from 
neighbours, rainwater harvesting and clandestine connections” (Allen et al., 2006, p. 334), 
which compose water infrastructure in most cities and seem to rarely fit neatly within either 
the public or private categories (Allen et al., 2006; Anand, 2011b; Bakker, 2010, 2003b; Budds 
and McGranahan, 2003). This weak postulation of the universality of the ‘modern networked 
city’ can also explain why opponents, just like enthusiasts, of privatisation have consistently 
focused their attention on the reasons behind the failure of this supposedly universal, 
standardised networks, even if they were never a reality in many cities across the world. In 
addition, it is often presumed that infrastructure in urban areas has become ‘hidden’ (Gandy, 
2004; Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000). However, this is evidently not the case in Bombay 
(McFarlane, 2008a), Kinshasa, Maputo or Bafatá, where infrastructures constitute vital parts 
of national and urban politics and the production of water is an essential and very visible 
component of everyday lives. In line with postcolonial debates, such assumptions concerning 
the ‘modern networked city’ and the disappearance of urban infrastructures from visual sight 
can be seen as over-generalisations originating from a small core group of Western Cities. 
Furthermore, they can be associated with developmentalist approaches focusing on what cities 
lack in relation to a supposed ideal. Crucially, these assumptions have curtailed analyses of 
ongoing processes and dynamics concerning the multiple ways in which people access water.  
McFarlane (2008a), Zérah (2008), Kooy and Bakker (2008a, 2008b)  and Gandy (2006) further 
elaborate on the impacts of the prevalence of a ‘modern networked city’ ideal in analyses of 
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urban infrastructure, by questioning the relevance of the splintering urbanism thesis in a 
variety of cities (Graham and Marvin, 2001). This thesis sets the fragmentation – splintering 
– of urban infrastructure as the key outcome of neoliberal reforms. Related to this, they 
investigate urban infrastructures in Mumbai (McFarlane, 2008a; Zerah, 2008), Jakarta (Kooy 
and Bakker, 2008a, 2008b) and Lagos (Gandy, 2006) and demonstrate that the fragmentation 
of urban infrastructure in these cities is not a recent phenomenon and cannot, should not, be 
easily associated with neoliberalism. Instead, it should be seen as an enduring characteristic 
of infrastructure throughout the colonial and post-colonial eras resulting from governing 
regimes that have systematically favoured particular groups within these urban regions. For 
example, Kooy and Bakker (2008a)demonstrate that neoliberalisation has not engendered a 
greater degree of splintering of infrastructure in Jakarta. Instead, they trace the continuous 
differentiation characterising water infrastructure in this city to the successive ‘rationalities of 
rule’, which have reproduced the socio-spatial fragmentation of different urban populations.  
Whilst challenging the modern network city and the splintering urbanism thesis, these analyses 
focusing on urban infrastructure in cities of the south raise two key questions. The first one, 
which will be further explored in subsequent sections, is the need to investigate the wide range 
of forces and processes shaping water provision in cities of the south, which are not necessarily 
tied to neoliberal reforms. But also, the need to extend analysis from the discourse to the 
everyday level. For example, Kooy and Bakker explore the ‘rationalities of rule’ but the 
evolution of urban water supply can also be related to processes of state formation, 
decentralisations and democratisation (Baptista, 2013a; Jaglin et al., 2011; Parnell and 
Robinson, 2012). In McFarlane’s words, “The historical view from many cities in the South 
indicates that casting a more international lens on infrastructures demands different narratives 
of distribution and fragmentation” (2008a, p. 417). The second question, which will be 
explored below, concerns the identified need to transcend associations between 
neoliberalisation and the fragmentation of urban infrastructure and, therefore, more broadly, 
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to unveil the specificities of the processes and impacts of neoliberal restructuring in the 
reshaping of urban infrastructure in a diversity of urban regions.  
For instance, shifts in the role of states in service delivery in the context of neoliberal 
restructuring have been conventionally framed as de-regulation – i.e. withdrawal of the state 
in favour of the private or community sectors –, re-regulation – i.e. the role of the state changes 
from that of provider to that of regulator and enabler of the private sector –, or a combination 
of both (Swyngedouw, 2005, 2004). However, multiple case studies in distinct cities of the 
global south have demonstrated that this is not necessarily the case. Bakker (2003b) examines 
instances of privatisation and commercialisation of water supply in diverse cities illustrating 
how these often coincided with the transition from artisanal, community-controlled, to 
industrial, corporate-controlled modes of production. In these situations, she argues, 
neoliberal reforms typically entailed the expansion of state control, even if only as regulator, 
to areas formerly beyond its (formal) sphere of influence. Hilgers (2012, p. 80) developed a 
similar argument claiming that “whereas in Europe the co-production of public services is 
often the sign of the decline of the social state, in Africa co-production has sometimes, but not 
always, led to greater efficiency”. Where state-delivered social services were for the most part 
non-existent, the restructuring of state institutions under neoliberal reforms necessarily 
followed a different trajectory from that of Western countries with consolidated welfare states. 
This is not to deny or diminish the dramatic effects of structural adjustments and subsequent 
neoliberal programmes. Instead, it indicates that “conceptions of the state in the neoliberal 
age are deeply shaped by the specificities of the state that they study” (Hilgers, 2012, p. 80).  
The case of Bafatá also demonstrates that in some circumstances, where state presence has 
been elusive, structural adjustments programmes involving considerable cuts in the state 
apparatuses do not result in de facto changes in the role of the state in water supply. In fact, 
in this context, policies introducing shifts in the role of the state from provider to enabler  can 
be situated within aims to expand the presence of the state in water provision.  
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In fact, it should be noted that in writing about neoliberalisation, scholars have often taken 
for granted concepts such as that of the state and citizenship. However, these concepts need 
to be turned into objects of inquiry (Baptista, 2013b; Gupta, 1995), especially in contexts, such 
as that of secondary cities in Africa, where distinctions are blurry and notions of state and 
citizenship must be foregrounded in the specific histories and trajectories of state formation. 
As will be discussed in chapter 3, and resembling what was previously discussed for policy 
makers, academic researchers have often adopted ahistorical views of the state, which fail to 
take into consideration the specific historical trajectories of different states.  
To summarise, the operationalization, effects and impacts of the neoliberalisation of nature 
need to take into account the specificities and pathways of different contexts. For example, 
there is a significant body of literature examining decentralisation and water governance 
across Africa. Here, as will be discussed in the case of Bafatá, the lack of resources, state 
weaknesses, the need to create management bodies from scratch and ongoing competition 
between management bodies are all key issues that need to be considered when evaluating the 
roles of states and the evolution of water provision (Danert et al., 2003; Golooba-Mutebi, 
2012; Jaglin et al., 2011).  
Exploring the evolution of urban infrastructure in diverse cities, scholars have ‘provincialized’ 
prevalent hypothesis included in theorisations of neoliberal restructuring and the concomitant 
reshaping of infrastructures. In this way, they have unveiled how neoliberal policies produce 
different outcomes in diverse cities, an important theme of wider debates on neoliberalism, 
which consider the heterogeneous geographies and pathways of neoliberalisation and 
embrace ideas of hybridisation (Brenner et al., 2010; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Scholars 
have also challenged the relevance of already made analytical frameworks, for example, 
questioning interpretations of fragmentation or the withdrawal of the state from service 
provision as being the results of neoliberal policies. What this means is that there is the need 
for more situated understandings of the articulations between neoliberalism and urban 
infrastructure but also to think beyond neoliberalism. The following sections explore this in 
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relations to actually existing alternative analytical approaches seeking to expand existing 
registers of analysis. 
2.3.2. Framing the need for a post-neoliberal optics 
I have argued that besides the need for more nuanced and situated analyses of urban 
infrastructure and neoliberalism, there is also a need to go beyond neoliberal analytical 
frameworks in explorations of the forces driving the production and use of water 
infrastructure. Related to this, and to understand the degree to which critiques of 
neoliberalism have come to dominate analyses, this section looks at how some scholars have 
framed alternatives as well as forms of resistance to the privatisation and marketization of 
water. 
Karen Bakker (2010, 2007) claims that the successes of anti-privatisation movements and 
protests have been limited, and she questions whether there are any instances where the 
retreat of the private sector can be attributed to anti-privatisation campaigns or other forms 
of resistance, rather than to private companies’ cherry-picking strategies. In her analysis of 
anti-privatisation movements and the related search for alternatives to neoliberalisaton, 
Bakker exposes vital limitations within strategies framed around human rights. This is 
because, she argues, human rights are not incompatible with private sector participation and 
market approaches to water management, as revealed in the recognition of water as a human 
right by international organisations, such as the World Bank or the United Nations, and even 
private companies. This is also apparent in the ways the recognition of water as a 
constitutional right in South Africa has been followed by the adoption of market approaches. 
Therefore, claiming water as a human right, even when it has been translated into legal rights, 
does not preclude privatisation. In addition, focusing on alternatives based around the notion 
of the commons, most often substantiated in some form of community management, and 
alluding to romanticised ideas of communities, she claims “commons, in other words, can be 
exclusive and regressive, as well as inclusive and progressive” (Bakker, 2007, p. 446). 
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Moreover, Bakker adds that community-management models, entailing the devolution of 
responsibilities to communities, often reinforce fragmentation and result in the expansion or 
prevalence of 2-tier services in cities, reflecting different resource levels among communities 
and differentiations ignited by cherry-picking techniques by private companies.  
More recently, Bakker (2013, p. 258) argued against “using the term postneoliberal to frame [a 
range of alternatives to privatization, which include both state and community-led water 
supply initiatives]”. Crucially, writing about the retreat of the private sector from the water 
sector in many cities of the global south, the recognition by proponents of privatisation – such 
as the World Bank – of the limits of private sector participation and the increasing role granted 
to the public sector as well as alternatives – including community or state management and 
PPPs –, she argues that these trends are “better understood as a mutation of neoliberalisaton, 
in which spatial variegation is an expression of the refinement of profit-seeking opportunities” 
(2013, p. 256). Thus, for Bakker, all alternatives are ultimately a product of neoliberal 
strategies.  
In contrast, in their study of two public-private partnerships (PPPs) in two South African 
secondary cities, Smith and Ruiters (2006) note that political ecology perspectives have 
frequently failed to account for the ways in which users responses to marketization and 
privatisation can affect their implementation. They argue that non-payment and illegal 
connections constitute a form of resistance of the poor and that “the poor themselves also play 
a major part in forcing the partial decommodification of services” (Smith and Ruiters, 2006, 
p. 195). Thus, everyday practices can have repercussions in attempts to extend neoliberal 
policies and, they argue, might in fact explain the failure to achieve cost-recovery and the 
marketization of water in many cities across Africa. In this way, these scholars hint at the 
weaknesses of ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Lawhon et al., 
2014). However, as argued by Lawhon et al. (2014), the limits of such resistances are also 
emphasised in an analysis that, adopting a Marxist critique of capitalism, implicitly calls for 
systemic change. In other words, these processes are not considered beyond a neoliberal 
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analytical framework, that could open the analytical view to other factors and processes 
affecting the ways in which these policies are translated into practice.  
What emerges from Bakker, Smith and Ruiters’ analysis is that neoliberalism, as a specific 
form of capitalism, remains a key obstacle to the emergence of any more progressive 
alternatives. Concerns relating to equity, capitalism and, more specifically, neoliberalism are 
referred to make sense not only of private sector participation in the sector, or even the 
adoption of market approaches, but alternatives are also framed through this same lenses, 
without openings for alternative factors. This emphasis upon neoliberalism has had vital 
impacts: first, it has deterred investigations that identify and explore alternative drivers of 
infrastructure development. For example, there is little research exploring state weaknesses 
that are, in fact, a crucial factor affecting service provision across Africa. In addition, as argued 
by Budds and McGranahan (2003), the prominence awarded to private sector participation 
raises questions as to whether debates about public versus private provision might be 
overlooking important dimensions and factors that are not linked to services being either 
privately or publicly managed. Such a narrowing of concerns also excludes a vast range of 
cities, or parts of cities, for consideration where these categories do not easily capture the 
multiple arrangements in place (Allen et al., 2006; Budds and McGranahan, 2003). 
Second, it has resulted in the systematic exclusion of various locations from the research 
agenda, where the impacts of neoliberalism might not be so easily observed. In fact, an 
overemphasis on the evolution of capitalist societies, the neoliberalisation of nature, and its 
operationalization and impacts on urban water infrastructure might partially illuminate the 
unwillingness of academic debates, until very recently, to explore a range of both policy-driven 
and informal arrangements that make up water infrastructure in cities across the globe. 
Indeed, urban scholars exploring water supply have paid considerably less attention to 
community-based management or smaller-scale public-private partnerships (PPPs) which 
have been at the core of mainstream water policies in various urban regions, large and small, 
but have become dominant in secondary cities where both public and private sectors have 
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been deemed unable or unfit to secure water supply. Finally, it has originated an over-reliance 
on neoliberalism as an analytical framework leading researchers to over-emphasise its reach, 
sometimes being too quick to link processes on the ground to the circulation of neoliberal 
policies without considering alternative logics and motivations (Castree, 2008a).  
This is not say that analyses of neoliberalism and the evolution of water provision in cities 
across the world are not relevant for the study of water infrastructure in secondary African 
cities. First, focusing on neoliberalism and the evolution of water provision, these studies 
articulate the extremely disadvantaged position of smaller urban centres, especially in lower-
income countries. They reveal how the systematic exclusion of poor and small urban 
settlements from private investments is an inevitable result of the ‘spatial variegations of 
neoliberalism’. In this way, they highlight the inequalities inherent in visions focusing on 
private investment to support the development of water infrastructure and, therefore, the 
spatial inequalities which result from such policies.  
Second, even community-management of water supply and public-private partnerships 
implemented in cities, or parts of cities, ignored by the private sector, are not shielded from 
market approaches and neoliberalism. For example, Benit-Gbaffou et al. (2012) note how 
investigations of neoliberalism in the African context, where local levels of state are often weak, 
have tended to focus on structural adjustments and its impacts on the state as whole. In fact, 
international organisations and states have been deeply involved in the promotion of 
community-based arrangements in secondary cities, and have contributed to the infiltration 
of global policies resembling a neoliberal ethos. Thus, drawing on recent developments in 
theorisations of neoliberalism, namely views dissecting how neoliberal technologies of rule and 
policies travel in heterogeneous, piecemeal packages, this research claims that it is essential 
that we perceive secondary cities in Africa as constituents of wider circulations of global 
policies. However, it is also vital that we explore the meanings global policies take when 
adapted to specific local contexts as well as the ways in which they are transformed in the 
process of operationalisation. And, analyses should be open to the emergence of new 
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meanings, and interpretations, which exceed a neoliberal framework, and to the consideration 
of what may be positive outcomes 
In addition, the over-emphasis placed on neoliberalism as an analytical framework leaves 
uncovered a large range of arrangements, processes and practices that are at the heart of water 
delivery in secondary cities in Africa. For example, whereas the weakness of state institutions 
is often at the core of policy debates and researchers adopting different approaches, it is rarely 
mentioned in analyses of water framed around neoliberalism. Paradoxically, whilst insisting 
on the role of the public sector, academic debates have invested little research in studies of the 
complexities of state weaknesses, their implications for service delivery or, in fact, for the ways 
in which states currently shape water infrastructure. Just as importantly, accounts of 
neoliberalism do not capture the range of forces shaping water infrastructure in these cities. 
In fact, the role of capitalist relations, and therefore often neoliberalism, in shaping the urban 
condition in the context of many secondary African cities should be turned into an object of 
enquiry rather than taken for granted.  
In capitalist societies, the production of urban space, and water, will inevitably be linked to 
capitalist relations. And, scholars have meticulously enunciated the impacts of neoliberalism, 
as the contemporary form of capitalism, in the water sector. However, there has been a 
tendency to solely adopt neoliberal analytical frameworks in investigations of water, and 
consequently, ignore that which is beyond. This is revealed in the fact that an overwhelming 
majority of investigations of water infrastructure examine private sector participation or the 
marketization and commodification of water. Furthermore, it is apparent in the ways in which 
neoliberalism continues to be called upon to explain water infrastructure even in those places 
where the links between capitalist relations and the production of water infrastructure are not 
so evident. 
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2.4. Thinking within and beyond neoliberalism:  
variegated neoliberalism, assemblages and everyday practices 
So far, it has been argued that political economy and political ecology approaches have shown 
an over-commitment to neoliberalism, which limits our ability to understand the multiple 
processes and forces shaping water infrastructure in secondary African cities. In addition, 
these approaches would also benefit from more nuanced views of how neoliberalisaton plays 
out in a diversity of cities. This section explores debates scrutinising the over-emphasis given 
to neoliberalism as an analytical framework in urban studies and grasping alternative 
analytical trajectories. Related to this, and building on the argument developed in previous 
sections, it is argued that critiques of neoliberalism have emerged from perceptions of the 
political, economic, social and cultural transformations of a core group of countries, but have 
come to dominate debates and shape scholarly imaginations. Thus, their analytical purchase 
in numerous cities across the global south should be turned into an object of inquiry. In other 
words, in the context of many secondary cities in Africa the predominance of capitalist 
relations, and therefore neoliberalism, shaping urban processes should not be taken for 
granted but investigated alongside with other forces shaping the urban condition. Locating 
these debates within the aim of this research, to investigate and theorise water infrastructure 
in African secondary cities, this section also discusses the concept of assemblages, thick 
description and explorations of the everyday as helpful methodological and analytical tools to 
make sense of urban processes that remain beyond the reach of existing analytical apparatuses 
(Simone, 2011).  
Provincializing neoliberalism   
In the past decade, there has been a growing thrust of literature engaging with debates on 
postcolonial urban studies and comparative urbanism, calling for “the need to integrate 
diverse urban experiences into wider theoretical reflections” (Parnell and Robinson, 2012) 
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and to consider all cities as sites of theory-making (see: Chakrabarty, 2007; Comaroff and 
Comaroff, 2012; McFarlane, 2010; McFarlane and Robinson, 2012; Nijman, 2007; Parnell 
and Robinson, 2012; Peck, 2015; Robinson, 2011, 2006, 2002; Ward, 2010; Watson, 2009). 
Related to this aim to foster a more international urban theory, more recently, various scholars 
have questioned the prevalence of critiques of neoliberalism in analysis of contemporary 
urbanism (Baptista, 2013a; Collier, 2012; Ferguson, 2010; McGuirk and Dowling, 2009; 
Parnell and Robinson, 2012). Hereby, Baptista (2013a) identifies “two pressing meta-analytic 
concerns: the status and the sites of epistemological production of ‘neoliberalism’ as a theoretical 
concept and as an analytical framework” (Baptista, 2013a, p. 594). Discussing the issue of 
status, Parnell and Robinson  (2012)  indicate that critiques of neoliberalism pervade most 
investigations of the urban condition, and provokingly claim that they have become a ‘ready-
made interpretative framework’ in contemporary urbanism. These scholars, like Baptista 
(2013a) and Ferguson (2010), then alert us to the fact that the emphasis given to critiques of 
neoliberalism in urban studies might be obfuscating our ability to grasp other drivers of urban 
change, and preventing us from engaging with other more relevant debates.  
Parnell and Robinson (2012) illustrate their argument with an analysis of anti-poverty policies 
in South Africa. Here, they note the adoption of notions of the right to the city in processes of 
policy-making and identify challenges relating to the contours of local governments and 
processes of state formation, which cannot be reduced to their connections with capital 
accumulation. Baptista (2013a) follows a similar argument in her empirical analysis of the 
processes leading to the formation and implementation of a European funded urban 
rehabilitation and environmental improvement programme in Portugal initiated in 2000. She 
cautions against the straightforward adoption of neoliberalism as an analytical framework, 
which while unveiling useful processes, would have excluded the consideration of other 
matters. For example, in a political environment committed to the construction of a 
‘European-standard’ welfare state, debates on decentralisation and devolution in efforts to 
democratise and modernise a society still marked by the remains of an almost 50-years 
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dictatorship replaced concerns with capital accumulation and urban entrepreneurialism at the 
heart of local preoccupations and politics. On a similar register, Ferguson (2010) questions 
whether the attention given to critiques of neoliberalism might be hindering our ability to 
actually scrutinise the challenges facing urban regions but also to imagine and propose more 
progressive forms of urbanism.   
Idalina Baptista’s (2013b) investigations of everyday practices emerging through the use of 
pre-paid electricity meters in Maputo constitutes an example of the insights that can be 
generated through analysis of infrastructure that are not framed solely around neoliberalism. 
Baptista does not discard theorisations charting how prepaid meters can serve neoliberal 
policies – such as cost recovery – (McDonald and Ruiters, 2005) or, adopting a 
governmentality lenses, work towards the disciplining and subejctivation of citizens as 
customers (Von Schnitzler, 2008). However, her research explores other forms of sociability 
and political interaction emerging with the introduction of prepaid meters. It examines 
everyday practices and demonstrates how the calculative rationale of these meters actually 
allows lower-income groups in the city to access and manage electricity according to their 
needs and desires and without entering in conflictual, uncertain and unbalanced relationships 
with providers. In this way, her research allows for “a more positive outlook of prepayment, 
while remaining critical of it” (Baptista, 2013b, p. 22). 
Turning to discussions relating to the sites of epistemological production of ‘neoliberalism’, 
researchers adopting a postcolonial lenses have brought out questions around the sites of 
theory production and their implications for urban theory. The point is that critiques of 
neoliberalism, linking urban processes to broader processes of capital accumulation and the 
domination of ruling classes, have arisen from a restricted group of Euro-American cities, 
where political, economic, social and cultural evolutions, namely related to the 
industrialisation of these countries, generated unprecedented links between the production of 
the urban and capitalism. Looking at cities outside this core, it is not sufficient to consider the 
multiple pathways of neoliberalism, it is also necessary to search for ‘other-than-neoliberal 
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trajectories’ (McGuirk and Dowling, 2009, p. 175), which account for the weaker links 
between urban elites and capitalist elites, or the role of traditional authorities and informality 
(Parnell and Robinson, 2012). As suggested by Lawhon et al. (2014, p. 506) “there are 
recurrent examples of the inability of state and capital to structure African residents and their 
cities”. To summarise, in some circumstances neoliberalism might provide a partial lenses or, 
in fact, “not apply at all” (Parnell and Robinson, 2012, p. 596).  
As discussed earlier, Bakker (2010) has convincingly argued that at the heart of prevalent 
understandings of infrastructure are flawed assumptions regarding the ‘modern networked 
city’ as a general phase or stage, which have implicitly framed analysis. However, inspired by 
debates seeking to go beyond critiques of neoliberalism in analysis of the urban condition, I 
argue that political economy and political ecology investigations of water infrastructure are 
also limited by their over-commitment to critiques of neoliberalism. The result has been not 
only the omission of alternative forces or interpretations but also, as in the case of various 
secondary cities in Africa, a flawed insistence on the links between infrastructure, capital 
accumulation and dominant classes, in contexts where they hardly apply or apply only loosely. 
In fact, critiques of neoliberalism emerging from perceptions of the political, economic, social 
and cultural transformations of a core group of countries have largely dominated debates and 
shaped scholarly imagination; yet, their analytical purchase in numerous cities across the 
global south should be turned into an object of inquiry.  
Granting a critical eye to urban political ecology (UPE) perspectives, Lawhon, Ernstson and 
Silver (2014) have developed a similar critique, discerning the ways in which they perceive 
UPE to be limited by its  “current narrow theoretical scope” (Lawhon et al., 2014, p. 497). 
Thus, they draw on insights from African urbanism in order to precisely draw attention to 
themes that have been neglected by analyses centred on the production of urban space in the 
context of capitalist relations. Such a conceptual move, they argue, is essential for situated 
analyses of African cities.  
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The truth is that in practice in many secondary cities in Africa, water infrastructure has hardly 
been linked to processes of capital accumulation or the specific evolutions of state institutions 
in the context of shifts from Keynesian to neoliberal regimes. In addition, in these urban 
regions, challenges related to water provision are often more related to the weakness of state 
institutions rather than their connections to processes of capital accumulation and the pursuit 
of the interests of ruling elites. In addition, inequality along the lines of class is often not a 
prevalent or relevant characteristic. An over-emphasis on critiques of neoliberalism can 
obfuscate some of the vital challenges facing these cities: how to create adequate governance 
systems that relate to the specificities of processes of state formation in these contexts? How to 
secure the long-term sustainability of water systems in contexts where resources, at all levels, 
are extremely scarce and where low-income populations cannot afford tariffs that reflect full- 
cost-recovery or, for that matter, enough revenues to secure the long-term maintenance of 
systems?  
Again, this is not to say cities of the global south or, more specifically, secondary cities in Africa 
are excluded from neoliberalism’s circuits or that this analytical framework should be at once 
dismissed. As discussed in the previous section, and acknowledged by most, if not all, scholars 
calling for a post-neoliberal optics, debates on neoliberalism have provided nuanced analytical 
tools to explore the pathways of neoliberalism in diverse contexts. For instance, in the context 
of Guinea-Bissau, the World Bank persistently worked with the state company managing 
water supply in the capital city, Bissau, seeking to bring different forms of private sector 
participation. In fact, different transnational water companies have been employed in the 
process. At the same time, the same institution has stayed away from other urban centres in 
the country, such as Bafatá, where alternative arrangements have been adopted. 
Simultaneously, several international organisations have, at different times and in different 
ways, been involved in water supply in this city bringing with them neoliberal policies 
circulating among these actors. Notions of circulating and variegated neoliberalism (Brenner 
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et al., 2010) can usefully be adopted to explain these selective interventions and the resulting 
alternatives.  
Earlier conceptualisations of neoliberalisation processes examined the ways in which market 
rule, as a governing logic, was re-shaping places in the capitalist core as well as those locations 
influenced by this core (Baptista, 2013a). In this way, neoliberalisation processes were seen to 
emanate from the core and subsequently expand to other locations, “that is as a replication of 
Anglo-American models” (Brenner et al., 2010, p. 191). Brenner et al. (2010), on the other 
hand, in their conceptualisations of circulating and variegated neoliberalisation account for 
the multiple directions and trajectories. What this means is that neoliberal strategies and 
modes of governance travel are recognised to travel in multiple directions. From this 
perspective, Bafatá, or any other small city in Africa, is not a mere recipient of policies and 
strategies but also an active constituent in the ongoing transformation and evolution of these.  
Considering the circulations of neoliberal modes of governance, Brenner et al. (2010) highlight 
the hybridity, incompleteness and unevenness of neoliberalisation processes and the multiple 
pathways these processes take as they are embedded in and joined within diverse development 
trajectories and social processes. What this means is that neoliberalism takes different forms 
in different locations, both processes and outcomes vary according to local settings. Where 
such an analysis is extremely important to account for the diversity of processes and outcomes 
engendered by neoliberalisation processes in a diversity of cities, these scholars’ approach 
allowing for hybridisation and variegation is also too encompassing. Not only do they not 
account for a range of alternative forces, as discussed before, but they also do not account for 
processes of transformation of circulating policies in such ways that they actually transcend 
their original logics, that is they become something else.  
The everyday in assemblages and African urbanism 
Recent debates on critical urbanism and assemblages partially mirror these concerns with the 
status and sites of epistemological production of neoliberalism and echo the tensions around 
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the place of critiques of neoliberalism in urban studies. Indeed, the concept of assemblages 
has been both implicitly and explicitly mobilised by numerous scholars seeking to extend 
political economy analysis in urban studies (Baptista, 2013a; Robinson, 2016). Brenner et al. 
(2011, p. 233) caution that specific uses of assemblages run the risk of moving urban theory 
away from its critical “questions regarding the broader (global, national and regional) 
structural contexts within which actants are situated and operate – including formations of 
capital accumulation and investment/ disinvestment; historically entrenched, large-scale 
configurations of uneven spatial development, territorial polarizations and geopolitical 
hegemony; multiscalar frameworks of state power, territorial alliance formation and urban 
governance; and the politico-institutional legacies of socio-political contestation around 
diverse forms of dispossession, deprivation and discontent”. Yet, this research contends that a 
narrow focus on Brenner et al.’s questions, on the other hand, leaves unattended the range of 
sites, forces and practices which assemblages approaches bring into view and that are at the 
core of urban processes in cities across the globe.  
In reality, the concept of assemblage has been put to use in multiple ways. While not the focus 
of this thesis, this section briefly explores debates on critical urbanism and assemblages (see: 
Brenner et al., 2011; McFarlane, 2011a, 2011b; Rankin, 2011; Simone, 2011). The aim is to 
examine the ways in which scholars have used the notion of assemblage to “make more use, 
better use, of all that exists in urban life” (Simone, 2011, p. 356)  and uncover urban 
multiplicities (McFarlane, 2011b); and, to situate detailed inquiries of embodied social and 
everyday practices in wider analytical interpretations of the urban condition.  
Katharine Rankin discusses the potential of the concept of assemblage to “probe articulations 
of political economy and everyday life” (Rankin, 2011, p. 563). She argues that “the concept 
of assemblage has a particular role to play in emphasizing thick description of everyday urban 
life and in countering politically paralyzing pictures of the unity of capital with notions of a 
more open social field” (2011, p. 564). Thus, focusing on assemblages and thick description 
as methodological tools that emphasise embodied social practices, she explores their potential 
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to capture the necessary messiness of the encounters between capitalist relations and everyday 
lives, but also to unveil contradiction, resistances and potential alternatives. Applying these 
ideas to her work on business improvements areas in Toronto, Rankin does not forget the 
ways in which these schemes are allied with neoliberalisation. Yet, scrutinising the multiple 
everyday practices of officials involved in these schemes she analyses these “as an assemblage 
of related but distinctive and sometimes contradictory projects” (Rankin, 2011, p. 566). 
Following Latour’s proposition of the researcher as the assembler, and claiming that some 
assemblages are more progressive than others, Rankin sees her position as a researcher as 
being not only to document but also to foment new forms of assemblage. McGuirk and 
Dowling’s (2009) also refer to the notion of assemblages to expand their analysis of 
masterplanned residential estates in Australia beyond neoliberalisation. In this way, they 
“illustrates the assemblage of political projects enacted in the production and governance of 
these urban spaces” (2009, p. 175), which both refer to and exceed neoliberal ideas. According 
to these scholars, this assemblage of political projects is the result of the situated assemblages 
of actors, practices and institutions emerging around these spaces, which logics, ways of doing, 
rationalities and motivations are crossed producing specific, and messier, processes and 
outcomes. 
African urbanists, such as Filip De Boeck, Garth Myers, AbdouMaliq Simone and Edgar 
Pieterse have turned to explorations of everyday practices of city-making in their attempts to 
“reorient theory-making and stabilize a different image of the city” (Lawhon et al., 2014, p. 
507).  In contrast to analyses that simply grapple with processes of marginalisation and 
exclusion of residents from urban life, these scholars seek to unveil the urban multiplicities 
within African cities, including the multiple practices through which urban dwellers sustain 
urban life.  
AbdouMaliq Simone (2004; 2015, 2011, 2008) in his investigations of diverse urban sites 
across the global south, such as Jakarta, Johannesburg, Pikine (Dakar) or Douala, routinely 
evokes the work of Deleuze and Guattari  and the concept of assemblage. In his contribution 
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to contemporary debates in urban theory concerning the use of the concept of assemblage, he 
writes: “the impetus to think about assemblages as a modality through which the urban 
instantiates itself seems to reflect a desire to make more use, better use, of all that exists in 
urban life. (…) It reflects recognition that there seems to be so much that takes place that isn’t 
seen or said, but yet exerts a force on all other acknowledged existences” (Simone, 2011, p. 
356). Thus, Simone deploys the notion of assemblage to trace the multiple (prescribed) 
possibilities that emerge through collaborations, alignments, affiliations and formations with 
distinct spatio-temporalities to compose urban life. Their relevance is justified by the fact that 
it is essentially through these that people access income opportunities, develop and access 
infrastructure, and establish ‘welfare’ safety nets in times of hardship. Moreover, although the 
possibilities are ‘prescribed’, i.e. framed within broader political economic configurations that 
set strict boundaries, these are also spaces of innovation that articulate the unfolding of 
everyday urbanism, exceeding, contesting and realigning such configurations. Finally, as also 
noted by Li (2007), these enquiries into these multiple formations also reveal the ‘gaps’ 
between what is intended and what takes place in practice.  
At stake here are also deeper questions concerning understandings of power and matters 
related to agency. Political economy approaches investigate how power operates in the 
production of urban space by scrutinising processes of capital accumulation and resistances to 
these processes. Capital emerges as the primary force shaping the urban condition, including 
social and cultural transformations (Lawhon et al., 2014). The deployment of the concept of 
assemblages and a focus on everyday practices does not entail neglecting capitalist relations 
but can draw attention to the ways power operates in a diffuse manner and is enacted 
everywhere. Such an understanding has a vital influence on how we perceive agency and the 
urban condition. It allows for more detailed understandings of how urban dwellers follow, 
contest, ignore, perform or adapt to rule and how a diversity of identities develops through 
multiple interactions at distinct levels with numerous actors.  
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To summarise, the concept of assemblages and the emphasis given to thick description of the 
everyday open the field to analyses that grasp nuances and gaps neglected by political 
economy and ecology perspectives. In addition, they allow for urban multiplicities accounting 
for diverse unfoldings; and, at the same time, constitute analytical and methodological tools 
to make sense of that which cannot be captured with reference to existing analytical planes. 
Moreover, through understandings of power as distributed and relational, everyday practices 
regain agency.  This is particularly important in contexts, such as that of Bafatá, dominated 
by emergent and ephemeral forms of power.  
2.5. Ethnographic explorations of everyday practices  
and urban infrastructure 
This last section of the chapter explores a growing body of work by researchers examining 
everyday practices in their investigations of infrastructure, and it traces their contributions in 
light of the arguments being developed.  
In recent years, an increasing number of scholars studying urban infrastructure, particularly 
water and sanitation, have adopted different theoretical orientations in attempts to extend 
and, in Lawhon et al.’s (2014) words, generate ‘more heterogeneous’ political ecology 
perspectives (Anand, 2011a, 2011b; Baptista, 2013b; Birkenholtz, 2010; Desai et al., 2015; 
Harris, 2009; Lawhon et al., 2014; McFarlane et al., 2014; McFarlane and Desai, 2015; 
O’Reilly, 2010; Page, 2005a; Truelove, 2011). Investigation of everyday practices and the 
micropolitics of water and sanitation have emerged as crucial themes in this work.  
For instance, Truelove (2011, p. 143) argues that urban political ecology analyses “have been 
more inclined towards analysing the production of class and distributional dimensions of 
inequality on a city-wide scale rather than illuminating how multiple social differences are 
(re)produced in and through everyday water practices”. As a result, these approaches 
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“inadvertently sideline additional dimensions, scales and spaces of water-related inequality” 
(2011, p. 145). Thus, she demonstrates how feminist political ecology can elucidate 
understandings of water inequality and expand conventional urban political ecology 
perspectives. In doing so, Truelove (2011) shows that everyday water practices are not only 
produced by but also produce social power relations, most notably gender inequalities but also 
class. In this way, she demonstrates that access and control, the focus of political ecology 
perspectives, are not the only factors shaping water-related practices and inequalities. 
Simultaneously, she shows that a focus on everyday can help to unveil these multiple iterations 
of social power relations.  
Still related to water practices and gender inequalities, Harris (2009) and O’Reilly (2010) 
investigate women’s everyday practices in diverse locations to demonstrate that development 
interventions promoting women’s participation in the implementation of projects and water 
management often result in the over-burdening of women, therefore sustaining or even 
reinforcing gender inequalities. Thus, they argue, attempts to empower through participation, 
which are now part of mainstream policy models, can equate the devolution of responsibilities 
to the most marginalised members of society. In this way, these scholars call for more detailed 
investigations of everyday practices that can question the foundations of policies linking 
participation to empowerment. From a different angle, Page (2005a) indicates that calls for 
women’s participation in water supply are, in fact, disempowering because they deny the vital 
roles women have continuously played not only in the consumption but also the production 
of water. Looking at the case of Tombel, a town in Cameroon, he argues that “by using 
historic forms of protest (such as nudity) [women] have articulated their demands in an 
effective way despite having no formal control over decision-making. (…) there are established 
rituals of resistance” (2005a, p. 4). Thus, it is necessary to expand understandings of the 
production of water in order to unravel the already existing and powerful practices through 
which women shape these processes.  
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Birkenholtz (2010) examines everyday water practices in Jaipur (India) in order to tease out 
the impacts of the expansion of the city’s water network, which has been followed by the 
adoption of full-cost recovery principles. First, he notes that policy and regulatory frameworks 
adopted in the city do not reflect the diversity of practices on the ground. In his words, “policy 
reforms do not address the series of local, informal adaptive practices and institutions to access 
drinking water with which people are engaging, particularly in poorer areas of the city” (2010, 
p. 2244). Second, charting the multiple practices behind the adaptive strategies adopted across 
different neighbourhood – including slums, working-, middle- and upper-class areas –, he 
demonstrates the ways in which these strategies produce new social and spatial 
differentiations, which vitally reproduce social power relations at the city-level.   
Desai, Graham and McFarlane (Desai et al., 2015; McFarlane et al., 2014) contend that 
“critical urban and geographical research lacks understanding of the micropolitics through 
which infrastructures are differently made, unmade and experienced” (Desai et al., 2015, p. 
98). Like Birkenholtz (2010), they argue that not enough attention has been paid to the 
improvised, adaptive strategies put in place to secure access to water and sanitation. Thus, in 
their detailed enquiry of everyday sanitation practices in two different settlements in Mumbai, 
they describe the multiple factors and dimensions shaping people’s everyday practices, from 
gender and crime to social and political relations, materialities, perceptions of disgust, and 
privacy norms. In this way, these scholars construct a complex picture of the micropolitics of 
sanitation in the city, which goes well beyond policy and legal frameworks or governing 
regimes, and exposes a complex scenario of multiple inequalities.  
Crucially, McFarlane and Desai (2015) suggest that entitlements secured through everyday 
practices should not be interpreted as simply struggles of the marginalised to secure 
inadequate access but as the ‘lived geographies of rights’. In their own words, “we refute any 
easy separation of abstract principle – such as the right to sanitation and water – and messy 
everyday context and struggles. (…) Rather than seeing context as the ‘micro’ and principles 
of entitlement as the ‘macro’, we contend that it is impossible to think about one without the 
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other” (2015, p. 2). These scholars also insist that understanding how entitlements are 
produced at the micro-level is vital for understanding how rights to water and sanitation might 
be delivered in the future.  
Likewise, Anand  (2011a, 2011b) claims that it is politically and theoretically important to 
move beyond simplifications resulting from political economy narratives of water supply. 
Therefore, he wants to show “how, despite tremendous odds, those marginalised by the state 
and the market actually make their homes and stay in them through what Asef Bayat calls 
‘the quiet encroachment of the ordinary’” (2011b, p. 544). Through ethnographic research 
conducted in Mumbai’s settlements, he describes the multiples ways in which settlers access 
water from the city’s network or, when they do not succeed at that, create alternative systems 
relying on groundwater. Here, he develops two crucial arguments. First, he argues that access 
to water in Mumbai is “mediated as much by capital as social connections” (2011b, p. 543). 
He illustrates his argument by pointing out the ways in which residents secure access to the 
water network through personal connections with politicians, engineers, plumbers, 
community organisations and NGOs. In fact, for Anand, connections with elected local 
councillors appear as much more effective than legal or policy entitlements to water, as 
epitomised in his account of how one resident, “called each new pipe after a particular elected 
official” (2011b, p. 549). This theme also emerges in the Bapat and Agarwal’s (2003) interviews 
with pavement dwellers in the same city.  
Second, Anand points to “how water is not entirely encompassed by powerful political regimes 
and also to the multiple ways in which diverse settlers are able to manage and establish 
themselves in the city” (2011b, p. 547). Interestingly, he links this incompleteness of central 
political regimes to the co-existence of multiple regimes of water supply, which need to be 
captured in understandings of urban water. Anand also illustrates that investigations of 
everyday practices can show how settlers adopt a myriad of strategies that allow them to be 
seen as a deserving public. In addition, exposing the multiple relations and claims that produce 
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water infrastructure in Mumbai, Anand contradicts the idea of a ‘denuded public realm’ 
(Gandy 2008).  
While the focus of the next chapter, yet another important aspect explored by several scholars 
looking at everyday water and sanitation practices is the ways in which the state appears in 
these daily routines. Examining everyday water and sanitation practices in Mumbai, Bapat 
and Agarwal (2003), Truelove (2011), McFarlane and Desai (2015) and Anand (2011a, 2011b) 
bring to the surface the multiple strategies used by residents to tap into the city’s piped water 
network. By connecting to the water scheme, these residents also enter into diverse relations 
and interactions with the city’s water company and the state. Thus, delving into these 
interactions between residents and different state actors, these researchers demonstrate the 
multiple and contradictory ways in which residents experience the state, which largely surpass 
policy and legal frameworks. They also show how everyday state practices contradict ideas of 
an autonomous, distant state.  For instance, Anand (2011a, 2011b) perceives the boundaries 
between state and society as inevitably blurry. Pointing out the multiple interactions between 
different state actors and those involved in water provision, he opens the possibility for these 
adaptive, compensatory, informal arrangements to become constituents of governing regimes. 
They are not merely the practices of the poor, beyond policies and legal frameworks and 
therefore the state. Instead, admitting the intrinsic blurriness of state and society, these 
practices can be seen as constituent parts of the state apparatuses. This indicates that both 
practices practices and the state are shaped through these interactions. As will be discussed 
below, these views contradict political ecology/ economy views of the state as unified and 
autonomous entities.  
To summarise, this expanding thrust of literature exploring everyday practices in urban water 
infrastructures demonstrates how these analyses can contribute to more nuanced 
understandings of how people navigate the city to secure access to water. It complicates 
analysis of water inequality teasing apart ways in which water practices are both produced by, 
and produce, social power relations that are not only related to access and control but extend 
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to gender and other social relations. Moreover, it contributes to more nuanced analysis of the 
state and the ways it shapes, and is shaped by, water practices beyond policy and legal 
frameworks. Finally, ethnographic approaches allow concepts that are normally taken for 
granted, such as the state or citizenship, to become objects of enquiry therefore allowing for 
more situated analysis of these cities.  
2.6. An analytical framework for the study of urban water  
in small secondary cities in Africa 
There is a vast literature within the fields of geography and urban studies exploring the 
processes and outcomes engendered by increases in private sector participation, and the 
adoption of market approaches more generally, in water provision. The overwhelming 
majority of this work has discussed these processes in the context of neoliberal reforms and 
the neoliberalisation of water. This extremely diverse and rich body of work has produced 
important insights. Nevertheless, this chapter also argued that it has produced an over-
commitment to interpretations based on neoliberal analytical frameworks. The extent to 
which critiques of neoliberalism have become all-encompassing in analyses of water provision 
is perhaps best seen in the ways protests, resistance and alternatives to private sector 
participation have been portrayed in this literature. In this chapter, I identified three main 
limitations emerging from a narrow focus on the neoliberalisation of water. First, the over-
commitment to critiques of neoliberalism has led to ‘fast’ interpretations without careful 
scrutiny of the degree to which specific urban processes fit into such frameworks. Second, it 
has diverted researchers’ attention from other matters or led scholars to insist on explaining 
certain phenomena with reference to neoliberalism that might have benefited from different 
angles of interpretation. Finally, it has either led to an over-emphasis on the role of capitalism 
in the production of the urban in contexts where looser analysis might be required or to the 
exclusion of case studies that seem to complicate attempts to apply such frameworks.  
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Whilst not discarding neoliberalism, this research adopts an analytical framework which 
embraces critiques of neoliberalism alongside alternative analytical devices that can 
encapsulate other forces and processes shaping the urban condition. Critiques of neoliberalism 
can help to situate small secondary cities in Africa in global circuits, which fundamentally 
shape water governance in these locations. As suggested by Bakker (2013; see also Page, 2003), 
governance models adopted in small cities and towns in poorer contexts – such as community-
based management or public-private partnerships involving domestic and  small-scale private 
providers – should certainly be understood in the context of the current neoliberal era and the 
spatial variegations of neoliberalism. These outcomes can be seen as a consequence of ‘cherry-
picking’ strategies embraced by multinational water companies, emerging precisely where 
large corporations are unwilling to invest. In fact, as will be suggested in Chapter 7, rather 
than simply being seen as the residualised outcome of private sector profit-making strategies, 
models emerging in small cities can also be perceived as outcomes of development 
interventions. At least in Bafatá, development interventions have vitally (and often 
unintendedly) shaped the motivations and practices emerging around the city’s piped supply 
scheme. In addition, sophisticated conceptualisations of variegated neoliberalisms (Brenner et 
al., 2010) can account for processes of hybridisation and unpack the ways in which neoliberal 
ideas and technologies of government are transformed and adapted according to specific 
institutional contexts. In this way, it is possible to grasp more precisely how circulating policy 
models come to affect the evolution of state institutions, the development of policies and 
projects and water governance models in particular situations, including in poor secondary 
cities in Africa.  
I have also established that the notion of assemblages and investigations of everyday practices 
can help investigations of water infrastructure in a secondary city in Africa. The use of the 
concept of assemblages, as both an analytical and methodological tool, marks an attempt to 
grapple with what this research will term creole modes of water governance. The term creole 
captures the intermixture of a variety of influences, practices, rationalities, motivations, which 
 76 
results in vernacular modes that are locally constructed through multiple spatialities and 
temporalities. A creole mode of water governance is thus perceived to emerge through the 
ensemble of diverse agendas, actors, practices and institutions joined together around water 
infrastructure. Together they produce a situated mode of governance that results from the 
ongoing ‘reciprocal activity’  (Ashcroft et al., 2000, p. 58) between different elements, and 
which comes to encompass multiple and evolving motivations, ways of doing, discourses and 
rationalities. At the heart of this Creole mode of governance are processes of appropriation and 
re-invention that engender not only variegations of neoliberalisation processes but also their 
transformation into ‘something else’, endowed with diverse logics, meanings and effects.  
Scrutinising how different actors, institutions and practices come together and explaining their 
interactions provides a lens to see how specific modes of governance emerge, what they 
achieve, and how they produce water infrastructure. For example, in Bafatá, the case-study 
of this research, cost-recovery principles, which have been frequently associated with 
neoliberal rationales, have been embraced by various actors and managerial and 
technological procedures for its implementation eagerly adopted. However, as will be shown 
in chapters 7 and 8, the meanings and logics relating to this principle have also been 
appropriated and re-invented by the different actors involved. In addition, the practices 
associated with its implementation at different levels, from the standpipe to the offices of the 
water operator, have also engendered significant transformations. Everyday practices actively 
contribute to the re-shaping of governance models.  
In this study, then, thick description and a focus on everyday practices will complement, 
critically extend and add nuances to political economic analysis of water inequality and 
processes of commodification. For example, through the vital consideration of the multiple 
social relations shaping water inequality (Truelove, 2011) or through accounts of the 
micropolitics shaping the use of water infrastructure  (Desai et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the 
aim is also to find new registers of analysis and engage in theory-making, to produce distinctive 
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analytical devices that can account for the experiences of secondary cities in Africa (Lawhon 
et al., 2014; Pieterse, 2008; Pieterse and Parnell, 2014; Watson, 2009).   
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– THREE –  
The state in urban water: 
Insights from ethnographic explorations of state practices 
3.1. Introduction 
In the brief discussion of water policy debates developed in the previous chapter (section 2.2.), 
it was shown that current policies targeting the devolution of water provision to the 
community and private sectors have been accompanied by a mounting interest in the role of 
the state by international organisations, such as the World Bank, the United Nations or the 
European Commission. In line with neoliberal ideas, this renewed interest in the state has 
focused on the role of these apparatuses in securing a supportive environment where non-
state organisations, including private companies, can operate. As a result, in recent years we 
have witnessed a proliferation of programmes and projects promoting the development of 
efficient legal and policy frameworks and supporting the expansion of rational-bureaucratic 
institutions that can enforce and implement such frameworks. In fact, this trend is not specific 
to the water sector as revealed in the numerous programmes focusing on ‘good governance’ 
and cross-cutting all sectors. Drawing attention to the state, and subsequently channelling 
investment into the strengthening of state institutions, policy makers have touched on a real 
challenge related to the impacts of state weaknesses on water provision. As will be discussed 
for the case of Bafatá, the shortage of administrative, technical and financial resources 
available to state institutions is at the core of challenges related to the sustainable provision of 
water in this city and the country in general. However, as suggested by Hansen and Stepputat  
(2001), the images of the state adopted in these policy briefs are founded on views of the state 
as institutions endowed with the capacity to perform a set of activities, rather than as political 
entities with specific historical trajectories. States’ functions are privileged over their form and 
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historicity. In other words, in these discussions, “the state and its institutions remain strangely 
ahistorical entities, a set of functional imperatives of regulation arising from society but devoid 
of distinct characters and different historical trajectories” (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001, p. 1). 
Therefore, it appears that policy makers are set to engage in an impossible task, i.e. to create 
hopefully effective but neutral and ahistorical state apparatuses, which are devoid of 
contextual specificities.  
In contrast, scholars adopting political ecology approaches have frequently adopted Marxist 
and post-Marxist accounts of states, which denaturalise the state and refute the technicist and 
apolitical views dominating neoliberal perspectives or Weberian conceptions of neutral states. 
Thus, academic researchers have examined the role of states in assisting elite visions of, and 
demands for, infrastructure, and have sought to grasp how states have continuously facilitated 
capital accumulation through their involvement in urban water supply. These researchers 
portray the state as “a set of organisational resources through which other agents (such as 
classes or elites) act” (Painter, 2006, p. 756), as opposed to views disseminated through 
neoliberal policies which see the state as “an organisational actor in its own right” (Ibidem). 
Interestingly though, as suggested by Hansen and Stepputat (2001) and Painter (2006), despite 
their divergent political agendas, both policy analysts and Marxist-inspired commentators 
frame states as unified entities or, as Painter observes, “in both cases the state is seen as 
consisting of a more or less coherent matrix of institutions” (2006, p. 756). 
Paradoxically, numerous researchers critiquing the neoliberalisation of water have taken for 
granted relations between state and capital and therefore have also envisaged and endorsed 
ahistorical views of the state. In contrast to what is frequently assumed in Marxist and 
Gramscian inspired notions of the state, the primacy of the productive interactions between 
the state and capitalist classes is not a universal reality. Instead, the social relations at the core 
of state power should be empirically verified. In certain contexts, such as that of Guinea-
Bissau, other social relations might supersede or compete with capitalist relations in 
orchestrating public agendas. More generally, Michael Mann (2012), in his discussion of the 
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‘sources of social power’, rejects the primacy given to economic power by Marxists and argues 
that economic power should be considered alongside ideological, political and military 
powers.  
In addition, proclaiming the benefits of publicly-owned systems and the vital role of the state 
as regulator and redistributor, scholars often rely on normative postulations of the state that 
have little reference to the social, economic and political reality of, for example, many African 
secondary cities. For instance, critical scholars seldom take into account the impacts state 
weaknesses can have on public service provision. Also, these researchers routinely fail to 
consider how state weakness affects these apparatuses’ ability to impose or adopt neoliberal 
agendas. Critiques of private sector participation and the concomitant support for public 
sector provision are often based on the situated historical experiences concerning the role of 
states in service provision in specific (core) cities. In addition, these commentators frequently 
adopt situated notions of the state and understandings of the relations between service 
provision and citizenship, which are not necessarily relevant in poorer and smaller cities. 
This chapter therefore argues that understandings of water infrastructure in African 
secondary cities require more nuanced views of the state, which can open the analytical view 
to the multiple ways in which state institutions and actors affect water supply in small African 
cities as well as to the myriad of ways in which different groups influence the state. Contrasting 
the policy and Marxist views of the state with empirical investigations of these apparatuses in 
Africa, the gap between the two becomes evident. This gap indicates the need for empirical 
investigations that are attuned to the realities of the state in Africa.  It also suggests that there 
is something to be learnt from a broad literature on the African state. Thus, the next section, 
section 3.2., explores theorisations of the state in Africa, which have frequently been centred 
around the notion of neopatrimonialism. Here, it is argued that whilst providing ways to 
account for the informalisation of state power and patron-client relationships, these narratives 
remain based on idealised notions of the rational-bureaucratic state, and therefore on notions 
of the state as cohesive, unified entities.  
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More generally, this thesis argues that imagining states as cohesive, unified entities constitutes 
one of the main impasses concerning analyses of the role of states in water infrastructure. 
Thus, section 3.3. examines anthropological explorations of states and investigations of 
everyday state practices, which enquire reified understandings, that is notions of the state as 
coherent unified entities. In this way, this section makes explicit the theorisations of the state 
underpinning this research. Scholars adopting these perspectives engage in investigations of 
the state without any preconceived ideas regarding the coherence of the state, and therefore 
make visible a range of processes previously hidden from analytical view, including a range of 
fragmented everyday state practices fundamentally shaping everyday lives. Just as 
importantly, in these discussions, these fine grained analyses of practices that often surface in 
extremely fragmented manners are not dismissed as deviations from the normal functioning 
of the state. Instead, they are drawn into more nuanced theorisations of the state which allow 
for the heterogeneity, complexity and contradictions inherent to these apparatuses and render 
visible the variety of modalities of states. This is in contrast to notions of the state as a unified 
entity originating analyses that overgeneralise from specific historical experiences or policy 
agendas and fail to conceptually allow for the multiple modalities of states.  
Section 3.4. discusses the work of scholars who have adopted more nuanced views of the state 
in their investigations of urban infrastructure. Here, it is shown how scholars have accounted 
for a number of state practices that are essential to understandings of the ways in which states 
shape water infrastructure but also to processes of state formation. Lastly, section 3.5. discusses 
the relevance of such theorisations of the state for the study of water infrastructure in 
secondary African cities, including the consideration of state practices and interactions in 
contexts of state weakness. 
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3.2. Neopatrimonialism and theories of the state in Africa  
“The discussion, as habitually engaged, is primarily concerned, not with comprehending the political in 
Africa or with producing knowledge in general, but with social engineering. (…) The criteria that African 
agents accept as ‘reasons for acting’, what their claim to ‘act in the light of reason’ implies (as a general 
claim to be right, avoir raison), what makes their actions intelligible to themselves: all of this is of 
virtually no account in the eyes of analysts.” (Mbembe, 2001, p. 7) 
Delving into investigations of the state and power structures in Africa and Asia, scholars have 
developed profound critiques of the field of ‘state theory’, with contents that echo postcolonial 
critiques of urban theory. Notwithstanding their different approaches to the study of states, 
numerous scholars have acknowledged the fundamental gap between the ways in which states 
operate and the theories and concepts normally deployed to analyse these apparatuses (Bayart, 
2009; Chabal, 2002; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Gupta, 1995; Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; 
Herbst, 2000; Mamdani, 1996; Mbembe, 2001; Meagher, 2012; Reno, 1997; Young, 2004). 
Are African or Asian states inadequate deviations from what a state should be? Or, do we 
need to “turn the question around and inquiry into the theoretical adequacy of the concepts” 
(Gupta, 1995, p. 384)? As argued by these scholars, the inadequacy is perhaps easily explained 
when we consider that most concepts currently used in political science have been generated 
excluding the African and the Asian continents. Investigations in the field have failed “to 
recognise African societies as historical and political entities in their own right” (Bayart, 2009, 
p. 2). In Hansen and Stepputat’s (2001, p. 6) words, “In the eyes of politicians, rebels, planners, 
and social scientists, the history of European state formation continues to provide powerful 
images of what a proper state should be”.  Thus, in order to go beyond analyses that simply 
grapple with what states in Africa or Asia lack and their continuous failure to build rational 
bureaucratic states, academic debates need to recognise and surpass “the imperialism of the 
Western conceptual apparatus” (Gupta, 1995, p. 393). 
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Since this thesis focusses on secondary cities in Africa, it makes sense to look at the ways 
researchers have engaged with the African state. And, in fact, there is an extensive literature 
devoted to the analysis of states in Africa. Among these are functionalist theories of the state, 
which have explicitly distanced themselves from prevailing notions of state failure and have 
argued for analyses that are not founded on teleological views based on Weberian conceptions 
of the state (Bayart, 2009; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Di John, 2010; Reno, 1997). Jean-
François Bayart advances the notion of ‘politics of the belly’ to convey the predatory quest for 
resources, which through varied social relations involves extensive segments of society 
including rich and poor, and constitutes the mode of governance of African states. He also 
refers to the notion of the ‘rhizome state’ to capture the working of state institutions. In his 
words, “[the postcolonial state] functions as a rhizome of personal networks and assures the 
centralisation of power through the agencies of family, alliance and friendship” (Bayart, 2009, 
p. 261) and “it is rather an infinitely variable multiplicity of networks whose underground 
branches join together scattered points of society” (Bayart, 2009, p. 220). In this analysis, the 
generalised corruption observed across African states is not an indication of state failure but 
the reflection of social, political and economic structures that are rooted in the evolution of 
African societies. Thus, he claims, these states are not, as it has often been argued, 
disembedded from society. Instead, institutions inherited from colonialism have been adapted, 
appropriated and transformed giving rise to indigenous states. One fundamental inference 
from Bayart’s analysis is that African states have a double political life, one ‘legal’, with which 
international institutions interact, and one ‘real’, where power is actually exercised.  
On a similar register, Chabal  (2002) and Chabal and Daloz (1999) perceive the exercise of 
neo-patrimonial power as the key to African politics. Neo-patrimonialism refers to the 
circulation of power in the informal sector, a system where, instead of neutral institutions, 
personal relations between leaders and subject mediate and maintain political relationships 
(Pitcher et al., 2009). This generates states with two faces: the formal, rational, bureaucratic 
institutions of the state (the neo) and the networks through which elites seek political support 
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in exchange for various favours (deGrassi, 2008). From the viewpoint of Patrick Chabal and 
Jean-Pascal Daloz, in such regimes, political accountability rests on meeting the expectations 
of particular groups of clients. Furthermore, such flows of power indicate that states are not 
emancipated from society, “in the sense that the exercise of central political power has not 
been emancipated from the overriding dominance of localised and personalised political 
contexts” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p. 1). Thus, Chabal and Daloz argue that these states 
have not been institutionalised, and they find a clear indication of this in the generalised 
perceptions of bureaucrats not as neutral civil servants but as links to clientelist networks.  
There are important differences between Bayart’s and Chabal and Daloz’s analyses. For 
example, Chabal and Daloz have been criticized for their essentialist understandings of 
culture, which consider the ways culture can shape politics but not the opposite, how politics 
can shape culture. Bayart, on the other hand, is perceived to assume a more complex 
understanding of the continuous processes of hybridisation of culture (Meagher, 2006). 
However, they also present some important similarities. Most importantly, they both adopt 
functionalist views of the state, and focus their analyses on “how political authority and capital 
accumulation are reproduced in the context of neo-patrimonial politics” (Di John, 2010, p. 
18). In fact, as noted by DeGrassi (2008) and Pitcher et al. (2009), neo-patrimonialism has 
been widely deployed to explain the character of the African state.  
Grasping the importance of informal institutions and channels in African politics, notably the 
intricate ways in which society permeates the state and the multiple social relations 
constituting these apparatuses, the extensive literature on the African state shows the striking 
gap between these dynamics and calls for rational-bureaucratic states to deliver a set of core 
functions in a neutral manner or conceptualisations based on Marxist understandings of states 
as inevitably linked to (capitalist) class interest. Furthermore, Bayart’s analysis, for example, 
demonstrates the relevance of patron-client relationships in understanding broader relations 
between state power and social relations. Nonetheless, the deployment of concepts such as 
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neopatrimonialism and patrimonialism to describe the nature of African states presents severe 
limitations. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this research to engage in detailed discussions on the African 
state in general, it is important to highlight some of the limitations related to the widespread 
usage of the concept of neopatrimonialism, since this has influenced the search for alternative 
theorisations of the state. First, the notion of neopatrimonialism has often resulted in analyses 
that appear to be based on  limited understandings of social relations and the sources of social 
power (Mann, 2012). As argued by DeGrassi (2008), literature on neopatrimonalism and the 
African state tends to draw on anecdotal evidence across a few countries to produce 
generalisations concerning the African state. This could be explained by the real difficulties in 
accessing reliable information.  However, the aim to engage in meso-level analysis of states 
should also be taken into account as a vital factor. On the one hand, this has led to 
overgeneralisations of the African state as a uniform phenomenon, which do not take into 
account the multiple variations across the continent or, at least, lack empirical evidence to 
support such generalisations. On the other hand, such theorisations fail to consider uneven 
geographies within countries. When neopatrimonialism is said to be at the core of state 
politics, does it mean it pervades the entire territory? Does it encompass national and local 
governments? Is it a trace of variations in society and culture (deGrassi, 2008)? In addition, 
focusing on function, studies deploying the concept of neopatrimonialism tend to neglect the 
diverse histories underlying the evolution of patrimonialism, they “conceal rather than explain 
the ways everyday Africans have adapted to the nation-state and international systems” 
(Pitcher et al., 2009, p. 127).  
African essentialism, mostly evident in views of neopatrimonialism as something inherent to 
African societies, is another important critique of the use the concept. These 
conceptualisations inadvertently rely on evolutionary interpretations of “Weber’s 
categorisation of charismatic, patrimonial and bureaucratic authority, invariably associating 
rational-legal authority with ‘progress’ and with Western developed countries” (Pitcher et al., 
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2009, p. 149). For example, Chabal and Daloz (1999) infer from their analysis of 
neopatrimonialism, which exposes the blurriness of state-society boundaries,  that states in 
Africa have not yet emancipated from society and been institutionalised. Furthermore, in their 
analyses they inherently locate the patrimonial in African traditions that are encroaching on 
‘imported’ rational-bureaucratic institutions. Such interpretations implicitly suggest a 
comparison with ideal types, where emancipation and institutionalisation have happened. 
Related to this, deGrassi (2008, p. 113) argues that “the dualism between ‘neo’ and 
‘patrimonial’ echoes the much criticised dichotomies of modernity and tradition”. Thus, 
despite Bayart, Chabal and Daloz’s claims to move beyond conceptualisations of the African 
state enacted through comparisons with their Western counterparts, their analyses continue 
to be  rooted in and, possibly to further nurture, idealisations of the Western state (deGrassi, 
2008; Pitcher et al., 2009). Just to give an idea of alternative lines of interpretation, Gupta 
(1995) looking at the blurriness between state and society revealed in lower-level bureaucrats’ 
operations in Indian villages, argues that “those categories [state and civil society] are 
descriptively inadequate to the lived realities that they purport to represent” (p. 384). And, he 
relates the inadequacy to these concepts to their rootedness in European states. 
Critics of neopatrimonialism have also demonstrated that these analyses both overestimate 
patrimonialism in African nations and underestimate it in their western counterparts 
(deGrassi, 2008; Pitcher et al., 2009). Furthermore, these accounts neglect to consider that 
“patrimonial leaders [can] be held accountable by the collective”. Or, that “a mutually 
constitutive relationship [can exist] between the personal and the public” (Pitcher et al., 2009, 
p. 149). Here, Pitcher et al.’s (2009) study, breaking the inevitable chains between patron-
client relations, state failure and economic stagnation, is particularly relevant. These scholars 
question whether assumptions concerning the relations between neopatrimonialism, 
economic development and democracy at the heart of most analyses of the state in Africa 
should be taken for granted. Referring to tendencies to downplay patrimonialism in western 
societies and drawing on their analysis of patrimonialism, legitimacy and socio-economic 
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development in Botswana, they claim that, in fact, in many societies “significant elements of 
patrimonialism survive and thrive today without decisively undermining democratic processes 
or economic development” (2009, p. 127). They insist that “informal institutions such as 
patron-client relations or personal ties can complement and even reinforce formal institutions 
associated with democracy and rule of law while remaining distinct from them” (2009, p. 44). 
Thus, contrary to what is often assumed, Pitcher et al. (2009) show that patron-client 
relationships are not incompatible with functioning bureaucratic states, neither do they 
necessarily obstruct economic development or the emergence of democratic institutions.  
In addition, like a range of neo-Weberian and neo-Marxist analyses of the state, studies of the 
neo-patrimonial state frequently reduce investigations of the state to a set of limited processes 
and functions. In Painter’s (2006, p. 753) words they are founded on “the idea that the state 
constitutes or occupies a distinct and identifiable segment of the social whole (‘the sphere of 
the state’), which then ‘interacts with’, ‘intervenes in’, ‘depends upon’ or ‘regulates’ other 
distinct social spheres such as ‘the economy’, ‘civil society’, ‘private life’ and so on”. This is 
evident in the ways in which Chabal and Daloz (1999), for example, perceive African states 
to have not yet emancipated from society. Related to this, and most importantly in the context 
of this research, such conceptualisations of the state do not provide us with the analytical tools 
necessary to make sense of a range of everyday state practices through which people 
experience the state. Thus, this research turns to alternative theorisations of the state, which 
question such reified views of the state and investigate everyday state practices. The next 
section discusses how these theorisations of the state and investigations of state practices allow 
for analyses that take into consideration the ways in which everyday, embodied state practices 
can inform both conceptualisations of the state and the everyday lives of people. Moreover, it 
demonstrates how ethnographic explorations of states facilitate the task of bringing diverse 
states into the same conceptual plane without falling into hierarchical categorisations. 
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3.3. Ethnographic approaches to the study of states 
In his investigation of state practices in rural India, Gupta (1995, p. 375) hints at a crucial 
paradox querying, “does the ubiquity of the state make it invisible”? On the one hand, he is 
faced with the extent to which the state has become imbricated in everyday life, as detected, 
for example, in the intense debates and gossips about the state thriving in daily conversations. 
On the other hand, he is faced with the scarcity of analysis exploring the ways in which these 
everyday state practices, at the heart of daily dialogues, affect the lives of people. Crucially, 
this paradox also touches the core of understandings of urban water infrastructure. Analyses 
of water provision in urban areas have shown the multiple ways in which poor 
neighbourhoods are excluded from water systems managed or regulated by different types of 
state entities, rightly highlighting exclusionary state practices and discourses. However only 
recently have researchers started looking into the multiple ways in which residents of these 
neighbourhoods nonetheless routinely interact with state actors in attempts to secure access 
to water.  
This absence of analyses focusing on the various ways in which everyday state practices shape 
everyday life can be traced in the prevalence of theorisations of the state that cannot capture 
or comprehend these practices. And, this is because these theorisations rely on a priori notions 
of unified, coherent states. Since these views of the state cannot perceive and interpret the 
lived ways in which states both affect the everyday lives of people and are constructed through 
these interactions, they are relegated to the domain of informality or read as deviations from 
the normal functioning, and strategies of the state. In this way, they are not considered 
relevant for either wider understandings of the state or investigations of the ways in which 
states shape everyday lives. Yet, there is an expanding body of work critiquing reified notions 
of the state and exploring everyday state practices as ways to work towards richer notions of 
the state. These understandings of the state not only propose richer starting points for 
theorisations of the state, which are more relevant to a diversity of urban situations, but they 
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also allow us to meaningfully analyse everyday state practices in investigations of water 
infrastructure.  
In effect, there is now a relevant body of literature inspired by Foucauldian understandings of 
governmentality and knowledge/power, defying reified understandings of the state (Abrams, 
1988; Corbridge et al., 2005; Ferguson and Gupta, 2005; Gupta, 1995; Hansen and 
Stepputat, 2001; Mitchell, 1991; Mountz, 2003; Nugent, 2007; Painter, 2006, 1995; Rose and 
Miller, 1992; Valverde, 2011). Mitchell (1991, p. 94; see also, Abrams, 1988) argues, “the state 
needs to be analysed as such a structural effect. That is to say, it should be examined not as 
an actual structure but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such 
structures appear to exist”. What emerges from this analysis is the idea of the state as a 
symbolic entity with real effects, an entity that cannot be separated from society and that 
largely supersedes its designated organisations and mechanisms, which are in any case 
impossible to delimit. Having established the elusiveness, porosity and shiftiness of the state-
society boundary as an essential characteristic, “the uncertain yet powerful distinction 
between state and society” (Mitchell, 1991, p. 78) that produces the ‘structural effect of the 
state’  is perceived to result from the practices of numerous state and non-state organisations, 
rather than merely those of a limited number of state organisations. In Painter’s (2006, p. 758) 
words, “statization can be defined not as the growing control of society by a separate sphere 
called the state, but as the intensification of the symbolic presence of the state across all kinds of social 
practices and relations.”  This perspective challenges distinctions between state and society, which 
perceive the state as an autonomous entity above society. It also challenges notions of the state 
as a unified set of institutions, since it perceives its effects as the result of numerous practices 
enacted by both state and non-state organisations.   
Focusing on ethnographic explorations of everyday state practices, Mountz (2003), Painter 
(2006), Hansen and Stepputat (2001) and Gupta (1995) have further extended critiques of 
abstract theorisations of states, and somewhat totalising Foucauldian inspired views of modern 
governing techniques, exposing the necessary gaps, contradictions and unintended effects of 
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state practices. As argued by Painter (2006), if the state emerges through the imbricated 
practices of both state and non-state organisations, then it follows that understandings of the 
state require detailed investigations of these practices. Related to this, he develops the notion 
of prosaic geographies of stateness. The notion of prosaic refers to the “unsystematic, the 
indeterminate and the unintended” (Painter, 2006, p. 763) which, he rightly argues, is missing 
from perspectives adopting governmentality approaches. For example, turning to the simple 
act of writing and passing a legislation, he highlights the multiplicity of actions and actors 
involved and suggests that their mundane practices vitally influence the process in ways that 
should be accounted in theorisations of the state. In this way, Painter highlights the 
heterogeneity, complexity and contradictoriness of state institutions and, consequently, 
naturalises the gaps between intentions and implementation, which are at the heart of state 
practices but are rarely mentioned and accounted for in state theory.   
On a similar register, Mountz (2003) scrutinises how investigations of everyday state practices 
can generate new insights, and more nuanced views of the ways in which the state is 
constituted. In her analysis of cross-institutional responses to human smuggling in Canada, 
she describes the contradictory responses by different institutions of the state, highlighting the 
different agendas and interests, which co-exist within this apparatus. But, Mountz also 
excavates another layer through which the messiness of state practices materialises in the ways 
policies are enacted: she demonstrates how policies are necessarily mediated through social 
relations and the experiences, subjectivities and emotions of state bureaucrats. Thus, she 
claims “it is through the feminist strategy of embodiment that the actual power of the state 
materialises in daily practice” (2003, p. 623). 
Gupta’s (1995, p. 376) analysis of everyday state practices in rural India constructs an image 
of a fragmented state encompassing multiple institutions and actors revealing little 
coordination between them. In addition, he demonstrates the fluidity between the public and 
the private, or state and society apparent in the operations of bureaucrats. This is most 
obviously apparent in the ways in which state officials work from the private space of their 
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home. However, rather than opposing such fragmentation and fluidity to a supposed coherent 
notion of the state, Gupta rightly argues “we should leave open the analytical question as to 
the conditions under which the state does operate as a cohesive and unitary whole” (1995, p. 
392). Thus, rather than compare this multiplicity of the state with a supposed coherent and 
unified apparatuses, scholars should investigate and make sense of this multiplicity of state 
actors and institutions whose practices consistently navigate, and undermine, the public and 
private divide.  How do these practices shape the everyday lives of people? What do they tell 
us about the state?  
Mariana Valverde (2011, p. 280) explores the inevitable multiplicity and contradictions 
underlying modern states and government techniques, and excavates the necessary “internal 
contradictions that develop within the seeing like a state gaze”. Dialoguing with Scott’s (1999) 
influential notion, ‘seeing like a state’, which describes the rise of the modern state in the form 
of centralised management based on expert knowledge, she demonstrates that “governing 
urban disorder through embodied, experiential, and relational categories is a necessary 
component of contemporary urban governance” (2011, p. 280). Valverde also suggests that “ 
cities’ efforts to replace subjective, aesthetic, relational categories by hard-and-fast, objective, 
seeing like a state rules constantly undermines itself” (2011, p. 280). Grappling with the failures 
and contradictions implicit to modern governing techniques, Valverde draws attention to the 
necessary persistence of subjective, embodied logics in state practices. These, she argues, are 
not to be perceived as deviations, failures or in the process of disappearing but as inbuilt 
characteristics of the state, since they can never be eliminated and they vitally affect processes 
and outcomes. In fact, they should be seen as revealing the necessary blurriness of the state 
society boundary and the embeddedness of states.  
An essential contribution emerging from this body of work has been the devising of analytical 
and methodological tools that make it possible to bring diverse states – namely African, Asian, 
European, Latin American – into the same conceptual plane whilst appreciating their 
necessarily distinct historical trajectories and specificities. Ethnographic approaches focusing 
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on the mundane and everyday practices of states reject views of the state as coherent 
autonomous entities and highlight the contradictions inherent to all states and the necessary 
blurriness between state and society. Anthropological explorations of state thus dismiss some 
of the idealisations of Western states, which have contributed to placing African and Asian 
states in special categories highlighting their failures (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; Mitchell, 
1991; Mountz, 2003; Nugent, 2007; Painter, 2006, 1995; Valverde, 2011). 
Related to this, Hansen and Stepputat (2001) suggest that, in order to move beyond 
conceptualisations of postcolonial states as flawed replicas of Western states, researchers 
should focus, first, on teasing out the ways in which the idea of the modern state became 
universalised and, second, on how ‘languages of stateness’ – i.e. “a bundle of widespread and 
globalised registers of governance and authority” through which states are continuously 
constructed (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001, p. 5) – have travelled to infiltrate diverse contexts 
in different ways, being transformed, adapted, re-invented in the process. Notably, in this view 
of the historical trajectories of states, the languages of stateness are not only transformed and 
adapted in diverse places but, importantly, they do not necessarily emanate from the West. In 
this way they propose a range of ethnographic sites from which to investigate the diverse 
languages of stateness in different contexts, an approach that contrasts with general 
abstractions on the nature of states.  
However, the most important idea emerging from this literature in the context of this research, 
is that views of the state focusing on a broad range of practices by both state and non-state 
actors allow for the consideration of what might appear as culturally specific, disjointed, 
fragmented practices in light of processes of state formation. On the one hand, these 
perspectives account for the ways in which different organisations and institutions become 
extended arms of the state (Hilbrandt et al., n.d.; Painter, 2006). On the other hand, and 
perhaps more relevant for theorisations of water infrastructure in Bafatá and many other 
secondary cities in Africa, they devise ways to allow “the state to be disaggregated… without 
prejudging their unity or coherence” (Gupta, 1995, p. 375). This means that multiple, 
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diverging state practices can be scrutinised without jumping to conclusions regarding the 
nature of the state. Instead, they are taken as indicators of the various modalities of the state. 
Going back to Pitcher et al.’s (2009) account of patrimonialism in Botswana, it allows, for 
example, for analyses of patrimonialism at different levels in different institutions without 
proposing generalisations of neopatrimonial power as the form of the African state or 
suggesting the exceptionality of these states. It enables one to view and consider the state as 
violent and benefactor, neoliberal and developmental all at once. This is in contrast with 
notions of state as a unified coherent entity which result in analyses that focus on one specific 
agenda and fail to account for the multiple modalities of the state. At the same time, such an 
approach enables researchers looking at everyday state practices to consider these not as 
deviations from a supposed unified, coherent state but as the lived geographies of states, part 
of the ways in which all states shape everyday lives and ideas of the state are constructed.  
This is not to simply say that local accounts are sufficient or, in any case more important, to 
make sense of states (Gupta, 1995). Instead, it means that an attention to everyday state 
practices can generate more nuanced views, which can influence the ways in which we 
interpret reality. For example, Mamdani (1996) and Bayart (2009) have criticised structuralist 
theorisations for their tendency to concentrate solely on the weak integration of African 
nations in international economic circulations and their manipulation by external actors, 
therefore reducing the evolution of African societies to externally driven transformations and 
eliminating any possibilities for African agency. Such views, they argue, activate external 
periodizations, which overemphasise the impact of Western nations at the expense of 
vernacular processes. As argued by Bayart (2009), Herbst (2000) and Chabal and Daloz 
(1999), the colonial period constituted an important episode but it did not amount to a total 
re-making of African structures. For instance, as Bayart suggests, “the colonial moment, 
apprehended in terms of its historicity, is an encounter with other dynamics, equally endowed 
with their own historicity, which no amount of military occupation, political repression, 
civilising mission, evangelisation or economic development can effect” (Bayart, 2009, p. xvi). 
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What emerges from these considerations is the necessity to investigate African states in relation 
to the specific histories of the diverse African nations. This involves considering, for example, 
how states co-exist with, incorporate, extend or replace alternative political structures, such as 
customary authorities. But, it also entails accounting for the ways various actors adopt, 
transform, ignore and contest international influences and impositions.   
Here, investigations of the everyday practices of states and non-state organisations involved 
in policy-making and implementation can reveal some of the ways in which international 
policies and impositions are adopted, transformed and contested. In fact, as discussed before, 
policies, laws and projects are not mere abstractions implemented in coordinated ways. Thus, 
focusing on the practices that lead to the adoption and guide the implementation of policies 
promoted, or imposed, by international organisations can shed light on the multiple ways in 
which different actors, inadvertently or advertently, adopt, transform, perform, avoid or reject 
such interventions. Focusing on the embodied practices can prevent overgeneralisations 
concerning the reach of specific agendas while shedding light on how multiple actors, through 
their situated practices framed by structural limitations, defy specific projects and open up 
possibilities for alternatives.  Rather than working with a priori generalisation, the motivations 
and rationalities underpinning state practices are turned into an object of enquiry that allow 
for analyses of the various modalities at play within different states. 
3.4. Ethnographic explorations of state practices in investigations of 
urban infrastructure 
This section examines investigations of urban infrastructure adopting more nuanced views of 
the state, notably in the African and Indian contexts (Anand, 2011a, 2011b; McFarlane and 
Desai, 2015; Truelove, 2011), and explores their contributions to understandings of water 
infrastructure and state practices.  
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In his detailed account of the variety of strategies adopted by urban dwellers to secure access 
to water in Mumbai, Anand (2011a, 2011b) identifies multiple meaningful interactions 
between settlers and distinct state actors. In particular, like Bapat and Agarwal (2003), he 
demonstrates how settlers successfully liaised with elected councillors to secure access to a 
piped supply in neighbourhoods that were not legally entitled to services, whilst other areas of 
the city with a legal entitlement to services continued to struggle to enact these. Most 
importantly, Anand notes that the ways in which urban dwellers mobilised the support of 
councillors demonstrate that whereas legal and policy frameworks matter, informal 
relationships with state actors can also result either in the practical achievement of legal rights 
or in their consolidation. In this way, he suggests that legal entitlements and formal policies 
and interventions are not enough to explain the ways in which states influence access to water. 
For Anand, the blurriness between public and private, state and society becomes evident in 
the ways patron-client relationships are mobilised to secure access to the water system. Thus, 
these operations challenge theorisations of the state and politics that draw on artificial 
distinctions between state, society and markets. On a similar register, McFarlane and Desai 
(2015) explore sites of entitlement constructed through everyday sanitation practices in 
Mumbai. In their analysis these practices of entitlement are produced through a variety of 
social relations of which the state is an inevitable part.  Thus, they argue, “ethnographic 
studies reveal the state not as an entity ‘up there’, above society, but as constituted by a 
multiplicity of actors, sites and practices that permeate and are reshaped through society and 
everyday life” (McFarlane and Desai, 2015, p. 5).  
Emerging from these investigations are therefore insights into the ways in which everyday 
water and sanitation practices are shaped by states and, conversely, how these practices shape 
the state. In this way, these scholars rely on, and contribute to, more detailed and nuanced 
understandings of the state.  In no way should these studies detract from investigations of the 
ways in which national policies and regulations drive the exclusion of certain groups and areas 
(Graham et al., 2013; McFarlane, 2008a; Roy, 2005). However, neither should these 
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mundane practices be ignored as they constitute both the ways in which systematic exclusions 
are materialised and the broader ways in which state practices shape everyday lives and legal, 
abstract principles are enacted.  As argued by McFarlane and Desai (2015), but also Gupta 
(1995) and Rankin (2011), these practices also open possibilities for political actions and 
effective improvements in access to urban services. 
Ethnographic explorations of states are particular important in the context of African cities, 
and especially small secondary cities. For instance, Fourchard (2011) and Lindell (2008) have 
demonstrated the ways in which state practices, which cannot be framed within formal 
institutions, policies or legal frameworks, vitally shape urban processes in Lagos and Maputo. 
Fourchard establishes that well-circulated portrayals of urban services in Lagos as self-
regulatory systems developed by the people to overcome the lack of state investment on urban 
infrastructure amounts to a misconception of reality. Instead, he argues, these systems unveil 
a multiplicity of complex power relations and connections among different individuals, 
associations, political parties and the state. Focusing on the particular cases of markets and 
transport, he renounces simplistic understandings, which depict these as operating within the 
informal domain, and points out the multiple ways in which the state is actually involved in 
shaping these sectors. He argues that these dynamics should, in fact, be positioned within 
processes of state formation in Nigeria. Lindell (2008) develops a similar argument critiquing 
views of the hollowing out of the state in urban governance caused by a narrow focus on 
policy-making and implementation. Examining an informal vendor association in Maputo, 
she demonstrates that, whilst government bodies might lack the ability to implement policies 
or deliver services, they exert significant influence on urban processes. She claims, “[urban] 
governance should be seen to encompass a wider range of activities or practices through which 
the state and other actors steer the economy and society. (…) In fact, [these practices] might 
go against existing politics or even break the law” (Lindell, 2008, p. 1883). Thus, both these 
scholars highlight, on the one hand, that diverging state practices are essential to the ways in 
which urban processes play out and, on the other hand, that these practices should not be 
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perceived as outliers of the normal functioning of the state but are inherent to processes of 
state formation.  
Overall, these scholars demonstrate the multiple and contradictory ways in which residents 
experience the state and the relevance of everyday state practices which often exceed policy 
and regulatory frameworks. These investigations focusing on everyday state practices 
contradict ideas of an autonomous, distant and unified state and, crucially, identify how both 
everyday lives and the state are shaped through these interactions. Where some scholars, like 
Anand (2015, 2011a, 2011b), have started to re-think broader understandings of the role of 
the state in water provision in light of these everyday practices, there is the need to expand 
these analyses, particularly in the context of small African cities.  
3.5. Conclusion 
Anthropological explorations of states and investigations of everyday state practices applied 
to studies of water provision can generate more nuanced and detailed understandings of the 
multiplicity of ways in which states shape water provision in cities. Crucially, these 
perspectives allow for the analytical consideration of the ways in which state institutions, 
practices and power routinely transcend pre-conceived state-society boundaries when shaping 
water provision. Related to this, these notions of the state can open the analytical view to the 
multiple modalities inherent to the workings of states and to a range of practices which have 
frequently been ignored in research on urban water supply.  
Ethnographic approaches to the state are especially significant in contexts such as that of 
Bafatá and other small cities in Africa where the weakness of state institutions often results in 
speculations concerning its absence or in a narrow focus on the violent, predatory modalities 
through which the state is often experienced. Investigations of everyday state practices can 
instead demonstrate the multiple, contradictory ways in which states shape water 
infrastructure in these cities, and can be instrumental in helping to ‘locate’ the distinct 
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modalities of the state. This includes a broad range of states practices that take place beyond 
formal bureaucracies. In contexts where bureaucratic institutions and legal and policy 
frameworks are often hardly perceptible, anthropological explorations of states allow for state 
presence to be acknowledged, as it is, without jumping to conclusions or relying on pre-
existing theorisations concerning the nature of the state. In addition, ethnographic 
explorations of the state allow for detailed considerations of the weaknesses affecting state 
practices from the perspective of its current operations rather than in relation to ideal notions. 
These approaches also allow for investigations of how states, among and in concert with other 
actors, shape water infrastructure. Thus, ethnographic explorations of states can overcome 
some of the limitations related to theorisations of the state underpinning water policies and 
political ecology/ economy approaches.  
A focus on everyday state practices shaping water delivery can also provide clues to processes 
of state formation and promote the regrounding of theorisations of the state. Scholars have 
reflected upon the statisation of society and how state effects are produced in multiple sites 
across the porous state-society boundaries. Yet, in contexts such as that of Bafatá, the case-
study of this research, state and non-state practices in the water sector have to be understood 
in the context of the ongoing competition between different actors and broader discursive 
constructions fostering images of a weak, corrupt and incompetent state. This context can 
affect processes related to the statisation of society. However, the reduced symbolic presence 
of the state in the sector should not be equated with the state’s inability to shape water 
infrastructure. As will be demonstrated in chapter 6, the state has shaped water provision in 
Bafatá in significant ways not through enforcing policy and regulatory frameworks, but 
through the decisions and practices of various state actors, routinely acting beyond formal 
bureaucracies. In addition, it has also influenced water supply in relational ways through 
interactions with non-state organisations.  
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– FOUR –  
Research methodology: 
 an ethnographic approach to the study of urban infrastructure 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews the research methods undergirding this project, and grapples with 
questions inherent to the research process concerning the production of knowledge about 
urban infrastructure in a small city in Africa. The next section, section 4.2., discusses 
epistemological, ontological and methodological questions related to this project’s choice of a 
qualitative methodology and, more precisely, an ethnographic approach. Such an approach 
is in line with the analytical framework proposed in previous chapters. But, it also enabled the 
themes of this research to emerge through my interactions in the field, and allowed for a longer 
and ongoing process of negotiation of identities. Then, section 4.3. gives the reader an overview 
of data collection and scrutinises the methods adopted for collecting data, namely interviews 
and participant observation, as they unfolded during fieldwork. Finally, section 4.4. turns to the 
stages of data analysis and writing. In line with the methodological approach adopted, 
questions of positionality and reflexivity are addressed throughout the chapter. Here, I discuss 
my positionality as a white European researcher and development worker and the ways in 
which I often became not only involved but also part of processes I was investigating.  
4.2. A qualitative methodology, an ethnographic approach 
This research adopts a qualitative methodology to assemble a narrative of how water 
infrastructure is being shaped, governed and used in a small secondary African city, in an 
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analysis that extends across the conceptual, discursive and everyday levels. In line with 
widespread contemporary critiques of positivist research paradigms, this study takes 
knowledge to be situated, partial and constructed from the intersubjective encounter between 
researcher and researched (Denzin and Lincoln, 2012; Limb and Dwyer, 2001a).  
Postcolonial and feminist scholars have sought to unravel depictions of the researcher as a 
neutral figure ‘finding out’ about the social world and to incite debates on representations of 
the ‘other’. Alternatively, these scholars have produced an extensive and diverse literature 
articulating the ways in which positionality, of both researcher and researched, and the 
dynamic and intersubjective encounter between the two shape, and must be taken into 
account during all stages of the research (Haraway, 1988; Ley and Mountz, 2001; Nagar, 
2002; Pile, 1991; Radcliffe, 1994; Raghuram and Madge, 2006; Rose, 1997; Sidaway, 1992; 
Smith, 2001). Fundamentally, what emerges from this thrust of literature is that the researcher 
can no longer claim her invisibility. Reflexivity has become an essential component of any 
project adopting qualitative methodologies in the construction of knowledge. Hereby, 
reflexivity can be understood as the process through which the researcher makes sense of her 
own positionality (e.g. gender, race, nationality, age), the micro and macro power relations 
framing the research encounter and the dynamic identities at play during fieldwork 
interactions but also in the processes of interpretation and representation.  
Having situated this research project within postcolonial critiques of urban studies creates an 
added obligation for a careful consideration of my positionality, and related debates 
concerning interpretation and representations of the ‘other’. I am a white, middle-class, 
Portuguese woman completing a PhD in a British University. And, I’m studying Bafatá, a 
Guinea-Bissauan city. Guinea-Bissau gained full independency from Portugal just over 40 
years ago, in 1974. Reflexivity, as the ongoing and multi-dimensional process through which 
I reflected on my positionality, was an essential labour throughout the entire research process. 
It entailed an appreciation of how intersecting macro and micro relations of power affected 
my subjective research encounters and subsequent interpretations. It required a constant 
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questioning of how my interpretations were driven by dominant discursive constructions or, 
conversely, by my reactions to these discourses. Yet, I agree with Gillian Rose (1997) when, 
inspired by Gibson-Graham (1994) and Butler (2006),  she argues that identities are performed 
in each moment, rather than fixed and discoverable. Reflexivity can never fully account for 
the ongoing processes inherent to the transformation of subjectivities. I will discuss this further 
below.  
Reflexivity is not enough. Postcolonial and feminist interventions have also scrutinised the 
politics of research. As argued by Radcliffe (1994, p. 29), “‘we’ must act to make use of the 
authority inherent in our positions to challenge global relations of patriarchies, racisms and 
colonialisms”. In fact, just as the production of knowledge was intimately linked to the colonial 
project promoting specific interventions, contemporary academic research is necessarily 
constitutive of particular geopolitical and economic structures (Nagar, 2002; Radcliffe, 1994; 
Raghuram and Madge, 2006; Sidaway, 1992). Thus, reflections on global circulations of 
knowledge and the ways it is linked to particular configurations of power must be at the heart 
of any research project. Our role as researchers is to seek to reconfigure these relations. This 
entails recognising political engagement as part of the research process.  
Related to this, Raghuram and Madge (2006, p. 271) call for a “radical reconstruction of 
history and knowledge production demanding attention to a diversity of perspectives and 
priorities”. In previous chapters, I discussed some of the implications of postcolonial critiques 
for urban theory. Naturally, there are also fundamental methodological implications resulting 
from postcolonial calls for the reconstruction of knowledge. For instance, considering how 
often  a researcher from the North travels to the South on fieldwork to then engage in 
theoretical debates that remain locked in the North, scholars have argued for collaborative 
encounters through which research questions, themes and even theoretical constructs are 
defined through dialogical and participative processes between researcher and researched 
(Radcliffe, 1994; Raghuram and Madge, 2006; Sidaway, 1992). For example, Nagar (2002) 
shared her findings with those she carried out her research with and discussed the ways in 
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which they suited their political engagements. These are strategies to make research more 
accountable and to create knowledge that relates to the debates and motivations of the 
researched. In Nagar’s words the “‘Western’/ ‘Northern’ academy cannot choose to remain 
silent (…) simply because there is a messy politics of power and representation involved in the 
fieldwork encounter. Rather, they should accept the challenge of figuring out how to 
productively engage with and participate in mutually beneficial knowledge production about 
those struggles” (Nagar, 2002, p. 181). 
 
Within qualitative methodologies, an ethnographic approach, including interviews and 
participant observation as methods for data collection, was considered to be the appropriate 
method to accumulate multiple perspectives, meanings and understandings of everyday 
practices related to the production, governing and use of water infrastructure in Bafatá. 
Denzin and Lincoln (2012) suggest that the use of different methods – such as different types 
of interviews, informal conversations and participant observation in the case of this project – 
allows not only for verification but also for in-depth analysis. “Triangulation is not a tool or a 
strategy for validation, but an alternative to validation” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2012, p. 5). 
Thus, the agglomeration of multiple perspectives and empirical material not only results in 
added rigor but it also generates complexity and richness. It generates questions, it challenges 
temporary assumptions and it induces further reflection. 
Simultaneously, doing an ethnography, I engaged in “an ongoing attempt to place specific 
encounters, events and understandings into a fuller, more meaningful context” (Tedlock, 
2000, p. 455). I sought not only to make sense of people’s varied perspectives and 
understandings but also to look at “how people do ‘things’, how they make the world as it goes 
along, as it becomes” (Smith, 2001, p. 23). Such an approach allowed me to explore how 
social forces are apprehended and enacted by agents in their everyday lives (Herbert, 2000) 
but also how everyday practices both reproduce and transform social processes (Crang and 
Cook, 2007a). As Clarke (2012, p. 227) argues, “ethnography can make visible the unfinished 
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character of governing”. Engaging with the messy everyday practices, ethnographic accounts 
set the tone for investigations that move beyond reified, united and cohesive accounts of 
governing. Instead, processes of domination are examined from the multiplicity of practices 
through which these are sustained, repaired and reconstructed.   
4.3. Research sample: overview of data collection, interviews and 
participant observation 
I carried out my research activities in Guinea-Bissau, between the cities of Bafatá – where I 
was based – and Bissau, the capital – where I occasionally visited (see Figure 1 above), over a 
period of 11 months, between May 2013 and April 2014. The aim was to compose a ‘montage’ 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2012, p. 4), comprising a cumulative and broad range of perspectives, 
understandings and everyday practices attached to the production, governing and use of water 
Figure 1. Map of Guinea-Bissau 
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infrastructure in the city of Bafatá. Methods for data collection included interviews and both 
active and passive participant observation. In-depth interviews provided a way to gather 
information on informants’ perspectives and understandings. Participant observation enabled 
me to explore how people did things rather than how they talked about them and to gain 
knowledge of the context I was studying (Smith, 2001; Valentine, 2001). In addition, 
ethnographic research constituted a way of telling and presenting that which remained 
unspoken and was not revealed in interviews, as well as a way of engaging with the unfolding of 
events (Back, 2013). Such an approach also allowed me, and others, to negotiate positions and 
encounters over time.  
A total of 94 interviews were conducted with a range of different informants from water users 
in Bafatá to high rank state officials in Bissau. Ethnographic research with the city’s water 
operator, ASPAAB, NGO TESE, the Regional Offices of the Department of Water Resources 
in Bafatá, and the Water and Sanitation Group of Guinea-Bissau complemented these 
interviews. Table 1 below gives an overview of my data collection including: brief descriptions 
of the organisations I interviewed and/or carried participant observation with, a list of 
interviews conducted, and a summary of the nature of the participant observation carried out. 
A complete list of interviews can be found in Appendix I. 
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 Description List of Interviews Participant Observation 
ASPAAB ASPAAB - Associação de Saneamento Básico, Proteção da Água e Ambiente de Bafatá  
Non-governmental organisation, operator of Bafatá’s water network since 2006, 5-
years concession contract signed in 2012 between ASPAAB and the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Energy. 
 
• Water Management Unit personnel  
• Association Management personnel 
• Animators 
• Waste Management Unit personnel 
• Members 
Total: 9 interviews 
(a few informants held more than one 
position within the organisation) 
• ‘Hanging out4’ in association’s offices several times 
a week over a period of 11 months; 
• Informal conversations with personnel and 
members of organisation; 
• Accompanied Water Management Unit technical 
personnel in their routine activities, such as revenue 
collection, repairs or routine meetings; 
• Attended a number of internal meetings; 
• Collaborated in the elaboration of project proposal 
and funding application to donors and in the 
organisation of events; 
• Accompanied and/or participated in various 
activities under Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu project (see 
below); 
• Attended a number of events organised by the 
organisation. 
STATE Department of Water Resources (Water Resources)  
Department of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources; entity responsible for 
sectorial policy and for monitoring the management of water resources and water 
supply in urban and rural areas;  
Regional Offices of the Department of Water Resources in Bafatá (Regional Offices):  
Representative of Water Resources in the region of Bafatá; 
Governor of Bafatá: (non-elected) representative of the state in the region of Bafatá. 
• State officials (and ex-personnel) 
from Regional Offices 
• State officials from Water Resources 
• Governor of Bafatá  
Total: 8 interviews 
• ‘Hanging out’ in offices of the Regional Offices of 
the Department of Water Resources in Bafatá 
several times a week over a period of 11 months;  
• Informal conversations with state officials; 
• Several visits to the Department of Water Resources 
in Bissau and informal conversations with state 
officials.   
 
Traditional 
authorities 
Customary authorities are not part of the administrative apparatuses of the state. 
However, they are well recognised institutions in the city and country. The ‘regolado’ 
of Bafatá extends beyond the limits of the city but it does not cover the entire region. 
• Neighbourhood chiefs 
• ‘Regolo’  
Total: 3 interviews 
• Attended meetings led by neighbourhood chiefs to 
raise awareness of projects being implemented. 
                                                      
4 I use the term ‘hanging out’ to refer to the time I spent in different locations, and with different people, immersed in their everyday, routine activities. During these times, I observed what was going on and engaged in informal 
conversations relevant to my research.  
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 Description List of Interviews Participant Observation 
Unicef Unicef Water and Sanitation Programme  1 Interview (1 staff member)  
European 
Commission 
Delegation of the European Union to Guinea-Bissau – Infrastructure   Programme  
Major donor for both projects: Bafatá Misti Iagu and Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu 
1 Interview (2 staff members)  
SNV SNV Netherlands Development Organisations is an international development non-
profit organisations promoting capacity development of local organisations in three 
sectors, agriculture, renewable energy, water, sanitation and hygiene.  
“Unlike many other development actors, SNV does not offer funding, but specialises in supporting the 
resourcefulness of development actors. Together we develop local capacities, strengthen governance 
systems, and make markets work for the poor.” (SNV Website)5 
Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu Project partner  
1 Interview • Attended project meetings where representatives of 
the organisation were present; (see below for list of 
activities developed within the scope of this project) 
TESE “Non-Governmental Development Organisation (NGO) that uses the concept of social innovation as an 
anchor in its operations in Portugal and in developing countries. We investigate, create, implement and 
raise awareness, building a cycle of socially innovative and sustainable solutions in response to 
traditional and emerging needs.” (TESE’s website)6 
Bafatá Misti Iagu and Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu: head project promoter 
 • Informal conversations with 8 staff members over 
period of 11 months; 
• ‘Hanging out’ in organisation’s offices, with regular 
visits; 
• Attended several events and meetings under project 
Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu headed by this organisation (see 
below for list of activities developed within the scope 
of this project). 
GAS Water and Sanitation Group (GAS) – National forum bringing together international 
organisations, NGOs and associations (national and international) and state 
representatives. This group is presided by the Department of Water Resources. The 
aim of this forum is to coordinate activities within the water and sanitation sector at the 
national level.  
 
 
 • Attended monthly meetings over a 7-month period 
(6 meetings). A complete list of meetings attended 
can be found in Appendix II. 
                                                      
5 In: http://www.snv.org/| Last accessed: 18-03-2016, 14h55 (GMT-8) 
6 In: http://tese.trtcode.com/en/index.php/who| Last accessed: 18-03-2016, 14h38 (GMT-8) 
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 Description List of Interviews Participant Observation 
Water Users Women, from different neighbourhoods in the city, responsible for collecting water for 
the household.  
 
 
 
 
49 Interviews • ‘Hanging out’ on various standpipes on a regular 
basis from opening to closing (2/3 hours); 
• ‘Hanging out’ on various hand pumps and wells on 
a regular basis; 
• Informal conversations with users as they waited 
and fetched water; 
• Informal conversations with city’s residents. 
Standpipe 
Operators 
Standpipe operators are typically nearby residents that take over responsibility for 
opening, closing, cleaning and collecting revenue at standpipes. They keep 20% of the 
revenues collected at the respective standpipe. In some cases, these operators are not 
nearby residents but people appointed by ASPAAB management.  
9 interviews • ‘Hanging out’ on various standpipes on a regular 
basis from opening to closing (2/3 hours); 
• Accompanied revenue collection from standpipe 
operators by ASPAAB water management unit; 
• Informal conversations with standpipe operators on 
various occasions over a period of 11 months. 
Hand Pump 
Managers  
These are individuals responsible for opening, closing, cleaning, charging for water 
(when that happens) and ensuring repairs and maintenance are carried out.  
11 interviews (see Appendix I for 
details) 
• ‘Hanging out’ on various hand pumps on a regular 
basis;  
• Informal conversations with users and managers.   
Table 1. Overview of data collection, including description of organisations, list of interviews and description of activities carried out under participant observation 
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4.3.1. Data collection in Bissau: Department of Water Resources, international 
organisations and GAS 
Interviews were conducted with state officials from the Department of Water Resources 
(Water Resources) in Bissau and staff members of international organisations working with 
this state department in order to engage with multiple perspectives and understandings of the 
discourses framing problematic and priorities for the water sector at the national level, as well 
as the ways in which the city of Bafatá fitted in these.  Contacts with state officials from Water 
Resources were established through personal connections and during the Water and 
Sanitation Group (GAS) meetings, held monthly in Bissau.   
Between March 2010 and March 2011, before starting my PhD, I worked for NGO TESE in 
the implementation of Bafatá Misti Iagu, an internationally funded project targeting water 
infrastructure in Bafatá (see table 3 below for more details). During this period, I was based in 
Bafatá, but often travelled to Bissau for work meetings with state representatives and donors. 
Thus, most of my informants at the Department of Water Resources were people I had 
previously met in a professional capacity.  Whereas my previous development worker ‘hat’ 
might have shaped our dialogues in vital ways, it also proved instrumental in opening access. 
It was extremely difficult to interview higher rank state officials when there were no previous 
connections, or gatekeepers with whom I had well-established personal relations. Moreover, 
going through my interviews with state officials and considering how I often referred back to 
my previous experience to demonstrate knowledge of the context and the sector, it becomes 
clear that I strategically used my credentials as a former development worker in the country 
to add ‘credibility’ to my study. Rather than being solely a researcher, my previous title 
allowed me, in some instances, to become an ‘insider’.  
Staff members from international organisations based in Bissau were recruited for interviews 
during GAS meetings. Some informants were initially rather distrustful, pointing out 
 109 
researchers’ unconstructive critiques of development and development organisations, and 
how these simply curtail any possibility for action. Yet, on some occasions, this initial hesitance 
actually stimulated insightful discussions, especially when informants were open about their 
reluctances. Also here, my previous experience as a development worker proved helpful. On 
the one hand, I was able to demonstrate inside knowledge of the sector in the country. On the 
other hand, by sharing some of my own personal reflections regarding my experience as a 
development worker in the country I was able to engage in a more balanced conversation 
than they had perhaps anticipated.  
My interviews with staff from international organisations were also affected by personal and 
institutional conflicts and informants’ perceptions of my position within those.  Where I felt 
that my links to specific organisations and assumed friendships were influencing my research 
encounters, I repeatedly reiterated my current position as a researcher and stressed that my 
goal was precisely to engage with different perspectives and understandings. I also reminded 
informants that interviews were confidential and anonymous.  
In addition to the interviews conducted with informants from Water Resources and 
international organisations working with this department, I attended six meetings of the Water 
and Sanitation Group (GAS), over a period of 7 months. GAS meets monthly bringing 
together representatives of international and national organisations as well as state institutions 
working in the sector. Carrying out participant observation with this group provided an 
alternative platform from which to engage with perspectives and understandings of the 
problematic and priorities for the sector.  By attending these meetings, I witnessed everyday 
practices and interactions between state and non-state actors, and how perspectives and 
discourses were negotiated, contested, transformed and constructed in the process. I observed 
the unfolding of events. These meetings not only helped me identify themes for my interviews 
but also continuously challenged my interpretations and understandings of their contents. 
In general, I adopted a passive role during these meetings. However, for one of the meetings 
I was asked to prepare a brief presentation of my research. I describe this episode as it 
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illustrates, first, the ways in which my positionality shaped research interactions; second, and 
relatedly, how my research became embedded in prevailing tensions between state and non-
state organisations, a key theme in my research.  
I presented at a GAS meeting that took place at the UN headquarters in Bissau. As I finished 
my presentation, one of the state representatives present at the meeting intervened. He 
claimed that until that moment, he and, most importantly, Water Resources had not been 
aware of the research I was conducting in Bafatá. Second, and related to the first point, he 
mentioned that I should have notified this department about my intentions to conduct 
research in Bafatá. Finally, given that my research focus was on water supply, he was surprised 
that I had not found it necessary to speak with the Department of Water Resources, which is 
responsible for water supply in the country. In my response, I mentioned that I had been 
working closely with state representatives from the Regional Offices of the Department of 
Water Resources in Bafatá, who were informed of my intentions; and that, in fact, I was 
extremely pleased that the Department of Water Resources was willing to receive me, I knew 
they were busy people. I added that I had not approached them before because I wanted to 
allow some time for preparation beforehand.  
The state representative’s comments, and my response, must be understood in the context of 
the ongoing tensions between state actors and non-state organisations. These tensions, 
perceptible during my interviews and at the GAS meetings I attended, were articulated, for 
example, in conflicts concerning the ways in which the role of state institutions versus non-
state organisations in the sector were understood or in clashes over who dictated the terms of 
specific events. My presence at the GAS meetings played into these tensions. The Water and 
Sanitation group was supposedly led by the Department of Water Resources. Yet, I was a 
European researcher/development worker and I had been invited to attend and present my 
work at these meetings by staff from international organisations. When I was invited to attend 
these meetings I did not reflect on how the way I had gained access to the meeting could 
influence how members perceived my position. Thus, underlying my response and my future 
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interactions there was an implicit concern to demonstrate my respect for state institutions.  I 
tried to make explicit that my research sought to move beyond pre-conceived ideas of the 
‘incompetent’ state rather than feeding discourses of non-state organisations taking over state’s 
responsibilities. This tension, in which I was directly involved, turned out to be a vital theme 
in all my interviews with state representatives and staff from international organisations. 
Whilst becoming a participant in these tensions, the combination of participant observation 
during GAS meetings and interviews  with informants allowed me to understand these 
conflicts and negotiations as they were experienced and understood in the everyday lives of 
people living them out (Crang and Cook, 2007b). 
4.3.2. Data collection in Bafatá: ASPAAB, Regional Offices and TESE 
Bafatá is a small city. This made it possible for my research activities to include all the city’s 
neighbourhoods (see Figure 2, below). Nevertheless, my research activities were purposefully 
concentrated in central neighbourhoods and, particularly, in those areas served by the 
network (see Figure 3, below). Rather than adopting criteria based on a set distance, I followed 
users’ views to define which areas were, or were not, served by the water network. I have no 
appropriate means to translate this information onto a map. Instead, figures 3 and 4 below 
show the location of the public standpipes and of the water network mains working at the time 
of my fieldwork. In these maps, the parts of the network in use at the time of my fieldwork are 
represented in white and those inactive in pink. For the sake of clarity, I have not included 
public standpipes in those areas where the water network was not working. Figure 5 displays 
the location of existing home connections. 
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Nema
Rua Porto
Coburnel Bairro 2
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Bairro 3
Tunturum
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Binalu
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Sintch Bilali
Bairro Policia
Sintcha Adulai
Figure 2. Map of Bafatá – neighbourhoods (Source: produced by author using google maps) 
standpipe
320m
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Rua Porto
Coburnel Bairro 2
Bairro 3
Bairro 4
Figure 3. Bafatá – central neighbourhoods (Source: produced by author suing googlemaps) 
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Figure 5. Bafatá piped water network: home connections (Source: Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu) 
Figure 4. Bafatá piped water network: mains and standpipes in 2014 (Source: produced by authors based on information collected 
from ASPAAB and TESE) 
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In Bafatá, participant observation and informal conversations, “characterised by a total lack 
of structure or control” (Bernard, 2006, p. 211), constituted key methods for data collection 
with the water operator (ASPAAB), and the Regional offices of the Department of Water 
Resources in Bafatá (Regional Offices).  These research activities provided me with a complex 
picture of the everyday practices through which these actors were involved in the production, 
governing and use of water infrastructure, as well as their perspectives and understandings.  
My previous experience in Bafatá, employed by NGO TESE as a local project manager in 
the implementation of the project Bafatá Misti Iagu (see table 3 below for details) necessarily 
shaped my interactions during my fieldwork. Between March 2010 and March 2011, I was 
not only a staff member of TESE, an organisation that remains a key player in the sector in 
the city, but I also worked closely with ASPAAB and the Regional Offices. One advantage 
coming from my past involvement was that the close relationships I had previously established 
with informants from these organisations vitally facilitated access. In addition, I started my 
fieldwork with considerable knowledge of the city and the sector. However, the fact that I had 
been involved in a project implemented by TESE might have limited informants’ 
predisposition to speak freely about both the project and the organisation I had worked with. 
The relations of trust I developed with several informants were essential to overcome this 
possible limitation. In other cases, to minimise such effects, I tried to emphasise my role as a 
researcher and took the initiative to share my reflections about the project I had been involved 
in and the role I played in it.  
At the time of my fieldwork, ASPAAB and the Regional Office shared the latter’s premises, 
while ASPAAB’s new offices were being built a few meters away. Over a period of 11 months 
I frequented this office on a regular basis, normally several times a week and in some instances 
on a daily basis. ‘Hanging out’  at the offices I learnt very much about these organisations 
everyday practices and gradually became immersed in their projects, activities, politics and 
sociability (Parr, 2001).  I became familiarised with the regular as well as the unpredictable 
routines relating to the operation of the water network, the small and big crises which at times 
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jeopardised the working of the network, and the practices related to the management and 
payment of personnel, revenue collection and accounting.  
Sitting outside under the shade of the trees planted in front of the office building, people came 
and went, sat, slept, prayed and chatted (to the point that, when one state official arranged for 
the trees to be pruned, significantly reducing the shade provided by these trees, several people 
complained). ‘Hanging out’ in the office, I progressively grasped the social relations being 
maintained and created. These offices, it surfaced, were not a mere work place but a location 
where people sought and maintained meaningful social relations. I became aware that for 
many being part of and/or participating in the activities of ASPAAB constitutes an important 
aspect of their identities, a means to establish social relations, seek independence, gain skills 
and search for income opportunities. Women in particular often talked about how being part 
of this organisation had influenced their ability to socialise outside their families, to express 
their opinions and feelings in public, to improve their confidence. In this way, new meanings 
related to the governing of water emerged.  
Seeking to productively (and politically) engage with the organisations I would be researching 
with (Nagar, 2002; Raghuram and Madge, 2006), at the beginning of my fieldwork in a 
meeting with ASPAAB management, we established a list of activities I would be carrying out 
with them. However, it turned out that the people I was supposed to work with were already 
very busy – working in ASPAAB, organising and participating in activities under the project 
BMMI (see table 3 below for details), teaching in local schools, attending classes in the evening, 
caring for their families. Thus, eventually, I ended up engaging with the organisation activities 
as we went along. I collaborated in the production of reports, in the writing of a project 
proposal, helped with IT (not always with much success), participated in the organisation of 
events, meetings and discussions. For a period of time, I collaborated with the Water Group 
of PONGAB (Platform for NGOs and Associations of the Region of Bafatá), which was led 
by ASPAAB.  In addition, as I will explore in more detail below, I engaged in consultancy 
work, acting as a mediator for the elaboration of the Water Plan for the city of Bafatá.  
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Over a period of 11 months carrying out participant observation with ASPAAB and the 
Regional Offices, at times my presence became uneventful, at other times it became evident 
and noticed. In particular, I was apprehensive about the ways in which my position as a white, 
European researcher/development worker, with links to NGO TESE, might translate into an 
authoritative voice. My attempts to attenuate/transform this voice were sometimes clumsy. 
For example, I attended a few training sessions for ASPAAB members involved in the 
implementation of a survey of the Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices related to water use in 
Bafatá.  At some point, the workshop facilitator, my housemate at the time with whom I had 
often discussed the contents of the training session while he was preparing them, invited me 
to participate with my insights on a particular topic. I surreptitiously refused, implicitly 
insisting on my passive role.  Reflecting about this event later on, I decided that this refusal 
had been a mistake.  I had been driven by a mix of personal anxieties related to public speaking 
but also by a misplaced concern that this invitation to speak during a training session would 
reinforce my position as the European/ white/ researcher/ development worker with an 
authoritative voice amongst members of the organisation. However, what I came to realise 
later was that negotiations related to our identities were ongoing as I spent time with ASPAAB 
members. A much better approach would have been to expose myself, the same way they 
were being asked to expose themselves. In fact, my ‘quietness’ and distance, as opposed to my 
participation, reinforced my exteriority. This could be perceived as an attempt to produce a 
unilateral gaze without creating space for dialogue, for mutual exposition (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2012). Learning by doing, I became more active yet always seeking to sense when 
my presence and comments were welcome or, on the contrary, inappropriate, invasive or 
resulting in fatigue.  
Besides participant observations and numerous informal conversations with staff from the 
Regional Offices and ASPAAB management and members, I also conducted interviews with 
informants. These interviews were, for the most part, carried out during the last three months 
of my fieldwork. In this way, they were strongly shaped by the months of ethnographic 
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research. They provided opportunities for covering a range of issues that had emerged from 
my previous research activities and for more structured dialogues on the perspectives and 
understandings of informants.  
I also conducted ethnographic research and interviews with standpipe operators. With the 
exception of two, they were normally nearby residents, and not necessarily ASPAAB 
members. Spending time at the standpipes made me familiar with the everyday practices of 
these operators and it also enabled me to build relationships that facilitated our dialogues. My 
interviews gave me insights concerning their perspectives and understandings of their roles 
and the implications for the governing and use of this infrastructure. These interviews also 
contrasted with those conducted with members of ASPAAB’s management team or users, 
providing me with yet another perspective.  
TESE, a development NGO based in Lisbon but with offices in Bafatá, has been working 
closely with ASPAAB and the Regional Offices since 2010, when their first project in Bafatá, 
BMI (see table 3 below for details), started. Since then, they have become an important player 
in the water sector in the city, mobilising significant resources and influencing governance 
models, ASPAAB, the Regional Offices and the reshaping of water infrastructure. During the 
time I worked for this NGO, before my PhD, I became familiar with the vision and ways of 
working of this organisation and its projects. During my fieldwork I also established relations 
of trust and friendship with a number of staff working in the implementation of a second 
project, BMMI. These relationships allowed for numerous informal conversations with staff 
from TESE, which contributed to my understanding of water infrastructure in Bafatá, and its 
recent evolution. Together with my engagement with the everyday practices of the 
organisation, these conversations gave me good and complex views of the perspectives of those 
involved in the implementation of BMMI and working closely with ASPAAB and the 
Regional Offices. In this way, I became aware of the ways they conformed to, contested, and 
transformed the organisation’s and project objectives. I also witnessed how they perceived, 
and, sometimes, sought to reconfigure their professional relationships with project partners, 
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such as ASPAAB and different state institutions. Given the depth of the informal conversation 
I had throughout my fieldwork with staff from TESE, I chose not to carry out formal 
interviews, which would end up being repetitive and bothersome for those being interviewed.  
I believe I had reached the point of  theoretical saturation  (Crang and Cook, 2007a). 
4.3.3. Data collection in Bafatá: water users 
Interviews with water users followed a sustained period of participant observation in various 
locations where people came to fetch water, including standpipes, hand pumps and wells. 
Hanging out in these locations observing everyday practices, allied to numerous informal 
conversations with users, made me familiar with water routines and different perspectives and 
meanings attached to these. This familiarity was essential for the interviews I then carried out. 
Whereas informal conversation taking place at the source typically involved several people, I 
chose to carry out interviews away from those places in order to secure some degree of privacy 
and one-to-one interactions. This proved to be a fruitful approach as informants were more 
open about, for example, conflicts at the source. In private I was also more comfortable to 
point out discrepancies between what was said and done and people, in general, were more 
willing to discuss these.  
My social circles in Bafatá included mostly people related to ASPAAB or, in some way, the 
water sector. For this reason, I chose to seek informants (water users) outside my social 
networks. The majority of water users were recruited by approaching people while walking 
around in the neighbourhoods, and carried out in the ‘courtyards’ of those interviewed.  As I 
approached potential informants, I explained the theme of the interview and its purposes and 
asked for consent. My gender, race and nationality necessarily influenced my dialogues. 
Despite my attempts to introduce myself as a researcher, rather than a development worker, 
it was clear that people often associated me with development organisations. This was visible 
in comments such as “we need water, make them [NGOs] bring us water” or in answers that 
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attempted to conform to messages being circulated around water quality. Nevertheless, 
interviews with a significant number of informants resulted in productive conversations about 
their practices, meanings and understandings around water. Being an outsider, I was also 
more willing to be surprised and informants more accepting of my often naïve questions. 
These interviews gave me a good insight into the practices of those interviewed as well as the 
meanings associated with those practices.  Table 2 below lists interviews by neighbourhood 
and Figure 6 provides an overview of the sources used by those interviewed. Of those 
interviewed, 37% were served by the piped water network (this means that they were 
considered to be close to a public standpipe or have a home connection) but only 22% got at 
least some of their water from the water network on a regular basis (see Figure 6, below). 
Nevertheless, the proportion of informants stating they were relying on the piped network to 
collect at least some of their water is still higher than the estimated 12% of the population of 
Bafatá which, under a survey carried out by ASPAAB and TESE in 2013, was found to have 
access and use the water network on a regular basis.  This is because my research activities, 
whilst not aiming to be statistically representative, did give more attention to the central 
neighbourhoods of the city, where changes created by the introduction of the water network 
were most obvious.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Bafatá population and interviews with water users by neighbourhood 9  
                                                      
9 See Appendix II for more details. INE Census 2009, neighbourhoods regrouped by ASPAAB from 21 to 17 No information was 
found concerning the reliability of Census data in Guinea-Bissau.  
Neighbourhood Served by network? % pop. Number of interviews 
Iussi  No 10.33 5 
Ponte Nova No 11.83 5 
Caibara No 9.68 4 
Bairro 3 Yes 6.99 4 
Palhota No 1.12 1 
Sintcha Bilali No 5.81 2 
Sintcha Adulai No 3.15 1 
Bairro 4 Yes 13.20 5 
Tunturum No 5.65 2 
Siberia No 6.86 4 
Bairro Polícia No 5.01 2 
Bairro Nema No 4.51 2 
Bairro Binalu No 2.46 1 
Praça No 0.85 1 
Bairro 2 Yes 2.96 3 
Rua Porto Yes 7.99 6 
Bairro Coburnel Yes 1.59 1 
Total   49 
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For statistically representative data, I relied on the survey carried out by TESE and ASPAAB 
during my fieldwork. Although I was not formally involved in this survey, I closely followed 
the process and discussed my findings versus their findings throughout the process. Whereas 
my sample is not statistically representative, it provided me with a good qualitative 
understanding of the ways in which residents of the city navigated different water sources. It 
complemented quantitative data I had access to. Interviews with water users focused on 
themes related to water sources used throughout the year and the motivations, reasons and 
explanations to why users navigated these different sources. In particular, I tried to explore 
the ways in which residents of the city perceived the piped supply system in terms of the service 
provided and the changes it brought to the ways people used water in the city. Using NVivo 
to analyse these interviews, I identified key justifications routinely mentioned to opt for 
different sources– such as distance, reliability, quality of water, payment, conflict –, and the 
frequency in which they appeared in these interviews. Appendix III provides a more detailed 
overview of interviews conducted with water users and the process of data analysis.    
Figure 6. Water Users: sample distribution by source 
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4.3.4. Data collection: Bafatá Misti Iagu and Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu 
Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu (BMMI) and Bafatá Misti Iagu (BMI) were two internationally funded 
projects, which significantly transformed water infrastructure in the city and the ways in which 
this infrastructure is used and governed. BMI was implemented between 2010 and 2012 and 
had already terminated by the time I started my fieldwork. BMMI was in the phase of 
implementation while I was on fieldwork. My research activities included various project 
activities. Table 2 below provides a brief description of each of these projects as well as a list 
of research activities I conducted during the course of these projects.  
Whilst BMI had already terminated by the time I went on fieldwork, I drew on reflections 
from my previous experience working in the implementation of this project. This involved 
looking back at emails and diaries I had kept while living and working in Bafatá but also 
reading and analysing project reports and other related documentation. Furthermore, I often 
discussed this project with other individuals who had also been involved in the project, 
including TESE’s staff, ASPAAB members and state officials. 
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Project Description Participant Observation 
Bafatá Misti Iagu (Creole for ‘Bafatá Wants/Needs Water’) (BMI) 
Project duration: 30 months, it started in January 2010 and terminated in June 2012.  
Project Partners: Project led by TESE, development NGO based in Lisbon. ASPAAB was both partner 
and beneficiary of this project, whilst the Regional Offices of the Department of Water 
Resources in Bafatá and EPAL were both associates of the project. EPAL is the Portuguese 
state-owned company that manages water supply in Lisbon.  
Project donors: This project was funded by the European Union, the Portuguese Development Agency 
(IPAD) and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.  
Overall Objective: The overall objective of this project was to improve access to a sustainable and 
improved water source. It adopted an approach focused on sustainability rather than mere 
construction of new infrastructure and, therefore, besides the refurbishment of 
infrastructures, it focused on the definition and implementation of water management 
model that would allow local partners to secure the operation of the system in a sustainable 
and viable manner.  
Expected results: (1) an optimised water supply management model that secured access to water for 75% 
of the population in a sustainable manner adopted and implemented; (2) local actors in the 
water sector capacitated and able to implement the adopted water supply management 
model; (3) water network infrastructures refurbished to supply safe water; (4) an awareness 
raising campaign on the themes of water, hygiene, environment and the user-payer principle 
implemented.  
 
 
 
 
 
• This project was completed before I started fieldwork in April 2013. However, I 
necessarily drew on my experiences working in Bafatá in the implementation of this 
project between March 2010 and March 2011 as an employee of NGO TESE.  
• My duties and responsibilities were varied but included, for example, liaising with project 
partners, including ASPAAB and state officials, donors and TESE coordination team; 
organising, facilitating and attending events with the community to raise awareness about 
the project and to inaugurate the awareness raising campaign on water; and, identifying 
institutional and policy settings in place. 
• My reflections on my previous experiences were necessarily crucial for the ways in which 
this research project unfolded and my interactions during fieldwork.  
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Project Description Participant Observation 
Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu (Creole for ‘Bafatá Wants/Needs More Water’) (BMMI) 
Project duration: 30 months, from July 2012 to December 2014. 
Project Partners: Project led by TESE, development NGO based in Lisbon. ASPAAB was both the main 
partner and beneficiary of this project, the Regional Offices of the Department of Water 
Resources in Bafatá, EPAL (Portuguese state-owned company that manages water supply 
in Lisbon), and SNV were also partners.  
Project donors: This project was funded by the European Union, and co-funded by Camoes Mission – 
Institute for Cooperation and Language, EPAL – Empresa Portuguesa de Aguas Livres, 
SNV – Netherlands cooperation Institute, TESE and ASPAAB.  
Overall objective: to maximise and build on the results of the previous project BMI and, in this way, to 
improve access to an improved water source in the city of Bafatá in a sustainable manner.  
Expected results: (1) Water Plan for the City of Bafatá complete and adopted; (2) Human and institutional 
capacity of ASPAAB reinforced in order to guarantee the sustainability of the system and 
its autonomy and leadership in water supply in Bafatá; (3) Refurbishment and expansion 
infrastructure for water supply in Ponte Nova, Bairro 5 Caibara and Bairro 3; (4) positive 
shifts in the attitudes, knowledge and practices related to hygiene, public health and 
payment for water through an awareness raising campaign.  
• Consultancy work under objective 1 related to the elaboration of a Water Plan for the city 
of Bafatá. My role was that of mediator between technical consultants developing surveys, 
assessments and investments plans and local actors, namely ASPAAB and Regional 
Offices. During this period, I engaged in the following: 
– Field survey of existing infrastructure; 
– Project partner’s meetings; 
– Regularly met with ASPAAB, Regional Offices and TESE project team to discuss 
survey and investments plans being developed.  
• Attended multiple events organised under this project;  
• Accompanied development and implementation of Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices 
study and awareness campaign;  
• Accompanied implementation of diagnostic of ASPAAB’s management model; 
• Attended several training events; 
• Numerous informal conversations with different actors involved in the project.  
Table 2. Overview of data collection during the course of Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu and Bafatá Misti Iagu, including participant observation and my involvement, on a professional capacity, in both projects.
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Between October 2013 and February 2014, I worked as a consultant under the project BMMI 
and collaborated in the elaboration of the Water Plan for the city of Bafatá. My role was that 
of mediator between the international consultant employed by the project to draft the Water 
Plan and local actors, namely ASPAAB and the Regional Offices. The aim was to ensure that, 
first, technical assessments of existing infrastructure and operation and maintenance 
procedures were embedded in local understandings; and, second, to guarantee that proposals 
for future investment in infrastructure conformed to social, political and economic priorities 
defined by local actors and to expected financial, technical and management capacities.  
Within the scope of this consultancy, I participated in a survey of existing infrastructure. 
Walking around for days surveying the existing water infrastructure accompanied by 
ASPAAB, the Regional Offices, TESE and the international consultant, provided me with a 
much deeper understanding of the complexities involved in the operation of the network. My 
role also entailed participating in several meetings where multiple aspects of the future 
expansions of the network in the short and long-term were considered. In this way, I 
participated in various insightful conversations concerning the idiosyncrasies of the network 
and its operation, I contributed to interactions and negotiations between different actors as 
they happened, and discussed priorities and visions for future expansions to the network. For 
a while, I became immersed in ongoing discussions concerning the production, governing and 
use of infrastructure. 
This opportunity proved vital for my engagement with the different organisations I worked 
with during my fieldwork. On the one hand, my participation demonstrated my willingness 
to get involved and contribute to the work of the different organisations. Moreover, the fact 
that my position was that of mediator between local actors and international consultants also 
contributed to the consolidation of my relationships with ASPAAB and the Regional Offices. 
From the beginning it was clear that my aim was to make sure that the Plan being developed 
conformed to their needs and priorities. On the other hand, this opportunity helped me with 
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my own anxieties related to my presence in Bafatá and the time and support I was requiring 
from my informants. 
The survey of existing infrastructure required that I travelled on several occasions to the 
Department of Water Resources in Bissau to search for technical specifications. In this way, I 
interacted with different bureaucrats and followed the workings of this department. For 
example, in one of my visits to Bissau to collect information from Water Resources, I had to 
extend my visit for several days because there was no electricity in the offices of this 
department. These experiences certainly expanded my understandings of the everyday 
workings of the state.  
As a consultant working on the project, I was also invited to project meetings bringing together 
all partners. These meetings provided essential platforms to witness negotiations and 
discussions concerning the priorities of water infrastructure and the goals of the project. They 
also constituted an important platform to witness and understand how power relations 
between different actors played out. Several of these events provided interesting platforms on 
which to base later discussions, namely related to the contrasting views of water infrastructure 
and the ongoing negotiations between local and international organisations.  
Apart from the activities falling within the remit of the consultancy I carried out, during my 
fieldwork I also attended and participated in several of BMMI’s activities that were not related 
to this work, including several training sessions.  
Finally, it is important to mention that consent was obtained before all interviews. I also 
explained to informants that they did not have to answer questions they did not feel 
comfortable with and that they could withdraw at any moment.  All interviews were recorded 
apart from a few cases where informants asked me not to. In those cases, I took brief notes 
during the interview and expanded them afterwards. In order to guarantee the anonymity of 
those interviewed, all names have been changed. While carrying out participant observation, 
I was consistently open about my position as a researcher. I kept a research diary where I took 
notes on a daily basis, including descriptions of events and conversations intertwined with 
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personal and sometimes more emotional reflections. My fieldwork diaries have been 
particularly helpful in inciting reflexivity in my interpretations and representations. I have 
cited my own notes where I used information included in these diaries. 
4.3.5. Language 
Portuguese is my mother tongue and the official language of Guinea-Bissau, but creole is the 
de facto language of the country, and a significant proportion of the population does not speak 
or understand Portuguese. My knowledge of creole was sufficient to effectively communicate 
with my informants. Interviews and informal conversations with staff from international 
organisations were conducted in Portuguese and Creole, according to informants’ preferences 
(and mine and their language skills). Interviews with higher rank state officials were conducted 
in Portuguese. Interviews and informal conversations with ASPAAB members, water users 
and state officials based in Bafatá were mostly conducted in Creole. In some cases, when the 
informant felt comfortable speaking Portuguese, we naturally shifted from one language to 
the other.  
All interviews were transcribed by myself in the language of the interview, Portuguese or 
Creole. Only excerpts of interviews quoted in this text were translated and, again, I did the 
translations myself. While the process of translation inevitably shapes the material, I tried to 
be as faithful to the original text as possible. In fact, where I found that no English word could 
encompass the meaning of a specific word in Creole or Portuguese, I kept it in the original 
language, with footnotes to explain its meaning. 
4.4. Data analysis and Writing: From data to theory to data… 
In this research, I adopted different analytical strategies to move between empirical data and 
theory. Grounded theory has been widely adopted among scholars using ethnographic 
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approaches (Limb and Dwyer, 2001b). This analytical strategy adopts an inductive approach 
to data analysis. The aim is to ensure that empirical data shapes the analysis and that pre-
existing theoretical constructs do not lead the researcher into forcing data into preconceived 
categories. Rather than seeking theory verification, researchers look for theory construction 
from the social phenomena being observed (Charmaz, 2012; Glaser and Strauss, 1999). As 
Charmaz (2012, p. 510) has argued, “constructivist grounded theory celebrates first hand 
knowledge of empirical worlds”.  I started data collection with a series of research questions 
but without pre-defined hypothesis to test. Thus, to a certain extent, my research was designed 
to be inductive, with theory construction emerging from the empirical data.  
However, the truth is that empirical work is necessarily shaped by the theoretical orientations 
of the researcher (Crang, 2001; Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). In addition, the strict 
adoption of grounded theory methods has often led to over-descriptive work that does not 
invoke abstraction or to generalisations with little theoretical innovation (Burawoy, 1998; 
Timmermans and Tavory, 2012; Wacquant, 2002). Thus, abductive analysis, as suggested by 
Timmermans and Tavory (2012), best describes the analytical strategy adopted. This strategy 
involves an iterative process of basing hypothesis and theoretical innovations on surprising 
research evidence. Empirical work requires an open mind, but one with a set of theoretical 
constructs at the background.  In this way, researchers do not seek to produce generalisations 
from particular empirical instances. Instead, assuming that theories enable us to understand 
and relate instances both within and between studies, “abductive analysis specifically aims at 
generating novel theoretical insights that reframe empirical findings in contrast to existing 
theories” (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012, p. 174). Empirical work extends the complexity 
inherent to different instances and speaks back to theory, seeking to improve the latter ability 
to account for the dynamic character and heterogeneity of social forces (Clarke, 2012).  
The first step towards data analysis and writing included the transcribing of all interviews. 
Once the process of transcribing interviews was concluded, I started coding all the material, 
including interviews and fieldwork notes. Research materials were coded using Nvivo 
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qualitative data analysis software and excel. Through a close reading of transcripts, fieldwork 
notes and reports I selected themes and developed codes, which emerged through my 
immersion in the empirical material. Initially, codes were fundamentally descriptive, focusing 
on the actions and concerns of the participants (Cheung Judge, 2016) – e.g. ‘mobilising 
resources’, ‘selecting water sources – conflict’.  Then, through an iterative, and at times messy, 
process, which required the continuous revisiting of materials, I reassessed codes and sought 
links to broader ideas. Throughout this process, theoretical questions and empirical material 
blended together in my mind. Deductive thinking imposed questions on the material, 
inductive thinking generated questions from this material. This process coincided with writing 
during which I continued to seek relations between codes and to engage with broader 
theoretical constructs. 
4.5. Conclusion 
Overall, my research activities originated a productive accumulation of perspectives, 
understandings, meanings and practices associated with the becoming of water infrastructure 
in Bafatá. Yet, to the end of the research process, I kept being surprised by new meanings, 
interpretations and understandings of the ways water infrastructure is shaped, governed and 
used in Bafatá. Learning was at the heart of a great number of people I interviewed and 
engaged with during my research. In particular, ASPAAB’s members in their pursuit to grow 
and to continue to improve the water supply service in the city were consistently seeking 
alternative ways to learn. Learn to operate a water system, learn to manage an organisation, 
learn to implement a project, learn accountancy, learn… It is their thirst for knowledge, and 
obsession with learning, that makes me believe that, by the time I’m writing these words, many 
changes will have already taken place. The same way learning has been at the heart of most 
people I engaged with during my research, “It is in this spirit of learning (McFarlane 2010) 
that the thesis proceeds” (Mosselson, 2015, p. 88).
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– FIVE –  
Guinea-Bissau: 
the political and economic context, water policies, and 
infrastructure in Bafatá  
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides the reader with some background information on Guinea-Bissau and 
Bafatá, focusing in particular on the political economic context, the postcolonial state and the 
evolution of water policies and infrastructure. Section 5.2. explores key political and economic 
developments in the country over the past few decades, including the processes of economic 
liberalisation and democratisation inaugurated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, respectively. 
It also examines the normalisation of political instability since the 1998-1999 civil war. In 
addition, it traces the inability of the postcolonial state to expand its influence and 
concomitantly the multiplicity of institutions which have consistently shaped and governed 
everyday life in this country.  
The second part of this chapter, section 5.3., discusses the evolution of water policies and 
infrastructure in Guinea-Bissau and Bafatá. In particular, it examines policy shifts relating to 
the role of the state in water provision in the context of a weak state with very scarce resources 
and where international organisations are heavily present. Focusing on the specific case of the 
city of Bafatá, this chapter then introduces the case study and provides an overview of the 
various ways in which people currently access water in the city. Furthermore, it discusses the 
piecemeal expansion of the piped water network over the years, which reflects also the 
piecemeal inflow of investments. Throughout, the research questions framing the empirical 
chapters of this thesis – chapters 6, 7 and 8 – are elaborated. 
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5.2. Guinea-Bissau: an overview 
5.2.1. An introduction to Guinea-Bissau 
 The case study of this project is the city of Bafatá, in Guinea-Bissau. Located in West Africa, 
Guinea-Bissau is bordered by Senegal to the North, Guinea to the East and South and the 
Atlantic Ocean to the West. Guinea-Bissau is a member state of the Economic Community 
of Western African States (ECOWAS), a 15-members regional group created to foster 
economic cooperation among member states. It is also the only non-Francophone country in 
the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), a customs and currency union 
between 8 countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal 
and Togo).  
Figure 7. Map of Economic Community of Western African States 
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With a population of approximately 1.746 million10 and over 20 different ethnicities living 
within its territory, Guinea-Bissau is a small but extremely diverse country, even for Western 
African standards (Davidson, 2004). The largest ethnic groups are the Fulani, at 
approximately 28.5% of the population, the Balanta, around 23%, the Mandingo, 14.7%, 
and, finally, the Papel, comprising around 9% of the population (INE, 2009). The country is 
also religiously diverse, including large Muslim, Christian and Animist populations. This 
religious diversity distinguishes Guinea-Bissau from its neighbouring countries, such as 
Senegal or Mali (Davidson, 2004). For example, Davidson (2004, pp. 417–8), having travelled 
to Guinea-Bissau after the 1998-1999 civil war to investigate the rise of a Muslim society, 
came to realise that, “no one set of cultural and religious norms would be imposed easily on 
this ethnically and religiously diverse population, even if driven by military might. Pluralism 
was alive and well protected vigilantly on both micro and macro scales”. And, despite the 
growth in both Muslim and Christian populations witnessed in the past few decades, followed 
by a decrease in the number of people declaring themselves to be animists, religious 
syncretism, where people combine rituals from several religions and beliefs, constitutes a vital 
feature of Guinean spiritual life. The country’s diversity is also reflected in the multiple 
languages spoken across the country and, particularly, in its main cities. For example, it 
estimated that over 75% of those living in the capital city, Bissau, speak two or more 
languages. These include different ethnic languages, Creole, which is the de facto common 
language in the country and is spoken by 90.4% of the population (INE, 2009), Portuguese, 
the official language, which is only spoken by 27.1% of the population (INE, 2009), and 
French, the official language of neighbouring countries, among others (Borges, 2004). 
Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 178 out of 188 in the 2015 
UNDP Human Development Report (UNDP, 2015). According to this same report, life 
expectancy at birth is 55.2, average years of schooling remain at 2.8, and the gross national 
income per capita is $1,362, compared with, for example, $2,188 in Senegal, $5,431 in 
                                                      
10 UN data. Available at: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=guinea-bissau. Last accessed on: 04/04/2016, 11.36 
am (GMT-8) 
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Nigeria or $12,122 in South Africa. According to the Second Document of the National 
Strategy for Poverty Reduction in Guinea-Bissau published in 2011 (MEPIR, 2011a), between 
2000 and 2010, the Human Development Index (HDI) of Guinea-Bissau registered an 
average annual growth rate of 0.9%, compared with an average of 2.1% for Sub-Saharan 
African countries and 1.68% for countries with very low HDI. The two main factors 
contributing to this very low HDI in Guinea-Bissau are seen to be generalised poverty, 
apparent in the very low incomes of a large share of the population, and life expectancy, a 
consequence of the lack of access to and quality of health services. In fact, a survey on poverty 
levels in the country showed that 69.3% of the population is poor (living on less than $2/day) 
and 33% is extremely poor (living on less than $1/day) and demonstrated that poverty levels 
grew between 2002 and 2010 (MEPIR, 2011b).11  
The economy of the country is mostly based on farming and fishing. In 2007, the agricultural 
sector was estimated to employ 80% of the population (Gacitua-Mario et al., 2007). 
Agriculture also represents approximately 60% of the national GDP and amounts to over 
98% of the national exports (MEPIR, 2011a). In fact, cashew-nuts exports alone represent 
over 90% of the overall exports of the country and amount to approximately 17% of the state 
revenue. This means that the economy is highly susceptible to fluctuations in the price of this 
crop. The private sector is overwhelmingly dominated by the informal economy and, in 2009, 
there were only 75 registered private companies (MEPIR, 2011a). 
The state of Guinea-Bissau remains dependent on foreign aid to finance public expenditure, 
including operating expenses. In 2008, foreign aid represented approximately 12% of the 
GDP and funded 96% of public investments  (Embaixada de França na Guiné-Bissau, 2008). 
Political instability has affected the flow of external aid in recent years since key external 
donors have imposed sanctions on the country. In 2010 it had decreased to 9.7% of the GDP 
and in 2012, it went down by almost 40% to 6% of GDP. This drastic reduction in external 
                                                      
11 Data published by different organisations presents considerably diverse scenarios, where possible I have chosen data published 
by the Republic of Guinea-Bissau rather than international organisations.  
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donations was not followed by an increase in internal revenues and, in 2012, 95% of public 
investments were still funded through foreign aid (EU and World Bank, 2014). 
Between 2010 and 2015, the average population growth rate, was 2.4%. During the same 
period, population growth in urban areas was above the national average, at 4.1%12 and, in 
2014, 48.6% of the population was designated as urban13. In Guinea-Bissau, settlements with 
populations larger than 5,000 inhabitants are considered urban areas. The population of 
Bissau, the capital city, more than doubled between 1991 and 2012, from just under 200,000 
to over 400,00014 in 2015. During the same period, the urban population in the Region of 
Bafatá, rose from just below 30,000 to over 40,00015.  According to the 2009 census, the city 
of Bafatá, capital of the region, counted approximately 30,00016 inhabitants. With a small 
                                                      
12 UN data. Available at: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=guinea-bissau. Last accessed on: 04/04/2016, 11.36 
am (GMT-8) 
13 UN data. Available at: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=guinea-bissau. Last accessed on: 04/04/2016, 11.36 
am (GMT-8) 
14 INE Guiné-Bissau. Available at: http://guineabissau.africadata.org/pt/DataAnalysis/. Last access on: 15/04/2016, 1.52 pm 
(GMT-8) 
15 INE Guiné-Bissau. Available at: http://guineabissau.africadata.org/pt/DataAnalysis/. Last access on: 15/04/2016, 1.52 pm 
(GMT-8). In Guinea-Bissau those settlements with populations over 5,000 inhabitants are considered urban areas. 
16 INE Guiné-Bissau. Available at: http://www.stat-guinebissau.com/publicacao/RGPH_2009.pdf. Last access on: 
15/04/2016, 2.47 pm (GMT-8) 
Figure 8. Map - cities in Guinea-Bissau (available in: http://www.ezilon.com/maps/africa/guinea-bissau-road-maps.html. Last 
accessed in: 2 August 2016, 14h34 (GMT-8)) 
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population, in the context of Guinea-Bissau, Bafatá holds the title of second capital, and 
constitutes an important urban centre in the country. Nevertheless, Gabu with a population 
of approximately 40,000 inhabitants, and strategically situated to the East of Bafatá and closer 
to the borders with Guinea-Conakry and Senegal (see Figure 8, above), is now the city with 
the second largest population in the country. The concentration of population in the capital 
city, which is followed by the concentration of investment and economic opportunities, 
suggests that, like elsewhere in the continent (Myers, 2011; Parnell and Pieterse, 2014), the 
phenomenon of urban primacy is an important characteristic of Guinea-Bissau. 
Whilst the predominant ethnicities in the East are the Mandingo and the Fulani, Bafatá, like 
the rest of urban areas in Guinea-Bissau, includes a diverse population, including people from 
different ethnicities as well as communities from several neighbouring states, such as Guinea, 
Mauritania, Gambia or Senegal, and elsewhere, such as Brazil, Lebanon and China.  
According to data collected for the Second Document of the National Strategy for Poverty 
Reduction17, published in 2011, only 66% of the population in the country has access to safe 
drinking water. Another study published a few years later in 2014 suggests that 10.1% of the 
                                                      
17 MEPIR (2011) Segundo Documento de Estratégia Nacional de Redução da Pobreza da Guiné-Bissau (DENARP II – 2011-
2015). Ministério da Economia, do Plano e Integração Regional. República da Guiné-Bissau. 
Figure 9. Urban Population Bafatá Region (Source: INE, Guinea-Bissau) (In Guinea-Bissau, settlements 
with populations larger than 5,000 inhabitants are considered urban areas) 
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population have access to a piped supply, 46% rely on protected wells and boreholes and 
32.1% on unprotected wells and/or springs (INE-GB and Ministério da Economia e Finanças, 
2014). Waterborne diseases  are one of the main causes of morbidity, particularly among 
children under 5 years old (MEPIR, 2011b; MINSAP, 2008). Nevertheless, these numbers 
cover a considerable disparity between urban areas, where 84% of the population is believed 
to rely on safe drinking water, and rural areas, where only 53% of the households were 
estimated to be using safe drinking water. Thus, despite urban growth and the related burden 
placed on service provision, access to safe drinking water is better in cities than in rural areas. 
Here, it is important to note that improved water sources, which are equated with safe 
drinking water, include a range of sources and technologies, such as: piped water into dwelling 
or to yard/plot, public tap or standpipes, tubewell or borehole, protected dug well, protected 
spring and rainwater.181920 Notably, whereas for example a piped supply is considered an 
improved water source, the use of such technology is a not guarantee of safe drinking water. 
This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8. 
5.2.2. From African Socialism to democratisation and the liberalisation of the economy 
Guinea-Bissau became independent in 1974 after an 11-year liberation war against the 
colonial power (see Dhada, 1993 for very detailed analysis of PAIGC struggle). The rates of 
economic and infrastructure development at independence reflected decades of colonization 
and economic extraction and, related to this, the relatively low status of Guinea-Bissau – as a 
colony governed through another colony, Cape Verde – in the economically, politically and 
socially decaying Portuguese empire.   
                                                      
18 This is according to WHO/ Unicef Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation. Available in: 
http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/watsan-categories/. Last accessed on: 30th May 2016, 15h15 (GMT-8). 
19 WHO/UNICEF Water Supply Statistics, 2015. Available in: https://knoema.com/WHOWSS2014/who-unicef-water-
supply-statistics-2015?location=1001920-guinea-bissau. Last accessed on: 30th May 2016, 15h15 (GMT-8). 
20 Different surveys present considerably different scenarios for population growth, urban population and access to safe water in 
Guinea-Bissau. Here, I have used reports published by the Republic of Guinea-Bissau where available and data published by 
international organisations otherwise.  
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After independence, following African socialist ideologies, Luís Cabral – the country’s first 
president (and the brother of Amilcar Cabral, a key figure in the struggle for the independence 
of Portuguese-speaking African countries who was murdered in 1973) – and his party, the 
PAIGC21, adopted a state-led economic model based on two main pillars: modernisation of 
agriculture and industrialization. This was a rather ambitious programme which aimed to 
transform the country at the political, economic and social levels, but that is now recognized 
to have failed to achieve its goals (Chabal, 1986a, 1986b; Forrest, 2005; Galli and Jones, 1987). 
In 1980, Nino Vieira led a successful coup d’état against Luís Cabral’s regime and became 
the second President of Guinea. Multiple accounts of these events have attributed the success 
and popularity of this coup precisely to the widespread discontentment with the outcomes of 
failed economic policies as well as perceptions of prevalent corruption among state officials. 
In addition, the increasing antagonisms against Cape Verdean descendants perceived to have 
benefited the most since independence, the rising factional struggles between different groups 
within the party, and the centralization and personalization of power as well as the consequent 
increase in repression and censorship are also considered important factors (Cardoso, 2004; 
Carvalho, 2006; Chabal, 1986b, 1983; Forrest, 1987; Galli and Jones, 1987; Galli, 1990). 
Nino Vieira’s regime did bring some change. As a result of both internal and external 
pressures, measures entailing the liberalization of the economy started being adopted in 1983. 
This was followed by the adoption of structural adjustment programmes (SAP) beginning in 
1986 in attempts to deal with a large deficit created by a disarticulated economy in which 
consumption was consistently greater than production (Galli, 1990). In addition, in 1991 the 
democratisation process was initiated with the recognition of multiple political parties and 
other forms of association, including traditional authorities (Forrest, 2005). The process of 
liberalization of the economy and the concomitant opening of the markets is seen to have 
initiated some important transformations in the economy of this country. This included a 
more regular and diversified supply of products and, relatedly, a significant increase in market 
                                                      
21 PAIGC – Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and 
Cape Verde) 
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activities, even if this is seen to have happened mostly in the informal sector (Lourenço-Lindell, 
2004, 2002). Furthermore, besides the significant increase in the number of private 
enterprises, such as large private plantations, the amount of cash crops being traded through 
state channels is believed to have increased by approximately 50% in the period following the 
liberalization of the economy (Forrest, 2002). 
Resembling similar programmes adopted in other African countries, the fundamental 
elements of the SAPs in Guinea-Bissau included the strengthening of the private sector, 
currency devaluations, and the reduction of public expenditure through significant cuts in 
both the number of public sector workers and social services, cuts in food subsidies and 
increases to producer prices (Forrest, 2002; Lourenço-Lindell, 2002; Monteiro, 1996). And, 
similarly to what happened in other countries, one important consequence of these 
programmes was a drastic reduction in the number of public sector workers, the main formal 
employer in the country, and therefore in formal employment (Borges, 2004). This dismissal 
of a significant number of public sector workers, alongside an increasing irregularity in the 
payment of public sector wages, drove a growing number of people to search for alternative 
sources of income in the informal sector leading to an increasing informalisation of the 
economy (Lourenço-Lindell, 2002).  
Reductions in the level of and lack of affordability of social services, most notably school and 
health centres, are perceived as another important consequence of liberalisation reforms. This 
deterioration in the level of the services provided by the state has been linked to an increasing 
demand for services provided in the informal and traditional spheres. For example, Lourenço-
Lindell (2002) traced the emergence of multiple associations, such as Koranic schools and 
traditional healers, and the re-ignition of traditional forms of authority in Guinea-Bissau to 
the aftermath of SAPs.  In fact, this is in line with broader trends in the continent, where the 
collapse of state institutions has been linked to an increasing reliance on ethnic based 
associations or religious institutions. Finally, SAPs have also been blamed for high inflation 
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and the subsequent rising costs of basic necessities, such as rice, the main staple in Guinea-
Bissau, with dramatic consequences for people’s livelihoods (Forrest, 2010).  
Simultaneously, liberalisation policies and the concomitant informalization of the economy 
seem to have benefited a small elite within the country. This minority includes a group of 
people that used either their position within, or their links to, the state, banks and international 
institutions to accumulate resources and “occupy dominant positions in informal trade” 
(Lourenço-Lindell, 2004, p. 91). In these circumstances, Forrest (2005) and Lourenço-Lindell 
(2004) suggest that the increasing informalisation of the economy has been followed by a 
widening gap between private traders with connections to or positioned within formal 
institutions and the majority of the population. This gap is revealed in the striking power 
imbalances within the informal sphere between the majority of very small scale informal 
traders and those few benefiting from beneficial loan conditions for their own personal 
purposes.  
Parallel to the liberalisation of the economy, Nino Vieira’s regime propelled important 
political changes.  These included replacing the dominant Cape Verdean elites within state 
structures and promoting a discourse that contrasted the Creole’s elite’s ideas of the modern 
nation-state with what was perceived to be the authentic Guinean culture based upon 
traditional forms of authority and ethnic identities.  Related to this, traditional authorities 
were once again recognised as significant actors in political life, even if there are no formal 
links between traditional authorities and the state. This endorsement of local kingdoms and 
chiefdoms was followed by attempts to expand state power through these structures (Forrest, 
2005) and, during the democratisation process, traditional authorities became key instruments 
used by political parties to gather votes in different constituencies. 
The democratisation process, which started in 1991, culminated in parliamentary elections in 
1994 and the election of Nino Vieira in the first presidential elections held in 1995. However, 
the shift to a democratic multiparty system did not result in an opening of the political sphere. 
Instead, following the elections, processes of centralisation and personalisation of power 
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seemed to accelerate with the president becoming increasingly distant from the population, 
detached from his own army and isolated within both the party and the government.  In 
Forrest’s (2005, p. 256) words, “Nino Vieira grew increasingly ‘bonapartistic’ – flagrantly 
intervening in other government and civil society institutions, removing perceived opponents 
from the government, and proving intolerant to criticism”.  
In 1998, 18 years after Nino Vieira first became president of Guinea-Bissau, a series of events 
would eventually lead to a civil war fought between two factions of the army, one led by 
president Nino Vieira and the other by Ansumane Mané, his Army Chief of Staff. This war 
lasted approximately one year, ending in May 1999 with the victory of Mané’s faction, while 
Nino Vieira escaped first to the Gambia and then to Portugal. The war was for the most part 
confined to the capital city Bissau, driving a large number of the city’s residents to temporarily 
take refuge in rural areas and other cities in the country as well as neighbouring countries.  
Nevertheless, the impacts of this war have been felt in the entire country for many years after, 
in the form of migration, damage to agricultural production, destruction of infrastructure and 
increasing poverty (Barry et al., 2007a). For example, GDP per capita is estimated to have 
dropped by 30% during the war and in 2005 was still below pre-war levels (Creppy and 
Wodon, 2007; Forrest, 2010). Agricultural production, trade and services were severely 
disturbed for a number of years and damage to the infrastructure during the war were still felt 
in 2010 (Barry et al., 2007b; Forrest, 2010). Barry and Wodon (2007) also refer the loss of 
human capital due to emigration as an important consequence of the war. Moreover, they 
mention that economic recovery has been extremely slow after the conflict; the economy went 
into recession in 2001 and stagnated in both 2002 and 2003. 
5.2.3. Political instability as normality 
Since the 1998-99 civil war, political instability has become the norm in the country, as 
demonstrated, for example, by the fact that between 2004-2009 the term of the successive 
governments did not exceed six months (MEPIR, 2011a). In these circumstances, political 
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instability is normally blamed for the slow, or even relapsing trends in social and economic 
development, the striking dependence on international funding as well as the inability of the 
state to expand its influence. The table below summarises key events since 2000 and 
demonstrates the succession of coup d’états and violent political events that have marked this 
country’s recent political history.   
President Year Events 
Kumba Iala 
(PRS) 
(2000-2003) 
2002 • Kumba Iala dissolved parliament and continuously postpones date for next 
election 
2003 • Coup d’état led by General Verissimo Correia Seabra, Army Chief of Staff 
Henrique Rosa 
(Independent) 
(2003-2005) 
(Acting president) 
2003 • Interim President nominated by military junta led by Verissimo Correia 
2004 
• Parliamentary elections 
• General Verissimo Correia Seabra is murdered; General Tagme Na Wai 
appointed Army Chief of Staff 
Nino Vieira 
(Independent) 
(2005-2009) 
2005 • Nino Vieira (former President) comes back from exile and wins presidential 
election 
 • Very instable climate throughout his presidency, ongoing struggles between 
political and military factions.  
2008 
• Bubo Na Tchuto, Navy Chief of Staff, flees the country following accusations of 
attempt to organise coup d’etat 
• Failed coup d’etat attributed to Kumba Iala 
• President dissolves parliament after withdrawal of PAIGC; Parliamentary 
elections: Carlos Gomes Junior is elected prime-minister 
• Rebellious soldiers attack president’s home 
2009 • Army Chief of Staff Tagme Na Wai, key rival of Nino Vieira, is murdered. A 
few hours later Nino Vieira is also murdered.  
Raimundo 
Pereira (PAIGC) 
2009 
(Acting president) 
2009 
• President of Assembly nominated interim president 
Malam Bacai 
Sanha (PAIGC) 
(2009-2012) 
2009 • Malam Bacai Sanha wins presidential election 
2010 
• Bubo Na Tchuto (previously Navy Chief of Staff) comes back from exile and 
takes refuge in UN headquarters in Bissau. In April, he is included in the US list 
of international drug lords.  
• Prime-minister arrested: deputy Army Chief of Staff, Antonio Indjai, frees Bubo 
Na Tchuto from UN while his soldiers arrest Prime-Minister Carlos Gomes 
Junior and Army Chief of Staff Zamora Induta. Prime-minister is released a few 
days later; Army Chief of Staff remains in custody.  
• Antonio Indjai nominated Army Chief of Staff, Bubo na Tchuto nominated 
Navy Chief of Staff.  
• In context of political instability, both the president and prime-minister leave 
the country for several months. 
2012 • Malam Bacai Sanha dies in Paris from illness ; Carlos Gomes Junior resigns as 
prime minister in order to run in the presidential election 
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President Year Events 
Raimundo 
Pereira 
(PAIGC) 
(Acting President) 
2012 
• First round presidential elections: Carlos Gomes Junior and Kumba Iala go to 
second round 
• Coup d’etat against elected government; Carlos Gomes Junior and Raimundo 
Pereiara arrested by military and later freed and sent to Ivory Coast.  
Manuel Serifo 
(Independent) 
(Acting President) 
(2012-2014) 
2012 • Manuel Serifo nominated acting president; Ibraima Papa Camara nominated 
Army Chief of Staff. He is included in the USA list of international drug lords.  
2013 
• Bubo Na Tchuto is arrested in international waters and taken to the United 
States for trial.  
 
Jose Mario Vaz 
2014 
–  
? 
• April: General elections following 2-year ‘transition’ period; Jose Mario Vaz 
elected President; PAIGC invited to form government, Domingos Simoes 
Pereira becomes prime-minister.  
• August 2015: In a controversial move, highly criticised in public culture, 
President dismisses elected government; September 2015: New prime-minister 
resigns after only 20 days in the post, after the supreme court ruled his 
appointment violated the constitution.  
Table 4. Some events illustrating political instability in Guinea-Bissau. 
 
The causes of political instability are varied, complex and controversial, and are beyond the 
scope of this research. Conflicts between military, executive and legislative powers, the 
interests of political elites, ethnic conflicts, illegal activities, personal and factional struggles are  
intermittently named as the main causes  (Adebajo, 2002; Barry et al., 2007b; L.I. Bordonaro, 
2009; Cardoso, 2004; Cardoso, Carlos, 1996; Forrest, 2010, 1988; Kohnert, 2010; Koudawo, 
1996; Temudo, 2009; Vigh, 2012). From the early 2000s onwards, perhaps taking advantage 
of the chronic political instability in the country, Guinea-Bissau has also become an important 
hub in international drug trafficking routes, linking Latin America, Europe and the United 
States.  Political elites are recognised to have become deeply involved in this trade with further 
implications for political instability as well as for corruption and engagement in various illegal 
activities – several high rank officials have been included in the USA’s list of international 
drug lords and Bubo Na Tchuto, previous Navy Chief of Army, is currently under arrest in 
the USA. The prevalence of drug trade in the country has led many to controversially refer 
to Guinea-Bissau as the ‘World’s first Narco-state’ (see: Forrest, 2010; Kohnert, 2010; 
O’regan, 2012; Vulliamy, 2008). Notwithstanding the details, the succession of events 
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described in the table above and the current political situation in the country clearly 
demonstrate the extent to which political instability has pervaded the country. 
My fieldwork period coincided with a ‘transition period’ which lasted for two years after the 
coup d’etat of April 2012. Whereas this could have been seen as an exceptional phase, 
therefore compromising my research findings concerning state practices and actors, the 
transition period during which I carried out my research activities can be perceived as another 
instance of political instability, which has become the normality in Guinea-Bissau. In fact, the 
elections successfully held in April 2014, just after I concluded my fieldwork, were seen as key 
moment for the country, signalling the beginning of a new chapter. However, only a few 
months after this election, the recently elected President dismissed the recently elected prime-
minister, a controversial move that marked the beginning of a new period of instability, which 
is still ongoing. My thesis thus explores the workings of state institutions in a context marked 
by routinized political instability, rather than the exceptionality of a specific period of political 
instability. 
This is not to say that political instability does not produce vital consequences or hinder the 
working of state and non-state institutions. The 2012-2014 period was a tense moment 
worsened by a social and economic crisis to a large extent caused by political instability. In 
general, political instability has been at the heart of the reduction of foreign aid flowing into 
the country. For example, the April 2012 coup d’etat resulted in sanctions from international 
organisations, which did not recognise the transition government and cancelled any assistance 
to state institutions. In a country heavily dependent on international donations, the impacts 
were severely felt across the country, namely through the delays in payments of public wages. 
In addition, between 2011 and 2013, Guinea-Bissau was also affected by the accentuated 
decline, by more than 40%, of the price of cashew nuts in international markets (IMF, 2015). 
As mentioned before, cashew nuts exports constitute a key source of income for households 
and the state.  
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The next section discusses the consistent elusive presence of the state in Guinea-Bissau and, 
related to this, explores the multiplicity of institutions shaping everyday life and service 
provision across the country. 
5.2.4. The multiplicity of institutions in Guinea-Bissau 
The inability of the postcolonial state to expand its influence in Guinea-Bissau and the 
concomitant presence of a multiplicity of institutions, such as traditional authorities and other 
looser formations, has been well documented. Researchers working in different areas of the 
country and on diverse topics have demonstrated that initiatives such as the SAPs have 
contributed to the informalisation of certain aspects of everyday life, namely through the 
reduction of formal employment (Lourenço-Lindell, 2004). Nonetheless, most researchers also 
acknowledge that the co-existence of a multiplicity of institutions shaping and governing 
everyday life, and service provision, has been a consistent and key characteristic of this society. 
The governance of water provision must be understood in light of this multiplicity.  
At independence in 1974, the PAIGC banned traditional authorities, which were perceived 
as old allies of the colonial state but also as contrary to this party’s ideas of social 
transformation and modernisation. To replace these and to consolidate the power of the newly 
independent state and in this way promote social transformation, village committees were 
created as a way to integrate villages into the state apparatuses. However, these committees 
were gradually sidelined from local political, economic and social life or appropriated by the 
old ‘traditional’ elites. Consequently, Forrest (1987) and Rudebeck (1988) suggest that rather 
than becoming integrated in the state apparatuses local structures grew increasingly 
independent from the central state over the years.  
For example, Rudebeck’s (1988) research examines how a group of villages located in 
Kandjaja grew increasingly distant from the state between 1976 and 1986 and, at the same 
time, how local organisations became gradually more autonomous. According to this scholar, 
 144 
on the one hand, the progressive withdrawal of the state was evident in the decay of local 
schools and the eventual closure of health centres. On the other hand, the consolidation of 
local institutions, namely customary authorities, was revealed in the creation of a new local 
tax. For Rudebeck, material improvements and change in these village were consistently 
locally ignited rather than state induced. Gable (2009) research with Mandjaco youngsters 
living in villages in the 1980s also demonstrates the extent to which local organisations and 
institutions played a much more important role shaping their lives than the state. For this 
scholar, the postcolonial state, just as the colonial state before, remained largely irrelevant for 
these youngsters lives.  
The vitality of a multiplicity of institutions governing everyday life continues to be a key 
feature of contemporary Guinea-Bissau, where a wide range of networks and associations 
oversee the allocation of resources, manage urban services and open access to income 
opportunities without any apparent state intervention or guidance (Forrest, 2003; Gacitua-
Mario et al., 2007; Lourenço-Lindell, 2002; Temudo, 2008). In her research of informal 
markets in Bandim, a neighbourhood in Bissau, Lourenco-Lindell (2002) demonstrated that 
one of the impacts of SAPs in this urban areas had been the consolidation, and transformation, 
of pre-colonial institutions. She claims, “the relevance of this resilience of ancient [pre-
colonial] structures in the face of external pressures is that they continue to provide points of 
reference for contemporary informal ways of provisioning and distribution of resources and 
food in the study setting today.” (Lourenço-Lindell, 2002, p. 49) Temudo’s (2008) detailed 
ethnographic work carried out in a rural area in the south of the country also illustrates the 
importance of long-lasting inter-ethnic forms of exchange and cooperation in production for 
this village survival strategies. Simultaneously, she stresses the role of local chiefs in resolving 
conflicts and promoting inter-ethnic cooperation.  
Like elsewhere in the continent, traditional authorities in Guinea-Bissau have long-lived the 
pre-colonial and colonial periods and continue to play a key role governing everyday life (Lutz 
and Linder, 2004). In Bafatá, traditional authorities hold an important role in the regulation 
 145 
of life and social order, being particularly involved in controlling access to land and dispute 
resolution. Their interactions with the state are complex, involving moments where these 
entities work together and moments of stark opposition. For example, it is normal for people 
to seek advice from the neighbourhood leader to solve disputes before going to the police. In 
addition, the police routinely send people back to the neighbourhood level or seek advice from 
leaders. At the same time, disputes relating, for example, to the use of land are not rare. When 
it comes to service delivery, and in particular water provision, customary leaders are seen to 
play an important part involving the population, seeking popular support for projects and 
interventions and disseminating public health messages. As explained by several actors 
involved in water provision in Bafatá, if you don’t secure the support of neighbourhood leaders 
or if you antagonise them, it will make it very hard for you to work in that particular location. 
Nonetheless, customary leaders rarely take a leading role in securing access to water.  
Overall, these researchers demonstrate the extent to which traditional authorities, pre-colonial 
formations have remained a key feature of contemporary Guinea-Bissau and have been 
followed by the emergence of more recent networks and formations. Thus, cities in 
contemporary Guinea-Bissau have to be perceived in this context of institutional multiplicity, 
bringing together the state alongside traditional and regional authorities as well as other social 
formations, which, together, govern everyday life. This project will discuss how water 
governance in Bafatá must be understood in this context of institutional multiplicity. Yet, this 
multiplicity and intertwining of institutions is also revealed, for example, in the ways the main 
state school of Bafatá has devised ways to overcome state weaknesses. Here, students are 
required to pay a fee that is administered by a school management committee which uses this 
extra income to pay an allowance to teachers and avoid the long strikes that have pervaded 
the school system in the country. The regional hospital in Bafatá has also put in place a self-
governance system with the aim to manage income and maximise the services provided. 
The low Human Development Index, the prevalence of political instability, the dependence 
of the state on international donations, the elusiveness of the state and the related presence of 
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alternative institutions governing everyday life in Guinea-Bissau are all essential factors for 
understandings of the ways in which water provision is governed in urban areas. In these 
circumstances, this research, focusing on the evolution of water infrastructure in the second 
city of the country, seeks to answer some crucial questions: How is water being used and 
supplied in urban areas in a context marked by political instability and a systematic lack of 
resources to invest in infrastructure development and maintenance? How is the elusive state 
of Guinea-Bissau shaping water infrastructure? What is the role of the state in service provision 
in this context of institutional multiplicity? How do different actors and networks come 
together in water governance? How can alternative social formations draw the financial, 
human and technical resources vital for the development and maintenance of water 
infrastructure? In what ways do they interact with state institutions?  
In addition, political instability alongside the demonstrated elusive presence of the state, 
namely in service provision, have warranted the recurrent use of terms such as ‘failed’ 
(Kohnert, 2010), ‘fragile’ (Brinkerhoff, 2007, 2007, Forrest, 2010, 2003), and shadow’ (L.I. 
Bordonaro, 2009) to describe the state in Guinea-Bissau. This thesis, on the other hand, 
without trying to engage with a general characterisation of the state explores how state 
institutions operate in a context marked by political instability and a chronic lack of financial 
resources. In what ways do different state institutions and actors affect the evolution of water 
infrastructure in the country? What are the logics and rationalities between these different 
practices? How do different institutions within the state relate to the causes and consequences 
of political instability? 
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5.3. Water policies and infrastructure in Guinea-Bissau and Bafatá 
5.3.1. Water policies in Guinea-Bissau: devolution and cost-recovery 
The Department of Water Resources, located in the Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources, is the state entity responsible for overseeing the water resources of the country and 
for managing water and sanitation in both rural and urban areas. Its responsibilities are 
defined in a series of policy documents, including a National Water Plan, and will be discussed 
below. The Department of Public Heath also intervenes in the sector providing guidance on 
policies related to safe drinking water and collaborating, alongside the Department of Water 
Resources, in the dissemination of messages related to water and public health. There are also 
two state-owned companies, EAGB and ENAFUR, whose duties include the management of 
the piped water systems of Bissau and Gabu, respectively. In the National Water Plan adopted 
in 1992, it is stated that the EAGB should be responsible for managing the piped water 
network of Bafatá, but this never happened and the geographical area of this state company 
remained the capital city Bissau.  
The role of the state, as well as the community and private sectors, in water provision is defined 
in a series of documents framing the policy and legal frameworks of the sector. Reflecting the 
dependency of the state of Guinea-Bissau on foreign aid, and of the water sector in particular, 
all these documents have been produced under projects financed by international 
organisations, such as the European Union (EU), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) or the World Bank (Bank). This is indicative of a general tendency of the 
sector, where state investments barely cover the wages of public sector employees. In this 
context, national water policies drafted with the help of international organisations also 
appear to replicate international policies conventionally disseminated by international actors 
in lower-income countries and routinely associated with neoliberal ideas. These include the 
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devolution of management responsibilities to the private and community sectors, the adoption 
of cost-recovery principles as well as the corporatisation of public entities.  
The Código das Águas, a legal act adopted in 1992, is the legal framework guiding the 
management, use, and conservation of water resources in the country, and establishing the 
institutional framework of the sector. This law defines water, in all its forms, as a public good, 
even though its use and management can be passed on, in the form of concessions, to other 
entities. Nevertheless, according to the water law of Guinea-Bissau, the state retains the right 
to control, monitor and plan the management of water as well as its rights of use.  This legal 
act also establishes priority uses for water, which include the provision of safe drinking water 
to the population. Nevertheless, this legal framework is considered to be outdated and a new 
version is being drafted (Balde, 2015). 
The National Water Plan adopted in 1992, alongside a revision from 1998, remain the main 
policy frameworks guiding water provision in Guinea-Bissau. These documents were drafted 
in projects promoted by the UNDP and the EU, respectively. A new version of this Water 
Plan was drafted in 2010, in partnership with the UNDP, but it is still to be completed and 
adopted. In addition, the ‘Plan of Action for the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals in the Water and Sanitation sectors’, drafted in 2010, and the ‘Carta Sectorial sobre o 
Abastecimento de Água Potável e Saneamento’, a policy brief published in 2009, provide further 
guidance regarding strategies being adopted in the sector. Both these documents were, once 
again, produced in collaboration with UNDP. 
The strategy devised in the 1992 National Water Plan, and further elaborated in later 
documents, is based around four main principles: 
(1) To promote equitable access to water, namely through the extension of water services 
in Bissau and other urban centres.  
(2) Sustainability: To promote the organisation and participation of communities in the 
designing and operation of water services as a prerequisite for their long-term 
sustainability; the adoption of a water tariff based on cost-recovery that can guarantee 
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the financial autonomy of water services; to promote community and private sector 
participation in the management of water infrastructure; to promote capacity-
building of all actors involved.  
(3) Institutional reform: strengthen and reorganise the institutional framework for water 
management, promoting a change in the role of the state, empowering communities, 
and exploring the potential of the community and private sectors for the 
implementation of sectorial policies  
(4) To promote the sustainable use and management of the water resources of the 
country.  
Reflecting these broader principles, currently, the tasks of the Department of Water Resources 
include: (1) to produce policy and regulatory frameworks guiding water provision in the 
country; (2) to monitor water infrastructure and the organisations managing these 
infrastructures across the country; and, (3) to coordinate the actions of multiple actors involved 
in the sector. These tasks represented a change from those established in previous national 
policies and which entailed the direct involvement of state institutions in water provision. In 
other words, with the adoption of the 1992 Water Plan, the role of the state shifted from that 
of provider to that of enabler and regulator.  
In addition, the strategy included in the 1992 Water PLAN also enacted key changes in the 
financing of the sector, namely through the adoption of cost-recovery principles, which came 
to be seen as a fundamental step towards the financial sustainability of the sector. 
Furthermore, these shifts at the policy level were followed by significant changes within the 
state. In line with wider efforts to reduce the state and cut public spending, between 1991 and 
1995, the number of workers in the Department of Water Resources slumped from 400 to 
120, whilst major reforms resulted in significant transformations in organisational forms. In 
1992, the UNDP also oversaw the creation of an independent para-statal company, 
ENAFUR, with the aim of supporting private sector participation in the country.  
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Altogether, the reduction in the size of the state apparatuses, cuts in public spending, 
organisational reforms, the devolution of responsibilities for service provision to the 
community and private sectors, and the adoption of cost-recovery principles are all moves 
that suggest a neoliberal turn in the sector. A move most likely to happen considering the key 
role international organisations, such as the United Nations, the European Commission and 
the World Bank, played in the process.  
Taking into consideration the apparent neoliberal ethos undergirding current water policies 
in Guinea-Bissau, alongside the routinisation of political instability and the elusiveness of the 
state, the following chapters of this thesis seek to answer a number of questions related to water 
provision in the country and the role different actors have played shaping and governing water 
infrastructure. For example, how were these policies perceived by state officials and other 
actors involved in the water provision in Guinea-Bissau? Or, in other words, how were they 
appropriated in the specific context of Guinea-Bissau? How did they relate to the de facto role 
of state institutions in a context where the elusiveness of the state is widely recognised? In 
addition, in a context where the state is heavily dependent on international donations, how 
are policies translated into practice? In a context marked by the multiplicity of institutions 
how is the state shaping service provision? In what ways is the state shaping water 
infrastructure in Guinea-Bissau? How are cost-recovery principles and the roles attributed to 
the public, community and private sectors being enacted on the ground?  
Processes of decentralisation have produced important changes in the ways small African cities 
are governed. Specifically, the devolution of power to local state institutions has enacted legal 
and de facto transformations in the contours of  institutions governing water supply in cities 
(Jaglin et al., 2011). However, in Guinea-Bissau, whilst decentralisation measures envisaging 
the creation of a locally elected tier of government have been legally adopted, they have not 
been implemented. For this reason, they are not discussed in this research. In fact, in Guinea-
Bissau, the decentralisation process started in 1994 with the publication of a law allocating 
new decision-making, implementation and control functions to regions and sectors. However, 
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even this initial attempt to decentralise proved to remain strictly formal since neither regions 
or sectors were endowed with any resources to carry out their new functions. The powers of 
regional and sectorial levels of administration remain therefore extremely reduced. 
Nevertheless, this research demonstrates the ways in which these state departments continue 
to influence water provision.  
These questions will be answered by focusing on the accounts and practices of multiple actors 
at the national level but, most importantly, through an investigation of the recent evolution of 
water provision in the second city of Guinea-Bissau, Bafatá.  
5.3.2. Water infrastructure in Bafatá 
The following empirical chapters of these thesis explore water provision in Bafatá between 
2006 and 2014 or, to put it in another way, since ASPAAB – a local organisation formed by 
a group of teachers and students from local schools without previous knowledge of water 
management – took over responsibility for the management of the city’s piped supply. The 
case study of Bafatá was chosen because of the perceived success of this organisation in 
mobilising the resources required to refurbish the piped network, strengthen the organisation 
and train their staff as well as their ability to put in place a governance model that seems to 
be working in the context of this city. In 2006, when ASPAAB started operating the water 
system there was only 1 standpipe and around 10 home connections in operation. By 2016, 
there were 23 standpipes in operation and the system served at least 104 home connections.  
As in many other cities across the world, Bafatá’s residents rely on various sources and 
technologies in order to meet their daily water needs and a relatively low number of 
households collect water from improved water sources. According to data collected by TESE 
(2010), in 2010, only 24.9% of the population of Bafatá was using water from an improved 
water sources. This included 19% relying on protected wells and hand pumps, 5.2% on public 
standpipes and 0.7% on home connections. In 2013, the situation had improved slightly and 
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29.2% were then relying on improved water sources. Between 2010 and 2013, the number of 
people relying on the piped water had increased by 6% to 12%, among these 11.8% opted 
for public standpipes and less than 1% used home connections. The remaining 88% of the 
population continued to use water from alternative sources, 70.8% relied on wells (both 
traditional and protected wells) and springs, 16.9% relied on hand pumps (TESE and 
ASPAAB, 2013a). 
As noted by Borges (2004), Davila (1987) and Lourenço-Lindell (2002), during the colonial 
era, urban areas were spaces of colonial power where European lifestyles and modernity were 
emulated, where political power was concentrated and where social services and urban 
infrastructures, such as roads, water distribution networks, electricity grids and housing were 
built. Investments by the Portuguese colonial authorities were thus concentrated within clearly 
defined boundaries that delineated these urban areas. The ‘native quarters’, where the 
majority of the population lived, remained located beyond those boundaries and therefore 
lacked any major infrastructure at independence. Accordingly, at independence, the water 
piped network of Bafatá served only the colonial city where the European and creole 
populations lived; and, the responsibility for the management of the existing piped supply of 
Bafatá, the Praça sub-network, was granted to the Regional Offices of the Department of 
Energy.  
The current contours of the piped water network in the city are the result of a series of 
piecemeal extensions, mostly funded by a myriad of different international organisations.  The 
first documented expansion to the network of Bafatá after independence happened in the late 
1980s. It was implemented under a project funded by the Netherlands Development 
Organisation and it sought to expand the network to Bairro 1, one of the central 
neighbourhoods, in what would become the Boma sub-network.  However, as the project 
came to an end, the newly installed distribution network had not been connected to a water 
source and some of the pipes installed had not been connected to the rest of the network. 
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Thus, the new water network remained out of use.  This would remain the case until 2008, 
when British NGO Plan international funded the completion of the works.   
The next significant investments in the water network happened during the 1998 -1999 civil 
war, when the UN and Unicef financed the construction of two new independent sub-systems, 
in two distinct neighbourhoods, Ponte Nova and Bairro 4. The Ponte Nova system was 
designed to serve 12 public standpipes and the Bairro 4 network served 9 standpipes. These 
systems were financed under an emergency fund, which sought to deal with sudden 
population growth resulting from the influx of war refugees to Bafatá running away from 
armed conflict in other parts of the country.  
Whereas at the time the other piped water sub-networks in the city – Boma and Praça – 
remained under the management of the Regional Offices of the Department of Water 
Resources, the responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the newly built water 
infrastructure was granted to residents’ committees created for the purpose.  This 
management approach reflected both the policies of the organisations involved in the 
construction of these sub-systems but also national policies, as established in the 1992 Water 
Plan, which had not yet been implemented in Bafatá.   
By the early 2000s, the Ponte Nova system was out of commission, because of technical, 
financial and management difficulties, and the Bairro 4 network continued to work but only 
very intermittently. Both the Boma and Praça sub-system were by that time also out of 
commission. Thus, when ASPAAB, a local association, took over the management of the 
Bairro 4 sub-system in 2006, replacing the previous residents’ committee, this was the only 
active part of the piped supply of the city. And, within this network, only one standpipe was 
in working order.   
Since 2006, the piped water network of Bafatá has undergone substantial transformations. In 
2014, both the Boma and Bairro 4 sub-networks were active, serving 13 public standpipes and 
53 home connections, and the system operated on a daily basis for approximately 3 hours. By 
2016, therefore after the end of the research period of this thesis, all the four sub-systems were 
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working and the system served a total of 23 standpipes and 104 home connections. The 
following chapters trace precisely these transformations, focusing on the role of various actors, 
including international organisations, and policy models, but concentrating particularly on 
the active role of state actors as well as local organisations shaping water provision. This study 
also discusses the ways in which the changes happening in Bafatá relate to the implementation 
of national policies. Lastly, as stated earlier, Bafatá’s inhabitants continue to rely on multiple 
sources and technologies to access water. Chapter eight delves into everyday water practices 
in the city to dissect the factors and motivations behind these practices and the ways they 
relate to evolutions in the piped water network.  
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– SIX –  
States, policies and the piped water network in Bafatá 
6.1. Introduction 
The images above show recently refurbished standpipes in Bafatá. On these a talented artist 
has painted, in minute detail, the logos of the European Union, Portuguese NGO TESE, and 
ASPAAB, a local association and the operator of the water network. Notably, the logo of the 
owner of this infrastructure, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, was left out. Why? Is this an 
instance of a stereotypically weak and absent West African state, accompanied by the 
concomitant rise of non-state organisations, taking into their own hands the responsibility for 
service provision? Is this just another example of rampant neoliberalism, where the state has 
withdrawn from service provision, devolving its responsibilities to the private sector or, where 
corporate businesses are unwilling to invest, to the community sector? This chapter provides 
a counter-argument to such assumptions. Situating policies and interventions in the specific 
trajectories of the state in Guinea-Bissau, it suggests that policy models influenced by or 
resembling neoliberal logics have taken on new meanings as they were adopted in and adapted 
to this specific context. It also shows that the state has shaped water provision in Bafatá in 
significant ways not through enforcing policy and regulatory frameworks, but through a 
Figure 10. Standpipes in Bafatá (pictures taken by myself in 2014) 
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variety of decision, practices and interactions by government officials. In this way, this chapter 
highlights the importance of practices beyond formal bureaucracies and illustrates how the 
state works in relational ways, through its interactions with non-state organisations.  It also 
demonstrates how states can be neoliberal and developmental, violent and benefactor all at 
once.  
This chapter draws on anthropological investigations of the state and explorations of everyday 
state practices. This literature challenges any preconceived notions related to the cohesiveness 
of states, and therefore opens the analytical field to the consideration of the multiple agendas, 
practices and modalities through which states shape water infrastructure (see, for example, 
Gupta, 1995; Mitchell, 1991; Painter, 2006).  
Discourses of state weakness pervade academic, policy and everyday representations of the 
state in the water sector in Guinea-Bissau and these weaknesses have been framed as one of 
the key challenges in securing the sustainable provision of water across the country. The next 
section, section 6.2., starts by situating perceptions of the state in the water sector in the context 
of broader discursive constructions of the state in Guinea-Bissau, which consistently highlight 
its weakness and even exceptionality. It then focusses specifically on the water sector, 
demonstrating the extent of the lack of financial and human resources available to the state, 
and exploring the implications of this for our understandings of state weakness. The difficulties 
related to policy-making and implementation and the heavy presence of international 
organisations and NGOs in water provision must be understood in this context. Yet, these 
weaknesses do not necessarily mean that the state is absent. Instead, state presence is revealed 
both in relational ways, through relations with non-state organisations, and through practices 
that routinely escape formal bureaucracies.  
The discourse of state weakness in the water sector pervades contemporary representations of 
the sector, but it also frames understandings circulating at all levels of the evolution of the 
sector in the past decades. Considering this long-term feature of the state in Guinea-Bissau, 
this chapter suggests that the apparent neoliberal turn in water policy in 1992 (see chapter 5), 
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involving the withdrawal of the state and the adoption of cost-recovery principles, did not 
translate into significant de facto changes in the role of the state in water provision. Instead, it 
argues that policies fostering the involvement of non-state organisations managing water 
infrastructure and seeking to create links between these organisations and state institutions 
must be viewed as pragmatic attempts to improve access to water in a context marked by a 
stark lack of resources. These policies also constitute efforts to extend the responsibility of the 
state in water provision.  In this way, the content of national policies is seen to largely 
transcend a neoliberal ethos. This is not to say that policies circulating in Guinea-Bissau have 
not been deeply shaped by international policies, or that neoliberal models are not a part of 
extant policies, but that the outcomes and meanings of these policies must be explored and 
understood in light of the specific context of Guinea-Bissau.  
Moving on to investigate the variety of practices and interactions through which the state 
shapes water provision, this chapter notes that in Guinea-Bissau, policy-making and 
implementation initiatives are mostly funded through international donations, and developed 
in partnership with international organisations and NGOs. Thus, the ability of state 
institutions to shape water provision is necessarily linked to the relations between the state and 
international organisations as well as international and national NGOs. Section 6.3. discusses 
the role of the state in policy-making and implementation by exploring the interactions 
between national-level state actors and non-state actors, that is by examining the relational 
ways of the state. Nevertheless, it suggests that the ability of the Department of Water 
Resources to shape interventions remains extremely dependent on non-state organisations’ 
willingness to be shaped, regulated and controlled by this state institution. Despite stated goals 
of strengthening state institutions, the reality is that development interventions often bypass, 
replace and ignore the state. State weaknesses hinder attempts by state institutions to perform 
roles defined in national policies. These weaknesses are then further reinforced by this state 
institutions’ inability to shape, control and regulate the work of a range of non-state 
organisations which both fund and implement most interventions in the sector. As a result, 
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interventions in the sector happen in disjointed ways which partly reflect the Department of 
Water Resources inability to enforce its role governing the work of non-state organisations 
leading interventions in the sector.  
In this chapter, in line with theorisations of the state discussed in chapter 3, I use the notion 
of ‘state effects’ to describe the ways in which everyday practices by both state and non-state 
actors come to be perceived as being part of the state, and therefore contribute to the 
expansion of the symbolic presence of the state (Mitchell, 1991; Painter, 2006). Related to 
this, scholars have reflected upon the statisation of society and the production of state effects 
within multiple sites across the porous state-society boundaries (Painter, 2006). This chapter 
demonstrates that in contexts such as that of Guinea-Bissau, interventions by state and non-
state organisations can contribute not to the statisation but also to the de-statisation of society. 
That is, rather than strengthening the role of the state in the sector, non-state organisations 
often compete with the state and contribute to the weakening of its symbolic (and actual) 
presence. This is in line with Jaglin et al.’s (2011) findings relating to competition between 
different actors in water provision in small towns in Benin, Senegal and Mali, and the 
subsequent impacts on the state’s ability to improve its capacity and enhance its role in the 
sector. 
Shifting from the national to the local level, section 6.4. explores the everyday ways in which 
state actors have shaped the evolution of Bafatá’s piped water supply in the past decades. It 
demonstrates that national policies and regulations have not been driving the evolution of 
water infrastructure in this city. However, different state actors have significantly shaped this 
infrastructure over the years. This has happened through local step-by-step negotiations that 
exceed any policy and regulatory frameworks or project interventions, but during which state 
officials have used their position within the state to make claims related to the piped supply of 
the city. Thus, this chapter argues that whereas state weaknesses have hindered policy-making 
and implementation processes, these weaknesses should not be equated with the total absence 
of the state. In addition, the variegated motivations and agendas underpinning state practices 
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suggest that the state of Guinea-Bissau adopts multiple modalities when shaping water 
infrastructure in Bafatá.  
Lastly, section 6.5. examines the concession contract signed in 2012 between ASPAAB and the 
Ministry of Natural resources, which formalised the role of ASPAAB as water operator in the 
city. It suggests that despite the attempts of the Department of Water Resources to extend its 
remit to the realm of water provision in Bafatá, this department remained unable to exercise 
the same influence that local state officials, alongside non-state actors, managed to achieve 
through local negotiations. Then, as we will see, the legal and policy facets of the state play 
quite a different role than anticipated – rather than amounting to devices that regulate social 
life, serve as devices that conform to international NGOs expectations to carving the 
appropriate legal languages of stateness.  
In sum, this chapter traces the multiple ways in which state institutions and actors seek to, and 
actually do, shape water infrastructure in Bafatá. In this way, it illustrates the vitality of state 
practices escaping formal bureaucracies and policies, and therefore the disjuncture between 
the everyday state practices through which state actors shape water infrastructure and 
processes of policy making and implementation. In addition, it also demonstrates that the state 
is far from a coherent entity following one specific agenda or motivation. This is revealed in 
the variety of motivations underpinning the practices of state actors as well as the multiple 
modalities adopted when shaping water provision. Thus, in order to understand the ways in 
which the state shapes water provision we need to consider the different modalities, agendas 
and, perhaps most importantly, the vitality of processes that largely exceed policy or 
regulatory frameworks.  
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6.2. States weaknesses and the water sector 
6.2.1. The exceptional weakness of the state in Guinea-Bissau 
Representations of the state among actors working in the water sector are constructed in, and 
influenced by, a broader landscape of perceptions of the state, produced and reproduced 
across multiple levels. For example, Gupta (1995) discusses how images of the state in rural 
India were constructed through everyday interactions with state bureaucracies but also 
through discussions of these practices in public culture at multiple levels. Before moving on to 
the analysis of the specificities of the state in the water sector, I will briefly illustrate how ideas 
of state weakness pervade assessments of the state at all levels and across all sectors. In 
addition, I will demonstrate how there is a widespread notion of the exceptional weakness of 
the state in Guinea-Bissau. The ongoing assumption is that these perceptions affect 
perceptions and practices related to water provision. But, this analysis of state weaknesses 
pervading all sectors also illustrates the dependence of state institutions on international 
donations, and therefore the extent to which state presence in water provision depends on the 
relations and interactions between state and non-state actors, which are then analysed in 
section 6.3. and section 6.4.. In other words, it illustrates the relevance of the relational ways 
in which the state seeks to influence water provision. 
Reports and policies produced by international actors are one site where the discourses of 
state weakness can be seen circulating. In a report published in 2013, the IMF ascertains the 
relative, but also absolute, weakness of state institutions in Guinea-Bissau by looking into tax 
revenues in the country, and establishing a comparison with other countries in the region. 
According to this report (see Table 5, below) in 2011, Guinea-Bissau collected the equivalent 
of 8.76% of its GDP in taxes, registering the lowest tax revenue performance not only among 
countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), but also when 
compared with any other sub-Saharan African country. Guinea-Bissau also registered the 
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lowest tax effort, measured in % of collected taxes in relation to potential tax revenue22; and 
the second highest tax gap, measured in the difference between the potential and collected 
tax. The very low tax performance levels are, at least according to this report, a clear 
indication of the lack of bureaucratic capacity of state institutions (IMF, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c).   
 
TABLE B4. WAEMU Countries: Actual vis-à-vis Potential Tax Revenue in 2011 
Ω   Tax Revenue  (A, % of GDP) 
  Estimated Potential Tax 
Revenue 
(B, % of GDP) 
Tax Gap 
(A-B, % of 
GDP) 
Tax Effort  
(A/B, %) 
Benin 15.53 24.19 8.66 64.18 
Burkina Faso 14.47 24.29 9.81 59.57 
Cote d’Ivoire 13.14 25.14 12.00 52.27 
GUINEA-
BISSAU 8.76 20.69 11.93 42.34 
Mali 14.87 23.32 8.45 63.75 
Niger 14.07 22.60 8.52 62.27 
Senegal 19.08 25.71 6.62 74.21 
Togo 17.1 23.90 6.72 71.87 
WAEMU 14.63 23.73 9.08 61.30 
1/ Simple mean of eight WAEMU countries 
Table 5. WAEMU countries: actual vis-à-vis potential tax revenue in 2011 (source IMF 2013, p. 37) 
 
The emphasis given to tax revenue and the connections established between low tax revenues 
and state weakness are in line with contemporary development policies circulating across the 
African continent, which stress the improvement of tax collection efforts as a way to 
consolidate state institutions (c.f. Juul, 2006). In this sense, there is nothing exceptional about 
the dissemination of these discourses in and about Guinea-Bissau. At the same time, this 
document is also one example of an extensive number of reports published by various 
organisations, building similar cases for state weakness whilst studying different sectors and 
portraying Guinea-Bissau as an extreme instance within cases of state weakness.  
Nevertheless, discourses related to the exceptional weakness of the state in Guinea-Bissau also 
circulate through the everyday practices of staff from international organisations with offices 
in Bissau. These perceptions were reiterated in their accounts of their experiences in the 
country and, more specifically, their experiences working with state institutions. For example, 
                                                      
22 According to this report, the inferior potential tax revenue, in relation to other WAEMU countries, can be linked to Guinea-
Bissau remaining the only country in the region not having fulfilled its obligation to adopt VAT. 
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João23 worked for the EU Delegation to Guinea-Bissau. In a dialogue about the EU Budget, 
pertaining to EU funds allocated to development cooperation, which directly funds the 
national state’s budgets,  João highlighted the exceptionality of Guinea-Bissau:  
“Guinea-Bissau is a particular case because Guinea-Bissau does not even have the resources to 
pay public sector wages, for this reason we have to support the general budget. But, in other 
countries, where they have the resources, for example, they have a general budget and, for example, 
one sector that was not well supported, or that it is not included for that year or the next, I don’t 
know, in that case the European Union can intervene and decide to support the sector…” 24  
Related to the above, Michel25, who worked for a Pan-African Intergovernmental Agency 
delegation to Guinea-Bissau, openly disclosed his desperation and lack of motivation. He had 
worked for the same organisation in other countries in the region – including his native Benin 
–, but, for him, Guinea-Bissau was a peculiar place. As he explained:  
“Guinea[-Bissau] has no problems, 1.6 million people and plenty of water. I’ve never seen a 
country like this, there are no problems, just politics. (…) Guinea-Bissau is very different from 
other countries I worked in, Benin and Niger. The state here, it can do nothing. There, it wasn’t 
like that.” 26  
Whilst not focusing on the exceptional weakness of the state in Guinea-Bissau, representations 
of the weak state also punctuate policy documents and strategies published by different state 
entities. Just to give an example, the Second Document for the National Strategy for Poverty 
Reduction (DENARP II), published in 2011, scrutinises the impacts of state weakness on 
poverty and it establishes the consolidation of state institutions and the rule of law as the first 
main prerequisite to reduce poverty in the country (MEPIR, 2011a). Here, it should be noted 
that this document, like most policy and strategy briefs in Guinea-Bissau, was funded by an 
international organisation, in this case the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and written 
                                                      
23 Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity.  
24 Interview International Organisation *2. Translated from Portuguese, my own translation. 
25 Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity. 
26 Interview International Organisation *4. Translated from Creole, my own translation.  
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by international consultants. On the one hand, the key role of international organisations in 
the elaboration of policies further reinforces perceptions related to the weaknesses of the state 
in Guinea-Bissau. On the other hand, it suggests that the current focus of international 
development discourses on state weakness and the consolidation of states institutions is likely 
to have influenced the contents of these documents, partly explaining the emphasis given to 
state weakness in this document. Therefore, it raises pertinent questions concerning the extent 
to which the focus on the consolidation of state institutions can be explained by the influence 
of international discourses. 
Most notably, not only do views of the weak state circulate in policy discourses and among 
workers for international organisations, they also circulate within state institutions themselves. 
Such views of the weak state emerged in the accounts of various state bureaucrats working at 
different levels and narrating their experiences. Institutional weakness was routinely drawn on 
to explain the poor performance of various state institutions and to point out the limitations 
these bureaucrats faced in their routine activities. In scrutinising participants’ incomplete 
sentences, intonations and body gestures recorded in my fieldwork diaries and interviews, I 
became aware of the degree to which assumptions of a shared understanding of state 
weakness, as well as corruption and incompetence, permeated my encounters. The quotes 
below are just a few examples of such assumptions from interviews with state officials: 
“but, now because of the institutional weaknesses, as Susana knows…” 27 (Water Resources, 
Bissau) 
“The state… no one trusts the state, you know that…” 28 (Water Resources, Bissau) 
“but later the project came to a halt, things ended up staying in the hands of the state, you know 
how it is, our state, the state it is in…” 29 (Regional Office, Bafatá)  
                                                      
27 Interview State *7. Original in Portuguese, my own translation from Portuguese. 
28 Interview State *6. Original in Portuguese, my own translation from Portuguese. 
29 Interview State *3. Original in Creole, my own translation from Creole.  
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In fact, most of the state officials I interviewed worked in the water sector. However, these 
consistent allusions to the incompetent state largely exceeded the workings of the state in this 
specific sector. These accounts hinted at broader notions circulated in public culture, 
including the media and, most importantly, everyday conversations. They also reflected their 
wider experiences, both as state officials and citizens of Guinea-Bissau.  
Related to this, narratives and anecdotes illustrating the incompetent state were a common 
theme in everyday conversations and casual encounters between strangers in Guinea-Bissau. 
For instance, my conversations with people regarding the role of different state institutions in 
water supply in Bafatá often provoked comments like the ones below: 
“State? What state? That is cansado30! Here, the state can’t hold its own head, and you want 
to hand it your belly? The state! It can’t hold its own head!” 31 
“The state doesn’t help at all (laughs)! We, we don’t expect anything from the state almost 
(laughs). The state doesn’t help at all! It just disturbs!” 32 
Perceptions of state weakness in the water sector do not emerge in a vacuum, they reproduce 
broader discursive constructions of the state. Most investments in the water sector in the past 
few decades have been financed by international donations, channelled through state 
institutions as well as international and national NGOs – reflecting the broader dependence 
of the state of Guinea-Bissau on foreign aid. Typically, these investments in infrastructure 
have been accompanied by substantial funds for activities related to state reform and the 
capacity-building of state institutions, and have been complemented by a stream of reports 
presenting solid cases for state weakness. Although these reports and analyses discuss 
weaknesses specific to the water sector, this discourse of state weakness in the water sector in 
Guinea-Bissau must be understood in relation to wider discursive constructions of the state in 
this country. It must also be situated within contemporary development discourses, including 
                                                      
30 Cansado (Guinea-Bissau Creole) – literal translation is tired. However, this term is used in many other ways, like here. It is 
often used to refer to things that complicate your life, or that do not work properly. Places can be cansado, for example, if Guinea-
Bissau is cansado, it means that life is hard there, things are not easy and are not working properly. If someone is cansado, it 
means that they are not ok, they are stressed, nervous, and/or hard to deal with.  
31 Interview Water User *1. Translated from Creole, my own translation. 
32 Interview Water User *2. Translated from Creole, my own translation.  
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the current emphasis upon ‘good governance’ (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; Jacobsen et al., 
2013). State practices relating to water provision and representations of these practices are 
both shaped by and contribute to broader discursive constructions depicting the weakness, 
and the exceptional weakness, of Guinea-Bissau’s state. Yet, as will be seen below, perceptions 
of state weakness in the water sector also emerge through the everyday experiences of actors 
involved in the sector. 
6.2.2. State weaknesses in the water sector: the lack of human and financial resources 
This section discusses perceptions of state weakness in the water sector, exploring reports and 
particularly the accounts of diverse actors’ experiences working with and for the state. It 
examines the extent of the lack of financial and human resources available to the Department 
of Water Resources, how this is perceived to affect this state institution’s ability to intervene 
in the sector, and how it engenders this department’s dependence on international 
organisations. Discourses of state weakness in the water sector circulating in policy documents 
and reports frequently establish that capacity-building of state institutions is an essential 
requirement to improve access to water in Guinea-Bissau. However, as will be seen below, 
this emphasis upon training and capacity-building should not hide the lack of financial and 
human resources faced by the Department of Water Resources – the main state institution 
working on water provision in Guinea-Bissau – and their impacts on the ability of this state 
institution to intervene in the sector. In addition, given the stark lack of financial and human 
resources, policy-making and implementation is commonly funded by international 
organisations and the Department of Water Resources depends almost entirely on foreign aid. 
One important consequence of this dependence on non-state organisations is that state 
presence is mostly produced in relational ways. In other words, state presence depends on the 
relations and interactions between the state and international organisations. Section 6.3. and 
section 6.4. below explore precisely how the ongoing relations and interactions between state 
institutions and non-state organisations foster and hinder state presence in the water sector.  
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The Department of Water Resources, whose responsibilities include policy making and 
implementation and the monitoring of water infrastructure across the country, is supposedly 
the key state institution shaping water provision in Guinea-Bissau (see chapter 5 for more 
details). Yet, according to a panoply of technical reports, as well as the accounts of state 
officials and staff from international organisations and NGOs working in the sector, the 
Department of Water Resources struggled to perform at least three of what were assumed to 
be its key tasks, as defined in national policies:  
(1) to monitor water infrastructure and supervise and support organisations managing 
these infrastructures across the country;  
(2) to regulate the sector through the elaboration and implementation of clear policy 
and regulatory frameworks;  
(3) to coordinate the activities of the different actors involved in the sector, namely 
national and international NGOs and organisations.  
For instance, in the evaluation report for a Netherlands-funded project implemented between 
1994 and 2000, Sawa (2000, p. 46) already expressed concern regarding the Department of 
Water Resources’ ability to perform “the activities typical of the state, like the planning and 
regulation of the sector, the monitoring of construction works, the monitoring and control of 
the infrastructure and training”. The difficulties related to the elaboration of policy and 
regulatory frameworks are quickly revealed in the outdated National Water Plan and the 
Water Law, both dated from 1992. They are also visible in the multiple inconsistencies 
pervading different policy briefs and the inaccurate assessments of the governance models 
adopted in the country. For example, in these plans it is stated that Bafatá’s piped water 
network is managed by EAGB, the state company that manages water and electricity in 
Bissau, even though this is not, and never was, the case. Different plans and sectoral 
documents also present inconsistencies in their categorisations of locations as urban, semi-
urban and rural and consequently the type of infrastructure and governance models to be put 
in place in these locations. In fact, there are multiple newer versions of several of these plans 
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and regulations but they have not been approved and adopted. The difficulties related to the 
approval and adoption of revised plans can partially be explained by political instability and 
its impacts on the normal functioning of state entities, such as the parliament, or the hindering 
of political decisions. 
Considering the significant role played by international organisations as well as international 
and national NGOs, the inability of the Department of Water Resources to coordinate, 
control and supervise projects and interventions promoted by these organisations was 
routinely cited as another key issue in the sector.33 Here, it is important to briefly mention the 
manifold consequences of the lack of coordination and control. The first clear impact was that 
it often led to the overlapping of interventions both geographically and thematically. For 
instance, a member of staff from an international NGO told me that once her organisation 
had literally bumped into another international organisation as they were both getting ready 
to start work on the construction of a borehole and hand pump in the same area.34 Second, it 
resulted in the proliferation of interventions that did not conform to sectoral policies and 
strategies and did not meet required standards. For example, state officials often mentioned 
that a frequent issue was that NGO’s projects did not install state-approved types of hand 
pumps that had been selected in order to facilitate the purchase of spare parts and, therefore, 
future operation and maintenance. Third, it gave rise to interventions which contradicted 
both policies and each other in content. For example, those actors seeking to put cost-recovery 
systems in place often complained about others who just ‘gave’ infrastructure away for free, 
and therefore undermined their efforts to promote a ‘culture of payment’ within the 
community. Finally, it undermined the Department of Water Resources’ role as the entity 
responsible for supervising, monitoring and controlling interventions and projects in the 
sector. For instance, without knowing what projects were implemented and where, this state 
                                                      
33 Interview state *7 
34 Fieldwork notes 
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institution struggled to identify needs and priorities for the sector. NGOs routinely failed to 
inform the state about their activities or even their presence in the country.35  
The erratic ways in which international organisations and NGOs intervene in the country is 
not a recent concern. A report published by the International Water and Sanitation Centre 
and the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV) in 1995 already claimed: “[External 
Support Agencies (ESAs)] often implemented their projects in isolation and introduced 
different technologies and different ways of communicating with the beneficiaries. They 
trained staff to different degrees and had their own views about institutional development” 
(van der Weff and Visscher, 1995, p. 15). 
In this context, resembling many other reports published by myriad organisations, the 
‘Millennium Development Goals Action Plan for the Water and Sanitation sectors’, published 
in 2010 by the Department of Water Resources, states, “in Guinea-Bissau, capacity-building 
[of state institutions] is an essential requirement for the long-term sustainable development of 
the water supply sector” (DGRH, 2010, p. 75).36 However, despite the emphasis given to 
capacity-building in circulating policies and reports, weaknesses in the sector – revealed in the 
difficulties state entities face in the elaboration, implementation and enforcement of policy 
and regulatory frameworks – must also be understood in the context of the extreme lack of 
financial and human resources available to the state, which became evident in the accounts 
of actors working with and for the state. Capacity-building should not detract attention from 
the lack of resources faced by state institutions.  
The lack of financial resources available to the Department of Water Resources was 
staggering. The quotes below, extracted from interviews with a state official and a worker of 
an international organisation, illustrate typical accounts relating to the lack of resources 
available to the Department of Water Resources: 
                                                      
35 Fieldwork notes, including notes on conversations with state officials and staff from different NGOs and international 
organisations.  
36 Original in Portuguese, my own translation from Portuguese. 
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“Buuu, state budget, state budget… State budget, Susana, is just wages and even that… even 
that… We [the Department of Water Resources] developed several monitoring programmes, they 
were delivered to the minister [of Natural Resources] but the resources are not there, we know 
that, there is no money, no funds, the budget only covers wages. Unfortunately…” 37 
“the Department of Water Resources doesn’t have the financial resources, it has vehicles, we 
donated two cars. (…) they lack the budget to cover routine activities, they do little more than we 
[international organisation] send money to do…”  
In a situation where the state budget covers only wages, the Department of Water Resources 
is forced into a position of complete dependence on international donations to carry out any 
activities. Some international organisations, like Unicef and the European Union, have multi-
year programmes which fund a range of activities to be implemented by this department. 
However, these programmes are not sufficient to cover the costs of the entire range of tasks 
those working in the sector might expect the department to deliver. Therefore those activities 
which are not encompassed in internationally funded projects or agreements are simply not 
implemented. 
Political instability has not only contributed to the steady decline of foreign aid over the years 
(see chapter 5), it routinely starves state departments of consistent influxes of foreign aid. This 
was apparent at the time of my fieldwork, when sanctions imposed by various international 
organisations, following the coup d’état of April 2012 40, considerably reduced the financial 
resources available to this already starved department. For instance, the EU had suspended 
any direct support to state institutions, and Unicef had postponed the beginning of a new 
multi-year programme of works with Water Resources until after the election. These 
suspensions had severe impacts at multiple levels including the basic functioning of this 
department.  
                                                      
37 Interview State *6. Original in Portuguese, my own translation from Portuguese. 
40 Several international organisations did not recognise the government rising to power after April 2012 coup d’état  
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The offices of the Department of Water Resources are based in the building of the Ministry 
of Natural Resources. On one occasion, when I visited these offices to conduct interviews, 
they had been without electricity for over a week. Interviewees also mentioned they were 
unable to secure even basic office supplies and equipment. Another time, after visiting this 
department looking for data within the scope of the consultancy work I carried out during my 
fieldwork, I only managed to get access to this data when the state official I had been in contact 
with eventually visited Bafatá, where, working from the offices of an international NGO we 
had electricity and access to the internet. The president of Enafur, a state company working 
in the water sector, also explained that sanctions leading to the suspension of most 
internationally-funded projects in the country had deeply affected the workings of this 
company, which was then struggling to pay the wages of its employees. Thus, it is apparent 
that the lack of financial resources severely affects the everyday functioning of the Department 
of Water Resources and consistently undermines any attempts by officials in this state 
department to carry out their jobs.  
If the Department of Water Resources in Bissau struggled with a drastic lack of resources, its 
Regional Offices faced even more severe situations. As representatives of the Department of 
Water Resources in the different regions, the key tasks of these regional offices were professed 
to be monitoring water infrastructure, as well as supervising and supporting the organisations 
managing this infrastructure in the different regions. However, some offices were severely 
under-staffed and depleted of resources, and others had simply closed down for lack of staff. 
In at least two regions, the Regional Director, often the only member of staff, had moved 
away from the region, to Bissau or other cities, in search of additional work to complement 
their incomes. These cases were well-known and accepted (by other state officials, staff from 
international organisations remained very critical), as the low wages and the lack of adequate 
conditions to conduct their jobs were consensually recognised.  
The lack of communication between Regional Offices and Water Resources was also 
staggering. In these circumstances, those located in the Department of Water Resources in 
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Bissau had little idea of what was happening in the Regional Offices and, vice-versa, those 
working in the offices spread out across the different regions had also little knowledge of what 
was happening at the central level. This situation changed when there were projects funded 
by international donors in place, as will be discussed below.  
The quotes below are typical accounts of the frustrations around the challenges faced by 
regional offices, and illustrate the extent of the lack of resources and the ways in which it 
affected the presumed activities of these state departments:  
 “.. at the minimum, a regional office should have a complete, fully-bodied structure: it should 
have director, it should have at least one technician, it should have an administrator, it should 
have… a complete structure…” 41 (Vasco, Water Resources) 
“The Regional Office is supposed to monitor, to monitor the various water sources, follow the 
workings of the management committees and associations, but if there are no resources, how can 
they do their work? They are going to sit! (…) Suppose you know of a specific problem somewhere, 
how can you write a report and send it to Bissau if you don’t have the equipment? There is no 
electricity, there is nothing… The Department of Water Resources gives nothing to its regional 
offices. Only wages. But wages also, they are worth nothing. You can’t use that money for petrol 
to go around visiting villages and infrastructure.” 42 (Malam, Regional Office) 
Thus, despite the fact that the Regional Offices were considered to be essential structures 
within the Department of Water Resources, in charge of monitoring existing infrastructure 
and organisations managing this infrastructure, in actuality, they lack financial resources or 
the conditions necessary to perform any activities. Indeed, the lack of financial resources has 
to be seen as a central factor in explaining this state institution’s inability to actually influence 
water supply in the country. Training and capacity-building are certainly important priorities, 
but they cannot make up for the lack of financial resources. In fact, government officials were 
often employed by private companies and NGOs suggesting that they had the skills and 
                                                      
41 Interview State *6 
42 Interview State *1. Original in Creole, my own translation from Creole.  
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qualifications required for their jobs. Thus, the lack of resources available to the state has to 
considered before, or side-by-side with, capacity-building when evaluating state weaknesses. 
Notwithstanding the emphasis upon the lack of resources that undermined the workings of 
state institutions and of the many state officials with the right qualifications, according to state 
officials and others working in the sector, the second main difficulty faced by the Department 
of Water Resources and its Regional Offices was the shortage of qualified human resources. 
Manuel, employed by the Department of Water Resources, and Teresa44, working in an 
international organisation, explained:  
“We lack qualified personnel, there are few young people deciding to study these disciplines 
nowadays, and those that do, when they finish their studies, they come back and, then, the public 
sector is not recruiting new people, it’s very hard.” 45  
“There is the need to strengthen the human resources available in the ministry. Because, right 
now, the number of staff is too small and they also need more technical capacity and more… 
more vision for the future. All this needs to be dealt with.” 46 
Here, Manuel and Teresa identify two key underlying issues, which were also discussed with 
other informants: the state freeze on new admissions until the administrative reform of the 
state is completed (unknown date) and the lack of people with adequate training. Here, it 
should be noted that adequate training is often equated with studying abroad. Most of the 
current civil servants in Water Resources studied outside the country, mostly in Cuba and 
countries of the ex-Soviet Union. More recently, in a programme promoted by Unicef and 
Water and Sanitation for Africa (WSA), in 2014, there were ten Guinea-Bissauans sponsored 
to study related disciplines, such as engineering and hydrology, in Burkina Faso. However, 
low wages and bad working conditions were also associated with an unmotivated workforce, 
which did not help the Department of Water Resources achieve its goals. Those with more 
                                                      
44 Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity.  
45 Interview State *5 
46 Interview International Organisation *2. Original in Portuguese, my own translation from Portuguese.  
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qualifications often opted for jobs with international organisations, which were typically better 
paid. 
Thus, the lack of financial and human resources are essential factors underpinning state 
weaknesses in the water sector, hindering the ability of the Department of Water Resources 
to carry out its expected role and commanding its dependence on international donations and 
non-state organisations. The emphasis upon capacity-building should not obfuscate this 
scarcity of resources. 
Before moving on, I would like to briefly note the ways in which political instability was 
perceived in relation to state institutions working in the water sector. Although sanctions 
targeted all state institutions, those working in the water sector in the country consistently 
perceived that the Department of Water Resources was separate from political instability. 
This is not to say that political instability was not mentioned or not perceived to affect the 
workings of the Department of Water Resources, it clearly did. As mentioned earlier, 
informants often associated the lack of financial and human resources with political instability. 
However, for those who have been working in the country for a while, it was obvious that the 
state is not a coherent whole which can be easily categorised. Different departments operating 
at various levels employ distinct people, secure distinct resources and relationships to political 
elites, access distinct amounts and forms of international donations, and work in distinct ways.  
In fact, within the Department of Water Resources, members of staff, including the General 
Director, had not seen their positions within the state change as a result of political instability. 
They appeared to survive political upheavals. In fact, acknowledging this separation between 
state institutions, some individuals working for international organisations attempted to 
circumvent the decisions dictating the suspension of projects with Water Resources, following 
the April 12th coup d’état.47 
Below I briefly discuss the meanings and effects of supposedly neoliberal policies in the context 
of long-term state weakness. Then, section 6.3. examines the role of national level state 
                                                      
47 Interview International Organisation *1, *2 
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institutions in policy-making and implementation in a context where state institutions are 
almost totally dependent on international donations. The role of the regional office of the 
department of water resources and other state officials in Bafatá will be discussed in more 
detail in section 6.4. 
6.2.3. State weaknesses, the neoliberal turn and the de facto roles of the state 
In line with what has been called the ‘neoliberal turn’ in water policies adopted in 1992 (see 
chapter 5), it is apparent that the role imagined for the state in the water sector in Guinea-
Bissau resembles neoliberal models prescribing the role of the state as the enabler and 
regulator of the community and private sectors. This is perhaps not surprising considering the 
involvement of international organisations in policy-making in Guinea-Bissau. For example, 
the quote below, extracted from an interview with a state official, illustrates well the key role 
played by international organisations in the formulation of national policies adopted in 1992:  
 “[referring to policies establishing the devolution of water management to the community and 
private sectors] I honestly think that the idea came from the outside and it was well received by 
us. At the time there was a project, the project for the maintenance of rural water that started the 
implementation of that policy. So, it was at the time of the elaboration of the first Water Plan, a 
policy document of 1991 or 1992 that people started reflecting… they [international 
organisations] advised us to change policies saying ‘ok, projects finish and you are not going to 
have the capacity to maintain so many water points. So, you should withdraw and give away 
that component to the private sector, work to strengthen the private sector on that.’ And, well, the 
state kept only the monitoring, regulation and policy-making, those things.” 48  
Thus, as suggested this government official’s reflection upon the Water Plan of 1992, national 
policies adopted in Guinea-Bissau have been heavily influenced by international actors, and 
                                                      
48 Interview State *6 
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neoliberal policies advocating both the devolution to non-state organisations and the adoption 
of market approaches in water provision.  
However, in a context marked by an extreme lack of financial resources and the consistently 
elusive presence of the state in water provision, shifts in policy concerning the role of the state 
in the water sector, even when heavily influenced by neoliberal policy circuits, necessarily 
produce divergent outcomes and assume new meanings. For instance, in Guinea-Bissau, these 
policies did not amount to a de facto change of the role of the state on the ground, since the 
state was already very loosely involved in water provision. Instead, fostering the role of the 
state as a regulator and enabler, these policies can be seen to represent an attempt to expand 
the role of the state in the sector. 
Likewise, the emphasis upon market approaches has to be understood in light of a context 
where it remains hard to associate water infrastructure, especially outside the capital city, with 
profit making, privatisation, the rule of the market and marketization. In the accounts of 
state’s workers involved in water provision, there was rarely a mention of the creation of 
markets or the realisation of profits in the sector. The key concerns were state weaknesses and 
the need to overcome these by relying on external capacity, whilst supporting and regulating 
the community and private sectors.  
The consistency of state weaknesses in Guinea-Bissau in the past few decades reveal why 
policies envisaging shifts in the role of the state from provider to enabler did not amount to de 
facto changes, or did not engender the withdrawal of the state from service provision. On the 
one hand, the elusive presence of the state in service provision can be understood in the 
context of broader investigations of the state in Guinea-Bissau. The inability of the 
postcolonial state to expand its influence has been well established (see chapter 5). On the 
other hand, there are also testimonies of the specific absence of state institutions in water 
provision prior to 1992 (the year the new Water Plan was adopted), which challenge views 
associating the weak presence of the state in water provision with the neoliberalisation of 
water. Just to give two examples, in a report published in 1995, but referring to the period 
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before 1992, by the International Water and Sanitation Centre and the Netherlands 
Development Organisation, it was stated, “the official agreement was that the government 
would take responsibility for maintenance, but in practice, projects secured spare parts and 
repaired systems. Upon completion of the projects, systems were handed over to the 
government, which did not really have the capacity and the infrastructure to organise the 
maintenance” (van der Weff and Visscher, 1995, p. 1). Similarly,  in a policy brief published 
by the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (República Guiné-Bissau, 2009),  the degradation of 
infrastructure built between 1974 and 1999 and financed by several international projects is 
attributed precisely to the lack of monitoring by local state entities, which is seen as a 
consequence of the lack of financial and human resources. In this context, as suggested by 
Hilgers (2012) for Burkina-Faso, it appears that shifts in policies concerning the role of the 
state in the sector did not amount to de facto changes on the ground. In other words, there 
was not a ‘real’ withdrawal of the state from direct provision.  
As discussed in chapter 5, structural adjustment programmes implemented from the late 
1980s onwards resulted in dramatic cuts to the public sector, including within the Department 
of Water Resources. Discussing the dramatic reduction in personnel in the Department of 
Water Resources as well as its Regional Offices under the structural adjustment programmes, 
several state officials lamented the impacts on the livelihoods of those previously employed by 
the state. At the same time, these state officials also noted that, before the SAPs, the state 
already lacked both the resources and the capacity to intervene in the sector. In addition, they 
also recognised that the excessive number of state workers was unjustified given the lack of 
work and the cost for the state. For example, Antonio49 and Malam50 recollecting their 
experiences working for the Regional Office in Bafatá, claimed: 
                                                      
49 Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity.  
50 Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity.  
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“From the beginning, the state did nothing, the state contributed with nothing. Only when there 
were projects there would be vehicles, petrol, oil, things to do. The state doesn’t pay anything, 
only wages.” 51 
“The state let people go because it was costing too much money to the state. Because there were 
too many people working for the state and not that many projects to work on. Well, those workers 
were there doing nothing and the state was paying.” 52 
Although cuts in the public sector had significant impacts in Guinea-Bissau, including on 
formal employment and the availability of certain services (Lourenço-Lindell, 2002), it is not 
clear that the impacts in the water sector, particularly outside the capital city, amounted to a 
significant decrease in the capacity of the state to secure water provision. Instead, for some 
state officials, the real turning point in the Department of Water Resources had been the 
1998-99 civil war, which deeply affected international donations and projects. For example, 
Manuel explained:  
“this department, I must say, lost a lot of its memory during the 7th June War53. To this day, 
we haven’t recovered. A lot of materials, documents, things got lost. We lost a lot, a lot, a lot of 
documents. This department was the most well-organised department (…) Lots of work had been 
done, lots of studies, and we had a lot of projects as well, ex-pats were here training people. For 
example, I was working on a project from the French Cooperation, on databases, to create and 
organise data. But, after the war… we tried to recover but… with all the difficulties, it’s very 
hard…” 54 
Besides the civil war which had naturally dramatic impacts on the country as a whole, political 
instability and the associated impacts on foreign aid and the social and economic development 
of the country are also perceived as key factors affecting the role of the state in the sector.  
                                                      
51 Interview State *2 
52 Interview State *1 
53 The 1998-9 civil war is commonly called the 7th June War, in reference to the day in which the escalation of events propelled 
the beginning of the war. This war lasted approximately one year, having lasting impacts on the social and economic development 
of the country.  
54 Interview State *5. Translated from Creole, my own translation.  
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Thus, given the consistent stark lack of resources available to the state as well as the lack of 
capacity to intervene in the sector, shifts in policies concerning the role of the state in the 
sector did not amount to de facto changes on the ground. In these circumstances, promoting 
the management of water infrastructure by non-state organisations and seeking ways to create 
links between these and different state institutions can be perceived as attempts to improve 
access to water and to extend the responsibilities of the state, which transcend the neoliberal 
ethos. In a context marked by the multiplicity of institutions governing most spheres of social 
life, finding ways for the state to build on this multiplicity and to support existing formations 
can certainly be equated with developmentalist goals. This is not to say that policies and the 
definition of the ‘supposed’ role of the state have not been heavily influenced by international 
policies, or that neoliberal models are not a part of current policies, but that the consequences 
and meanings of these policies have to be understood in the specific context of Guinea-Bissau. 
The adoption of these policies must be understood, and interpreted, in light of the specific 
circumstances of Guinea-Bissau and the particular trajectories of states. New meanings 
emerge if such a route is taken. 
This section examined the prevalence of discourses of state weakness circulating at all levels 
in Guinea Bissau as well as perceptions of state weakness in the water sector. Here, the stark 
lack of resources available to the state and the ways it is perceived to affect the workings of the 
Department of Water Resources were demonstrated. One important consequence of this lack 
of resources is the almost total dependence of state institutions working on water provision on 
foreign aid and international organisations and NGOs. Thus, the next section will explore 
how the state sought to intervene in the sector through their relations and interactions with 
non-state actors. 
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6.3. The search for state effects:  
state practices, non-state organisations and policy-implementation 
In Guinea-Bissau, most investments in infrastructure derive from international donations and 
the elaboration of policies by the state is typically funded by, and carried out in partnership 
with, international organisations. In addition, the Department of Water Resources also 
depends almost entirely on foreign aid. In these circumstances, the ability of state institutions 
to shape water provision is inevitably linked to the relations and interactions between the state 
and international organisations as well as the international and national NGOs which 
implement projects in the sector. This section looks at the ways in which the state acts in 
relational ways to dissect how these practices and interactions translate into the presence of 
the state in the sector. In particular, it explores how these relations and interactions between 
state and non-state organisations foster or hinder state presence in policy implementation, or, 
in other words, generate ‘state effects’. This is perhaps particularly relevant if we consider that, 
in line with contemporary development policies, international organisations and NGOs 
working in the country unanimously declare their commitment to work with and strengthen 
state institutions. Unless, of course, there are sanctions in place.  
6.3.1. Competing for a role in policy implementation 
All state bureaucrats interviewed acknowledged the role of international organisations in the 
elaboration of sectoral policies and strategies in terms of both funding conditionalities and the 
use of international consultants in the drafting of policies. At the same time, these same state 
officials insisted that extant policies did not amount to mere reproductions of global policies 
circulated through international organisations. Civil servants insisted on their ability to direct 
investment, and to shape programmes according to their own priorities. For example, this is 
evident in Carlos’ account of the ways World Bank’s programmes were set in place: 
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“World Bank staff come in missions during which they query the government, through the 
adequate ministries, about its needs and the projects are mere responses to those needs. Following 
these identification missions, the project is still reviewed several times by government offices and 
it has to be approved by the government before it is approved by the WB.” 55 
In addition, state officials consistently claimed that international consultants working in the 
drafting of sectoral policies never truly led the formulation of national policies. Instead, these 
consultants worked under terms of references approved by the Department of Water 
Resources and were integrated in teams including national specialists. In addition, each single 
draft produced was circulated for comments and approval. For example, recollecting the 
various external consultants with whom he had worked over the years, Manuel emphasised 
the good working relationships he had established with several of them. Conversely, stressing 
this department’s ability to shape and control the work of these external consultants, he gave 
the example of a particular consultant, who had been employed under a European Union 
funded project to draft a policy brief, and who had been replaced at the request of the 
Department of Water Resources. They had demanded his substitution when they realised he 
lacked the necessary knowledge and competencies to carry out the work assigned to him.  
This is not to say that state officials did not recognise pressures to adopt certain policies, 
namely in light of urgencies related to the need of financial resources. Still, even in these 
circumstances, civil servants often counterposed these pressures with the state’s ability to 
subsequently overturn them. For example, one government official stated:  
“Any donor that comes can help in the elaboration of policies, but who eventually approves those 
policies is the government. Well, it can happen that due to the needs, urgencies sometimes faced, 
the state… hmmm, hmmm… accepts. But then these policies can be reviewed…” 56  
Whilst recognising the presence and influence of international organisations, state officials 
routinely noted that ultimately it was the state who decided which polices were adopted. From 
                                                      
55Interview state *8. Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity. 
56 Interview State *7. Translated from Portuguese, my own translation.  
 181 
the perspective of those working for the state, the lack of financial and human resources did 
not emerge as important factors affecting their capacity to influence policy-making. This is 
perhaps natural since admitting the prevalence of global policies would amount to admitting 
their own shortcomings and inability to shape policies.  Thus, whilst acknowledging the 
influence international organisations and actors had on the crafting of national policies, state 
officials also emphasised the role of the staff of the Department of Water Resources discussing, 
accepting and adopting policies according to their own views and priorities. 
 
Views were rather different when it came to the Department of Water Resources’ ability to 
control and monitor project interventions, and therefore promote the implementation of 
national policies. At times, these shortcomings could be related to conflicts within the state. It 
was common for decision-makers to ignore technical advice by civil servants and request the 
implementation of projects that were seen as not fitting the departments goals and priorities. 
For example, Vasco explained:  
“Now and again, they do not listen to technical advice, the opinion of technical staff. Therefore, 
often, a donor comes and they [political appointees] look only for the financial benefits, the money 
that they can get, personally, that’s not a secret for us, and they do not listen to us down here. 
You, down here, you are forced to implement. These are things that can happen.” 57 
Thus, conflicting interests and motivations co-existing within the state apparatuses sometimes 
hindered the Department of Water Resources’ ability to follow their priorities and select 
projects accordingly. However, the failures of the Department of Water Resources in 
monitoring and controlling interventions in the sector were most commonly associated with 
its inability to oversee international organisations, and especially international and national 
NGOs. Related to this, Matilde’s comments below illustrate a number of key issues: 
                                                      
57 Interview State *6. Translated from Portuguese, my own translation. 
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“We try to involve our partner [the Department of Water Resources] at all stages. Our relation 
with Water Resources is very good, very good. There are other organisations, like XXX that… 
seem to hide their projects… but we produce annual plans, they [Water Resources] know what 
activities are included. We also do micro-planning every three months… we define activities and 
we transfer the funds to Water Resources so that they can do their part. But, on the other hand, 
often we reach a point that they didn’t manage to do what they were supposed to do, for lack of 
clarification, for lack of planning on their part, sometimes. But we don’t exclude them, we don’t.” 
58 
Whilst claiming that her organisation worked closely with state institutions, Matilde also 
hinted that this was not always the case for other organisations working in the country. In fact, 
NGOs routinely failed to inform the state about the projects they were involved in, neglected 
the input of the state, or simply bypassed the control and supervision supposedly attributed to 
state institutions. By not informing and involving the state in their projects, despite their 
proclaimed commitments to work with state institutions, these organisations not only avoided 
state control and guidance but also neglected and undermined the role of the state in the sector 
as supervisor and regulator. In some ways, they could be seen as taking advantage of state 
weaknesses to carry out their activities beyond the grasp of any state supervision.  
At the same time, alluding to the fact that the Department of Water Resources regularly failed 
to carry out the works agreed for ‘lack of clarification and planning’, Matilde touches on 
another key issue. In fact, the incompetence of the state was often called upon by NGOs to 
justify their neglect or attempts to circumvent the state. These claims were frequently justified 
with basis on previous experiences where state actors had been slow or failed to complete the 
tasks expected. Thus, non-state organisations often justified their neglecting of the state on the 
basis of the need to ‘get things done’.  
Although Matilde claimed to have a very good relationship with the state, the tensions between 
her, as a representative of an international organisation, and some state officials became 
                                                      
58 Interview International Organisation *1 
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evident during meetings of the Water and Sanitation Group (GAS). These tensions surfaced 
in conflicts regarding their role in the meetings, and the role of the institutions they were 
representing in the sector. In fact, GAS59 meetings provided an interesting platform to explore 
the everyday practices and interactions shaping the relations between government officials 
and staff from non-state organisations. GAS emerged as an attempt to promote coordination 
among different organisations, including international organisations, local and international 
NGOs, and state institutions working in the sector. Any organisation working in the sector 
can ask the Department of Water Resources to join this group. GAS holds monthly meetings, 
the agenda of these meetings is agreed in the previous meeting and, in a recent effort to 
distribute tasks more evenly, the chair rotates. Supposedly presided over by the Department 
of Water Resources, this group also represents an attempt to establish the role of this state 
institution as the rule maker.  
Below, I refer to two particular instances taking place in two different GAS meetings to 
illustrate how interactions between state officials and representatives from non-state 
organisations oscillated between competition over their roles in the meeting and in the sector 
and performances concerning the role of the state in the sector. Most importantly, these 
moments demonstrate the extent to which the role of the Department of Water Resources in 
the sector is dependent on non-state organisations’ willingness to at least symbolically allow 
for that role. On the one hand, these episodes illustrate the process of ‘de-statisation’ of society 
engendered by the strong presence of non-state organisations alongside the weakness of state 
institutions. On the other hand, they demonstrate how state presence is constituted through 
the subtle and erratic recognition bestowed on it by non-state organisations.  
In a meeting held in 2013, Dílio60, the water specialist of an international NGO, delivered a 
presentation in which he summarised the main projects implemented by the organisation in 
the country. This presentation highlighted the achievements of the organisation he 
                                                      
59 During my fieldwork I attended six GAS monthly meetings over a period of 7 months. I also analysed the minutes of the 
meetings I attended as well as those of meetings held before I arrived in the country.  
60 Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity. 
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represented, emphasising the positive impacts of its projects, and occasionally mentioning 
flaws that had promptly been tackled in subsequent projects. This desire to create a good 
impression on those present at the meeting is easily understood. After all, in this social world, 
both the organisation he was representing and his own professional future were to a great 
degree dependent on this impression. State officials, representatives from international 
organisations, and staff from international and national NGOs present at this meeting are not 
merely partners working in the sector. Rather, interactions in these meetings have to be 
understood in the context of multiple cross-cutting donor-recipient relationships as well as 
professional reputations and ambitions in a context where employment options are scarce.  
Throughout the presentation, whilst describing the organisation’s projects, Dílio mentioned 
the ways in which different non-state organisations – both national and international – present 
at the meeting had been involved in and contributed to their projects. For example, he 
controversially claimed a key role in the creation of ASPAAB, at the time perceived as a 
particularly successful local NGO amongst members of GAS. He also noted how they had 
shifted the approach to their sanitation projects following conversations with Unicef 
representatives in Bissau, and pinpointed the benefits of the new approach. Moreover, 
discussing his organisation’s intentions to expand to new regions of the country, Dílio 
reassured those present that, unless subcontracted by the EU or Unicef, they would not 
intervene in areas where these two organisations were already present. They would restrict 
themselves to other regions.  
Dílio’s account of their engagement with state institutions carried a different message. Rather 
than showing a real engagement with state institutions, he only superficially mentioned that 
this organisation had met one of the requirements for the projects: to work with state 
institutions. For example, describing a project implemented in the region of Bafatá, and 
coming to a slide with a picture of a member of the organisation standing next to a state 
representative, he merely stated, “Yes, because projects have to be done in collaboration with the state.” 
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61 Notably, not even at this moment was there an explanation concerning the ways in which 
the state had been involved or how this project fitted the state’s policies. The slide with the 
picture appeared as a mere ‘box ticking’ procedure. In this account, the state emerged as a 
symbol, a picture. But one that rather than having a definite presence, or an effect, was simply 
alluded to as a requirement by those with real effects, i.e. donors.  
The response of Cristovão, a civil servant in the Department of Water Resources, to this 
presentation expressed an effort to affirm the state as a protagonist in the sector. Starting by 
reiterating the state’s commitment to improving access to water in the country, he then 
identified NGOs as the effective agents to achieve this goal in a context marked by state 
weaknesses. In this way he reminded those present that, in a context of state weakness, NGOs 
do not replace state institutions but help them achieve their goals. In other words, it is not 
NGOs that act but the state that uses them to act. If Dílio’s intervention was illustrative of the 
ways in which international NGOs tacitly undermined the role of the state in the sector, 
Cristovão’s response was also demonstrative of the ways in which representatives of the state 
attempted to reconfigure representations of their roles and that of state institutions. Thus, 
Dílio and Cristovão’s interaction during this meeting illustrates the ongoing competition 
between international NGOs and state institutions for a role in the sector, which often came 
to the surface in these meetings.  
In another meeting held a few months later, the General Director of Water Resources (DG) 
introduced a topic for discussion, World Water Day. He explained that in normal 
circumstances, the Ministry of Natural Resources would give a speech on national television 
and the Department of Water Resources would organise a central event. However, he 
continued to explain that, given the ‘transition period’ and the impacts on the normal 
functioning of state institutions, that year these events were compromised. At this point, the 
representative of an international organisation suggested that the ‘central event’ could overlap 
with their own celebrations, which would take place in the South of the country and coincide 
                                                      
61 Fieldwork notes.  
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with the inauguration of a recently refurbished and expanded piped water network. The 
suggestion was welcomed by all present at the meeting. The DG then suggested the creation 
of an independent committee, which would work on the planning of this event, and he 
announced that he would appoint a civil servant to come to the first meeting of this committee 
with a proposal for a programme of activities.  
This event, which did eventually take place, was in fact promoted and financed by an 
international organisation. During this meeting, state officials and representatives from NGOs 
performed their expected roles, allowing the state to play the role of the main actor: the 
decision-maker. This was not necessarily reflective of its real role. Yet, independently of who 
organised the event, how it was organised and who decided on what happened, both the 
international organisation and the state benefited from this performance. The state managed 
to have a role in an event celebrating World Water Day, and also asserted its role in the sector 
and in the development and implementation of a new water system in the country. The 
international organisation, on the other hand, demonstrated its commitment to work with the 
state and to strengthen its role in the sector, in line with its vision and with broader 
development discourses. At the same time, given the prevalence of state weakness discourses, 
the international organisation would in fact remain understood as the main protagonist. 
The dynamic in this meeting was very different from the tense dynamic described before. In 
the first instance, the representative of the state justifiably felt compelled to reiterate the 
position of the state and to compete for state effects, which were not sufficiently represented 
during Dílio’s presentation. In this second instance, both representatives of the state and 
international organisations collaborated in a performance of state effects, granting the state 
the prospect of becoming a protagonist in the celebrations of World Water Day and the 
opportunity to at least appear to lead this event which was in fact being organised by an 
international organisation.  
These two episodes illustrate how state representatives and staff from international 
organisations both competed for a role in the sector and also entered into performances aimed 
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precisely at granting the state the appearance of a role in water provision. Nevertheless, what 
emerges is that the Department of Water Resources remains dependent on non-state 
organisations not only to intervene in the sector through implementing projects, but also to 
monitor and to be granted a role in these projects. On some occasions, NGOs recognise and 
support the role of the state as supervisor and regulator. In other instances, they neglect and 
undermine this role. Yet, it is apparent that interventions in the sector are de facto led by non-
state organisations and that the latter hold the ability to decide when to recognise or evade 
the role of the state.  
At this point it is important to note that whilst these meetings represented an attempt to 
enhance the capacity of the Department of Water Resources to monitor interventions in the 
water sector, Regional Offices – supposed to be responsible for monitoring water provision in 
the different regions – were not included in this group. Logically, by side-lining regional state 
structures from these meetings, which specifically sought to enhance the ability of the state to 
monitor the sector, Water Resources’ reliance on NGOs not only to intervene but also to 
monitor the sector was further intensified. Excluding its local representatives in the different 
regions, the Department of Water Resources had very little way of knowing what was 
happening elsewhere. This further reinforced its dependence on NGOs to communicate their 
presence and the scope of their projects. It also meant that the Department of Water 
Resources had to accept NGOs’ narratives of events.  
The commissioning of reports and policy briefs from non-state organisations or the devolution 
of responsibilities for service provision to non-state actors in Guinea-Bissau per se is nothing 
exceptional. There is an increasing scholarship detailing how the state largely surpasses the 
workings of state institutions (Painter, 2006; see chapter three). However, in Guinea-Bissau, 
the dominance of non-state actors associated with state weakness undermines the process 
through which both state and non-state practices come to be perceived as being within the 
realm of the state. On the one hand, non-state organisations advertise their aims to work with 
and strengthen the state and, in fact, invest a considerable amount of resources seeking to 
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meet these aims. On the other hand, non-state organisations consistently undermine the role 
of the state and prevent the expansion of the presence of the state in the sector. This means 
that the ongoing competition between state and non-state organisations allied to state 
weaknesses can actually hinder the production of ‘state effects’. In other words, the practices 
of non-state organisations and the ways in which the interactions between state and non-state 
organisations are unfolding are contributing not to the statisation of society but to the de-
statisation of society. At the same time, depleted of resources, the Department of Water 
Resources actually depends on international organisations and NGOs to claim a presence in 
the sector. And this presence is in fact constituted through the subtle and erratic recognition 
conferred by non-state organisations on the state.   
6.3.2. Imposing the role of the state in the sector 
In bids to show the relative influence of the Department of Water Resources, civil servants 
routinely referred to a number of events, displaying the assertiveness of the state. Notably, this 
assertiveness was used to demand a continued recognition of the role of the state in the water 
sector and to avoid what were perceived as attempts to sidestep the Department of Water 
Resources. Simultaneously, these occurrences reiterated their efforts to separate the 
Department of Water Resources from other state institutions more caught up in political 
instability. Several civil servants routinely mentioned two particular events related to the EU’s 
suspension of all projects involving direct support to the state following the April 12th 2012 
coup d’état.  
In the first episode, a representative of the EU Delegation to Bissau requested that two vehicles 
funded by his organisation, and recently donated to two different Regional Offices, were 
returned. He argued that, given the suspension of all donations to state institutions after April 
coup d’état, these offices would lack the resources to operate and maintain these vehicles. 
Despite the insistence and threats of the EU representative, the Department of Water 
Resources refused to return these vehicles. Eventually, they responded to EU’s demands by 
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presenting them with the legal contracts that had already been signed by both parties. Various 
state bureaucrats referred to this episode to demonstrate their expertise and ability to protect 
the interests of the Department of Water Resources in negotiations with international 
organisations. This episode was confirmed by staff from the EU in Bissau.  
The second event also took place in the aftermath of the coup d’état in April 2012. This time 
the EU Delegation to Guinea-Bissau received instructions from Brussels to suspend or cancel 
all projects, or components of projects, involving direct support to state institutions while 
maintaining those classified as direct support to the population. Under the European 
Development Funds being implemented at the time there was a project in the water sector, 
which included two main components. The first one entailed the rehabilitation and 
construction of water infrastructure and was assessed as direct support to the population. 
Therefore its implementation was continued. The second component entailed institutional 
support to the state, including the revision and elaboration of sectoral policies, and was 
therefore suspended.62 
In an attempt to overcome this suspension, the European Union Delegation to Bissau 
investigated the possibility of transferring this second component, which was originally to be 
implemented with and by the state, to an international NGO. If this option were to go ahead, 
an international NGO would take over the elaboration of sectoral policies and the project 
could therefore continue, since it was no longer perceived as direct support to the state. In 
these circumstances, the EU delegation to Guinea-Bissau entered in negotiations with an 
NGO which they thought would be able to carry out the task. However, in what some 
informants described as a rather tense situation, the Department of Water Resources fiercely 
opposed the idea. Eventually, a different solution was found and the budget initially allocated 
to the institutional component of the project was added to the infrastructural one, and the 
latter expanded.  
                                                      
62 Personnel from EU in Bissau, staff from the international NGO and state officials provided several accounts of this episode. 
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In these events, state bureaucrats successfully contested endeavours to set aside the 
Department of Water Resources, alongside all other state institutions, following the events of 
April 2012. Claiming their right to keep the two cars previously donated, they were not only 
looking to keep these vehicles but also contesting international organisations’ attempts to 
neglect, and further weaken, this state department. Likewise, by fiercely opposing the 
handover of a project including the elaboration of sectoral policies, which they considered to 
be a task to be performed by their department, to an international NGO, this department 
once again contested and resisted attempts to dismiss this state institution. In both these 
instances, state officials were asserting their right to govern and to preserve their role in the 
sector.  
At the same time, in these instances, state officials from Water Resources contested the 
association being made between this state department and the so-called illegitimate 
government, and they refused decisions that would lead to the ‘collapse’ of this particular state 
institution. In fact, as discussed earlier, the multiplicity of and contradictions between state 
institutions were not only recognised by state officials. Several representatives of international 
organisations which had adopted sanctions calling for the suspension of all support to state 
institutions also tried to find ways to go around these sanctions and to continue working with 
the Department of Water Resources, which they understood to have nothing to do with the 
ongoing instability and judged to be a mere victim, just like the general population.  
Exploring everyday practices and interactions alongside informants’ accounts of the 
relationships between state and non-state actors, this section has highlighted the complicated 
nature of the relationships between state and non-state actors. The interactions at the heart of 
the relational ways in which the state seeks to influence the sector are marked by moments of 
competition, performance and assertiveness. Nevertheless, in most cases the decision to obey 
or evade state guidance remains in the hand of non-state organisations. In some instances, 
non-state organisations recognise the role of the state, on other occasions they neglect or 
bypass state institutions. This means that policy-making and implementation is effectively led 
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by non-state organisations. Arguably, the exclusion of the Regional Offices from GAS 
meetings further contributes to this dependency of the state on non-state organisations by 
eliminating those state structures with actual proximity to projects and interventions.  
The next sections move from the national level to the city level. In line with what has been 
argued, it is shown how water provision in Bafatá has evolved regardless of national policies. 
But, focusing on everyday state practices the following sections also demonstrate the multiple 
ways in which state actors have shaped water infrastructure in this city, whilst acting beyond 
state policies, regulations or guidelines and shaping the work of non-state organisations. 
6.4. Local state practices and the piped water network in Bafatá 
This section explores the ways in which different state actors have shaped the piped water 
network of Bafatá. On the one hand, it demonstrates that this infrastructure has evolved 
regardless of extant policy and regulatory frameworks and that it has also escaped the control 
and supervision of the Department of Water Resources in Bissau. On the other hand, this 
section traces the multiple ways in which various state officials based in Bafatá have 
fundamentally shaped water infrastructure in Bafatá. It thus becomes apparent that although 
polices and regulations have not been driving the evolution of water infrastructure in Bafatá, 
ongoing step-by-step negotiations – happening largely outside legal and regulatory 
frameworks – between state and non-state actors continue to be essential in shaping water 
provision in the city. Thus, the apparent absence of policies and regulatory frameworks does 
not amount to a total lack of state intervention at the local level.  
Furthermore, the investigation of state practices in Bafatá demonstrates how these practices 
challenge attempts to analyse the state using any unitary logic, and it stresses the importance 
of considering everyday embodied state practices in analysis of water infrastructure. In this 
way, in line with the work of McFarlane and Desai (2015; 2015), Anand (2011a, 2011b), 
Lindell (2008) and Fourchard (2011) this section notes the importance of considering the 
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multiplicity of ways in which state actors influence urban water infrastructure, and the 
multiple logics underpinning such involvements.  
 
The one-storey building housing the Regional Office of the Department of Water Resources 
in Bafatá, and temporarily hosting ASPAAB, the operator of the city’s water network, is an 
isolated construction located at the top end of a large pot-holed avenue, which connects the 
sleepy old colonial city to the lively upper part of the town. Walking away from the building, 
taking the opposite direction from the large boulevard, after a climbable steep slope, at a lower 
level, is Boma, a spring. From here, spring water is pumped to the main water tank in the city, 
an imposing concrete structure standing close to the Regional Office’s building. A few meters 
away, visible during the dry season and hidden by vegetation during the rainy season, the new 
headquarters of ASPAAB are being built. This building, when finished, will dwarf the modest 
installations of the state department now hosting them.63  
Besides the workplace of the Regional Office, this building also houses the living quarters of 
the Regional Director, which are located in one corner of the building. Like most buildings in 
Bafatá, surrounding the front part of the house is a veranda. And, not so commonly, in one of 
the pillars there is a tap, where people get water to drink, pray, wash, and so forth. Right in 
front of this veranda there stand three trees, precious sources of shade for those gathering here 
on a daily basis. It is here, between the offices and the shade of the trees, that the everyday life 
of this regional office and now ASPAAB takes place. It is here that the personnel of this state 
department, ASPAAB’s members and associated networks meet, djumbai64, work and pray. 
What could be another sleepy state office becomes alive with people, activities, and talk of 
water and politics.   
The slightly unconventional liveliness of this Regional Office can be traced back to May 2006, 
when responsibility for the management of the water network was transferred to ASPAAB, a 
                                                      
63 The construction works terminated in 2015 and ASPAAB has now moved to this new building. 
64 Guinea-Bissau creole, term used to describe conversations, meetings between people, exchanges of ideas and thoughts, 
socialising.  
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local association. An inconspicuous occurrence at the time, this transfer eventually 
engendered profound transformations in the water infrastructure of the city. The changes in 
the piped water network will be discussed in more detail in chapters 7 and 8. But just to give 
an overview of the extent of these transformations: in 2006, when ASPAAB started operating 
the system, there was only one standpipe and around 18 home connections in operation. The 
system worked irregularly, every 2 to 3 days, with long periods during which there was no 
water supply. By 2015, there were 23 standpipes in operation and the system served 104 home 
connections. Water was supplied on a daily basis and interruptions were dealt with much 
more expediently. Despite the still small scale of the system, the improvements were 
indisputably significant.   
Whilst this handover of the responsibility for the management of the water piped network of 
Bafatá to ASPAAB appears nothing exceptional – it conformed with national policies adopted 
in 1992 and policies disseminated in development interventions –, in fact, this transfer 
materialised independently of any specific policy guidelines and without the direct 
intervention of international organisations. However, despite exceeding formal procedures 
and regulations, state actors were still key in this process. This transfer resulted from a verbal 
agreement between ASPAAB and the Regional Director of the Regional Office in Bafatá 
(Regional Director).  
The ways in which this transfer happened demonstrate the argument laid out before about 
state weaknesses. Taking place without the intervention or knowledge of the Department of 
Water Resources in Bissau, it reiterates this department’s inability to monitor and control the 
work of its Regional Offices and to oversee the management of infrastructure. This transfer 
also demonstrates the argument of this chapter regarding the astonishing lack of financial and 
human resources available to Regional Offices. By 2006, the year the transfer took place, the 
Regional Office in Bafatá employed only two staff members – a regional director and a 
secretary – and operated with no budget. The offices were equipped with some furniture and 
computers but had no electricity. A car and a motorbike, bought with funds provided by 
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international organisations under past projects, were only used on a private capacity since 
there were no budget allowances to buy petrol or to secure maintenance and repairs. In 
general, it was agreed that the responsibilities of this Regional Office included monitoring 
water infrastructure in the region, supervising and supporting committees created to manage 
these infrastructures but also, in this specific case, to monitor as well as manage and operate 
parts of the water network in the city of Bafatá. However, with limited staff, an inadequate 
skills’ pool and without a budget, this Regional Office, like others in the country, struggled to 
perform its key tasks. Yet again, the lack of financial and human resources dictated the 
redundancy of this state department. Like any other Regional Office from the Department of 
Water Resources, the Regional Office in Bafatá remained reliant on internationally-funded 
projects to carry out any activities. In the words of Antonio, a state official in the Regional 
Office: 
“the Regional Office relies on projects (…) since independence, water resources relies for the most 
part, over 90%, on projects. (…) Only when there is a project, then there will be a car, there 
will be petrol, there will be oil, there will be things to do, there will be everything, the state doesn’t 
pay anything, only wages.” 65  
However, as well as illustrating the arguments about state weakness, this handover also shows 
the ways in which local representatives of the state continue to have an influence, despite the 
state’s stark scarcity of resources. In particular, the then Regional Director played a 
particularly important role in shaping water provision in the city of Bafatá. This government 
official trained as an engineer in Cuba and moved to Bafatá in 2000 as director of a project 
being implemented by the state under a European Development Fund in the region of 
Bafatá.66  While he was still based in Bafatá as director of this project in the water sector, the 
previous Regional Director left his position to work in the private sector, and he was appointed 
to replace him. Thus, when the project terminated in 2004, he remained in Bafatá as Regional 
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66 EDF – European Development Fund; they are the main fund from the European Union allocated to development cooperation. 
It typically funds projects in different sectors, which are implemented by receiving states through a project cell created for the 
effect.  
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Director.67 Now heading a state office without a budget and very limited staff, this state official 
whilst seeking ways to circumvent this department’s lack of resources got involved in the 
creation of ASPAAB, and later in the transference to this association of the responsibility for 
the management of the city’s network. In fact, this devolution of responsibilities cannot be 
separated from the active role of this state official.  
The quote below, extracted from an interview with one of the founding members of ASPAAB, 
illustrates typical accounts of the role of the Regional Director in the creation of ASPAAB.   
“the creation of ASPAAB relied on a group of young people from here. It had only the support of 
the Regional Director who, in fact, motivated us and continuously encouraged us, ‘you should 
create it, you should work hard, you should commit to create the organisation’.” 68  
In fact, the Regional Director actively participated in the foundation of ASPAAB. In his own 
words: “I participated in the foundation of ASPAAB, here [Regional Offices]. I was right here, sitting on this 
chair. There were five people present and I was there…”.69 Moreover, he was also a member of the 
association at the very beginning. He eventually left because of the perceived conflict of 
interests between his role as Regional Director and being a member of ASPAAB.  
ASPAAB was created in the last trimester of 2005. Only a few months later, in May 2006, the 
Regional Director granted ASPAAB the responsibility for the management of the water 
network. Mamadu’s, a member of ASPAAB’s management team, reflection upon this event 
highlights this organisation’s desire to take over the management of the piped supply scheme. 
It also reveals their belief that they could do a better job than the current operators and 
therefore provide a better water service.  
“There was the management committee, which was managing the water system, that management 
committee was not working properly. Thus, we thought that since there were infrastructures – a 
water tank, standpipes, a generator – in place, even if they all worked with faults, why wouldn’t 
                                                      
67 Bacar Sissé was the Regional Director between 2000 and 2014.  
68 Interview ASPAAB *4 
69 Interview State *1 
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the Regional Director give us the management so that we prevent water being distributed one or 
two days, and then stop for one or two months… we discussed that with him.” 70 
Thus, behind this agreement, lay ASPAAB’s members aspirations to operate the water system. 
In reality, once this organisation took over they were able to modestly improve the service, by 
relying on the volunteer work of many members, raising funds from parallel activities and 
entering in partnerships with international organisations and NGOs. Yet, this agreement 
would not have been possible without the participation of the Regional Director, as recognised 
by Mamadu, when he explained what happened after they first discussed the transfer option.  
 “Well, he [Regional Director] said, there is no problem but… he needed to see… and for a 
period of time he monitored the work of ASPAAB, what it was doing. Then, later, when he 
gained trust, he said, OK!” 71  
Like ASPAAB’s members, the Regional Director also trusted that the handover to ASPAAB 
would result in improvements in the water service being provided in this city, and therefore 
further his department’s key aim, i.e. to improve access to water in the region of Bafatá. 
 “before, the Ministry of Natural Resources managed and monitored water infrastructure, but 
that did not work so they created management committees. These were not legalised associations, 
just groups that were created and told to manage water, like here in Bafatá. But, as I realised 
that the management was not working well, I took away the responsibility for managing this 
infrastructure from this group, I organised ASPAAB, and I gave them the responsibility for 
managing water infrastructure. (…) I gave them the management responsibility because the only 
place with water was there in Bairro 4, that water tank, this one here, it did not work. So, I 
passed them the management.” 72 
The quote above illustrates not only the motivations of the Regional Director but also hints 
at the ways in which this transfer happened beyond any specific policy, regulatory or 
institutional guidelines. In this account of the transfer, there was no mention of this transfer 
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ever being discussed with the Department of Water Resources in Bissau, which in fact it was 
not. Although a specific development intervention was mentioned in accounts relating to the 
creation of ASPAAB, this intervention did not plan the transfer process, it only indirectly 
influenced it. Thus, the accounts of the transfer demonstrate that ASPAAB and the Regional 
Director were the active and key participants in the process. And, even if this transfer 
resembled national and international policies, these actors acted autonomously from any 
policy or legal frameworks and without any institutional support from the state. The 
devolution of responsibilities and the ongoing relationships of mutual support were propelled 
by the motivations of ASPAAB and the Regional Director. Crucially, whilst using his position 
within the state to enact this transfer, this official acted autonomously. Thus, if the Department 
of Water Resources was unable to enforce its policies, and neglected to invite Regional Offices 
to GAS meetings, state officials nevertheless continued using their position within the state to 
influence water provision.   
After the transfer, the Regional Director remained deeply involved in the workings of 
ASPAAB and the management of the piped water network, monitoring their work and 
supporting them as he could, and as he perceived to be his role as Regional Director. For 
example, Fatumata, a member of ASPAAB’s management, explained: 
“we have a good relationship [with the Regional Office], because, as you can see, we are here 
[using their offices] and we don’t pay rent or anything. Also, he [Regional Director] helps us 
with advice, anything we need he is there for us, he gives good ideas/advice.” 73 
The Regional Director also used his position and contacts within the state to mobilise 
resources. For example, at a certain point he brought a generator from a nearby city to Bafatá 
in replacement of another that had broken down. On another occasion, when asked to identify 
locations for the construction of boreholes and installation of hand pumps, he worked closely 
with ASPAAB to discuss the possibility of using this opportunity to add another source to the 
water network. Moreover, he routinely mobilised ex-employees of the state, who possessed 
                                                      
73 Interview ASPAAB *3 
 198 
detailed knowledge of the city’s infrastructure, to help the organisation in surveys and 
assessments of existing infrastructure. He was also profoundly involved in ASPAAB’s attempts 
to mobilise funding through international NGOs.  
Nevertheless, the Regional Director of the Regional Office of the Department of Water 
Resources in Bafatá was not the only state official influencing ASPAAB and water 
infrastructure in Bafatá. For example, Fatumata’s account of how the governor of Bafatá and 
the local administration helped ASPAAB with land transfers required for the installation of 
solar panels provides an illustration of the ways in which different state officials influenced 
water provision:  
“That time, that thing related to the space down there, the panels, we talked with them, and they 
gave land to the land owners [where the panels were being installed]. That place where the panels 
were installed, in Bairro 4, that land belongs to someone. When we told them we wanted to 
install the panels there, they did not accept that. But then, they told us to give him another piece 
of land. They told us that we should give him another piece of land. We spoke with the governor, 
the local administration and they showed us a piece of land, we then showed it to those people. 
Then, there were some more complications with this new piece of land, there were other people 
there, we went to speak with the governor again, he told us to not worry, he would sort it out, and 
he did. I think he did.” 74 
Again, in this situation, state officials crucially enabled the evolution of water infrastructure in 
Bafatá, in this case by securing a place for the solar panels required to produce energy for one 
of the pumps used in the system. Notably, like in other instances, interactions with 
representatives from the state in Bafatá were mostly described in terms of step-by-step 
negotiations between different actors rather than justified with reference to legal documents 
and policies.  
At the same time, state officials were not always so supportive. On the contrary, they were 
perceived time and again to use their position in the state to make claims, whose legitimacy 
                                                      
74 Interview ASPAAB *3 
 199 
was questioned and which were not seen as beneficial to the operation of the water system 
and ASPAAB. For instance, in 2013, ASPAAB acquired a piece of land next to the building 
of the Regional Office and initiated the works for the construction of its own independent 
installations. A few months later, the works were suspended by order of the local 
administrator, allegedly because ASPAAB had not applied for a construction license. 
Describing the succession of events, Mamadu, one of the members of ASPAAB’s 
management, explained that the organisation acknowledged the legal requirement to obtain 
such a license. However, they objected to this state officials’ demands for two key reasons.  
First, given the role of the organisation as operator of the city’s network, they saw themselves 
as partners of the state, helping the state achieve its goal of providing water to the population. 
Thus, rather than obstructing their work or claiming taxes, they expected state institutions to 
support them and exempt them from taxes. In fact, Mamadu went even further, claiming that 
even though ASPAAB had bought the land where they were building their offices, this land 
should have been allocated to them by the state. The second issue related to the amount 
requested for obtaining this license. Whereas ASPAAB had been charged over 500,000 CFA 
(762.38 Euro), Mamadu claimed that the real cost of the license should be around 50,000 
CFA (76.24 Euro). Eventually the matter was settled after Mamadu – accompanied by 
Demba, a fellow member of ASPAAB, and the Regional Director – met the administrator 
and managed to negotiate the value of the license to what they considered to be a fair amount.  
The comite de estado75 (local administration) was also routinely blamed for interfering with works 
related to the operation and maintenance of the water infrastructure, in their practice of 
demanding a tax for the right to dig on public roads and streets. Also on these occasions, 
Mamadu and Demba disputed not only the value of the taxes being claimed but also their 
legitimacy. Whereas ASPAAB was actively operating and maintaining an infrastructure which 
was in fact owned by the state, the roads and streets of Bafatá were hardly maintained by the 
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local administration or any other state institution. Again, these disputes were solved through 
lengthy negotiations, in which both the value and legitimacy of the taxes were on the table.  
As described by Demba, a member of ASPAAB’s management, the relations between 
ASPAAB and local representatives of the state were ‘informal’ and involved ongoing 
negotiation.  
“If I am the local authority, I should help you, I should do certain things, and, we, as a local 
association, we should also take on our responsibilities and do our things. However, the relations 
are… informal (laughs), it is not formal, it is informal. So, it’s on these terms that we work. 
Sometimes we get approval, sometimes we don’t (laughs). The relation is not formal. We 
negotiate every step of the way” 76 
Even without resources, and barely following legal and policy frameworks, different state 
officials continuously influence the work of ASPAAB, the organisation managing the water 
network and the water infrastructure of the city. For ASPAAB to be able to operate in the 
city, they continuously engaged in negotiations with different state officials. Notably, even 
when ASPAAB disputed the legitimacy of the claims of different government officials, they 
did not challenge their authority. They engaged in negotiation and sought agreements that 
satisfied both parts. Notably, these ‘informal’ negotiations at the level of the city, as described 
by Demba, prevailed not only while ASPAAB’s role as operator of the network remained 
based on a verbal agreement but also after its official recognition as operator of the city’s water 
network in 2012 when ASPAAB and the Ministry of Natural Resources signed a concession 
contract.   
The ways in which different state officials in Bafatá used their positions within the state to 
make claims related to the workings of the water network and ASPAAB demonstrate that the 
state is not absent in Bafatá. In contrast to state officials in the Department of Water Resources 
in Bissau, state officials based in Bafatá regularly influence water infrastructure in the city. 
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However, they consistently act beyond policy and legal frameworks. As argued by Lindell 
(2008) in the case of Maputo, to understand state practices in the context of Bafatá, it is 
essential that we do not focus on policy and legal procedures. We must take into consideration 
the multiple ways state actors influence what happens beyond prescribed policies but whilst 
using their position in the state to legitimate their actions. Also here, it was clear that state 
actors routinely and significantly influence water provision in relational ways, that is through 
their interactions with non-state organisations. 
6.5. Fragmented states: between legality and international donations 
In 2012, ASPAAB and the Ministry of Natural Resources signed a contract which formalised 
the role of ASPAAB as the operator of the piped water network of Bafatá. This legal contract, 
the initiative of an international NGO working closely with ASPAAB, was drafted in order to 
overcome regulatory weaknesses. It aimed, firstly, to define and fix ASPAAB’s position as the 
operator of the city’s water network; and, secondly, to delineate the capacities, duties and 
responsibilities of both parties.  
Contrary to international NGOs’ expectations, this contract did not necessarily result in more 
clarity concerning the roles and responsibilities of different actors. For instance, according to 
the contract ASPAAB is only responsible for ongoing maintenance and minor repairs – major 
investments remain the responsibility of the Department of Water Resources. Nevertheless, 
the state routinely fails its contract obligations, and this clause was included in the contract 
when both parties knew that, in practice, ASPAAB would have to mobilise funds for all 
investments. Neither did this contract situate ASPAAB’s practice in a legal and regulatory 
framework. This was apparent in ASPAAB’s ongoing negotiations with different state officials, 
which were largely unsupervised by any legal or regulatory frameworks. Interactions between 
ASPAAB and local state actors in Bafatá continued to rely on ongoing negotiations, which 
consistently escaped any strict policy or legal framework.  
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Still, this contract was perceived as an important tool for the organisation. In Mamadu’s 
words:  
“If anyone [international donors] wants to finance you, if they know you do not hold a contract, 
a concession to operate the network, with the government, they might think twice before investing 
in you. The contract creates a guarantee for them in this way. (…) Also, I think that at the 
national level, it does not happen that often, with local organisations. Thus, if ASPAAB did it, 
you think it’s a good thing.” 77 
Thus, for ASPAAB, the legal contract constitutes an important device for negotiations with 
international NGOs, which draw security and legitimacy from this kind of legal document. 
Also, it represents a validation of ASPAAB’s work, an appreciation of their ‘good work’.  
At the same time, this contract between ASPAAB and the Ministry of Natural Resources 
signalled the extension of national-level state institutions, namely the Department of Water 
Resources, who had previously been largely uninterested and unware of what was happening 
in the city, to the realm of water infrastructure in Bafatá. Here, it is important to remember 
that this contract was largely the result of the initiative of an international NGO, suggesting 
once again the dependence of this department on international NGOs to extend its influence.  
The implications of this expansion of national level institutions to the realm of water provision 
in Bafatá became evident in a rare visit of staff from Water Resources in Bissau to Bafatá in 
2013.78 Following a visit to the city’s recently refurbished water infrastructure, the president 
of ASPAAB presented the new water management model adopted in the city, which together 
with the refurbishment of the infrastructure had been funded under a project led by 
Portuguese NGO TESE and funded by international donors. In response, a civil servant in 
Water Resources, noted that the competent authorities in Bissau had not approved the model 
being presented, questioning its validity and legitimacy. The Regional Director, his 
subordinate, then noted that, in fact, there wasn’t an actual working model validated in the 
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country for the organisation to follow. A representative of NGO TESE then asserted that a 
manual including the adopted management model had been submitted to the Department of 
Water Resources in Bissau in October 2012 for their consideration. To this day, they were 
still waiting for a reply. In addition, he added, a legal contract formalising the concession of 
the water system to ASPAAB had been signed with the Ministry of Natural Resources. 
Nevertheless, the bureaucrat from Bissau insisted that the legality of this management model 
needed to be further considered.  
Where previously the Regional Office in Bafatá and ASPAAB were in fact isolated, almost 
independent, from the Department of Water Resources in Bissau, the NGO TESE fostered a 
new link between the Regional Director and ASPAAB in Bafatá, and the Department of 
Water Resources.  This new link brought ASPAAB and the Regional Office onto the radar of 
the Department of Water Resources and it exposed them to their attempts to assert their 
influence. As noted by Luisa, a member of staff in TESE, ASPAAB is probably one of the only 
organisations in the country holding a legal contract with the ministry and, therefore, legally 
entitled to run the water network system. Thus, the Department of Water Resources was 
questioning the legality of the most legal of organisations. In fact, it can be said that the 
question was not about the legitimacy of ASPAAB or the model they had adopted. Instead, 
this intervention by a civil servant from the Department of Water Resources in Bissau can be 
understood in terms of what has been discussed before as the search for ‘state effects’. This 
civil servant was not actually worried about the legality of ASPAAB or the content of the 
management model. Instead, he was worried about the ways in which the Department of 
Water Resources had, or had not, been involved in the process and the ways in which the role 
of the state in the process was being narrated. This was especially the case as Bafatá and 
ASPAAB became increasingly framed as the success story in Guinea-Bissau.  
Still, ASPAAB members were not particularly concerned by this increased exposure and 
visibility. They trusted that state weaknesses would prevent the state from taking any dramatic 
action such as taking over the management of the water network. Again, in Mamadu’s words: 
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 “Now, while there are no elected local authorities, I know that it is difficult for the government 
to say ‘no, I’ll take over [the management of the water network] and do it’. Why? Because the 
Department of Water Resources has water technicians that have knowledge of the water 
problematic, they know that the state cannot manage to do it, it cannot.” 79  
This extension of Water Resources into the realm of water supply in Bafatá also illustrates the 
differences between this department and local representatives of the state, and the ways in 
which they influenced water supply in Bafatá. Local state representatives’ practices were 
routinely considered illegitimate and typically exceeded any legal or policy frameworks. 
Notwithstanding this, they propelled responses and negotiations which affected the workings 
of ASPAAB and the water infrastructure in the city. The extension of Water Resources to the 
realm of water in Bafatá also produced effects. These were visible in this department’s 
questioning of the legitimacy of the management model. However, this episode did not propel 
any further negotiations and ASPAAB did not seem threatened by these claims. The effects 
of the legal contract were most apparent in ASPAAB’s recognition of its value mobilising 
international donors. Notably, it is not the legality of the contract that is valued, since it is 
recognised that this legality will not be translated into practice, but the appearance of legality 
that it creates among international donors. The legal and policy facets of the state are not 
valued for their roles governing social life but for the ways they are valued by international 
donors.  
6.6. Discussion 
Going back to the picture of the standpipe in Bafatá at the beginning of this chapter, it can 
now be argued that the notable absence of the logo of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, 
alongside those of the European Union, NGO TESE and ASPAAB, should not be simply 
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understood as symbolic of an absent state. Neither should it be merely interpreted as indicative 
of a neoliberal state. State actors influenced water infrastructure in Bafatá in significant ways, 
and the various logics and motivations behind their practices cannot be summarised in terms 
of a neoliberal ethos. To unveil these various state practices and its multiple logics and 
motivations, it was necessary to disaggregate the state, opening the analytical lenses to the 
multiple agendas, levels and agencies characterising the state and state actors; and to focus on 
modalities of the state that exceed conventional state-society distinctions.  
The role of different state actors and institutions in water provision cannot be separated from 
state weaknesses and the stark lack of financial and human resources faced by these 
institutions, which vitally affect the possibilities of state actors to influence water provision in 
Guinea-Bissau. Crucially, these long-term state weaknesses also translate into the need to 
reinterpret the outcomes and meanings of neoliberal policies. In the context of Guinea-Bissau, 
the neoliberal turn did not amount to a de facto change in the role of the state in water 
provision, or to public disinvestment from the sector. In fact, in the context of Guinea-Bissau, 
these policies can be interpreted through developmentalist goals, including aspirations to 
expand the role of the state within the possibilities of state institutions. This is not to say that 
neoliberal models, focusing on, for example, the benefits of market rule, are not part of the 
rationalities underpinning water policies in Guinea-Bissau. Instead it means that neoliberal 
logics are not the most important feature or the one with the most visible effects, especially 
outside the capital city. The need to overcome state weaknesses and to improve access to water 
by building on the strengths of a range of non-state organisations continues to be at the top of 
the agenda. And policies promoting the role of the community and private sectors are mostly 
framed within these aims. Thus, this chapter suggests that the meanings and effects of policies 
influenced by neoliberal logics need to be analysed in light of the specific circumstances and 
the particular trajectories of states in a diversity of contexts. New meanings emerge if such an 
approach is taken.  
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One important consequence of state weaknesses in the water sector in Guinea-Bissau is the 
almost total dependency of state institutions on foreign aid and non-state organisations, 
funded almost entirely through international donations. The state depends on non-state 
organisations to intervene in water provision. It depends on non-state organisations to foster 
policy implementation.  And, lastly, it also depends on non-state organisations’ willingness to 
acknowledge at least symbolically its role of enabler, supervisor and regulator of the sector. 
This means that the relations and interactions between state and non-state organisations are 
key in shaping state presence in water provision, that is the state constitutes itself in relational 
ways. Nevertheless, although on some occasions non-state organisations, in line with 
organisational policies to support and strengthen state institutions in the sector, recognise and 
work with the state, in many other instances these organisations neglect and undermine state 
institutions. In fact, non-state organisations often compete with state institutions for a role in 
the sector. On the one hand, the immediate result is that state institutions have a rather limited 
ability to control and monitor the work of non-state organisations, which translates into a 
limited capacity to control and monitor water provision through policy and regulatory 
frameworks. On the other hand, this also means that state presence in the sector is 
simultaneously undermined and constituted through its interactions with non-state 
organisations. The case of Guinea-Bissau also suggests that in contexts of state weakness the 
practices of both state and non-state organisations might not engender ‘state effects’, or the 
expansion of the symbolic presence of the state, but simply reinforce the symbolic presence of 
non-state organisations. Thus, rather than the statisation of society, we witness the de-
statisation of society.  
Delving into the everyday practices of the state and the ongoing interactions between state 
actors and ASPAAB in Bafatá, it becomes apparent that state actors have significantly 
influenced the evolution of the city’s piped supply scheme. However, this has mostly happened 
in ways that exceed any policy and regulatory frameworks or project interventions. This is 
revealed in the various ways different state officials based in Bafatá have used their positions 
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within the state to encourage water associations, but also to make claims related to the piped 
water network of the city. Thus, although, in line with notions of state weakness discussed 
earlier, state institutions have been mostly unable to enforce policy and legal guidelines, this 
cannot be interpreted as the total absence of the state. In addition, the multiplicity of 
motivations behind state practices suggests that the state of Guinea-Bissau adopts many 
different modalities when affecting water infrastructure in Bafatá.  
The contract signed in 2012 by ASPAAB and the Ministry of Natural Resources formalising 
the role of ASPAAB as water operator provides an interesting platform to consider the 
different modalities of the state. This contract did entail an extension of the realms of policy 
and regulatory frameworks and of the national-level state to the domain of the piped water 
network of Bafatá. Here, it is particularly relevant that this expansion was initiated by an 
international NGO, revealing once again the dependency of state institutions on non-state 
organisations for it to expand its influence when it comes to the elaboration and enforcement 
of policy and regulatory frameworks. At the same time, this contract did not amount to a 
change in the everyday interactions between state and non-state organisations involved in 
governing the piped water network. In other words, ASPAAB’s interactions with different 
state officials in Bafatá remained based on step-by-step negotiations that largely exceeded the 
enforcement or interpretation of this legal contract. In this way, these modes of interaction 
remained an essential feature of how the state shapes water infrastructure in Bafatá. However, 
this contract was still valued by various actors, not because of its legal effects, but because it 
was perceived as a key device to attract international donors. This suggests that the legal and 
policy facets of the state, rather than functioning as devices that regulate social life, can serve 
as devices that conform to the international NGOs’ requirements to engage with the 
appropriate legal languages of stateness.  
Finally, political instability has become the norm in Guinea-Bissau and has affected all state 
institutions. This is most obviously apparent in the extreme lack of financial and human 
resources, especially after the 2012 sanctions. Nevertheless, in this chapter it was shown that 
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state institutions in the water sector, consistently distance themselves from the causes and 
upheavals related to this political instability. In fact, this autonomy from the causes of 
instability is recognised by non-state actors and was most visible in the attempts of staff from 
international organisations to work around organisational sanctions. Thus, although 
understandings of state institutions in Guinea-Bissau cannot be separated from political 
instability, different departments, entities and institutions must be understood to have different 
histories, logics, motivations and interests at their core. 
Adopting ethnographic understandings of the state and everyday state practices, this chapter 
demonstrates the multiple ways in which states shape water provision, highlighting the 
importance of looking into those practices that exceed policy and regulatory frameworks. At 
the same time, it illustrates the multi-layered modalities of the state which cannot be conveyed 
under any single unitary logic.  Such an approach allows for the consideration of the 
multiplicity of roles that state practices can play in water provision. In particular, it opens the 
analytical view to the roles states play in local level governance through ongoing negotiations 
with a multiplicity of actors. As the conclusion of this thesis will suggest, rather than being 
ignored or dismissed as ‘informal’, the multiple state practices involved in governance systems 
at the local level should be acknowledged and considered in progressive imaginations of water 
provision. 
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– SEVEN –  
Creole water governance: Neoliberalism, assemblages and the 
piped water network 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the multiplicity of actors, practices and logics shaping water provision 
in Bafatá, which have not only promoted the hybridisation of neoliberalisms but also 
engendered processes and outcomes that, it is argued, cannot be captured using a neoliberal 
analytical framework. Thus, the notion of assemblages alongside ethnographic descriptions of 
the everyday are used to develop an understanding of a ‘Creole’ mode of governance, 
producing situated, and messier, processes and outcomes than those characteristically 
considered under the analytical label of ‘neoliberalism’ (McGuirk and Dowling, 2009; Rankin, 
2011). The notion of Creole is called upon precisely to depict the evolving product emerging 
through the intermixing and reciprocal transformation of motivations, logics, agendas and 
practices. 
The piecemeal expansion of Bafatá’s piped water supply over the past decades has to a large 
extent followed the rhythms of international donations and development projects, and the 
governance models put in place have often resembled the evolution of circulating policy 
models. In an analytical move that seeks to decentre the role of international policies in 
understandings of water supply, this chapter perceives international development practices as 
part of, but not the determinant of, agendas and practices shaping water provision in Bafatá. 
In this way, the motivations and practices of a variety of actors are considered and the agency 
of these practices highlighted. In particular, this chapter explores the Creole governance 
model in place in Bafatá with reference to both attempts to improve access to water in the city 
and to generate training and income opportunities through securing the support of 
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international NGOs. In addition, this chapter examines the role of gaps – emerging as policy 
models are translated into practices on the ground – in shaping water provision. Related to 
this, it explores the role of various actors appropriating, re-inventing, ignoring and contesting policy 
models circulating in the city, and therefore shaping water provision in ways that defy easy 
associations with international policies or “any straightforward coding as” neoliberalisation of 
water (McGuirk and Dowling, 2009, p. 184).  
The reminder of this chapter is divided in three main sections. The next section, section 7.2., 
explores water governance in Bafatá between 2006 and 2010, including the factors and 
practices leading to the creation of ASPAAB and the devolution of responsibilities for water 
management to this organisation.  Then, it explores the mode of operation of the piped supply 
scheme between 2006 and 2010, which is termed ‘persistent irregularity’. This term captures 
both the irregularity of the service provided at the time and the persistent efforts of ASPAAB 
and the Regional Director to keep the system running.  
Section 7.3. then explores water governance in Bafatá between 2010 and 2014. This period 
coincided with the implementation of two international development projects and the 
consistent presence of international actors, in particular the Portuguese NGO TESE. It 
explores some of the ways in which ASPAAB and the Regional Director have appropriated, re-
invented, ignored and contested policy models circulating in the city to demonstrate how these 
policies have been consistently transformed in such a way they have often become ‘something 
else’. In addition, it shows that even processes and outcomes resembling neoliberal logics 
might have other agendas at their core. 
This chapter argues that the mode of governance adopted in Bafatá is thus better understood 
as an assemblage of multiple actors, agendas, rationalities and ways of doing that together 
produce a situated – Creole – mode of governance that cannot be understood in relation to any 
single element of the assemblage.  Nevertheless, processes of appropriation and re-invention 
– creolisation – of policy models in accordance with the needs, priorities and possibilities of those 
actors involved in the governing of water infrastructure should be seen as key in shaping this 
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model. These processes of appropriation and re-invention drive not only the hybridisation of 
neoliberal policies but also their transformation in ways that come to exceed original agendas. 
In other words, they become ‘something else’. In this way, this chapter also demonstrates the 
agency of a range of practices, including those of subordinate actors.   
7.2. Re-launching the piped water network:  
local aspirations, development and unintended outcomes 
This section traces the evolution of Bafatá’s piped supply scheme between 2006 and 2010. 
This was the four years period prior to the launch of two international development projects, 
which coincided with major investments and transformations in the city’s piped water 
network. Sub-section 7.2.1. below examines a variety of factors and motivations driving the 
creation of ASPAAB and the subsequent devolution of responsibilities for water management 
to this organisation in 2006.  It demonstrates that these events can be seen as unintended 
outcomes of development interventions and discourses that both comply with and exceed 
original agendas, and which have been ignited and appropriated by a variety of actors. Thus, 
it is argued that targeted development interventions, rather than residualisation produced by 
cherry-picking strategies of private sector entities, might be key forces shaping alternative 
models emerging in small cities. Sub-section 7.2.2. then explores the multiple actors, practices, 
motivations and agendas shaping water provision between 2006 and 2010. These are analysed 
as a situated assemblage emerging around Bafatá’s piped water network that sought (and 
eventually succeeded) to generate new possibilities within prescribed social, political and 
economic configurations (Simone, 2011). The materialities of infrastructure, the uneven 
patterns of investment and the motivations and practices of ASPAAB are show to be key 
elements in this assemblage.  
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7.2.1. The beginnings of ASPAAB – an unintended outcome of development 
interventions? 
In chapter 6 it was argued that the transfer of responsibilities for water management to 
ASPAAB cannot be traced in national or international policies. Neither can it be directly 
linked to planned ‘development’ interventions. Instead, this transfer should be seen as the 
result of the initiative of ASPAAB’s members alongside that of the Regional Director, who 
negotiated this transfer outside the remit of institutional, policy or regulatory guidelines. 
Nevertheless, delving into the motivations of those actors involved in the devolution process, 
it is also evident that both ASPAAB and the Regional Director were deeply influenced by the 
manifest presence of development interventions and discourses in the country. In this way, 
the devolution of responsibilities for water management to ASPAAB can be understood as an 
unintended outcome of development interventions – a localised response to the weighty 
presence of development interventions in the country, which both reflects and challenges 
policy models circulated by international organisations and NGOs through projects. 
Workers in British NGO PLAN international often claimed a role in the creation of ASPAAB. 
However, in the accounts of ASPAAB members, this international NGO “had nothing to do with 
the creation of ASPAAB. The creation of ASPAAB relied on the initiative and work of the young people that 
were there, and had only the support of the Regional Director.” 80 In a context marked by the presence 
of development projects and discourses, international NGOs’ claims for a part in the creation 
of ASPAAB can be situated in their broader attempts to validate their projects and assert their 
position as development actors in the country, often at the expense of the agency of other 
organisations (Mosse, 2005). Likewise, ASPAAB’s attempts to assert its own agency can be 
interpreted as a form of resistance to international NGOs’ narratives that neglected or 
diminished their role, but also in the light of ASPAAB’s own attempts to assert its role as a 
development actor. As will be seen in the course of this chapter, the evolution of ASPAAB in 
                                                      
80 Interview ASPAAB *4  
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recent years has to a great extent coincided with its consolidation as a development actor in 
Bafatá and, more widely, in Guinea-Bissau.  
Yet, the birth of ASPAAB could also be seen as an unintended consequence of PLAN’s 
interventions. In 2005, a group of volunteers participated in a city-wide cleaning and hygiene 
campaign implemented by PLAN in partnership with the Regional Office. After this event, 
motivated by the success of this activity, this group of volunteers, which included mostly 
teachers and also some students from a local school, decided to create an organisation, 
ASPAAB.81 The quote below, extracted from an interview with one of the founding members 
of ASPAAB, illustrates typical accounts linking ASPAAB’s member participation in this 
project to the creation of the organisation.  
“we evaluated the impacts of the works we carried out with PLAN, we realised we had done a 
good job, it was at that point that the idea to create an organisation, which is ASPAAB, emerged, 
as a way to continue those works began with PLAN, so that the city could remain clean. It was 
then that the idea to create an organisation emerged.” 82  
Thus, as suggested by Mamadu and other founding members83, even if indirectly, PLAN 
actually played a role in the creation of ASPAAB. It contributed with funds for the initiative 
that generated the momentum which eventually resulted in the birth of ASPAAB. 
Furthermore, channelling funds to certain activities and contributing to the identification, and 
construction, of specific problems, PLAN also influenced the themes and areas of intervention 
of the new organisation being created. In fact, reflecting the themes of the activities they had 
been previously involved in, ASPAAB’s initial focus was only on sanitation, only later did it 
extend its area of intervention to water provision. As Mercer and Green (2013) argue, the sub-
contracting of local associations by international NGOs to implement activities often 
generates impacts well beyond their projects and planned goals. Conflicts over representations 
and interpretations of events can hide the more nuanced ways in which different actors are 
                                                      
81 Interview ASPAAB *4, Interview ASPAAB *5, Interview State *1 
82 Interview ASPAAB *4 
83 Interview ASPAAB *5 
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involved in processes. Therefore, the birth of ASPAAB can be perceived as an unintentional 
outcome of an international NGO’s project. An outcome that was led by the initiative of 
ASPAAB’s members but deeply influenced by PLAN’s projects in the city.  
Taking this argument further, the creation of ASPAAB and the subsequent devolution of 
responsibilities for water management to this organisation can be traced in the propagation 
of development interventions and discourses in the country (Bordonaro, 2009)84. For example, 
reflecting upon ASPAAB’s members’ motivations and aspirations during the early years of 
ASPAAB, Demba also illustrated the influence development interventions hand on them.  
“when I was a student I was a member of an organisation in Bissau. When I moved here, 
because I always like this thing of being in an association, I joined CEL 21. CEL 21 is an 
NGO, well, it is a grassroots association like ASPAAB, but which works on forest management. 
(…) When they started with the idea of creating ASPAAB, I though the idea was interesting, 
you see. Also, the majority of my close friends, they were all there, so I eventually joined… (…) 
at that time, no one hand any experience, overall there was the desire to volunteer and to contribute 
to the development of the city. (…) At the beginning, the motivation of members was essential for 
the association to develop and to engage with activities with the hope, you see, the hope that one 
day the association would have funds, its own funds to contribute. Because we thought that if 
there was no involvement if there were no small activities, if we only waited for someone to come, 
give us money and ask us to do an activity… we thought that engaging in small activities was a 
way to keep our cohesion, to keep members involved, we got to know each other, we created 
friendships and… we survived for a long time…” 85  
Stating that he “always like[d] this thing of being in an association”, Demba echoed the views of 
other members of ASPAAB.86 This motivation to be part of an organisation was routinely 
explained by a “desire to volunteer and to contribute to the development of the city”. For some, it was also 
                                                      
84 See Bordonaro (2009) and Temudo and Abrantes (2013) for investigations of the generalised circulation of development 
interventions and discourses in Guinea-Bissau.  
85 Interview ASPAAB *5 
86 Interview ASPAAB *1, Interview ASPAAB *2, Interview ASPAAB *3, Interview ASPAAB *4, Interview ASPAAB *7, 
Interview ASPAAB *8.  
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an important way to make friends outside the house or neighbourhood.87 But, in a city where 
employment and training opportunities are extremely limited, being part of an association 
was also perceived as a key chance to gain skills and access training as well as income 
opportunities.88 In this context, the motivations of ASPAAB’s members must be understood 
both in terms of their desires to contribute to the development of the city and their 
expectations relating to training and (paid) job opportunities. When Demba says that their 
hope was that the association “would have funds, its own funds to contribute”, he is actually referring 
to their own project money, and therefore their hope to be recognised as a development actor 
and secure funds from international donors. This means that expectations relating to the 
desire to contribute to the development of the city and to opportunities for training and (paid) 
jobs were also profoundly linked to aspirations to attract funds from international donors, and 
therefore become involved in development interventions. 
Demba also mentions ASPAAB’s involvement in a wide range of small activities in attempts to 
maintain and strengthen the organisation. In this way, he hints at the fact that ASPAAB’s 
involvement in the management of the water network started as one among a list of other 
activities that ASPAAB engaged with in the expectation of raising funds, strengthening the 
organisation and, eventually, becoming a recognised development actor and attracting foreign 
aid. ASPAAB was not created with the intention to work on water provision. Instead, it started 
operating the piped supply scheme, the same way it got involved in a number of other small 
activities, whilst seeking to attract international donations. Thus, the creation of ASPAAB and 
its involvement in the operation of the piped supply scheme can once again be traced in 
aspirations to eventually attract international donations and therefore to the manifest presence 
of development interventions in the city.  
Likewise, the Regional Director – the state official that allowed the transfer of responsibilities 
to ASPAAB – also mentioned that one of the key benefits resulting from this transfer was 
ASPAAB’s ability to raise funds from international donors, since donors were more willing to 
                                                      
87 Interview ASPAAB *6, Interview ASPAAB *7 
88 Interview ASPAAB *1, Interview ASPAAB *3, Interview ASPAAB *5 
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work with NGOs than with the state.89 He also noted that aid given to the state was unlikely 
to get to Bafatá. Thus, whilst escaping specific development interventions, the motivations 
and aspirations of both ASPAAB’s members and state officials involved in the process were 
profoundly shaped by the prevalence of development interventions and discourses in Bafatá, 
in particular the ways international funds are channelled in the country. This reflects views 
arguing for the importance of the unintended consequences of development projects but also 
for the considerations of the autonomous spheres of actions that are inevitably created within 
(and beyond) development interventions (Mosse, 2005). 
Although the creation of ASPAAB and the subsequent devolution of an urban service to this 
organisation can be seen as only unintended outcomes of development interventions, these 
instances were nonetheless in line with development interventions’ policy models – to promote 
the devolution of urban services to the private and community sectors. This means that the 
ways in which development agencies are channelling funds to non-state organisations are 
fostering their aims even beyond the scope of planned interventions.90 However, the process 
of devolution to ASPAAB also produced outcomes that exceeded, and even contradicted, 
policies disseminated through projects. In particular, the benefits of market approaches were 
never mentioned by either ASPAAB or the Regional Director. There were also no 
expectations concerning the financial viability of organisations involved in water 
management. On the contrary, guiding the transfer of responsibilities to ASPAAB were 
expectations related to the mobilisations of international funds. These funds were seen as 
essential to subsidise the operation of the piped water network and to raise funds for ASPAAB 
and its members. Thus, contrary to their policies and goals, development interventions did 
not reproduce market approaches but provoked the birth of an NGO that expected to 
mobilise subsidies from international organisations and NGOs both to operate the water 
system and to secure its existence. In this way, ASPAAB and the Regional Director can be 
                                                      
89 Interview State *1 
90 Yet, as discussed in chapter 6, in a context where state institutions are depleted of resources, it is not clear how these processes 
fostering the role of non-state organisations in service delivery are contributing to the strengthening of the role of the state 
regulating and monitoring the work of these organisations – another stated goal of development interventions.  
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seen to have appropriated the presence of development interventions and discourses, and to 
have shaped outcomes according to their own aspirations and motivations. In the process, 
they transformed meanings and processes.  
 
The personal relationships nurtured between the Regional Director and the most active 
members of ASPAAB are another important factor explaining how ASPAAB came to be 
involved in the operation of the city’s piped water network. Queba, an ASPAAB member and 
close friend of the Regional Director, suggested that this state official’s involvement with 
ASPAAB was linked to him being an outsider:  
“hmmm, it could have happened with someone else, if he [Regional Delegate] wasn’t there… 
Maybe, in his place, that other person could have done it, but I am not so sure… For example, 
he didn’t have, when he got here at that time, he didn’t have any friends, a friend, I don’t know 
what, he was all alone… But with ASPAAB, with the foundation of ASPAAB, he made friends, 
he became more transparent, open, more like a person. When he got here, he was alone, he had 
come from Cuba [where he trained as an engineer]…” 91  
For Queba, the Regional Director’s involvement in the creation, and later in the workings of 
ASPAAB is explained by his aspirations to establish new relationships in the city and to expand 
his social networks. In fact, this in line with views expressed by various ASPAAB’s members, 
who mentioned new friendships as one of the key benefits of being a member of the 
organisation. Nevertheless, the personal relationships and trust established between ASPAAB 
members and the Regional Director were key in facilitating the exchange of knowledge and 
ideas and therefore in driving the process of devolution and subsequently the evolution of the 
city’s piped water supply. In fact, the close and routine rapport between the Regional Director 
and ASPAAB members was widely recognised as one of the major strengths of ASPAAB and 
the water governance model established in the city.92 
                                                      
91 Interview ASPAAB *1 
92 Fieldwork Notes, Interviews with ASPAAB and staff from international organisations. 
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Mountz (2003) and Rankin (2011) have reflected upon the relevance of everyday embodied 
practices and social relations in understandings of the ways in which policy models or state 
agendas are translated into practice. In the context of water provision in Bafatá, the 
embodiment and social relations of those actors involved are essential to explain why the 
devolution of responsibilities to ASPAAB happened in this particular place and at this 
particular time.  
 
Thus, the birth of ASPAAB and the subsequent transfer of responsibilities for the management 
of the piped supply scheme can be seen as unintended outcomes of development interventions, 
which influenced the strategies adopted by those actors involved in the process. But, these 
events must also be seen as being mediated through the subjectivities, emotions and social 
relations of those involved. Financing a range of activities implemented by non-state 
organisations, international actors influenced the unfolding of events. Nevertheless, these 
events were fundamentally shaped by ASPAAB’s and the Regional Director’s own aspirations 
– to contribute to the development of the city, to improve access to water, to secure subsidies 
for the operation of the piped water scheme, to raise the profile of ASPAAB as a development 
actor, and to access income and training opportunities. In this way, ASPAAB and the 
Regional Director both conformed to and escaped policy models disseminated through 
development projects. At the same time, the embodied practices – the desire to make friends, 
“to be a person” – and social relations of those involved are also vital in understanding the 
ways in which the creation of ASPAAB and the devolution process took place.  
Paradoxically, despite the emphasis given to market approaches and recently to public-private 
partnerships in global policies, the ways in which international organisations and NGOs 
channel funds seems to be fostering the emergence of NGOs and associations that are created 
in attempts to mobilise subsidies93 that can fund urban services but also create training and 
jobs opportunities – rather than delivering market-driven, private and economically viable 
                                                      
93 These subsidies are a necessity if piped water schemes are to exist in cities such as Bafatá. 
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solutions. Thus, more than the outcome of private companies’ cherry picking strategies, the 
‘alternative’ water governance model in place in Bafatá can be seen as the unintended 
outcome of development interventions in the country.  
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7.2.2. The ‘persistent irregularity’ of Bafatá’s water piped network between 2006 and 2010 
Following the devolution of responsibilities for water management to the organisation in May 
2006, ASPAAB inherited a very limited and run-down water network. Of the four existing 
sub-systems – Boma/Central, Bairro 4, Praça and Ponte Nova – only Bairro 4 was operative 
and even this sub-system presented severe faults with only one out of nine standpipes in use 
(see figures 11 and 13 below). The remaining eight public hydrants either lacked taps or were 
without water because of leaks and lack of pressure in the network. In addition, the pumps 
used to power the system suffered frequent breakdowns and consumed a high volume of 
financial resources (in repairs and fuel) which continuously threatened the viability of the 
system. Whilst Bairro 4 sub-network had been designed to include only standpipes, home 
connections had been added to the network and, therefore, ASPAAB also inherited at least 
28 identified home connections (see figure 12 below). These unplanned home connections 
significantly affected the pressure in the system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. The one standpipe in operation in 2006 
(picture taken in 2010) 
Figure 12. Home connection active in 2010 (before 
refurbishment works). The residents excavated a pit to 
overcome water pressure issues. 
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Figure 13. Bafatá Piped Water Network in 2006. Out of four sub-systems - Bairro 4, Ponte Nova, Praça and Boma/Central - only one - Bairro 4 - was in operation. (Source: google earth, produce by author)
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Figure 14. Number of actives standpipes between 2006 and 2010, periods when there were no active standpipes coincided with major 
breakdowns and the total shut down of the system (This graph is based on information collected in various reports produced by ASPAAB 
and NGO TESE and the accounts of those involved in the management and operation of the system. It is not supposed to be a precise 
description but it gives an idea of the overall workings, and failures, of the system.) 
 
Figure 14 above shows the number of active standpipes at different times between 2006 and 
2010. It demonstrates both that the number of operational standpipes varied quite 
significantly, and that there were long periods when there were no active standpipes, these 
were periods during which the entire system was out of service. Below, I examine some of the 
key actors, motivations and practices shaping the ‘persistent irregularity’ characterising the 
operation of the water system in this period. This term captures, on the one hand, the 
irregularity of the service provided and, on the other hand, the consistent efforts of ASPAAB 
and the Regional Director to provide a water service in the city. Where during this period, 
ASPAAB only barely managed to provide a rather irregular water service, it nevertheless 
succeeded at creating the foundations for the subsequent period during which the service 
being provided improved significantly. 
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Between 2006 and 2010, the materialities of infrastructure were a critical element within the 
overall assemblage of actors, institutions and practices emerging around the city’s piped supply 
scheme, which profoundly shaped the possibilities of ASPAAB and the Regional Director 
operating the system. For example, this is apparent in the ways in which the pumps used to 
power the system continuously disrupted the operation of the scheme and consequently 
dictated the activities of those actors involved in its operation. After taking over the 
management of the water network, ASPAAB invested the organisation’s own sparse resources 
in the refurbishment of two standpipes and the restoration of the generator used to supply 
energy to the system. And, as illustrated in figure 14 above, during the following months, this 
association succeeded in keeping the system running without any major interruptions. 
However, on May 24th 2007, almost exactly one year after ASPAAB took over the 
management of the system, the electric pump used to send water from the borehole to the 
water tank feeding the distribution network burnt out as a result of an electric short-circuit. 
At this point, ASPAAB managed to gather the money required to buy a new electric pump to 
replace the old one. But, during the installation, this new pump also broke down and, without 
any further resources to invest in yet another pump or repair the existing ones, the entire 
system remained inactive for over one year. Eventually, in June 2008, a new electric pump 
was found and installed (see Figure 15, above). However, in yet another demonstration of the 
extreme vulnerability of this system, and the impact pumps had on its overall functioning, 
Figure 15. Pump installed in Bairro 4 in 
2008 
Figure 16. Motor-pump installed in Boma in 2009 
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only one month later, in July 2008, this pump also stopped working, when lightning struck it 
during a storm. 
In the meantime, the Boma sub-system, out of order in 2006 when ASPAAB took over the 
position of water operator, started working in February 2009.94 This followed the 
refurbishment of the Boma/Central water tank and the installation of a new motor-pump for 
this sub-system (see Figure 16, above), under a project funded by British NGO PLAN 
International and the Department of Water Resources. Once the refurbishment works were 
completed the system operated with only minor interruption for the following three months. 
However, in May 2009, the system stopped operating when, in another demonstration of the 
idiosyncrasies of technology, this new motor-pump broke down. A local technician eventually 
fixed this motor-pump, and the system started working once again in November 2009. 
The successive breakdowns of the pumps, which commanded the regular shut down of the 
entire system, illustrate the extent to which the materiality of infrastructure dictated the overall 
operation of the system. Here, the regular interruptions to the water service resulting from 
technical difficulties also show that ASPAAB and the Regional Offices lacked the technical 
capacity to operate the system and struggled to find spare parts. This is revealed in the 
difficulties associated with repairing pumps but also, for example, in the fact that one of the 
pumps actually got damaged during installation. Most importantly, the constant breakdowns 
demonstrate that in order to operate the network ASPAAB required a significant amount of 
investment, investments which were beyond the financial capacities of ASPAAB or the 
Regional Offices of the Department of Water Resources in Bafatá. In this way, the materiality 
of infrastructure engendered the constant juggling of efforts by those involved in the operation 
of the piped scheme to maintain, repair and operate the system.  
In fact, practices related to the multiple attempts to mobilise the resources required to operate, 
maintain and repair the network should be seen as another key element of the piped supply 
                                                      
94 At this time ASPAAB connected the Boma and Bairro 4 sub-systems. This meant that they could supply water to both 
distribution networks using only one pump and water tank.  
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scheme at this time. They too shaped the ‘persistent irregularity’ of the system. These practices 
also illustrate the continuous search to generate possibilities within prescribed social, economic 
and political configurations. One strategy adopted by ASPAAB was to secure the support of 
different entities, such as NGOs and different state departments, through step-by-step 
negotiations. Where ASPAAB was sometimes successful in securing the support of different 
entities, the times taken to conduct repairs or replace equipment also indicate that negotiations 
not only took a long time but also required several attempts, including liaising with different 
entities. For example, the water service was out of commission for one year before a new pump 
was installed in June 2008. This new pump was actually a second-hand equipment found in a 
town located close to Bafatá and which the Regional Director managed to bring to the city. 
When this new pump also broke down, it took ASPAAB another almost two years to mobilise 
the resources required to fix the problem. This time the materials required, including electric 
cables and post, were donated by the Department of Energy and Guiné Telecom. But, before 
securing the support of the Department of Energy and Guiné Telecom, ASPAAB and the 
Regional Director had tried and failed to mobilise resources from a number of other entities. 
In 2009, it was PLAN, an international NGO, that funded the installation of a new motor-
pump. When this new motor-pump also broke-down, the Regional Director was also not so 
successful in his negotiations. This new motor-pump had been installed by ASCON, one of 
the largest contractors operating in the country and included a guarantee. However, the 
Regional Director failed to get this private company to replace or repair the equipment as 
established under this equipment’s guarantee.  
Besides seeking contributions from international NGOS, various state departments and large 
corporations, ASPAAB also engaged in numerous alternative enterprises in attempts to 
mobilise the revenues required to operate the water system. For instance, from the very 
beginning, ASPAAB sought to increase water revenues flowing from the sale of water. For 
this, they surveyed all existing home connections and disconnected those customers who 
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consistently failed to pay their water bills. Although without much success95, ASPAAB also 
started installing meters in home connections. Furthermore, the purchase of the meters itself 
became a strategy to raise extra-revenue for the organisation, as some ASPAAB’s members 
travelled to Senegal to buy meters more cheaply and then attempted to sell them with a 
considerable profit margin. Crucially, these efforts also demonstrate that cost-recovery was 
already at the core of ASPAAB’s strategy during these early years. Yet, rather than being 
based on ideas relating to the benefits of market approaches or the advantages of perceiving 
water as an economic good, cost-recovery emerged as a pragmatic response in a context 
marked by an extreme lack of resources.  
At this point, the persistent irregularity of Bafatá’s water service appears to be shaped by the 
failing materialities of infrastructure, and the uneven patterns of investment resulting from the 
successes and failures of the multiple negotiations and enterprises ASPAAB engaged in whilst 
seeking to mobilise the resources required to operate the network.  
However, ASPAAB’s activities were not all linked to the operation of the water network. On 
the one hand, these other activities can be situated in ASPAAB’s strategy at the time, which 
involved engaging with a wide range of initiatives in attempts to strengthen the organisation, 
optimise its chances of mobilising funds from international donors and maximise training and 
                                                      
95 Users refused to pay for (buy) meters and, at this time, ASPAAB also lacked the ability to enforce the ‘rule of the meter’.  
Figure 17. Sporting Club of Bafatá Swimming Pool. ASPAAB managed 
this swimming people for a short period of time between 2006 and 2010. 
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income opportunities for its members. On the other hand, these activities profoundly shaped 
the evolution of ASPAAB’s involvement in the operation of the piped supply scheme. For 
example, ASPAAB participated in several interventions focusing on rubbish collection and 
cleaning the city, for which they occasionally mobilised funding from the community, market 
traders, local state institutions and international NGOs. Furthermore, PLAN International 
also continued to fund different activities being implemented by ASPAAB, including several 
sanitation and water safety campaigns. The revenues raised through these activities would 
cover mostly the costs of food for the volunteers. Nevertheless, these activities were also very 
important in securing ASPAAB’s members’ – who played a key role operating the network – 
active commitment and in raising the profile of organisation in the city.96 
For a while in 2008, ASPAAB also ran the swimming pool of the Sporting Club of Bafatá (see 
figure 17 above). Part of the profits was handed in to the club but another was kept by the 
organisation. In addition to charging entrance, ASPAAB also sold drinks such as juices, beers 
and red wine in an attempt to raise some extra-money97. Demba also remembers some 
members using their own private resources to fund ASPAAB’s activities.98 These revenues 
were at times invested in the operation of the piped supply scheme. Thus, these parallel 
enterprises also generated resources essential for the water service being provided. In this way, 
they were also a key dimension of the piped supply scheme.  
In fact, between 2006 and 2010, efforts to operate the water network went hand in hand with 
attempts to maintain the organisations’ members together by engaging in different activities; 
find multiple ways in which to raise income; and, raise the profile of the organisation. 
ASPAAB’s aim was to improve the city’s water service but also to work towards securing 
international donations for the organisation.  And, in fact, these undertakings, including the 
role of the organisation operating the piped supply scheme, contributed to the development 
of ASPAAB as an organisation. They resulted in the growing recognition of ASPAAB as a 
                                                      
96 Interview ASPAAB *5, Interview ASPAAB *4 
97 ASPAAB gave up the management of the swimming pool when someone drowned and died. This event shows once again the 
vulnerability and unpredictability of the context.  
98 Interview ASPAAB *5 
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valuable development actor among various actors in the city, and eventually culminated with 
its participation in two international development projects that fundamentally reshaped the 
organisation and Bafatá’s piped supply scheme. It can therefore be argued that ASPAAB not 
only sought but also succeeded in creating possibilities within prescribed socio-political 
configurations.  
Tracing the evolutions of ASPAAB as an organisation and water provision in Bafatá between 
2006 and 2010, it emerges that the workings of both organisation and infrastructure rested on 
a continuous juggling of different people, organisations, financial resources, practices and 
equipment. The persistent irregularity characterising the operation of the piped water 
network at this stage can be seen as a product of an assemblage, which fundamental elements 
included: the materialities of the system; the joint efforts of ASPAAB and the Regional 
Director to operate the network; the instable pattern of investments sustained by step-by-step 
negotiations; as well as the motivation and aspiration of ASPAAB’s members to strengthen 
the organisation. This assemblage sought the multiple possibilities that emerged through 
collaborations and alignments within a prescribed social, political and economic 
configuration. Where they only barely managed to keep the system working during this 
period, ASPAAB and the Regional Director actually succeeded in extending possibilities.  
ASPAAB went from a provisional arrangement to a more permanent organisation involved 
in service delivery. It was their work and commitment during these years that enabled the 
major transformations that took place from 2010 onwards, when ASPAAB became partner 
and beneficiary of a major international development project targeting the piped water 
scheme of Bafatá.  
Whilst outcomes, such as the devolution of water management to the community sector or 
the adoption of cost-recovery principles, can resemble international policies and planned 
development interventions, this section demonstrates that the evolution of water provision in 
Bafatá between 2006 and 2010 was not directly shaped by neither of these. Nevertheless, 
water provision evolved mostly in line with the motivations, agendas and practices of 
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ASPAAB’s members and the Regional Director which were influenced by the heavy presence 
of development interventions. Still, both these actors appropriated development interventions 
and discourses in accordance with their aspirations.  
The next section explores the sedimentation of a new governance model between 2010 and 
2014, a period that coincided with the implementation of two major international projects. It 
focuses on the ways in which ASPAAB appropriated, re-invented, contested and ignored 
global models and policies and continues to engage in a range of practices that largely exceed 
these policies. 
7.3. Creole water governance: development interventions and the 
appropriation and re-invention of policy models 
Bafatá Misti Iagu (BMI, Guinea-Bissau Creole for ‘Bafatá Wants/Needs Water’) and Bafatá 
Misti Mas Iagu (BMMI, Guinea-Bissau Creole for ‘Bafatá Wants/Needs More Water’) – the 
two international development projects implemented in Bafatá between 2010 and 2015 99 – 
resulted in profound transformations in the city’s piped water network. Table 6 below 
summarises key information concerning these two projects, including the duration, expected 
results and main achievements of these projects. Table 7 and figures 18 and 19 below illustrate 
the fundamental changes in the piped water network undertaken in the course of the 
implementation of these interventions. If in 2006 only Bairro 4 sub-network was in operation, 
by 2014 there were two active sub-networks and by 2016 all four existing sub-networks were 
in operation. In addition, between 2006 and 2016, the number of active standpipes rose from 
one to 24 and the number of home connections went from 18 to 104. Here, it is also important 
to point out that, where between 2006 and 2010 the system worked irregularly, by 2014 water 
was supplied on a daily basis for approximately two to three hours. By then, eventual 
                                                      
99 The second project finished 2015 a few months after I completed my fieldwork.  
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disruptions to the service were also typically solved in a matter of few days, compared with 
the previous situation where it could take months or even years to deal with breakdowns. 
As noted in table 6 below, both development interventions, BMI and BMMI, highlighted the 
long-term sustainability of the water system in Bafatá. In these circumstances, the definition 
and adoption of an adequate water governance model, the training and capacity-building of 
local actors and the strengthening of ASPAAB and relevant state institutions emerged as key 
components of these projects. These components were visibly influenced by mainstream 
international water policies and development discourses and, related to this, these projects 
tried to recreate a model similar to a public-private partnership entailing a small-scale 
provider, ASPAAB.100 For this, these projects formalised the role of ASPAAB as the water 
operator of the network, created a separate and financially independent water unit within 
ASPAAB and engaged in attempts to professionalise this unit. In addition, detailed 
management procedures were also put in place to guide all levels of the operation of the 
network and the water unit of ASPAAB. The influences of neoliberal ideas were evident not 
only in the model adopted, that of a public-private partnership, but also in the attention paid 
by TESE, the projects’ lead promoter, to cost-recovery principles and the strengthening of 
legal frameworks (see chapter 2 for discussion of neoliberalism and water provision).  
This section explores the ways in which ASPAAB and the Regional Director negotiated the 
transformations towards the adoption of this new governance model. Sub-section 7.3.1. 
analyses the shifting contours of the relationship between ASPAAB and TESE. It shows the 
ongoing uneven power relations between these two organisations, which nevertheless did not 
prevent ASPAAB from significantly shaping projects’ outcomes and processes.  It also 
demonstrates the variety of motivations and practices co-existing within TESE and the 
evolution of ASPAAB as a development actor. Sub-section 7.4.2. explores some of the ways 
                                                      
100 ASPAAB is a non-profit association, rather than a private company, but the model in place is still closer to that of a public-
private partnership than to a community-management model. Where ASPAAB claims to be a grassroots organisation, there were 
never attempts to put in place a system that enabled the active participation of the community in the governance of water 
provision.  In addition, the internal reforms of ASPAAB, including the creation of a separate water unit, have resulted in the 
transformation that approximate this organisation management approach to that of a private entity.  
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in which ASPAAB and the Regional Director have appropriated, re-invented, ignored and contested 
policy models circulating in the city to demonstrate how these policies have been consistently 
transformed in such a way they have often become ‘something else’. In addition, it shows that 
even processes and outcomes resembling neoliberal logics might have other agendas at their 
core. In doing so, it examines the meanings and effects associated with the legal concession 
contract signed in 2012. It demonstrates how the meanings and effects granted by ASPAAB 
to this legal tool – related to its utility as a means to mobilise international donations – 
surpassed those originally planned by policy models – that is to strengthen policy and 
regulatory frameworks. Furthermore, this sub-section describes how ASPAAB and the 
Regional Offices, whilst embracing cost-recovery principles, successfully ignored and 
contested a range of technical studies relating to the definition of a water tariff. Instead, the 
findings of these technical reports were manoeuvred in order to comply with the aims of 
ASPAAB and the Regional Offices. Here, it is also shown that despite the fact that ASPAAB 
and the Regional Director embraced cost-recovery principles, this resulted from a pragmatic 
attempt to raise revenues to operate the system rather than beliefs related to the benefits of 
market rule. Thus, where ASPAAB and the Regional Director have been actively involved in 
development interventions, they have triggered the transformation of policy models in such a 
way that they conform to the aspirations of these actors, and often exceed original (neoliberal) 
agendas. Lastly, sub-section 7.4.3. examines how the governance model in place in Bafatá has 
been continuously re-shaped by a range of practices at various levels, including those of users 
and standpipe operators. This is analysed as a process of embedding the model in existing 
social relations, a process essential for ensuing its ability to govern the city’s piped water 
network. In this way, this section also demonstrates that everyday practices and the ways in 
which policies are translated into practice are endowed with the agency of various actors even 
in contexts were power relations remain highly unbalanced. In addition, it traces how different 
motivations, agendas and ways of doing came to be at the heart of the governance model put 
in place.  
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Table 6. Description of BMI and BMMI, two international development projects 
 
 
 
Project Description 
Bafatá Misti Iagu (Creole for ‘Bafatá Wants/Needs Water’) (BMI) 
Project duration: 30 months, it started in January 2010 and terminated in June 2012.  
Project Partners: Project led by TESE, development NGO based in Lisbon. ASPAAB was both partner 
and beneficiary of this project, whilst the Regional Offices of the Department of Water 
Resources in Bafatá and EPAL were both associates of the project. EPAL is the Portuguese 
state-owned company that manages water supply in Lisbon.  
Project donors: This project was funded by the European Union, the Portuguese Development Agency 
(IPAD) and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.  
Expected results:  
(1) an optimised water supply management model that secured access to water for 75% of the population 
in a sustainable manner adopted and implemented;  
(2) local actors in the water sector capacitated and able to implement the adopted water supply 
management model;  
(3) water network infrastructures refurbished to supply safe water;  
(4) an awareness raising campaign on the themes of water, hygiene, environment and the user-payer 
principle implemented. 
Summary of main Achievements: 
• Infrastructure: 53 home connections and 13 standpipes in operation and with meters installed; 
Bairro 4 and Boma/ Central sub-systems refurbished with one new water source (borehole) added 
to the system and solar panels installed in two locations; 
• Service: water supplied daily 
• Management: significant improvements in management and increases in cost-recovery 
Project Description 
Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu (Creole for ‘Bafatá Wants/Needs More Water’) (BMMI) 
Project duration: 30 months, from July 2012 to December 2014. 
Project Partners: Project led by TESE, development NGO based in Lisbon. ASPAAB was both the main 
partner and beneficiary of this project, the Regional Offices of the Department of Water 
Resources in Bafatá, EPAL (Portuguese state-owned company that manages water supply 
in Lisbon), and SNV were also partners. 
Project donors: This project was funded by the European Union, and co-funded by Camoes Mission – 
Institute for Cooperation and Language, EPAL – Empresa Portuguesa de Aguas Livres, 
SNV – Netherlands cooperation Institute, TESE and ASPAAB. 
Expected results:  
(5) Water Plan for the City of Bafatá completed and adopted;  
(6) Human and institutional capacity of ASPAAB reinforced in order to guarantee the sustainability of 
the system and its autonomy and leadership in water supply in Bafatá; 
(7) Refurbishment and expansion infrastructure for water supply in Ponte Nova, Bairro 5 Caibara and 
Bairro 3;  
(8) positive shifts in the attitudes, knowledge and practices related to hygiene, public health and payment 
for water through an awareness raising campaign. 
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Sub-
system 2006 2014 2016 
Bairro 4 Working Working Working 
Boma/ 
Central 
Not 
working Working Working 
Praça Not working 
Not 
Working Working 
Ponte 
Nova 
Not 
working 
Not 
Working Working 
Table 7.  Condition of water sub-networks in 2006, 2014 
and 2016 
Figure 18. Number of active standpipes and home connections: 2006, 2010, 2014, 2015 
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Figure 19. Bafatá piped water network 2014 
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7.3.1. The contours of the relationships between ASPAAB and international NGOs 
Before moving on to the analyses of the Creole Water Governance model adopted in Bafatá, 
this sub-section examines the evolution of the terms of the partnership between ASPAAB and 
international NGO TESE – the main promoter of BMI and BMMI. The aim is to 
demonstrate that even in contexts where power relations remain extremely unbalanced, 
subordinated actors still maintain agency and autonomous spheres of everyday action. 
Underlying this sub-section is also the evolution of ASPAAB’s as a recognised and 
knowledgeable development actor. In addition, this sub-section complicates local-non-local 
binaries by showing the variety of motivations and practices co-existing within TESE.  
The beginning of Bafatá Misti Iagu (BMI) coincided with the start of the consistent presence of 
Portuguese NGO TESE in Bafatá and, in particular, with their regular involvement in the 
management of the piped water network. In these circumstances, the relationship between 
TESE and ASPAAB became an important part of the assemblage of actors and practices 
emerging around the water system, influencing the ways in which the project was 
implemented and its outcomes, as well as the ongoing governing of water infrastructure. 
Furthermore, the presence of TESE corresponded to the dissemination of development 
discourses and international policies and models, which became key elements in the governing 
of water infrastructure. Thus, the relationship between these two organisations also influenced 
how these models travelled between the two organisations and were translated into practice. 
Between 2008, when ASPAAB and TESE first started working together on the first funding 
application, and 2014, a time when BMI had already been implemented and BMMI was 
more than halfway through its implementation period, the terms of the partnership between 
the two organisations swayed considerably. These variations denoted the unequal power 
relations between the two organisation and, despite the noticeable growth in ASPAAB’s 
capacity to make demands, how they persisted over time.  
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TESE’s evaluation of the partnership between the two organisations for the duration of the 
first project, BMI, was extremely positive. It highlighted ASPAAB’s enthusiasm and active 
participation in all project activities and the interest of the organisation in continuing the 
partnership with TESE.102 On the other hand, ASPAAB’s appraisal was less optimistic and 
raised some fundamental issues. In fact, in 2014, with the benefit of hindsight, one member 
of ASPAAB’s management team cited the partnership between the two organisations as the 
weakest point in the first project.103 This is not to say that ASPAAB members did not value or 
recognise how much their organisation, and the water infrastructure of the city, had benefited 
from this project. During my interviews, most members of ASPAAB mentioned the fantastic 
increase in the human resource and institutional capacities of the organisation as the most 
important consequence of BMI.104 For example, Mamadu noted:  
“Training was the most important thing during the project [BMI], that contributed to most 
changes in the organisation. ASPAAB had human resources because its members are mostly 
teachers and students but there was no prior knowledge of project management. (…) Before the 
project ASPAAB had no written registers, archives or accounting. There was no control, no 
flexibility and no skills and knowledge to do things, this changed with the training in business 
administration, business and financial management, accounting, marketing, internal auditing, 
etc.”  105 
In fact, they did not only recognise these benefits but also linked their ability to evaluate their 
partnership in the terms discussed below to their involvement in the implementation of BMI, 
and their growing ability to understand and negotiate the terms of the partnership.106  
In the accounts of ASPAAB’s members, the first crucial dispute concerning the relationship 
between the two organisations touched on the distribution of project resources between the 
two partners. For example, Mamadu107 and Demba108 described how, for the entire duration 
                                                      
102 Fieldwork notes  
103 Interview ASPAAB *4 
104 Interview ASPAAB *2, *3, *4, *5 
105 Interview ASPAAB *4 
106 Interview ASPAAB *5 
107 Interview ASPAAB *4 
108 Interview ASPAAB *5 
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of BMI109 as well as the initial months of BMMI110, ASPAAB’s members’ participation in 
project activities was done mostly on a voluntary basis. This means that its members did not 
get paid for any of the work they undertook for the project. Furthermore, they pointed out 
that at a certain point during the implementation of BMI, some of the associates of ASPAAB 
started suffering cuts in their teachers’ wages, since they were missing classes in order to 
perform project activities. They raised this issue with TESE who agreed to include stipends 
for four ASPAAB members into the overall project budget.111 However, these stipends were 
so low that, despite accepting them, some ASPAAB’s members felt ashamed and insulted. In 
Mamadu’s words: 
“The total stipend was 95,000 CFA [per month] (€144.85), to be divided between four 
people… (laughs) So 95,000 CFA divided by four, I received 30,000 CFA (€45.74), which 
was considered to be my wage, Demba 25,000 (€38.12 Euro), Samba 25,000 and Fanta, 
who was the secretary at the time, 15,000 (€22.87). Well, at the beginning I even wanted to 
say no, I don’t need that … that [little] money. But then, I thought, since I’m missing classes, 
I’ll do it, I’ll take the money” 112,113 
Related to the above, whereas project resources were used to acquire the materials, equipment 
and wages TESE needed to implement the project, these resources did not reach ASPAAB. 
The materials and equipment that ASPAAB might have needed had not been entered in the 
overall project budget and during BMI, ASPAAB even used its own scarce resources to buy 
materials for the implementation of project activities. For example, Mamadu noted how they 
had contributed some of the material needed for the awareness-raising campaign 
implemented during BMI.114 TESE’s project coordinator115 perceived the volunteering and 
the contributions to project activities as ASPAAB’s own input to the project, similar to TESE’s 
                                                      
109 Bafatá Misti Iagu (1st Project) 
110 Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu (2nd Project) 
111 Interview ASPAAB *4, (TESE and ASPAAB, 2011a): ASPAAB’s Water Management Model Manual – Appendix IV: 
Diagnosis of the existing water management model in Bafatá   
112 Interview ASPAAB *4 
113 Employed by the Portuguese Development Agency and TESE to work on the implementation of the same project, BMI, I got 
a monthly wage of approximately 1,700 Euro.  
114 Interview ASPAAB *4 
115 At the time I was part of the local project team and responded to the project coordinator who was based in Lisbon. This 
information is based on our conversations at that time.  
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financial contribution demanded by the EU, the chief donor. In addition, it constituted a way 
to avoid the unsustainable dependency of a small organisation like ASPAAB, through the 
flooding of resources that would disappear as soon as the project finished. On the contrary, 
ASPAAB’s members claimed this only happened because ASPAAB was a small organisation 
with little means; other organisations in the country with more resources would have never 
accepted this kind of partnership. They claimed TESE was taking advantage of ASPAAB’s 
fragilities and their dependency on TESE for accessing international donors.116 As will be 
discussed below, this view was shared by some of TESE’s staff who recognised the unequal 
distribution of resources between the two partners.117 
The second issue concerned TESE’s reluctance to negotiate some key aspects of the project 
and the need to further involve ASPAAB in decision-making processes relating to both 
technical issues and project budgeting in future initiatives. For example, ASPAAB’s members 
anticipated that their potential involvement in the formulation of the second project, BMMI, 
presented an important opportunity for them to learn how to formulate projects and produce 
funding applications, which they considered an essential step towards their autonomy as an 
organisation. However, as often happened at this time, ASPAAB was only superficially 
involved in the process. For example, ASPAAB participated in the definition of the areas for 
future extensions of the piped water network during a visit by the project leader, then based 
in Lisbon, to the city. Nevertheless, they were never invited to join in the actual formulation 
of the proposals, including the financial component. Their role was relegated to that of 
collecting data and sending it to Lisbon where the project was being formulated. Also, 
ASPAAB never had access to any of the project’s budgets. These events surrounding the 
formulation of the second project, BMMI, were just one example of the ways in which 
ASPAAB’s members perceived TESE to have systematically failed to involve them in key 
stages of the projects and to share processes of decision-making. For ASPAAB, 
notwithstanding TESE’s talk about helping ASPAAB to become an autonomous organisation 
                                                      
116 Interview ASPAAB *4  
117 Fieldwork Notes  
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that could lead water supply in the city, the fact that they did not give them the resources they 
needed or integrate them in fundamental stages of the project undermined their ability to 
become autonomous and independent.118  
The relationship between the two organisations improved considerably at the beginning of 
the second project, BMMI, during the last trimester of 2012. The first factor evidently shaping 
this shift in the contours of the partnership between the two organisations was the change in 
TESE’s project team, which entailed the transfer of the entire project team to Bafatá, followed 
by the appointment of new staff, including a new project coordinator with visibly distinct 
visions of development. For Luisa, the new project coordinator, the chief aim of BMMI was 
to build the capacity of ASPAAB and to contribute to the consolidation and autonomy of this 
organisation, rather than to directly improve the water supply system. The improvements in 
the water supply service, which had been the main focus of the first team, would flow from 
the renewed capacity of local institutions.119 Following her vision, and her acknowledgement 
of ASPAAB’s viewpoint regarding the extremely unbalanced distribution of project resources, 
Luisa initiated key alterations in the project. These alterations required a lot of internal fights 
within TESE but were eventually adopted.120  They included wages for ASPAAB’s members 
involved in the delivery of project activities, a new budget to be managed by ASPAAB to 
implement project activities, and the formal inclusion of ASPAAB in all dimensions of the 
project, in an attempt to share decision-making processes.121  
Crucially, the different approach of the new project team employed by TESE was also 
revealed in the ways ASPAAB’s role was portrayed, not only among those working on the 
implementation of the project, but also more generally among actors in the sector. For 
example, the previous TESE project coordinator did not recognise ASPAAB’s right to be a 
member of GAS, the national water and sanitation group. Instead, they invited members of 
the organisation to occasionally participate in GAS meetings as “a way to recognise their good 
                                                      
118 Interview ASPAAB *4, Interview ASPAAB *5, Fieldwork Notes  
119 Fieldwork Notes  
120 Fieldwork Notes  
121 Fieldwork Notes  
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work”.122 Conversely, the new project team claimed that as the operator of the piped water 
network of Bafatá, the second city of Guinea-Bissau, ASPAAB was entitled to be a member 
of GAS, whose aim was precisely to bring together actors working in the sector from across 
the country. In fact, this recognition of ASPAAB as an actor in its own right, rather than a 
mere goodwill local association, translated into significant changes in the ways the 
organisation was perceived by other actors in the sector. This transformation of ASPAAB 
from a small, well-intentioned association doing the best they could to a successful 
organisation implementing a model that could be reproduced elsewhere became evident in 
the ways in which different actors in the sector referred to the organisation during GAS 
meetings.123 It became particularly evident when, in 2013, Unicef invited ASPAAB to train 
an organisation being created in another city to manage a piped water network.  
ASPAAB’s appraisal of the partnership between the two organisations clearly demonstrated 
how they perceived the changes in TESE’s project team. ASPAAB stated that “the new project 
team shows the willingness to support ASPAAB unconditionally”.124 This was revealed in the sharing of 
opinions and decision-making processes for all activities and results of the project. Related to 
this, ASPAAB’s members routinely praised the new project team, stressing how much things 
had changed and how much they had learnt since their arrival. Furthermore, ASPAAB’s 
members constantly recalled the fact that they had started getting paid for their work and that 
their organisation had secured its own budget to run an office equipped with materials and 
equipment, such as laptops, printers, Internet, and electricity to use all these.125 
This is not to say that all conflicts disappeared. The share of project resources and the 
distribution of work within the project remained contentions, as witnessed in some of the 
events that took place under the new management. These tensions also reflected conflicts 
                                                      
122 Fieldwork notes  
123 GAS Meeting *1, GAS Meeting *2, GAS Meeting *3, GAS Meeting *4, GAS Meeting *5, GAS Meeting *6 
124 Fieldwork notes  
125 Interview ASPAAB *4, Interview ASPAAB *5 
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within TESE, with the new project team often disagreeing with the wider organisational 
approach.126 
Besides the changes in TESE’s project team, another important driver in the evolution of the 
partnership between ASPAAB and TESE was ASPAAB’s increasing knowledge of, and co-
optation into, development discourses and the working of internationally funded projects, as 
noted by ASPAAB’s members themselves. In fact, ASPAAB’s associates recognised that when 
they first started the partnership with TESE, they had never been involved in that kind of 
partnership before and, therefore, did not know either what to expect or what to demand. It 
was only towards the end of BMI that they started realising the many problems related to the 
partnership between TESE and ASPAAB.127 As ASPAAB gained more experience of the 
development world they came to understand that whilst ASPAAB needed TESE in order to 
access funding from international donors, TESE also needed ASPAAB, as a local partner, to 
access these same funds. Dependency was, to a certain extent, mutual. Simultaneously, they 
became increasingly aware of the meaning and objectives of partnerships between local and 
international organisations in development projects and, consequently, became more critical 
of the existing asymmetries in the relationship between ASPAAB and TESE.  
The unequal division of project resources and decision-making abilities between the two 
organisations during the early stages of their partnership was a good indicator of their unequal 
power to dictate processes and outcomes within the project. Shifts which altered some of these 
imbalances suggest that ASPAAB’s influence increased over time and that shifts were partly a 
result of ASPAAB’s own development. Nevertheless, the arrival of Luisa, a new project 
coordinator with a different vision of development projects seems to have constituted the most 
important factor in the materialisation of change. On the one hand, the role of this project 
coordinator and the ongoing conflicts between her and TESE’s management suggest that 
individual’s perspectives and approaches can considerably affect how projects unfold on the 
ground. As suggested by Mountz (2003), the subjectivities and experiences of actors involved 
                                                      
126 Interview ASPAAB *4, Interview ASPAAB *5, Fieldwork Notes  
127 Interview ASPAAB *4, Interview ASPAAB *5 
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are important in shaping outcomes. Related to this, as Luisa left TESE in March 2014, it is 
not clear how much of, and for how long the changes ignited by her will last. In fact, in 
informal conversations with some ASPAAB associates just after the appointment of a new 
project coordinator, it emerged that they were concerned and not very positive about the new 
TESE staff member.  They were particularly worried about the ways in which he was already 
excluding ASPAAB from project meetings and decision-making. Once again, this hints at the 
extent to which the shifts in the relationship depended on the vision of TESE’s project 
coordinator rather than on ASPAAB’s own ability to make demands.  
Thus, despite the changes in the terms of the partnership and in ASPAAB’s abilities to make 
demands, the reality was that ASPAAB remained the weak party, depending on TESE’s 
concessions to their demands to be more involved in the project and in decision-making 
processes. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, the patterns of this partnership were not 
necessarily emulated in the ways the projects were implemented or the piped water 
infrastructure governed.  ASPAAB continuously rejected, adapted, and transformed ideas, 
models and policies advanced by TESE. In fact, the consolidation of ASPAAB’s role as a 
recognised development actor suggests the progressive co-optation of this organisation within 
development discourses but also an increasing ability to negotiate and enact its own 
motivations and agendas.  At the same time, TESE, as an example of an international NGOs, 
is not a coherent non-local entity. Instead, as shown above, it includes and engenders many 
motivations and practices that largely transcend local-global binaries. This means that often 
TESE is also involved in processes of transformation of policy models introduced by 
themselves.  
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7.3.2. Appropriating and Re-inventing policy models I: legal contracts and cost-recovery 
principles 
This sub-section explores how different policies and models promoted by international NGOs 
were appropriated, re-invented, ignored and contested as they were put into practice and 
appropriated by different actors. In doing so, it examines the process of appropriation of the 
concession contract signed in 2012 between ASPAAB and the Ministry of Natural Resources. 
Then, it explores how ASPAAB and the Regional Director successfully ignored and contested 
financial analyses developed under BMI in attempts to re-define the water tariff. In this way, 
it shows how processes of appropriation and re-invention, which profoundly re-shaped 
circulating policy models, resulting in a creole model of governance. This model has its own 
logics, ways of doing, rationalities and motivations, which despite being influenced from many 
directions, also transcended any particular influence.  
Re-inventing legal frameworks – appropriating the concession contract 
As discussed in chapter 6, in 2012 ASPAAB and the Ministry of Natural Resources signed a 
contract, which formalised ASPAAB’s role as the operator of Bafatá’s piped water network. 
The contrasts between the logics and motivations underpinning TESE’s128 initiative to 
elaborate this contract and the meanings and effects that ASPAAB attached to this legal tool 
illustrate some of the ways in which various actors appropriated and re-invented policy models 
circulating in the city.   
The need for a legal concession was established through a series of ‘participatory’ assessments 
carried out by TESE under BMI and involving ASPAAB, the Regional Director and, 
occasionally, representatives of other organisations. Among these assessments were: a SWOT 
analysis of ASPAAB to assess the internal dynamics of the organisation and its members129; a 
                                                      
128 Here, it is important to note that I mention TESE and not TESE’s staff. TESE, as an organisation, included a number of staff 
that clearly transcended the local versus global binary. This means that TESE’s staff was often part of the process of appropriation 
and re-invention.  Thus, I use TESE to refer to views of the organisation, as stated in reports and official documents, rather than 
individual views of its staff members.  
129 (TESE and ASPAAB, 2011b): ASPAAB’s Water Management Model Manual – Appendix II: ASPAAB SWOT – Analysis 
Final Results 
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comprehensive diagnosis of the water management model then adopted and implemented in 
Bafatá130; more general assessments of three different models adopted in other secondary 
centres of the region131; and, the compiling of a bibliography on water supply management 
models and best practices in small cities across the world. 132 Eventually, the conclusions of 
these assessments were summarised in reports and included as appendices in ASPAAB’s 
Water Management Manual (TESE, 2010; TESE and ASPAAB, 2013b, 2011a, 2011b, 
2011c, 2010).  
Overall, these analyses illustrated a commitment to ‘rational’ decision-making and the 
mobilisation of ‘scientific’, measurable knowledges to justify solutions and decisions. They 
therefore represented an obvious move away from the ‘ad-hoc’ decision-making processes and 
pragmatic responses which prevailed between 2006 and 2010. The ways in which both the 
need for and the findings of these multiple studies were framed also illustrate TESE’s reliance 
on mainstream policies and development discourses. This is revealed in the participatory 
methodologies adopted, the focus on cost-recovery and the emphasis given to the 
strengthening of regulatory and policy frameworks. In addition, these studies demonstrate 
TESE’s reliance on the effects of specific languages and modalities of the state, including legal 
and policy tools.  
One key finding emerging from the above analyses was the lack of adequate policy and legal 
frameworks guiding water governance in the city, as widely suggested by World Bank analyses 
of similar contexts (see chapter two). According to TESE’s analysis, the inadequacy of 
regulatory, legal and policy frameworks was revealed in the lacunas and contradictions 
detected in existing policies, the ambiguities concerning the adoption and implementation of 
new and existing policies and the confusion relating to the roles and responsibilities of different 
actors in the sector. For example, while new policies and legislations were supposedly being 
                                                      
130 (TESE and ASPAAB, 2011a): ASPAAB’s Water Management Model Manual – Appendix IV: Diagnosis of the existing water 
management model in Bafatá   
131 (TESE and ASPAAB, 2011c): ASPAAB’s Water Management Model Manual – Appendix III: Sessions for the analysis of the 
management models adopted in the Region of Bafatá – Final Report   
132 (TESE and ASPAAB, 2010): ASPAAB’s Water Management Model Manual – Appendix I: Review of bibliography on models 
and best practices for water management in small cities   
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drafted under the 10th European Development Fund133, it was unclear which direction those 
policies would take and whether, or when, they would be adopted and implemented. 
Furthermore, the management model adopted by the state for secondary centres envisaged a 
National Water Fund, which had not yet been created hindering the adoption of the new 
management model by operators of water systems like ASPAAB and leaving them without 
guidance. Crucially, in this context, the informality of ASPAAB (at the time without any legal 
contract defining its role as water operator) was also perceived as an important flaw, 
threatening the security of ASPAAB as water operator and generating ambiguities in the 
distribution of duties and responsibilities between this organisation and the multiple state 
institutions. 
In these circumstances, the contract signed between ASPAAB and the Ministry of Natural 
Resources was drafted as a way to overcome existing weaknesses. In the impossibility of 
transforming national regulatory, legal and policy frameworks, the contract signed appeared 
as a way to overcome the perceived policy and legislation vacuum. Thus, this contract defined 
the duties and responsibilities of different actors and the terms of the governance model to be 
put in place, protecting ASPAAB from not only inconsistencies but also eventual or sudden 
changes in policy134 and securing ASPAAB’s position as the operator of the water network of 
the city. Here, it becomes obvious how, for TESE, legal, policy and regulatory instruments 
were seen as essential to govern social order. This reflects, on the one hand, their reliance on 
international models and, on the other hand, the extent to which their images of what a state 
should be were based on Western models (see Chapters 3 and 6). 
Yet, the views of those actors involved in the management of the piped water network were 
rather different. Their views reflected their understandings of weaknesses relating to the rule 
of law and the implementation of national policies in the country. In particular, although 
supporting the drafting and signing of the contract, ASPAAB’s members did not expect or 
                                                      
133 This fund included a project entailing revisions of national water policies and the national water law (Codigo Nacional das 
Aguas) 
134 This contract included a clause to secure a transitional period in case of policy changes or the adoption of a different model 
for urban centres such as Bafatá.  
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attempt to rely on the legality of this document in their operations. They did not expect this 
contract to change the ways in which they interacted with different state actors and 
institutions. They also did not expect it to de facto clarify the roles of different entities 
converging in the governance of water supply. For example, they knew from the start that the 
role attributed to national-level state departments in this legal document – including taking 
responsibilities for major repairs and expansions to the network – would not be translated into 
practices on the ground. ASPAAB’s members also looked more into state weaknesses rather 
than this contract in order to secure their position as Bafatá’s water operator. However, as 
illustrated in the extract of an interview with Mamadu below, the legal contract represented 
an important tool for ASPAAB: 
“Because they [international NGOs] think that they will invest their funds and then, at any time, 
the government can take over and trust the management to someone else. (…) the contract creates 
a guarantee from them in this way. And, for us, well… it’s a kind of recognition from the state, 
the state recognised our work, the service we did, and gave us the network. That’s good for us.” 
135 
In fact, when Mamadu says that this contract created security for those international NGOs 
wishing to invest in ASPAAB, he is also saying that, besides the recognition of their work by 
the state, this contract also serves one of ASPAAB’s key aims. For ASPAAB’s members, the 
legal contract represented a vital tool they could use in their search for international donations, 
since international donors frequently seek the security of legal language when engaging in 
different projects. The contract might not enhance the regulatory and policy frameworks in 
which the organisation operates but it works to satisfy the requirements of international donors 
working in the country, and therefore it increases ASPAAB’s chances to mobilise foreign aid. 
Thus, pragmatically embracing this contract as a key tool to mobilise funds from international 
donors, ASPAAB endowed this legal device with new meanings and effects. It was re-invented 
in accordance with ASPAAB’s motivations and practices. Rather than complementing policy 
                                                      
135 Interview ASPAAB *4.  
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and regulatory frameworks or defining relations and interactions between ASPAAB and other 
institutions, the legal contract is being used as a tool to mobilise international funds. The 
original logics and effects have in this way been dramatically re-invented and therefore 
transformed into ‘something else’.  
Contesting and ignoring tariff analyses – appropriating cost-recovery  
The endeavours to introduce cost-recovery principles into the management model constitute 
another example of the ways in which models and policies were transformed as they were 
introduced in the specific context of Bafatá. In this case, it shows how various actors 
successfully ignored and contested policy models introduced during a development 
intervention. For TESE, a key requirement for the long-term sustainability of the system was 
the financial viability of the enterprise, which would rest on the adoption of strict cost-recovery 
principles. As TESE observed, in the management model adopted in Bafatá before the 
beginning of BMI, the water tariff being applied – 1000 CFA/m3 (€1.52/m3) at public 
standpipes and 600 CFA/m3 (€0.91/m3) for home connections – was not based on any tariff 
or viability surveys. Simultaneously, this tariff did not reflect either the cost, or the quality of 
the service delivered nor consumer’s willingness to pay for an improved water service. Thus, 
in line with the overall aim of BMI of guaranteeing the long-term sustainability of the water 
system of the city, TESE completed two important studies: a “Study of the socio-economic 
characteristics of the population and its willingness to pay for improved water services in 
Bafatá” (WTP) and a “Water Tariff and financial analysis”.  
The Water Tariff and Financial analysis followed specific criteria and principles in order to 
identify a tariff that would guarantee the recovery of operation and maintenance, replacement 
and small investments costs.136 The WTP study, on the other hand, was conceived as an 
important tool that would support the definition of a water tariff by adding information about 
consumers’ willingness to pay for different levels of service in different areas of the city.137 
                                                      
136 (TESE and ASPAAB, 2013b)ASPAAB’s Water Management Model Manual – Appendix V: Tariff and Financial analysis   
137 (TESE, 2010) 
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Notably, whereas the results of the WTP survey showed that people’s willingness to pay was 
higher than tariffs in place at the time, the final results of the water tariff and financial analysis 
proposed tariffs 7% lower in the case of home connections and 67% lower in the case of 
standpipes. 
Once again, the methodologies, assumptions and analyses carried out by TESE reflected this 
organisations reliance on broader international policies and development discourses 
advocating cost-recovery principles and alluding to the poor’s willingness, and (hidden) ability 
to pay for water. However, in spite of all the activities related to the implementation of an 
adequate tariff, by 2014 the tariff remained exactly the same as before BMI was launched. 
When the results of the WTP survey, the first study being completed, were presented to 
ASPAAB and the Regional Director, it became clear that both entities were reluctant to 
accept any significant, or even minimal, changes to the tariff adopted.138 Nevertheless, in the 
final report of the water tariff and financial analysis the choice of a volumetric linear tariff, as 
opposed to a rising block tariff or other models considered in the analysis139, was justified on 
the basis of the criteria140 and principles141 adopted in the calculation of the tariff rather than 
any inertia in the system. Even if this amounted to continuing with the same type of tariff. In 
terms of the levels of the tariffs, by the end of BMI, TESE announced that the tariff structure 
was being checked and validated by a senior economist from the International Water and 
Sanitation Centre for future implementation.142 At the same time, the final report of this same 
project stated that an external evaluation carried out showed that by the end of the project, 
revenues from the sale of water covered 2/3 of the operation and management costs and that 
it was expected that this would rise to 100% of the costs in the near future. Here, there was 
no mention to changes in the tariff.  
                                                      
138 Fieldwork Notes  
139 The types examined were single tariff, linear volumetric tariff, rising block tariff and decreasing block tariff.  
140 The criteria adopted were: (1) Financial (secure cost recovery); (2) Economic efficiency (costs must equal marginal costs); (3) 
Equity (consumers pay the equivalent of the company’s costs); (4) Justice (consumers pay according to their possibilities). Cross-
subsidisation between different consumers is considered and therefore the criteria of economic efficiency relaxed in favour of 
those of equity and justice. 
141 The principles adopted were: (1) Conservation; (2) Applicability (utility should be able to efficiently implement tariff adopted); 
(3) Just (respect consumers’ ability to pay); (4) Simple (easy to understand by consumers).  
142 (TESE, 2012): Bafatá Misti Iagu Final Report 
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Considering these same events from a different angle, one could maintain that TESE’s 
attempts to change the tariff were never taken into real consideration by ASPAAB and the 
Regional Director. In the end, the exercise was more one of TESE seeking a ‘rationale’ that 
could explain the existing tariff rather than the tariff adapting to the rationale introduced by 
TESE. In fact, not only did the tariff remain the same despite the conclusions of the studies 
developed but also the value being charged at standpipes remained higher than that charged 
for home connections (1000 CFA/m3 versus 600 CFA/m3). From the perspective of TESE’s 
first project team, opting for a higher price at the standpipe prevented poorer households from 
accessing water from this system and, therefore, was unjust. In addition, it seemed irrational 
to demand a higher price for a lower service. This was reflected in the final proposal included 
in the tariff and financial analysis, which foresaw that the price for m3 of water for home 
connections would ultimately be set at almost double that of standpipes. ASPAAB and the 
Regional Offices had a different view. According to them, the price of home connections was 
lower in order to create an incentive for users to build these, and to compensate for the fact 
that users had to cover the costs of all the materials and work needed to connect them to the 
grid. In addition, it was actually cheaper for ASPAAB to sell water using home connections, 
which were paid for by users, than using standpipes, which were paid for by ASPAAB and 
required a paid contractor for their operation.  
Thus, the current tariff highlights the ability of ASPAAB and the Regional Offices to dictate 
the final tariff, despite the attempts, supported by various technical appraisals, by TESE to 
change it. In addition, it also illustrates the inability of these technical documents to relate to 
contexts such as that of Bafatá, and account for the vulnerability and specificities of the 
infrastructure in question. This was, perhaps, because they remained models, they did not 
adapt to capture or fit the reality of Bafatá. TESE claimed that the structure of the tariff was 
linked to the infrastructures being constructed since only in this way could it reflect the real 
costs of the operation and maintenance of the system, the production of water and of 
 250 
substitutions and new investments.143 However, the lower tariffs arrived at are the result of a 
theoretical exercise conducted by TESE’s team in Lisbon and are unlikely to represent the 
real costs of such enterprises in Guinea-Bissau, where the shortage and higher costs of 
materials and equipment, the lack of technical staff and the extremely hot and humid weather 
conditions result in much higher costs. Thus, ASPAAB and the Regional Director successfully 
ignored and contested standard models being disseminated and backed by ‘scientific’ 
appraisals, which validity they did not recognise. 
At this point, it is important to notice that this resistance to changes in the tariffs did not 
amount to a resistance to the adoption of cost recovery principles by local actors. In fact, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the emphasis on cost recovery was in line with this 
organisation’s pragmatic approach and at the core of ASPAAB’s management from the 
moment the organisation took over responsibility for managing the water system. Thus, 
similar to what was described for the devolution of responsibilities for the management of the 
piped water network to ASPAAB, the initial adoption of cost-recovery principles in Bafatá 
cannot be easily linked to national or international policies, neither can it be attributed to 
TESE’s, or any other international organisation, direct influence. The adoption of cost-
recovery principles in Bafatá was first initiated by ASPAAB and the Regional Offices as a 
pragmatic response to local possibilities, rather than based on assumptions concerning the 
benefits of market rule.   
In fact, cost recovery was a real concern for ASPAAB, since they were more than aware that 
the organisation actually depended on water revenues to survive. Also, during BMMI, it 
emerged that ASPAAB was de facto more committed to the needs of cost-recovery than its 
partner TESE. Included in the initial programme of work to be carried out under BMMI, was 
the extension of the distribution network in the upper parts of town (Bairro 4 and 
Central/Boma systems) and the construction of 5 new standpipes to serve these new areas of 
the city. ASPAAB was extremely concerned about the impacts of these activities on the quality 
                                                      
143 (TESE, 2012): Bafatá Misti Iagu Final Report 
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as well as the operation and maintenance costs of the service. On the one hand, since there 
were no programmed increases in the production of water or storage capacity in the system, 
the extension of the distribution of the network, and the consequent increase in water usage, 
would result in a reduction of the system’s operating times (which were already down to 2h30 
during the dry season). On the other hand, increasing the number of standpipes would result 
in a direct increase in the O&M costs since there would be more standpipe operators that 
would have to be paid. Since the volume of water being sold would remain the same, the 
revenues would remain constant but the costs of running the system would go up. 
Interestingly, this was a major concern of ASPAAB since it would have an impact on their 
revenues and it was something that, apparently, had been missed out by TESE, despite their 
focus on cost recovery. This shows once again how ASPAAB’s pragmatic, and grounded, 
approach was considerably more attuned to the needs and possibilities of the system in Bafatá. 
Policy models had to be transformed if the system was to operate in Bafatá.  
Thus, ignoring and contesting tariff analysis, ASPAAB and the Regional Director did not 
reject cost-recovery principles. In fact, ASPAAB enthusiastically embraced managerial and 
technical innovations proposed by BMI and BMMI that facilitated revenue collection. 
Instead, this contestation can be seen as the process through which ASPAAB and the Regional 
Director ensure that it remained in line with their own goals, priorities and ways of doing. In 
this way, they selectively appropriated a well-travelled principle – cost-recovery – according 
to their own aspirations. This episode also illustrates the ability of subordinated actors to both 
embrace and contest knowledge.  
7.3.3. Appropriating and Re-inventing policy models II: cost-recovery, everyday practices 
and processes of embedding 
In line with efforts towards cost-recovery, BMI financed the installation of meters on all public 
standpipes and home connections. This investment in technology was accompanied by the 
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adoption of apparently extremely strict measures in the measurement of and payment for 
water use. The deployment of this ‘strict rule of the meter’ affected interactions between users 
and the piped water network (as will be discussed in more detail in chapter eight) but it also 
required a new approach to the work and routines of standpipe operators, whose activities 
would now be monitored by the meters. This sub-section examines how the everyday practices 
of various actors emerging around the use of water meters re-shaped the governance model 
in place. It shows how these practices fostered the embedding of the model in the social fabric 
of the city. Thus, these practices are seen to represent not only further appropriations and re-
inventions of standard models but also crucial steps towards the embedding of institutions in 
social relations (Cleaver, 2000).  
In 2012, after meters were installed, standpipe operators’ wages were set at 10% of the revenue 
raised at their respective standpipes. In addition, in order to ensure that operators embraced 
the rule of the meter, any inconsistencies between the revenue handed in to ASPAAB and the 
meter reading would be deducted from the operators’ wage.144 However, a few months 
following the adoption of the above measures, ASPAAB was struggling to find operators, as 
operators’ wages were considered to be too low. This was particularly the case for those 
operators who had already worked before the installation of meters and who witnessed a 
significant reduction in their incomes. For instance, Malam, a standpipe operator, claimed 
that after meters were installed he lost interest in the job, precisely because of the low wage he 
was getting.145 This contrasted with his previous situation, in which operators could keep what 
they considered to be the fair amount for their work, as ASPAAB had no way to check revenue 
handed in by operators against the volume of water sold. 
Realising that the low wages being paid to operators were affecting their ability to find people 
willing to take over these positions, ASPAAB raised operators’ percentage to 20%. In addition, 
it also allocated a daily 500 CFA (€0.76) food subsidy to those operators working on standpipes 
open all day (two in total). Nevertheless, the operators’ profit margins remained extremely 
                                                      
144 A small allowance for inevitable for inevitable water losses was included in the model.  
145 Interview ASPAAB *1 
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low146, inconsistencies between meter readings and revenues handed in by operators to 
ASPAAB were widespread and conflicts resulting from the persisting inconsistencies were also 
quite common. For example, according to the father of one ex-operator, his daughter had 
given up her position because ASPAAB repeatedly failed to pay her. They believed that 
ASPAAB was taking advantage of her. ASPAAB’s version was that the amounts being handed 
in by this operator were so low that, even after not having paid her, they were still not able to 
recover their 80% share of the revenue. This episode illustrated what ASPAAB perceived to 
be a key problem concerning the work of operators, who typically did not understand the 
payment system, and therefore believed that ASPAAB was not paying them the amounts they 
were entitled to. This was creating mistrust and conflicts between operator and ASPAAB’s 
management team, and also undermining the functioning of standpipes.   
ASPAAB’s efforts to work within the social fabric of the city were reflected in the ways they 
tried to respond to the difficulties related to the operation of standpipes. Increasing the wages 
of standpipe operators was not an option because of the impacts it would have on the financial 
sustainability of the system. Instead, and rather than seeking to solve this problem through the 
elaboration of ‘legal’ contracts for operators as suggested by some TESE’s staff, they sought 
different ways to motivate operators. One important component of ASPAAB’s strategy was 
the ongoing effort to raise awareness amongst operators focusing on the details of their jobs 
and their role in the operation of the system. Other components focused on improving the 
working conditions of operators. For example, in October 2013, ASPAAB implemented a 
survey to identify the main difficulties faced by operators and to work out solutions that could 
facilitate their everyday work. The measures devised, which had not been implemented by 
the time I left fieldwork, included giving operators a 25 litre basin they could use as a measure, 
supplying operators with gooses to make it easier filling up heavy containers, or fixing and 
replacing taps.147 In addition, ASPAAB created a prize, which was initially granted once every 
year and then once every 3 months, for the best performing operator. This prize of 10,000 
                                                      
146 Interview ASPAAB *2, Interview Standpipe operator *1,2,3,4(CHECK) 
147 Fieldwork Notes  
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CFA (€15.25) was seen to create competition among the operators and motivate them to do a 
good job.148 And, according to Queba, it was working: Aminata, an operator famous for her 
very little revenues, had recently handed in the right amount and won the prize.149 Thus, 
ASPAAB consistently sought to adapt procedures in place to the practices of standpipe 
oeprators. 
Nevertheless, inconsistencies between meter readings and revenues being collected were also 
perceived to be the results of operators’ dishonesty. Despite ASPAAB’s efforts to find people 
they could trust, it was hard for ASPAAB to avoid backhanders. For example, Malam 
admitted that he often handed in a little less money than expected because he would take 
money to buy cold water to drink or, sometimes, to give his wife to buy food for the house.150 
In fact, according to Malam, most of the inconsistencies verified were due to the fact that 
operators ‘ate’ the money.  
The persistent backhanding and inconsistencies between meter readings and revenues handed 
in to ASPAAB can be understood in the context of operators’ motivations. But, the practices 
of these contractors also illustrate the extent to which the model was progressively embedded 
in existing social relations and insitutions. Standpipe operators would mention different 
reasons for taking over the job and they would often state that it was a way to contribute to 
the city and the neighbourhood in particular. However, it was also obvious that, in most cases, 
being an operator was one of many enterprises undertaken by individuals in order to raise 
their incomes. For example, Virginia151 worked in the standpipe in the morning, sold fole152 
from her house during the day and mangos and fried fish on the high street in the evening. At 
last, she also got a cleaning job.153 Some operators also found ways to gain an extra income. 
One of the operators would leave his wife on the standpipe and go around delivering water 
                                                      
148 Interview ASPAAB *1, Interview ASPAAB *2 
149 ASPAAB Interview *1 
150 Interview ASPAAB *1 
151 Interview Standpipe Operator *XX 
152 Fole is a fruit 
153 Fieldwork Notes 
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from the standpipe to people’s houses, charging them 25 CFA (€0.04) for the transport of each 
container.154 
The arrangement between Bacar and Queba is also an example of the ways in which the 
operation of standpipes become immersed in multiple social networks and strategies devised 
to seek income and security in a context of vulnerability. Bacar, the operator of one of the all-
day standpipes, combined this job with another one running the television salon located just 
in front of the standpipe. In reality, he had been sub-contracted by Queba, the individual 
contracted by ASPAAB. The arrangement between the two was that Bacar would keep the 
daily 500 CFA food subsidy, which he took home since he got food from the TV salon where 
he was working simultaneously. Moreover, Queba would also give Bacar a small share of his 
20% share of water revenues. Queba justified this arrangement in several ways. Firstly, he 
perceived it as compensation for all the efforts and sacrifices he went through when the 
standpipe was not profitable at all and ASPAAB asked him to stay there since no one else 
would. Secondly, he framed it as a favour to Bacar who had to be there anyway because of 
his job in the salon and, in this way, earned an extra income. Thirdly, he also pointed out how 
sometimes when he was struggling for money he would like to stay himself at the standpipe, 
in order to get the 500 CFA food subsidy, but he didn’t do it because he knew Bacar needed 
the money. Instead, he would find other ways to raise money, like betting on his mobile. 
Finally, he avoided accusations of exploitation by referring to moments when he actually 
helped Bacar. For instance, he explained that Bacar’s wife had needed a C-section at the 
hospital that cost 50,000 CFA (€76.24) and Queba had helped him raise the money. He spoke 
with the president of ASPAAB who lent them 20,000 CFA (€30.50), Queba’s uncle lent 
another 10,000 CFA (€15.25) and like this, bit-by-bit, they raised the money Bacar needed.155 
While perhaps not aware of the details of these arrangements, ASPAAB’s management team 
was often aware that they were in place. The same way they were aware of the backhanding 
among standpipe operators. In fact, ASPAAB’s management team was also involved in their 
                                                      
154 Interview ASPAAB *1 
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own strategies and social networks. However, perhaps one of ASPAAB’s best qualities was the 
fact that they seemed to be aware that in order to secure the functioning of the piped water 
network, rather than creating brand new, rational, bureaucratic institutions, they had to be 
embedded in existing social relations.  
The flexibility of ASPAAB’s management team and their ability to adapt to local conditions 
was also reflected in their approach to collecting revenues from home connections. All home 
connections were required to have meters installed and also in this case ASPAAB had become 
stricter when it came to payment. Customers failing to pay their bills for more than one month 
in a row were disconnected from the network.  If, after paying the amount owed, they wanted 
to re-activate their connection, they would have to pay a 15,000 CFA (€22.90) fine. 
Notwithstanding this apparently stricter approach, there was still a fair amount of flexibility 
within this system. For example, Didierpointed out that, in order to avoid being disconnected, 
people often came to ASPAAB’s office asking for more time to pay their water bills.156 In 
addition, Bubacar, who was responsible for collecting payments from home connections, also 
explained that he routinely visited each house several times before collecting payment.157 In 
general, talking to ASPAAB members it became evident that personal relations and trust were 
very important in the application of the strict measures announced. They would be applied 
when they did not believe people would pay their bills but they would be relaxed when they 
understood someone was going through a difficult period but would eventually pay.  
The multiple enterprises and arrangements emerging around standpipes and home 
connections illustrate the ways in which the piped water network and ASPAAB are deeply 
imbricated in local economies and social relations. Whilst trying to control backhanding, and 
other strategies which result in the loss of revenue, ASPAAB also relies on the multiple existing 
formations within the city which are at the heart of people’s survival strategies. In fact, the 
system depends on the multiple small economies co-existing in the city as its financial viability 
depends on the availability of people willing to take jobs for very little money. Related to this, 
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this section also highlights the importance of everyday practices shaping governance 
arrangements. Here, it was show that the practices of standpipe operators, and particularly 
their resistance to ‘the rule of the meter’, engendered a set of reactions that re-shaped the 
model in place. In this way, the governance model adopted by ASPAAB is a Creole model of 
water governance that is also characterised by its embeddedness in the social fabric of the city. 
Simultaneously, these arrangements and collaborations around standpipes and home 
connections are an example of the ways in which the new governance model in place, which 
was definitively influenced by the implementation of BMI and BMMI, kept some of the traces 
of its previous mode of operation. This is revealed in the ways standpipe operators and 
ASPAAB members created new possibilities within existing social, economic and political 
configurations. These possibilities were often exploitative but they were, nevertheless, at the 
core of the operation of the piped water network.  
7.4. Discussion 
This chapter demonstrated that the evolution of water provision in Bafatá has been closely 
tied to the flows of foreign aid and the discourses of development interventions. Nonetheless, 
it also showed that the aspirations, motivations and ways of doing of supposedly subordinate 
actors – most significantly ASPAAB and the Regional Director – have remained crucial forces 
shaping water provision in this city. On the one hand, the practices and motivations of these 
actors have profoundly shaped the ways in which infrastructures have been governed. On the 
other hand, ASPAAB and the Regional Director have successfully appropriated, re-invented, 
ignored and contested policy models disseminated through development interventions. The 
governance of water provision in Bafatá is thus better understood as Creole mode of governance 
which involves multiple, overlapping agendas, practices and motivations but also multifaceted 
processes of appropriation and intermixing of different logics according to the needs and 
possibilities of those actors involved in governing the city’s water piped network. It works as 
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an assemblage of actors, practices and agendas producing specific, and messier, processes and 
outcomes, which cannot be easily associated with any individual element of the assemblage.  
Water governance models emerging in small secondary cities in Africa have frequently been 
explained in relation to the ‘spatial variegations of neoliberalism’ and the related cherry-
picking strategies of private sector entities, residualizing water provision in poorer urban 
contexts (Bakker, 2013). Yet, this chapter suggested that the manifest presence of development 
interventions and discourses in these cities does not only shape the motivations, aspirations 
and practices of various actors involved in the management of water supply, but also results 
in the dissemination of specific policy models and engenders particular possibilities. Thus, in 
the context of small African cities, development interventions and discourses might be more 
important factors shaping water governance models than private sector strategies.  
The power relations inherent in development interventions and discourses and the frequent 
subordinate positions of small local NGOs and state institutions have been discussed at length 
in the development literature (Escobar, 1995; Goldman, 2005; Kothari, 2005; Lewis et al., 
2003; Li, 1999; Mosse, 2005; Rossi, 2004a). This chapter showed that in contexts marked by 
uneven power relations, subordinate actors still “create everyday spheres of action 
autonomous from the organising policy model” (Mosse, 2005, p. 10). This agency was 
revealed in the practices leading to processes of appropriation of international policies and 
models, but also in everyday practices, for example those of standpipe operators, that were 
seen to significantly re-shape the model in place. Thus, everyday practices can generate more 
nuanced understandings of the ways in which policies are adopted in a diversity of contexts as 
well as the ways in which these policies are translated into practice (Lawhon et al., 2014; 
Pieterse, 2008).  
Related to the above, this case-study demonstrates that neoliberal modes of governance are 
not only hybridised but also deeply re-shaped as they are adopted in a diversity of contexts. 
What this means is that the meanings and effects of policies are shifted in such ways that their 
original agendas and rationalities are transcended. Thus, in order to understand the variety 
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of factors and processes shaping water provision in small African cities attention needs to be 
given to the ways in which apparently neoliberal policy models are transformed into 
‘something else’. In Bafatá, it was shown how motivations and practices relating to desires to 
improve access to water coupled with aspirations to gain access to training and income. These 
motivations and practices, alongside a pragmatic approach in a context where resources are 
extremely scarce and unpredictable, fundamentally shaped water provision.  
From the analysis of the case of Bafatá, it also became apparent that the operation of the city’s 
water network between 2006 and 2010 was significantly shaped by ASPAAB’s attempts to 
create possibilities within a specific socio-political and economic context, possibilities for the 
water service but also for the organisation and its members. In this case, ASPAAB’s efforts 
materialised in their success in attracting foreign aid, which was at the centre of the strategy 
the organisation adopted. In this way, the example of Bafatá also shows that ephemeral 
coalitions and improvisations create the foundations for and do have the possibility of 
becoming something more permanent and consequential. Even, if the permanence of the 
model of water provision in Bafatá is not guaranteed. 
The creolisation of the governance model adopted in Bafatá was essential for its success in 
governing water infrastructure in the city. This raises important questions concerning the 
potential effectiveness of the wider circulation of policies. ASPAAB is now training a similar 
organisation working elsewhere in the country. What is being shared? Abstract policy models 
or strategies of appropriation and re-invention of these models? The conclusion to this thesis 
will review these issues and implications of the study for policy debates.  
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– EIGHT –  
Everyday water practices and the piped water network 
8.1. Introduction  
This chapter examines water provision using perspectives from everyday water practices in 
Bafatá. In particular, it discusses the changing practices of users provoked by shifts in the piped 
water network discussed in previous chapters. This chapter complicates conventional political 
ecology perspectives which, focusing on access and control in the production of water 
inequalities, have neglected other factors shaping water-related practices and inequalities 
(Truelove, 2011). It does so by illustrating multiple social relations shaping, and being shaped 
by, water practices. Simultaneously, it shows that these micropractices influence management 
practices, shape the possibilities of governance models, and reveal how infrastructures are 
governed. 
Delving into the ways in which water practices have been affected by changes in the piped 
water supply scheme, this chapter shows that lack of access to a piped supply – defined in 
terms of distance from the source and ability to pay – is not the only relevant factor influencing 
water-related practices in the city. Instead, there are multiple factors – including perceptions 
of quality of water, distance, waiting times, convenience and the availability of free sources – 
shaping people’s choices of sources, and therefore users’ complex water practices. This 
chapter also notes that access to safe water does not necessarily equate the use of the piped 
supply scheme. In this context, the use of multiple sources, that is processes of ‘splintering 
from below’ (Bakker, 2003b), emerges as a key feature of water provision in Bafatá. These 
processes are shown to complicate notions of access but also to significantly shape the 
possibilities of a piped supply scheme that relies on users’ contributions. 
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Focusing on the transformations ensuing from the introduction of the ‘rule of the meter’, this 
chapter discusses how the deployment of these new technological and managerial devices has 
affected sharing practices. The disruption of sharing practices is explained in terms of a 
transition from ‘private-collective’ to ‘collective-individualising’ modes of water supply. 
Private-collective modes of supply, which have typically characterised water use in the city, 
entail the collectivisation of private water sources, such as wells and hand pump, through 
sharing practices. These modes of supply show that particularistic solutions, such as wells or 
home connections, can become collective infrastructure through ingrained sharing practices. 
Collective-individualising modes of supply, on other hand, entail the individualisation of use 
of collectivised systems through the use of meters and the disruption of micro-sharing 
practices. 
Situating this shift in the broader analysis of water infrastructure, this transition resembles 
processes of commodification and marketization of water, and the associated re-constitution 
of subjectivities (Von Schnitzler, 2008). However, this chapter shows that in Bafatá the 
transition from ‘private-collective’ to ‘collective-individualising’ modes of supply remains 
nascent and, instead, water gifts at the micro level co-exist with other more individualistic 
practices. Furthermore, water markets have long existed in the city and water has long been 
both an economic and common good. In addition, whereas the enforcement of the ‘rule of 
the meter’ has resulted in the disruption of ingrained sharing practices, and the exclusion of 
poorer groups, it has also produced positive outcomes. These include allowing users to 
monitor and regulate their consumption according to their possibilities and needs, which 
would not be possible under a flat rate fee; and helping ASPAAB, the water operator, to ensure 
that water revenues remain within the system. It has also enabled processes that whilst 
disrupting practices of sharing at the neighbourhood level have also ensued a collective system, 
centrally-managed, and where redistribution, and therefore ‘sharing’, is centralised. These are 
essential outcomes in a context where resources are extremely scarce. Thus, narratives of 
commodification and marketization are not enough, or even the most important, when 
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accounting for the evolution of water provision in Bafatá. The practices of users and concerns 
of local providers can illustrate other equally if not more relevant processes.  
8.2. Splintering water infrastructure from below 
In a study of the Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) of water users carried out in 2013 
in Bafatá158, it was estimated that over 70% of the population of this city continued to collect 
all their water from wells, springs or ponds. Approximately 17% of the city’s residents fetched 
at least some of their water from hand pumps, installed on wells and boreholes; and, less than 
12% collected at least some of their water from standpipes (11%) or home connections (1%). 
In this KAP study, access was conceived in terms of both distance, i.e. people being located 
within acceptable distance of the network, and financial resources, i.e. people having the 
resources to pay for water. And, lack of access was pointed out as the main factor explaining 
why only 12% of the population collected water from the network in Bafatá. Delving into the 
rationales and motivations of those responsible for this KAP study and adopting an 
ethnographic approach to the investigation of everyday water practices, this section 
demonstrates how access, as defined in this survey, cannot alone explain why consumption 
from the network remains so low. Related to this, it also complicates prevalent political 
economy and political ecology analyses, which tend to overemphasise access and control in 
understandings of water inequality (Birkenholtz, 2010; Desai et al., 2015; Truelove, 2011). 
                                                      
158 (TESE and ASPAAB, 2013a): KAP study elaborated by ASPAAB and TESE under project titled Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu (BMMI, 
Creole for ‘Bafatá Wants/Needs More Water’). This project was promoted by TESE in partnership with ASPAAB, and funded 
by the EU, Instituto Camoes, SNV, EPAL, TESE and ASPAAB. 
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8.2.1. The contradictions of the piped water network: public health, infrastructure and 
cost-recovery 
National policies in Guinea-Bissau define the type of water infrastructure deemed appropriate 
for different locations. In the Water Plan adopted in 1992, it is stated that investments in water 
infrastructure in urban areas should focus on the construction, expansion and maintenance of 
piped water networks, including public standpipes and home connections. In the context of a 
small secondary city, like Bafatá, where alternative water sources and technologies co-exist, 
the benefits associated with a piped supply could entail: improved public health, through 
securing access to an improved water source159; the ease and comfort associated with these 
systems, when compared with alternative improved water sources, such as hand pumps and 
protected wells; and, transport, i.e. the ability to safely transport water to areas of cities where 
limited access to alternative sources results in significant efforts by residents in order to access 
water, especially during the dry season. 
In 2014, water from the piped scheme in Bafatá was sold for 1,000 CFA/m3 (€1.52/m3), i.e. 
25 CFA/25 L (€0.04/25 litres), on standpipes, and for 600 CFA/m3 (€0.91/m3) on home 
connections. However, according to a survey conducted in 2009, 33% of the population living 
in the region of Bafatá was extremely poor (living on less than 1$/day), and as much as 75% 
of those living in this region were considered to be poor (living on less than 2$/day).160 In this 
context, and considering that resources in the sector are extremely scarce, discourses justifying 
the need for, and promoting the use of, the piped water network in this city focused essentially 
on public health and transport, whilst neglecting the ease and comfort associated with this 
infrastructure. Ease and comfort became a luxury in a context where people had to 
strategically decide where to invest their very limited resources, and water competed with 
                                                      
159  “An ‘improved’ drinking-water source is one that, by the nature of its construction and when properly used, adequately 
protects the source from outside contamination, particularly faecal matter.” WHO/ Unicef Joint Monitoring Programme for water 
supply and sanitation (JPM) In: http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/watsan-categories/. Last accessed: 05/05/ 2016, 
18:06 (GMT-8). 
160 In: http://guineabissau.africadata.org/pt/DataAnalysis/. Last accessed: 02/05/2016, 10:23 (GMT-8).  
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many other necessities, such as food and education. Maimuna’s161 account below is illustrative 
of how people situated water in relation to other needs:  
“Between water, school, electricity and other things, water is the first thing in life, isn’t it? But 
water, you can go to the well and you don’t pay anything. Education, school, that you have to 
pay for. Electricity you have to pay for. But people don’t mind, even if you don’t pay for electricity, 
you will pay for your children to go to school. School is the first thing, because electricity, if you 
don’t have it you can get a candle. School and water, those are essential things. School, I don’t 
play with it, it is essential. Education is the most important thing!” 
In addition, mirroring the scarcity of resources in the sector and the related requirements for 
cost-recovery to secure the financial sustainability of the system, messages being disseminated 
also focused on the user-payer principle.  
Despite the emphasis given to public health, and the importance given to the piped supply as 
an improved water source, Bafatá’s system lacked adequate centralised treatment. In other 
words, the water being supplied through this network was not adequately treated and 
therefore not safe to drink. This was still the case after the completion of the refurbishment 
works carried out under the two internationally funded projects discussed in the previous 
chapter. In addition, the supply remained intermittent. This meant that positive pressure was 
not maintained at all times resulting in increased risks of water from the outside contaminating 
the piped supply (Shaheed et al., 2014). Thus, whereas according to Unicef and the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), piped water into dwellings or to yards/plots and public taps 
and standpipes constitute improved water sources, this is not always necessarily the case when 
there is not central treatment or the supply is intermittent (Shaheed et al., 2014). Thus, in 
Bafatá, as with water from other sources, water from the piped scheme is not safe for 
consumption and should be treated in the home.  
Since taking over responsibility for the management of the city’s water system in 2006, 
ASPAAB has also assumed an important role raising awareness in matters related to water 
                                                      
161 Interview Water User *40. Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity.  
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and hygiene, becoming a recognised actor for the communication of health messages in the 
sector. Accordingly, this organisation has concentrated significant efforts on campaigns to 
raise awareness about water and hygiene. For example, for a while, the president of this 
organisation participated in weekly debates on topics relating to water and hygiene on the 
local radio. In addition, ASPAAB implemented several awareness raising campaigns in the 
city, including door-to-door visits, activities in schools and various public events, such as 
theatres. These campaigns were typically funded by international organisations and, 
therefore, also reflected development discourses in the water sector in the country. 
In line with public health concerns, which dominate interventions in the water sector in the 
country, these campaigns promoted by ASPAAB, adopted messages targeting users of the 
multiple water sources in use in the city. These messages focused on the relations between 
water and disease, listed the various ways in which contamination could occur, and provided 
advice related to procedures to adopt in the collection, transport, storage and treatment of 
water at home. Recognising that wells remained the most used source in Bafatá, these 
campaigns also targeted measures to protect and treat water from wells. In addition, 
acknowledging that the water from the piped scheme was not potable, ASPAAB also 
sometimes alerted residents in the city to the need to always treat water, from all sources, as 
shown in the figure below. 
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 However, whilst the need to treat water from the network was included in some public 
campaigns, the emphasis given to the quality of the water from this system, when compared 
to other sources, often obfuscated such recommendations. This was revealed in various users’ 
comments, referring to water from the standpipe as good because it was ‘treated’, when this 
was not the case. In addition, in the accounts of the members of ASPAAB’s management 
team, it often became evident how they assumed that whereas water from wells should be 
treated, that was not the case with water from the piped scheme. For example, Fatumata 
explained: 
 “When raising awareness, you tell people to go fetch water from the standpipe. But, at the same 
time, you make people aware that, if the standpipe is too far, if they get water somewhere else, 
they should treat water...” 163 
                                                      
163 Interview ASPAAB *3 
Always treat your drinking water,  
no matter what the source is! 
Treating water with a cloth is not enough: using bleach is 
the best way to kill microbes in the water 
Figure 20. Poster from Awareness Raising campaign implemented under project Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu (BMMI) (Source: BMMI 
Final Report) 
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In fact, messages being disseminated in the city often promoted the use of the piped scheme, 
stressing the qualities of the water from this system: whereas people were alerted that “the water 
from the well has bugs”, they were also taught that “the water from the standpipe is healthier”. And, the 
discussion of everyday water practices in Bafatá below demonstrates that these campaigns 
were having an important effect on people’s perceptions and, to a lesser extent, on their 
practices. 
On the one hand, the emphasis given to the water network reflected beliefs that the water 
from this system, which was classified as an improved water source, was, in fact, healthier. 
And, these notions actually resembled various international organisations, such as Unicef and 
WHO, definitions of improved sources.164 In this way, promoting the use of the network was 
equivalent to promoting public health. On the other hand, promoting the use of the water 
network has become an important priority for those involved in the management and 
operation of the system, in a context where these infrastructures have to compete with a wide 
range of alternative water sources and technologies, many of which are free and, according to 
some users, provide water with superior taste, colour and temperature. This is because the 
long-term sustainability of this system, under cost-recovery, depends on the monetary 
contributions of users. Increases in the number of users will not only secure the ongoing 
operation and maintenance, but also allow for the expansion of the network and, perhaps 
eventually, the central treatment of water. In addition, ASPAAB’s capacity to secure 
international donations also depends on their ability to demonstrate the need for such 
infrastructure. Related to this, a higher number of users presupposes a greater need, and the 
possibility to frame scarcity of water as a key problem in the city.  
According to Luisa165, a water specialist employed by TESE in Bafatá, the emphasis given to 
infrastructure in public health reflected a wider problem in the country which, according to 
her, was related to international policies and standards, as well as the working of international 
                                                      
164 See website for the WHO/Unicef Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation: 
http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/watsan-categories/  
165 Fieldwork Notes *10 
 268 
NGOs. Public health concerns have been at the heart of investments in infrastructure across 
the country seeking to reduce the prevalence of waterborne diseases by improving access to 
safe drinking water. Naturally, strategies have changed over the years. However, the emphasis 
has consistently remained on the building of infrastructure. As mentioned earlier, the WHO 
and Unicef define improved water sources in terms of the technology adopted. In this way, 
public health messages have tended to associate different types of infrastructure with distinct 
levels of water safety. For example, water collected from hand pumps is commonly conceived 
as better than that from wells, and water from piped networks as better than that collected 
from hand pumps or wells. However, according to Luisa, these links established between type 
of infrastructure and quality of water are often flawed, for many reasons that include 
deficiencies in operation, maintenance and repairs. Or, more precisely, in Guinea-Bissau, 
there was typically a lack of evidence to support such claims. For example, referring to an 
experiment carried out in a village, she noted how, after testing the water, they established 
that the quality of the water collected from wells and a hand pump were basically the same. 
They both required treatment before drinking.  
If public health is the main concern related to water supply in the country, the focus should 
be on adequate treatment and handling of water, which involves consistent public campaigns. 
Instead, the continuous investment in infrastructure reflects funding schemes, which make it 
much more profitable for organisations to be involved in infrastructure projects rather than 
just being involved in training and dissemination of health messages. This is not say that 
investments on infrastructure are not required, but that they should be followed by adequate 
testing and monitoring of water, and ongoing investments in campaigns on how to handle and 
treat water.  
However, even if the water being supplied by the piped water network in Bafatá is not safe for 
drinking, the piped water supply system still provides an important service in the city. It 
provides a more reliable source then unprotected wells, which are more prone to 
contamination with faecal matter. Wells are often not very deep, protected in appropriate 
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ways, or built within a safe distance from latrines. Also, considering ASPAAB’s evolution in 
recent years, it is likely that the monitoring of the quality of water will improve as the system 
expands and this organisation’s technical knowledge grows. In 2013, they had already started 
cleaning water tanks on a regular basis and adding bleach to water stored in tanks. Centralised 
treatment will necessarily depend on the availability of resources in the next few years. 
Furthermore, transport and ease and comfort are also important factors, as will be 
demonstrated in the discussion of everyday water practices in the city below. Finally, water 
safety relies on many factors, which are not only confined to water source used. Shaheed et 
al. (2014) claim that contamination during transport and storage at home are key variables 
when evaluating the risk of water-related diseases. 
Therefore, the piped network provides an improved service but it does not replace the need 
for public health campaigns. However, the importance of public health campaigns, alongside 
measures seeking to facilitate water treatment, and the use of safe water is rarely mentioned 
in discussions of urban water supply. In small secondary cities, such as Bafatá, where residents 
rely, and will continue to rely, on multiple water sources and sources located outside the house, 
investments in public health campaigns remain as important as investments in infrastructure 
in securing access to safe water and improving the livelihoods of urban dwellers. The 
multiplicity of sources needs to be acknowledged and the focus shifted to how to secure safe 
livelihoods in these contexts.  
The next section explores everyday water practices in Bafatá, including both those of users 
relying on the piped water supply and those of people relying on alternative sources. On the 
one hand, it shows how awareness-raising campaigns promoting the use of the piped supply 
have had an effect on people’s perceptions of quality of water and, to a lesser extent, on 
people’s water practices. On the other hand, it demonstrates that, in fact, access to a lower-
risk or apparently more comfortable source is not enough to guarantee its use. Water practices 
are extremely complex and combine an array of different factors, which largely exceed those 
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commonly analysed in conventional political ecology perspectives relating to access and 
control.  
8.2.2. Everyday water practices emerging around the use of the piped water network  
Like in many other secondary cities of the global south, in Bafatá, the piped water network 
constitutes one among many alternative sources and technologies available to access water. 
Reflecting this range of alternatives, residents often navigate the various sources and 
technologies available in order to meet their water needs, for example, selecting different 
alternatives according to the use for the water they are collecting (drinking, cooking, washing, 
etc.), or according to the time of the year (dry or rainy season). The most frequent sources and 
technologies used in Bafatá included: wells (traditional and improved, see Figure 24, below); 
hand pumps (installed on wells or boreholes, see Figure 24, below); springs and ponds; as well 
as, standpipes (see Figure 23, below) and home connections (see Figure 21, below). The river 
was also used to bath (by a small minority), and to wash clothes and vehicles (see Figure 25, 
below). In addition, some organisations, such as Hotel Triton and the Catholic Mission (see 
Figure 26, below), had their own private piped supply, and donated or sold water. 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Home connection Figure 22. Public standpipe Figure 23. Hand pump 
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From the accounts of water users I talked to in Bafatá166, seven main factors emerged in 
people’s explanations of their water practices. These factors included: perceptions of quality 
of water, payment, conflict, distance, effort, reliability and waiting time. Hereby, perceptions 
of quality of water emerged as the most often mentioned factor, when selecting a specific water 
source. This was followed by payment and distance to the source, and then waiting time. 
Among those interviewed, conflict was routinely mentioned but given less weight on decisions 
to use a specific source.167  
In Bafatá, it was common, among those collecting water from public standpipes, or with access 
to a home connection, to continue to rely on alternative water sources. Resembling both 
public campaigns promoting the use of the piped water network and understandings of access 
included in the KAP study mentioned earlier, perceptions of quality of water and payment 
                                                      
166 For more details on sample of interviews and ethnographic work, see methodology of this study in chapter four and appendix 
XX. The sample, while not statically representative, provides a good qualitative account of users’ experiences.  
167 These factors were deducted from interviews with water users. Using Nvivo, I coded these different factors as they appeared 
in interview transcripts and fieldwork diaries. I then looked at their prevalence in terms of sources and references.   
Figure 24.. Traditional well Figure 25. River Geba 
Figure 26. Catholic mission Figure 27. Water transporter 
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were most commonly mentioned to justify this reliance on multiple sources. For example, 
Aissatu168 lived in Bairro 2, a central neighbourhood, in a house standing a few meters away 
from a public standpipe. In her house, drinking water was collected from the standpipe. As 
for the remaining water, they fetched it from the well bored by the neighbours living in one 
of the adjoining houses. She explained that they combined the well and the standpipe in order 
to avoid the crowds gathering around the public tap, therefore reducing time spent collecting 
water, and also to save money. Yet, during the dry season, as most of the wells in the area 
dried out, they collected all their water from the standpipe. Aissatu’s routine echoed that of 
many other residents using the piped scheme in these central neighbourhoods, and where 
perceptions of the quality of water, payment and waiting times appeared to dictate water 
practices, entailing the combined use of standpipes and wells. 
Since only a restricted area of the city was served by piped water supply, there were a number 
of transporters (see Figure 27, above), typically men with donkey carts, charging a fee to 
transport water from the standpipe to people’s houses.  For example, Mamadu169, who lived 
in Praça, had the phone number of different people owning donkey carts, who he contacted 
every time he needed water in the house. One of them would then come around to the house 
collect the empty containers and return them later filled with water from the standpipe. He 
was charged 100CFA for each container, 25CFA for the water and 75CFA for the transport. 
In addition, people often used bikes or (more rarely) cars to transport water from the 
standpipes to other areas of the city, or just carried the containers themselves. Once again, 
perceptions of quality of water were essential for those seeking alternative ways to extend this 
piped water network to new areas. For example, Fatumata170 also lived in Praça, the sleepy old 
colonial district situated on a gentle slope on the foothill of the new postcolonial city centre. 
Once the only neighbourhood served by the piped network, the system was by then 
                                                      
168 Interview Water User *43 
169 Fieldwork notes. Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity. 
170 Interview Water User *40 
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inoperative in this location.171 They collected most of the water used in the house from a well 
dug in their yard or, during the dry season when it dried out, from other wells in the vicinity. 
As for drinking water, Fatumata’s children filled the 20 to 25 litre containers from the 
standpipe installed up the hill and carried them down on their bikes. Instead, Carla172, her 
neighbour, collected all her water from the standpipe and used her car to carry the containers 
back and forth. Marietto173 resided in Bairro Nema, a neighbourhood located quite far from 
any standpipe in working order. Following doctor’s recommendations she walked up the hill 
to the nearest standpipe to fetch drinking water for her youngest child. But, because the 
standpipe was far, only her child drank water from the standpipe. The remaining members of 
the household drank water from a nearby well. For Fatumata and Marietto, their perception 
of the quality of the water being provided by the piped network justified the added effort. 
However, both the distance they had to overcome and the fact that they had to pay for the 
water from the standpipe, influenced their decisions to only fetch a small portion of the water 
needed from the piped water network. 
Nonetheless, in some users’ accounts, the ease and comfort associated with the piped network 
were particularly stressed. For example, Cecília lived in Bairro 1, close to a public standpipe. 
She typically collected all her water from this standpipe because: 
 “It’s much easier! They say that this water is safer but also it makes it much easier in terms of 
collecting water.” 176 
Cecília further explained that she only used water from the well, when, for some reason, there 
was no water in the network or she was late and the standpipe was already closed. Still, Cecília 
pointed out that she didn’t remember the last time she had drunk water from the well, because 
“it makes it easier but also the water is safer.” Thus, while emphasising the ease and comfort 
                                                      
171 The refurbishment of the water network in Praça was included in the works of the project Bafatá Misti Mas Iagu. The 
works were completed in 2015 and this network is now operational. ASPAAB newsletter sent out in May 2016 announced 
19 new home connections in this neighbourhood.  
172 Fieldwork notes. Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity.  
173 Interview Water User *24 
176 Interview Water User *25 
 274 
associated with the standpipe, when compared with other technologies, Cecília still pointed 
out her perception of quality of water as a key factor.  
Elizabete’s177 explanation resembled that of Cecilia. Elizabete had access to a home 
connection, with a tap installed in her internal patio. In her household, they used water from 
the tap to drink, cook and bath but, for the remaining uses, they fetched it from a well dug in 
their outer yard. They had installed a home connection in order to reduce the effort and time 
required to access water, but they continued to use the well in order to lessen water bills. In 
this case, the ease and comfort associated with the home connection emerged as the key reason 
justifying the investment in the installation of a home connection and its subsequent use. 
Payment, on the other hand, determined that water from the well continued to be used for 
specific purposes. At the same time, the uses given to the water from the piped scheme versus 
the water from the well, also suggested that they perceived the network to be providing safer 
water, which they used for drinking and cooking.  Unlike Elizabete, Mona178 and Mohamed179 
stated that in their homes they only used water form their respective home connections. For 
them, the ease and comfort were the main benefits associated with the home connections, 
since before they used to get what they considered to be good quality water from the Catholic 
mission.  
Water scarcity during the dry season was another factor driving people to use the piped supply, 
and consumption of water from the piped scheme actually increased significantly during this 
time of the year. As alternative sources started drying out, people that did not use this 
infrastructure during other times of the year started gathering around standpipes and, 
simultaneously, those, like Aissatu, who combined the piped scheme with other sources during 
the rainy season, started progressively collecting more and more water from the network. For 
example, Bairro Iussi is one of the fastest growing neighbourhoods in the city, and it is also a 
barren, flat hilltop lacking in trees, shade and water. Water scarcity has increasingly become 
                                                      
177 Interview Water User *45 
178 Interview Water User *46 
179 Fieldwork notes. 
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a problem due to increases in population. Here, wells dry earlier than anywhere else in the 
city and the few sources that provide water all year round get extremely busy during the dry 
season. Thus, a significant number of residents leave the neighbourhood to search for water. 
Some rely on the works of ‘transporters’, others find other, cheaper means to bring water to 
their homes. In these instance it was the lack of alternative sources, improved or unimproved, 
rather than the quality of the water from the piped scheme or ease and comfort, which drove 
people to use water from the network. 
The accounts of these users of the piped scheme demonstrate that perceptions of quality of 
water and payment heavily influenced people’s decision to use water from the piped scheme. 
In fact, whereas ease and comfort were often mentioned as key advantages deriving from the 
use of the network, these rewards were frequently combined with perceptions of quality of 
water. These accounts support conventional viewpoints linking access to an improved source 
with its use and, therefore, water safety. Furthermore, they suggest the efficacy of campaigns 
promoting the quality of the water from this scheme. Simultaneously, these users’ practices 
demonstrate that payment, whilst driving people to collect only part of their water from the 
network and to continue to rely on alternative sources, did not prevent these users from 
collecting drinking water from standpipes or home connections. The fact that people outside 
the catchment area of the piped scheme devised means to extend the network further 
supported ideas concerning lack of access, and suggested an existing need to expand the water 
system to areas where users were spending effort and money to access the network.    
8.2.3. Splintering water infrastructure from below 
The truth is that the water users cited above were amongst the mere 12% estimated to collect 
at least some of their water from standpipes and/or home connections. The remaining 88% 
of the population continued to rely on alternative sources, including improved and 
unimproved sources, for all their needs. Whilst a great part of these 88% would be living 
outside the catchment area of the piped scheme, a significant proportion lived nearby public 
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standpipes. For instance, in Bairro 4, a central neighbourhood served by the water network, 
the influx of users to standpipes outside the dry season remained extremely low. In fact, at 
some point during my fieldwork, three standpipes located in this neighbourhood (out of a total 
of 13) were inactive due to the lack of users.181 Comparing Bairro 1, where there was a good 
influx of people to standpipes and a higher number of home connections, with Bairro 4, where 
the number of people using the piped scheme remained lower than expected, several 
ASPAAB’s members pointed out that, crucially, it was the lack of alternative sources in Bairro 
1 that forced people to opt for standpipes.182 Thus, they suggested, it was not the lack of access 
to the piped scheme that was driving people to use alternative sources, but, on the contrary, 
the lack of access to alternative sources that persuaded people to rely on the piped water 
network. There were several reasons why people continued to prefer alternative sources.  
Surely, the fact that many of the other sources were free, associated with the lack of money 
were often mentioned as key factors driving people away from the piped scheme. In particular, 
I spoke with two women who mentioned that after the death of their husbands, they had not 
been able to use the standpipe anymore.183 Nevertheless, there were many households that 
preferred to invest their scarce resources on other things. For example, Aua explained:  
“We rarely go to the standpipe. We are used to the water from the well. There you have to pay 
25 CFA (€0.04). You always have to pay 25 CFA. If you don’t have that money all the time, 
you have to go to the well. It is better for you. Or, is it not?”184 (Aua, Water User) 
Thus, the water tariff did result in the exclusion of the poorest. Furthermore, in a context 
where a large percentage of the population is poor, or extremely poor, people often explained 
that, since they had the possibility to access water for free, they preferred to invest their scarce 
resources in other basic necessities, such as education, food or power.185   
                                                      
181 Interview ASPAAB *1; Fieldwork Notes  
182 Interview ASPAAB *1; Interview ASPAAB *5 
183 Fieldwork notes.  
184 Interview Water User *6. My own translation from Creole.  
185 Interview Water User *40, Interview Water User *44 
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Nevertheless, waiting times, conflicts and the lack of reliability resulting from too many people 
gathering around standpipes also emerged in the accounts of some users, particularly in Bairro 
1 where the system was used by a greater number of people, as significant reasons for opting 
for other sources: 
“Do you see the standpipe there, with all the containers standing around? Often, one doesn’t 
manage to get water there, there are a lot of people. On this side of the road, everyone gets their 
water from these standpipes. There are also people coming with donkey carts [to take water 
elsewhere]. So, you just stand there, you waste your time and, in the end, you don’t find water… 
If you come to the well, it’s better. You fetch your water quickly, then you are done, you can go 
ahead with your day.”186  
“there are a lot of people there [at the standpipe]. Sometimes you don’t find water, sometimes 
people get into fights, people insult each other. I don’t want problems.”187 
However, for a significant number of people I talked to wells remained the most convenient 
source, notably, for reasons that included perceptions of quality of water. They actually 
preferred water from the well for drinking. Mariama188 is an ASPAAB member, who 
participated in the KAP study carried out in 2013, conducting door-to-door surveys and 
facilitating workshops with focus groups. In addition, in that same year, she was part of a team 
created by ASPAAB to investigate precisely why the influx of users to some of the standpipes 
in Bairro 4 remained so low. She explained how people often said they did not got to the 
standpipe because of the taste of the water:  
“We went door-to-door, speaking to people, to find out what’s happening in those standpipes, 
which are not very well used. (…)  In some of the houses we visited, people mentioned money, 
they can’t pay for water. But, in many other cases, they said they didn’t like the taste of the water 
                                                      
186 Interview Water User *39 
187 Interview water User *9 
188 Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity.  
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from the standpipe, they say that water from the wells tastes better. In many of the houses we 
visited, that’s what we were told.” (Mariama, ASPAAB member)189 
Notably, whereas perceptions of quality of water were essential for many of those using the 
network, the taste, colour and smell of the water was also driving people away from the 
network. For example, Victória190, Alimato191 and Djenabu192 all lived in Bairro 4, in close 
proximity to standpipes, and they all drew water from wells dug in their yards or close by in 
surrounding houses. This is not to say that they never went to the standpipe. Djenabu 
exchanged the well for the standpipe during the dry season when water in the nearby wells 
got murky or, even, non-existent. And, Victória, despite getting all the water needed in the 
house from the well excavated in their yard, still walked to the standpipe two or three times 
per week. There, she bought water to re-sell on the street in small plastic bags that she filled 
with water and placed in buckets with ice.  
On the one hand, Victória echoed the explanations given by other women when she claimed 
that the well was actually more convenient: 
“If you have a well in the house, there is no reason to go outside. If you don’t have a well in the 
house then, instead of going elsewhere you might go to the standpipe. There, it is easier, you don’t 
need to pull the bucket, you just stand and wait, you don’t get tired.”193  
Whilst recognising the ease associated with getting water from the standpipe, these women 
would not conceive going to the hydrant when they had wells, and free water, readily available 
at all times in the immediate vicinity. Even if women often complained from pain in the chest, 
which they attributed to pulling buckets when fetching water, the ease and comfort associated 
with the tap did not compensate for the distance, limited opening hours, waiting times and 
conflicts associated with the standpipe.  
                                                      
189 Interview ASPAAB *7. Original in Creole, my own translation. Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity. 
190 Interview Water User *7. Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity. 
191 Interview Water User *8. Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity. 
192 Interview Water User *10. Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity. 
193 Interview Water User *7.  
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On the other hand, perceptions related to the taste of the water were perhaps the most 
important factor for these women.  When asked about quality of water, these women 
enthusiastically asserted that the water from the wells “is very good!” Referring to water from 
the standpipes, these women, echoing messages disseminated by ASPAAB, stated, “The water 
from the tap is healthier”. Nevertheless, they insisted that they preferred water from the well, 
including for drinking.  And, they admitted that their preference was related to taste: 
“Because if you get used to this water [from the well], you put water from the tap in your mouth, 
you can’t swallow!” 194 
Mariama’s195 comments, who lived close to a standpipe but in Bairro1 resembled those of 
Alimato: 
“This water [from hand pump] is cleaner, that water [from the standpipe] is not very clean, 
sometimes the water comes out red, sometimes is dirty. (…) for this reason, we prefer coming to 
the hand pump. Also, this water tastes better. We come here not because we have to pay 25CFA 
to get water from the standpipe but because the water tastes better. Even if this pump is heavy.” 
Aissatu196, who lived in Bairro 3 in close proximity to a standpipe, said she preferred to get 
water from a hand pump located close to her house, and compared the colour of the water 
from the piped water network to the black trousers of a passer-by: 
“the water there [at the standpipe] often comes out black. As black as the trousers of that girl! 
The water from the hand pump is always good and that borehole never dries out.” 
These women were used to and preferred water from the well. Referring to water safety, they 
also claimed that neither them nor other people in their households had been sick because of 
this water. In addition, they noted that the water from the tap often came out with a strange 
colour. Indeed, ASPAAB explained that the water of the piped scheme often came out 
reddish, because of an excess of iron in one of the sources supplying the network.  
                                                      
194 Interview Water User *8.  
195 Interview Water User *30. Name has been changed to preserve informant’s anonymity.  
196 Interview Water User *11 
 280 
In fact, I came across at least one household that opted to collect all water from the standpipe, 
except for drinking water. I met Maimuna and Mona, on several occasions, at one of the 
standpipes where they claimed they went on a daily basis to collect water for their large 
household. But, I also bumped into them at a privately owned well equipped with a hand 
pump, located farther away from their house than the standpipe where I usually met them. 
As indicated by the containers with lids they were carrying, they were there to collect drinking 
water. And only then, they admitted that, in fact, whilst using water from the standpipe for all 
other purposes, they collected drinking water from this well. This was because they believed 
the water was better. It was fresher, it tasted better and it was pristine, which was often not 
the case with the water from the piped scheme, which came out reddish, warm and with a 
strange taste.197 Their reluctance to openly disclose their water practices in the first place, 
suggests that they were acquainted with messages claiming that the water from the network 
was ‘healthier’, and safer.  
Kooy and Bakker (2008b) have discussed the contradiction between different parameters used 
to measure ‘quality’ of water in the context of Jakarta: Traditional assessments are based on 
the sensory qualities of taste, smell and colour; modern assessments are founded on scientific 
knowledge that replaces sensory with scientific considerations focusing on the ‘invisible’, and 
potentially threatening, characteristics of water. According to these scholars, the adoption of 
modern assessments of water was closely associated with projects of piping and networking 
(some parts) of Jakarta. And, simultaneously, the modern-traditional binary associated with 
these two assessments of water became a fundamental part of divisive and exclusionary 
discourses advocating, and shaping, different types of infrastructure for different parts of the 
city.   
In Bafatá, discourses behind the construction of infrastructure were typically framed around 
notions of public health and water safety, as defined according to scientific principles. Even if 
often interventions could not guarantee the safety of the water being provided, these discourses 
                                                      
197 Fieldwork notes  
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supported investments in infrastructure targeting precisely those groups without access to safe 
water, which were commonly associated with the poor. This is revealed in many reports from 
international organisations financing infrastructure, which consistently included the poorer 
groups of society as their target groups, even if cost-recovery principles then boycotted their 
stated aims. Furthermore, this is reflected, for example, in the distribution of Bafatá’s 
infrastructure, which does not reflect any socio-spatial differentiations within the city.198   
Everyday water practices, on the other hand, illustrate the ways in which these two 
understandings of water were combined in everyday practices. The women I interviewed did 
not reject one perception or the other outright. Claiming, “The water from the tap is 
healthier”, these women willingly demonstrated their acquaintance with ‘modern’ perceptions 
of water quality. And, to some degree, they also acknowledged that the water was safer. 
Notably, whilst they claimed that the water from the wells was good, they never attempted to 
say it was healthier. This could be indicative of their respect for the scientific assessment of 
water quality, which they tacitly accepted was not the one they were mobilising for their 
appraisal of the water from the wells. However, these women continued to found their water 
practices on perceptions based on taste, smell and colour. After all, they had always done it 
and never had any problems. In these ways, they both acknowledged and contested messages 
related to quality of water being disseminated.  
At the same time, whilst it was apparent that some users did not perceive any advantages in 
collecting water from public standpipes, often these same users had different ideas concerning 
home connections. Having a tap in the house was commonly perceived as the best solution, 
compared to any other available in the city. And, for example, Alimato, who preferred the 
taste of the water from the well, claimed that she would even drink water from the piped 
supply if she had a home connection. After all, she said, it was supposed to be better for your 
health. Here, the lack of resources was the only factor preventing households from connecting 
                                                      
198 I could not find any data relating to socio-economic characteristics of the population of Bafatá, or their spatial distribution 
within the city. This assessment is based on my understanding developed through conversations and me experience living in the 
city.   
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to the water network. The connection tax charged for new domestic connections was, in 2014, 
20,000 CFA (€30.50). New customers were also expected to buy their own meters which cost 
18,500 CFA (€28.21) and to pay for the work and materials required to build their connection 
to the mains. The price of the last item varied from situation to situation but averaged 121,500 
CFA (€190.61). Thus, even if the water tariff was cheaper for home connections, the initial 
investment was beyond the means of most people living in the city. Thus, despite the added 
public health benefits associated with home connections, since they reduce the risk of 
contamination during collection and transport, they were unaffordable for most of the 
population. At the same time, because they are private, they are not financed by international 
projects.  
Everyday water practices in Bafatá are complex. Most people rely on multiple sources and 
technologies and juggle different factors in their water routines. Whilst the price of water is 
excluding some people from accessing water from standpipes, it is apparent that there are also 
many other factors affecting people’s water practices. Namely, perceptions of quality of water 
and convenience continue to drive people to use alternative sources. As suggested by Shaheed 
et al. (2014), based on a study carried out mostly in Cambodia, access to lower-risk water 
sources is not enough to guarantee that they are used. At the same time, in a context where 
poverty is widespread, it is likely that people will continue to opt for free sources, where and 
when they are available, and to invest their scarce resources in satisfying other basic 
necessities. This is likely to happen independently of the price of the water. Opting for 
alternative sources, people in Bafatá engage in what has been called ‘splintering from 
below’(Bakker, 2010). Here, this splintering refers to a reliance on multiple un-networked 
water sources but also to the impacts these practices have on the expansion of piped water 
supply systems in poorer contexts, where systems rely, to a great extent, on users’ 
contributions. 
At the same time, most users perceived home connections to offer a much better alternative 
than public standpipes, which would allow them to avoid distance, conflicts and waiting times. 
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In addition, home connections provide public health benefits by reducing the risk of 
contamination during the collection and transport of water. However, home connections 
remain expensive and beyond the possibilities of most residents in Bafatá.199 Investigations of 
water provision in urban areas have mostly focused on access to a piped supply, often 
considered as the only form of adequate access by researchers focusing on urban water 
provision. Related to this, there has been little mention of the importance of alternative 
sources or public health campaigns in guaranteeing the use of safe water. In the context of 
small secondary cities, such as Bafatá, people rely, and will most likely continue to rely, on 
multiple sources. It is thus crucial that researchers take into account this diversity of sources, 
and the ways in which they play a role in meeting people’s water needs. Whereas investments 
in infrastructure, including piped supply schemes are unarguably a priority, these should not 
replace the need for investments in public health campaigns that focus on the diversity of 
sources people use and the need for facilitating ways to access safe water through these 
alternative sources. The progressive contamination and enclosure of alternative sources, 
resulting with processes of urbanisation, is also an important ongoing process that needs to be 
taken into account in these contexts.  
8.3. The incipient transition from ‘private-collective’ to ‘collective-
individualising’ modes of water supply 
Despite the ‘splintering from below’, recent improvements in water provision have resulted in 
an increasing number of people opting for a piped supply in Bafatá. And, numbers are 
expected to grow as the network expands and messages promoting the use of the network 
consolidate. This section discusses the differences between private-collective modes of water supply, 
which emerge around wells and hand pumps and entail the sharing of resources, and collective-
                                                      
199 Home connections also depend on the capacity of the system. In 2013, before the completion of the works programmed under 
BMMI, the second project, ASPAAB was not accepting any new connections because of the impacts it would have on the overall 
system.  
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individualising modes of water supply, which have arisen around metered standpipes and home 
connections and entail the disruption of sharing practices and water gifts. First, it is shown 
that the transition between these modes of water supply is incipient, despite the increasing 
number of people relying on the network. Instead, these modes co-exist in the city. Second, 
this transition is discussed in relation to debates around the commodification and 
marketization of water. Here, it is shown that the introduction of meters, and the associated 
shifts in modes of supply, amount to transformations that exceed the commodification and 
marketization of water. In line with Baptista’s (2013b) work focusing on prepaid electricity 
meters in Maputo, it is suggested that meters can introduce positive changes that cannot be 
framed under neoliberalism, such as allowing people to control use according to their needs 
and possibilities. In addition, in a context like Bafatá, where resources are so scarce, meters 
prove essential for the operation and maintenance of the system.  
8.3.1. Wells, pumps and (unmetered) home connections: private-collective modes of water 
supply 
Wells and hand pumps remain the most prevalent technologies for extracting water amongst 
residents in Bafatá. Wells are widespread throughout the different neighbourhoods of the city, 
and include many different types, from traditional to protected wells, entailing different levels 
of investment and water safety. Regardless of the type, wells typically result from individual, 
private ventures: not only are they excavated on private property, but also their construction, 
ongoing maintenance and eventual repairs or piece replacement are financed by individuals 
or particular households. However, in striking contrast to the private and individual practices 
framing the investments in, and management of, these infrastructures, access to these water 
points is free and open to all.  
Whereas wells can be built and maintained at a relatively low cost – hand dug wells, for 
example – the drilling of a well or borehole followed by the installation of a hand pump 
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necessarily involves a significant investment. For this reason, most hand pumps in the city 
were in fact installed with funds from international donors, and are currently managed (or 
supposed to be) by management committees, comprising nearby residents. In addition, 
contrary to the case of wells, where maintenance and repairs do not typically require 
significant resources, the maintenance of hand pumps is costly, mostly due to the prices of 
spare parts. The costs and complexity related to the maintenance of hand pumps are mirrored 
in the large number of such pumps, supposedly managed by committees of residents, which 
are out of order due to the lack of resources to carry out necessary repairs. Nevertheless, a 
number of hand pumps in the city were also the product of the private initiative of individuals 
or households, who financed not only the installation of this infrastructure, but also, as in the 
case of wells, their ongoing maintenance and repairs. Still, access to these privately owned 
infrastructure is typically free and open to all.  
Before meters were installed, it was also common for people to share the costs of private home 
connections and to make these available to neighbours. For instance, in 2010, Fanta, Djenabu 
and Djau200 shared the costs of a home connection, which consisted of a tap next to Fanta’s 
house. Since, at that time, the system only worked an average of two days a week for 
approximately two hours, the tap was always left open and once the water started running 
these women would fill as many containers as they needed. After they finished, their 
neighbours were welcome to collect water free of charge. In effect, as will be discussed below, 
even after meters were introduced practices involving giving water for free to neighbours 
prevailed. The introduction of meters, did not automatically or necessarily disrupt practices 
entailing the sharing of private sources.  
These practices entailing the collectivisation, through sharing, of private sources can be traced 
to prevailing social norms. In fact, people seem to struggle to explain why they shared all these 
resources. For example, I asked Mariama, the owner of a well, why she opened her well to 
                                                      
200 Information collected between March 2010 and February 2011. 
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everyone and, since she did it, why she did not ask for contributions towards the maintenance 
costs. She explained: 
“Nothing!!!! Because… hmmm… you know, the Fulani people say, ‘if you want a better life in 
the other world, you have to work for it in this one’. That’s it!” 201 
Related to this, Aissatu, who collected water from someone’s else well, claimed: 
“They do it for themselves. They are seeking goodness.” 202 
Fatumata203, Djenabu204, Adama205, and Ramatu206 explained the sharing of water resources 
in light of broader norms of reciprocity. To express this, they relied on a Creole expression 
“anos ke sinta djunto”207, denoting interdependence, neighbourliness and reciprocity. This 
interdependence is revealed in Aua and Victoria’sexplanations to why they opened their wells 
to their neighbours without charging them anything:  
“No, we can’t [deny water], we can’t, that’s wrong! (…) Because… it is our well, you can go 
ask someone to contribute [towards repairs and maintenance], now imagine it happens they can’t, 
they will worry… They will say: ‘they charged us, we didn’t pay, for us now to go fetch water 
there, we can’t.’”  210  
 “[we give water] because of goodness, of propinquity…everyone needs the support of their 
companions, isn’t it? This is why we do it…” 211 
For hand pumps, if you were to privately install one, it meant that you had the resources to 
do so, and, therefore, it was your duty to share with your neighbours who could not afford to 
do so.212 Thus, in Bafatá, if you have a water point, whilst you are entirely responsible for its 
construction and maintenance, you are also expected, and expect to, share it with your 
                                                      
201 Interview Water User *38. My own translation from Creole. 
202 Interview Water User *1 
203 Interview Water User *19 
204 Interview Water User *5 
205 Interview Water User *13 
206 Interview Water User *16 
207 The literal translation would be: we sit together 
210 Interview Water User *23 
211 Interview Water User *7 
212 Fieldwork notes 
 287 
neighbours. The sharing of private water points – wells, hand pumps or home connections – 
is deeply ingrained in the water practices of the city’s residents.  
Therefore, whereas wells, hand pumps and, to a lesser extent, home connections constitute 
individual and privatised endeavours engendered by the city’s inhabitants to satisfy their water 
needs, they turn into collective ventures when, through sharing practices, their access becomes 
free and open to all. They constitute private-collective modes of water supply, whereby private 
investments in technologies to access water are made collective through deeply-ingrained 
norms and practices of sharing that secure typically private infrastructures are open to all.  
In a context such as Bafatá, these practices entailing the sharing of water resources are 
essential for urban dwellers seeking to meet their water needs. And, they are not exceptional, 
they are one dimension of an urban fabric where reciprocal gifts are essential survival 
strategies. Considering the elusive presence of the state of Guinea-Bissau in what concerns the 
delivery of urban services in Bafatá, these private-collective modes of water supply are essential 
for the city’s residents’ ability to live in the city and to access basic services.  
These private-collective modes of water supply cannot be framed as commons (Ostrom, 1990). 
They are recognisably private and, whereas access is generally open, the responsibility for the 
management and maintenance remains in private hands. They also cannot be adequately 
framed within narratives of privatisation, commodification and circulation of capital. They 
are private but they are not profit-oriented and water is not sold. In fact, they are 
particularistic solutions that seek to meet the demands of private individuals where there is no 
collective service provision. Yet, they do not hint at collapsing, fragmented public realms 
(Gandy, 2006) as demonstrated in the ingrained practices of sharing resources. On the 
contrary, they enable what Anand (2011b, p. 545) termed hydraulic citizenship, “a form of 
belonging to the city enabled by social and material claims to the city’s water infrastructure.”  
In Bafatá, they are possible for several reasons. First, because the small size of the city 
translates in a relative abundance of water that it is not severely contaminated (as far as we 
know). Second, and still perhaps related to the small size of the city, social relations based on 
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reciprocity and sharing of resources enable, and in fact motivate, the sharing of private water 
points. These water practices are part of broader social relations and institutions, which 
include looser formations but also traditional and religious authorities, that stress 
neighbourliness, propinquity and companionship as vital characteristics of the urban fabric. 
8.3.2. From private-collective to collective individualising modes of water supply: beyond 
commodification and the evil rule of the meter 
Not long after taking over the responsibility for the management of the water piped network 
in 2006, in an attempt to increase revenues and nurture a culture of payment amongst users, 
ASPAAB sought to install ‘the rule of the meter’, but without much success. In 2012, by the 
end of Bafatá Misti Iagu (BMI) – the first project implemented by Portuguese NGO TESE in 
partnership with ASPAAB – the juxtaposition of two important events allowed this 
organisation to go one step further towards these goals. First, BMI financed the installation of 
meters on all standpipes and home connections. Second, ASPAAB was now better equipped, 
and also more determined, to build on the discipline allowed by the introduction of this 
technology to achieve ‘cost-recovery’. The deployment of this novel combination of 
technological and managerial devices profoundly affected the ways in which users interacted 
with the system and the way in which the system operated as a whole. It enacted the 
emergence of collective-individualising modes of water production.  
This is not to say that attempts to closely monitor users of the piped water network through 
the use of meters have not met widespread resistance. In fact, an on-going struggle over 
enforcement and evasion of this strict rule of the meter ensued. Nevertheless, the deployment 
of the ‘rule of the meter’ has signalled a change and started to sow the seeds for what might 
become decisive shifts in the multiple social relations and institutions shaping the urban 
landscape. In this section, they are discussed in terms of the transition from a private-collective 
to a collective-individualising mode of supply. In contrast to the private-collective modes of 
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production discussed before – which entailed the collectivisation of private water points 
through sharing practices – collective-individualising modes of production, which are 
associated with the use of meters, entail the disruption of ingrained sharing practices, resulting 
in the individualisation of the use of a collective system, the piped water network.  Instead re-
distribution happens at the central management level.  
The introduction of meters has resulted in significant changes to practices around the use of 
home connections. Before meters were introduced, users with home connections paid a 
monthly flat rate and, in line with private-collective modes of water supply, home connections 
were frequently shared and neighbours welcome to help themselves. With the introduction of 
meters this started to change as people started to refuse water to their neighbours, or at least, 
to tightly control the amounts being given. This was reflected, for example, in the installation 
of multiple devices on taps, in attempts to control access to these. The figures below show 
some examples of home connections with meters where devices to lock taps have been 
installed in attempts to prevent uncontrolled use. 
Elizabete213 and Indja214 living not far from each other in Bairro 1 openly admitted not to give 
water to neighbours. Elizabete, who also has a well from where neighbours are welcome to 
draw water, explained:  
                                                      
213 Interview Water User *45 
214 Interview Water User *46 
Figure 28. Home connections with meters and different devices to lock taps 
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“we don’t give water [from the tap] because we have to pay for the water we give. (…) The 
water from the well is mine, I can give it away. The water from the tap I pay for.” (Elizabete, 
Water User) 
Nevertheless, Elizabete still admitted she gave water to at least one elderly neighbour. Binta215, 
on the other hand, continued to give water to neighbours. At the same time, she complained 
about the extremely high water bills they were getting, and how she kept trying, and failing, 
to prevent people from using their tap. Papis, her son, claimed that it was not that they didn’t 
want people to use the tap, 10 litres or so per person would be fine. They preferred to pay a 
bit more and make sure their neighbours didn’t get sick. However, according to Binta and 
Papis, the neighbours seemed to be using the tap not only to get their drinking water, but also 
for other purposes. Mohamed, a Mauritanian who has been living in Bafatá for over 20 years, 
also gave water to his neighbours, but only a limited amount, for drinking. Again, this gift was 
explained in terms of a responsibility for the health of his neighbours.  
Although not representing a complete break with the past, the introduction of water meters 
clearly disrupted social relations mediating practices of sharing water resources. Where 
previously home connections financed by private individuals or households were open to 
neighbours, with the introductions of meters these same individuals and households have 
started denying or at least attempting to control water gifts. In many cases it might be that 
their water bills are now lower than the flat rate they used to pay. But now they can quantify 
the gift to their neighbours. Simultaneously, the introduction of water meters came with users’ 
ability to monitor use. This might have enabled people that would not be able to pay a fixed 
flat rate to have a home connection, if they are able to mobilise the one off payment required 
to install this connection.  
As with home connections, interactions at the standpipe were also affected by the installation 
of meters. The ‘rule of the meter’ profoundly affected both the ways in which operators 
worked, and the ways in which users interacted with standpipes and their operators. After 
                                                      
215 Interview Water User *48 
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meters were installed on all standpipes, ASPAAB started comparing revenues handed in by 
operators against meter readings, and any inconsistencies between the cash handed in to 
ASPAAB and the meter reading would be deducted from the operators’ wage. Thus, in order 
to secure conformity between revenues and meter readings, standpipe operators were 
required to change their interactions with users, in order to minimise the loss of non-charged 
water. Notwithstanding the heterogeneity in both size and form of containers brought to the 
hydrant, in order to secure the conformity between meter readings and revenues, operators 
had to make sure that these containers were filled with the right amount of water, 25 litres for 
25 CFA. A task that often resulted in protests from users, who saw their containers half empty. 
Furthermore, the washing of containers at the water point, an adopted and accepted practice, 
should also be forbidden, even if this contradicted public health campaigns disseminating 
messages about the importance of washing and cleaning water containers. Finally, the tight 
control of water revenues prevented water gifts at all levels. This included giving water for free 
to those claiming not to have the money to purchase it or even those promising to pay in the 
future. But, it also targeted practices encompassing water gifts to passersby requesting water 
to drink, which were also common, especially in those standpipes located near schools or 
mosques. Used to more relaxed rules and still surrounded by wells where water was given 
away for free, adjusting to the tight control of the standpipe required a change in people’s 
perceptions of the value of the water they were getting.  
In addition, before meters were installed, ASPAAB had no means to check revenue handed 
in by operators against volume of water sold. Operators would hand in what they stipulated 
as an adequate amount. Queba’s narrative illustrates how things worked then:  
“In those days, standpipes had no meters installed. Operators sold water and then, from the 
revenues collected, they handed in whatever they wanted. On my first day I raised something like 
12,000 CFA (€18.30) or 13,000 CFA (€19.82) selling water at the standpipe. I raised that 
and I handed in ASPAAB something like 12,000 CFA and I kept 1,000 CFA (€1.52) for 
myself. I only kept 1000 CFA because I was scared of keeping the money, I was afraid of getting 
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into trouble. I was not sure if they would be able to find out. So, I decided, ‘I’ll keep 1000 CFA 
and I will hand in 12,000’. But, it turned out that, the other people that had been working on 
the same standpipe before me, they were handing in only 3,000 (€4.57) to 4,000 CFA 
(€6.10)!!! They were keeping all the rest. Thus, ASPAAB called me and told me to stay working 
on the standpipe. (…) well, I regretted it. I thought, ‘Well! In the end, the other operators got 
something and I got nothing!” 216 
Therefore, the ‘rule of the meter’ profoundly affected the work of operators, as ASPAAB 
started comparing revenues handed in by operators against meter readings, and in this way 
controlling operators’ wages. On the one hand, the introduction of meters resulted in drastic 
reductions to operators’ income, which were eventually set at 20% of the water revenue at the 
respective standpipe. As a result, according to Queba, some operators simply gave up their 
jobs in search of more profitable opportunities. On the other hand, it helped ASPAAB control 
the work of operators, guaranteeing that cash paid for water remained within the system. The 
wages of operators are low but also related to the resources available and, supposedly, fair 
among different operators.  
Contrasting the practices resulting from the scrupulous following of the requirements of the 
meter with those described above emerging around the well or the hand pump, the differences 
are evident. The meter appears as a device that could effectively disrupt sharing and gift 
norms, which have fundamentally characterised water practices in the city. However, the 
continuing sharing of home connections with neighbours, the perennial inconsistencies 
between meter readings and cash handed out to ASPAAB by operators and the refusal of 
people to work as operators all indicate ways in which this rule of the meter is resisted and 
contravened. In fact, operators continue to give water to passersby, especially those located 
next to schools or mosques, to fill in containers more than the stipulated 25 litres and to allow 
people to pay tomorrow. Likewise, ASPAAB was finding it harder and harder to find people 
willing to work on standpipes. This is because the payment is bad but also because the job is 
                                                      
216 Interview ASPAAB *1 
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hard and this hardness is to a great extent related to all the requests resulting from the 
introduction of meters. Considering the lack of employment opportunities in Bafatá and the 
high levels of poverty, it becomes clear the precariousness of these jobs. The difficulties in 
finding people willing to work at the standpipe meant that ASPAAB had to keep working with 
people that consistently handed in much less money than the amounts registered in meters 
and, sometimes, even plead with these people not to give up working at the standpipe. In fact, 
ASPAAB members often used their social position, as teachers and members of the water 
operator, to persuade people to work on standpipes by claiming that it was their duty to 
contribute to the city and the well-being of their fellow residents. At the same time, relying on 
extremely low-paid work, ASPAAB was de facto accepting backhanding and resistance to the 
rule of the meter.  
Yet, the continuous efforts of ASPAAB to enforce the rule of the meter are also proving 
effective. According to ASPAAB’s217 technicians, operators lacked rigor and control in their 
work. Some operators often went to do other jobs leaving the standpipe unattended or in the 
hands of someone without experience. Some went to sit in the shade and did not control users 
adequately. In fact, several standpipe operators complained about standing under the hot sun 
and claimed that ASPAAB should build sheds next to standpipes, as one of the operators had 
done himself. 
                                                      
217 Interview ASPAAB *2 
  Figure 29. Standpipe with shade 
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Even Virginia, the most exemplar operator, had recently gotten a job cleaning in the 
mornings. For this reason, her standpipe was now often unattended since her son, who she 
had asked to take over, would often not bother to be around. Nevertheless, members of 
ASPAAB management team believed that efforts to raise awareness amongst operators were 
showing results and the situation was improving. At the same time, ASPAAB recognised the 
difficulties the job entailed and the low incentive created by the extremely low revenues. Thus, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, they tried to find ways to motivate operators and to 
enforce the rule of the meter. For example, they created a system of prizes that established 
competition amongst operators.  
In some way, the introduction of meters subverts private-collective modes of water supply. 
Instead, it inaugurates what can be perhaps termed a collective-individualising mode of 
supply, collective in the ways it is managed but individualising in its use. Without wanting to 
go into discussions relating to whether water is, or is not, a public good, it is clear that the 
piped water supply service being provided in Bafatá is framed as a public utility providing a 
social good. In line with its public utility character, the ownership and, supposedly, the 
regulation and monitoring of water provision remains in the hand of the state. Related to this, 
the goal of the piped supply scheme is to provide access to an improved water source, with 
effects on public health, and to expand this service to as many people as possible. In other 
words, this system can be seen as an attempt to devise a collective solution to secure access to 
safe water, replacing a multiplicity of sources of unknown quality.  In order for such system to 
work, in the context of Bafatá, users have to pay into the system. Their contributions are then 
re-distributed at the management level: they are used to maintain and operate the system but 
also to expand the network to new areas and users. The payment of water, which engenders 
the individualisation of use, is therefore essential for this collective solution to be in place. In 
this way, the piped water supply scheme, a collective enterprise, can be seen to incentivise 
individualistic modes of provision, which disrupt deeply ingrained sharing practices at the 
neighbourhood level, whilst enabling re-distribution at the central management level.  
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On the one hand, the transition from private-collective to collective individualising modes of 
production suggests a disruption of sharing practices, and water gifts, which could in fact be 
equated to a fragmentation of the public realm, visible in the disruption of reciprocal survival 
strategies which are at the heart of the urban fabric. In addition, the introduction of meters, 
which is associated with the enforcement of cost-recovery, hints at the commodification and 
marketization of water. In fact, a new market, where water is being sold and bought, was 
created.  
On the other hand, this transition has also enabled the operation of the piped water supply 
system in a context where resources are extremely scarce. As highlighted in contemporary 
debates concerning the use of prepaid meters, the introduction of ‘ordinary’ meters in Bafatá 
spurred transformations – in users, managers and technicians – that involved the creation of 
spaces of calculation and the learning or adoption of calculation in daily water practices.  
Schnitzler’s (2013; 2008) work on the use of prepaid meters in South African cities has 
highlighted the role of these technological devices in the creation of particular neoliberal 
subjectivities. She also notes how technologies become embedded in particular rationalities 
but also how they turn into sites of political struggle. Schnitzler herself recognises that it’s not 
the meter itself but the context, which shapes these outcomes. Meters can mediate different 
meanings in different places. Baptista’s (2013b) work on the use of prepaid meters by electricity 
providers in Maputo suggests precisely the relevance of alternatives meanings, which 
transcend interpretations around neoliberalism. Instead, she highlights how the introduction 
of meters is creating new possibilities for users, who are now able to control and monitor their 
spending according to their possibilities and desires.   
The case of Bafatá demonstrates how, like in the case of prepaid meters, the introduction of 
‘ordinary’ meters can also result in reconfigurations of practices and subjectivities related to 
these practices. Neoliberal and governmentality based conceptual frameworks could enable 
narratives of commodification of water or disciplining of subjects in Bafatá. The introduction 
of meters is certainly igniting changes at several levels, changes that amount to more precise 
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measurements that facilitate the payment of water and to a certain degree amount to the 
commodification of water. 
However, these might not be the most important phenomena happening here. The 
introduction of meters in Bafatá inaugurated a process of learning: Learning how to manage, 
learning how to work and learning how to consume water with the meter. And, these 
renovated procedures to enforce payment for water allow ASPAAB to control standpipe 
operators and users guaranteeing that cash paid for water remains within the system; they too 
permit consumers to control their consumption according to their means opening the 
possibility for people that would not be able to pay the flat rate to connect to the network. In 
addition, whilst disrupting sharing practices, these procedures also allow for the 
collectivisation and centralisation of re-distribution. Surely, the meter enacts important 
changes to water consumption practices. Perhaps those changes are required if a water piped 
network is to operate in a city with such scarce resources. 
8.4. Discussion 
The investigation of everyday water practices in Bafatá shows that, as suggested by Truelove 
(2011), access and control, the focus of political ecology perspectives, are not the only factors 
shaping water practices and inequalities. Instead, in the case of Bafatá, perceptions of quality 
of water, as well as the convenience associated with different water sources revealed 
fundamental in people’s decisions not to rely on the piped water network. Inspired by Bakker 
(2010), the phenomenon resulting from this continuous reliance on multiple water sources has 
been termed as a form of ‘splintering from below’.  These practices shape ongoing attempts 
to operate and extend the piped scheme, in a context where resources are extremely scarce. 
But, they also should shape understandings of water provision in these cities, which must 
account for the multiplicity of sources used without referring to path dependent trajectories 
assuming its inevitable substitution by a piped supply. The residents of Bafatá rely, and are 
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likely to continue to rely on multiple water sources, many of which provide a level of water 
security similar to that of the piped supply scheme. As will be discussed in the conclusion of 
this thesis, this has important implications for investments in public health campaigns in order 
to secure safe access to water.  
The introduction of the rule of the meter initiated significant changes in the ways water was 
used and supplied in Bafatá.  These shifts have been described in terms of the partial, ongoing 
and contested transition from private-collective to collective-individualising modes of water 
use and production in the city. The transformations associated with this transition could be 
interpreted within a neoliberal framework, focusing on processes of commodification and 
marketization of water, as well as the exclusion of the poorest from accessing water under cost-
recovery conditions. These are certainly important phenomena. However, this chapter 
demonstrated that they might not be the most relevant. The rule of the meter has also been 
essential to secure the viability of the piped water scheme in a context where resources are 
extremely scarce, and where people continue to rely on alternative sources. Moreover, the 
meter, while preventing gifts and the sharing of water at the neighbourhood level, has enabled 
redistribution at the central management level. Water revenues have enabled ASPAAB to 
secure the operation and maintenance of the network, but also to invest in the construction of 
new infrastructure, such as standpipes. As suggested by Baptista (2013b), meters can also 
enable households who could not afford monthly flat rates to invest on home connections and 
monitor their use according to their possibilities and needs. Furthermore, in context of 
widespread poverty, where users have to carefully choose where to invest their money, it 
appears that as long as there are free alternative sources, people will continue to rely on these. 
At the same time, in a context where resources are so scarce, someone has to pay for this 
system, and it will likely be users. In small secondary cities, like Bafatá, water provision has to 
be understood in relation to the multiplicity of sources that are essential in securing safe access 
to water. 
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– NINE –  
Conclusion 
This thesis set out to explore how water infrastructure is being produced, governed and used 
in Bafatá, a small secondary African city. Related to this, it sought to evaluate the relevance 
theoretical constructs currently circulating in urban studies can have for understandings of 
water provision in cities like Bafatá, and to set out ways to conceptualise water infrastructure 
in the context of small cities in poorer countries. It was argued that, whilst providing important 
insights, conventional political economy and political ecology perspectives cannot encapsulate 
the multiplicity of processes and outcomes shaping the evolution of water provision in cities 
like Bafatá. In particular, two main limitations were identified in these approaches: the 
prevalence of critiques of neoliberalism and the reliance on flawed theorisations of the state. 
The concepts of variegated neoliberalism and assemblage coupled with an attention to the 
everyday were thus adopted as analytical and methodological tools to expand these 
perspectives. The analytical framework adopted sought to capture a variety of logics that, I 
argued, should not be straightforwardly interpreted with reference to critiques of 
neoliberalisation. In addition, this thesis drew on anthropological explorations of states and 
investigations of everyday state practices in order to propose more nuanced and empirically 
based understandings of the roles of the state in water provision. 
In line with critiques of neoliberalism at the heart of political economy/ ecology perspectives, 
the features of water governance models adopted in smaller urban centres – such as 
community-based management, public-private partnerships and a multiplicity of informal 
arrangements – are often portrayed as second rate solutions, which reflect these cities’ inability 
to attract private sector investments. In this way, they are seen as further evidence of uneven 
development trajectories in the context of neoliberal reforms (Bakker, 2013). Certainly, the 
spatial variegations of neoliberalism, which result in the exclusion of these cities, with smaller 
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and poorer populations, from global circuits of capital, can be seen as an important factor 
explaining the models emerging in these cities.  At least, they illustrate why transnational water 
companies have not been seen to be part of water provision solutions in these locations. 
However, these accounts say very little about the specificities of the alternative models 
emerging in the cities. They also rely on path-dependent views, which assume the ‘modern 
networked city’ as a general phase for all cities.  
This is not to say that scholars have not looked into alternative models, similar to those 
adopted in smaller cities. Community management and public private-partnerships, which 
have become widespread in small cities across Africa, can be, and have been understood in 
the context of broader neoliberalisation processes (Bakker, 2010; Jaglin, 2002). Cost-recovery 
and user participation are not only at the heart of these models but they are also commonly 
justified on the basis of the benefits of markets regulating access to urban services and of the 
inevitability of state failures. However, this thesis demonstrated that ‘fast’ interpretations 
based on assumed neoliberal frameworks cannot account for the multiplicity of logics, 
motivations and practices shaping water provision in Bafatá, and probably in many other 
small cities in poorer contexts. They also do not account for the ways in which the logics of 
circulating policy models are adapted and transformed so that new meanings and effects, 
which transcend original agendas and logics, emerge. In addition, current analyses of water 
infrastructure have not properly investigated the ways in which everyday water practices 
influence water provision, and therefore do not properly account for these in 
conceptualisations of water infrastructure.  
In response to the flawed theorisations of the state at the heart of current understandings of 
water infrastructure, this thesis has argued that views of the state underpinning the policy 
literature rely on idealisations of neutral, bureaucratic states that have little to do with the 
reality of states on the ground. Although views adopted by academic researchers seek to de-
naturalise the state and challenge its neutrality, these analyses continue to rely on notions of 
the state that do not take into account the specific histories and trajectories of different states. 
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These views are still based on idealisations of western states, and on the situated experiences 
of a small core group of states. Thus, this thesis argued that in investigations of water delivery 
in small African cities, states should be turned into objects of empirical inquiry. It suggested 
that anthropological explorations of states and investigations of everyday states can open the 
analytical view to the complex and heterogeneous ways in which states shape, and are shaped 
by, water provision in small cities in Africa. By making the state an empirical object of 
investigation, these conceptualisations also allow researchers to bring states across the 
North/South and East/West divide into the same conceptual plane, whilst acknowledging 
their diverse histories and trajectories.  
Below, I summarise the main findings and contributions of this thesis within the three themes 
introduced above, including a discussion of topics for future research and some of the policy 
implications of my findings. 
9.1. States and water provision 
One of the most significant insights generated by this study concerns the role of the state in 
water provision. I argued that one important flaw at the core of current understandings of 
water infrastructure relates to the ways in which states are theorised, and subsequently 
understood to shape water provision. Related to this, I also claimed that views of the state in 
analyses of water provision should be turned into objects of empirical inquiry. This is essential 
if these approaches are to capture the reality of states in a diversity of contexts and to take into 
account the specific, and diverse, trajectories of states (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001). 
Contrasting current understandings circulating in academic and policy analyses of water 
provision with empirical investigations of the state in Africa constituted an easy and efficient 
way to convey the inadequacy of the former. Typically, theorisations of the state at the core 
of analysis of urban infrastructure continue to be defined in relation to Western/Northern 
ideals of what states should be. In addition, notions of the state adopted have tended to view 
 301 
these apparatuses as reified and cohesive entities, and therefore commonly failed to 
acknowledge the multiple agendas and modalities of states and the evident blurriness of the 
state-society boundary. 
This research suggested that anthropological explorations of states and investigations of 
everyday states (Abrams, 1988; Gupta, 1995; Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; Mitchell, 1991; 
Mountz, 2003; Painter, 2006) provide more nuanced theorisations of states that can better 
capture the multiplicity of ways in which state institutions and actors shape water provision. 
Rejecting views of the state as coherent, unified and autonomous entities, these approaches 
allow the consideration of what appear to be disjointed, fragmented practices in light of 
processes of state formation. First, such an approach empowers researchers to consider a 
broad range of everyday state practices not as deviations from a supposed unified and coherent 
state but as the lived geographies of states, and therefore intrinsic to the ways in which all 
states shape everyday live and relevant to how ideas of the state are constructed. As argued by 
Gupta (1995, p. 384) if “[state officials] are seen as thoroughly blurring the boundaries 
between ‘states’ and ‘civil society’, it is perhaps because those categories are descriptively 
inadequate for the lived realities that they purport to represent”. Second, this means that 
multiple diverging practices can be explored without jumping into generalisations related to 
the nature of the state – as absent, violent, neoliberal, and so forth. Instead, they are seen as 
indicators of the variety of modalities of the state. It enables views of the state as violent and 
benefactor, neoliberal and developmental all at once. In addition, Foucauldian views of the 
state as a symbolic entity with real effects  generated through the practices of both state and 
non-state actors also open the analytical view to the notion of ‘state effects’ (Mitchell, 1991) 
and processes of statisation of society (Painter, 2006). In other words, such views of the state 
call for investigations of the processes through which a range of practices by state and non-
state organisations come to engender the expansion, or not, of the symbolic presence of the 
state, and therefore the expansion of state influence. This has important implications for 
understandings of states practices in contexts of state weakness. Delving into the embodiment 
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of both state and non-state actors and exploring how social relations and the experiences, 
subjectivities and emotions of these actors influence practices, scholars have developed more 
nuanced views of policy-making and implementation processes (Mountz, 2003; Rankin, 
2011). 
Applying the above concepts to the study of water provision in Bafatá, this thesis demonstrated 
that in a context marked by state weaknesses and the heavy presence of international actors, 
the state was not simply absent or neoliberal. It still influenced water provision in Bafatá in 
important ways that largely transcended neoliberal logics. Given the prevalence of discourses 
of state weakness, the stark lack of resources and the dependency of the state of Guinea-Bissau 
on foreign aid, the relations and interactions between state and international actors were 
shown to be essential to examine the role of the state in the water sector, or in other words the 
relational ways in which the state influences water provision. Nevertheless, it became evident 
that the state not only depends on non-state organisations to foster policy implementation, but 
also that the state is dependent on these organisations’ willingness to at least symbolically 
accept their role as enabler, supervisor and regulator of the sector. In line with what Jaglin et 
al. (2011) demonstrated in their study of small towns in Benin, Mali and Senegal, the ongoing 
competition between state and non-state organisations emerged as a key feature of the 
interactions between state and non-state organisations. What this means is that the practices 
of state and non-state organisations in the water sector are not producing ‘state effects’ or the 
expansion of the influence of the state. We are witnessing not the statisation but the de-
statisation of society. In Guinea-Bissau the broad range of state and non-state practices seems 
to be contributing to the expanding influence of non-state organisations. This has important 
impacts on discourses of state weakness circulating at all levels, but also on the state’s ability 
to perform the expected tasks. It also goes against most non-state organisations’ stated goal of 
working to strengthen state institutions in the country.  
In these circumstances, the most significant ways in which the state influenced water provision 
in Bafatá involved state actors using their position within the state but acting beyond any 
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evident regulatory, policy or institutional guidelines.  For instance, this was shown in relation 
to the role of the Regional Director of Bafatá in the devolution of water management to a 
local organisation. As Lindell 2008) demonstrated in her analyses of markets in Maputo and 
Fourchard (2011) in his analysis of urban infrastructure in Lagos, in order to understand the 
ways in which states shape water provision, or the urban context more generally, researchers 
need to go beyond investigations of formal bureaucracies. These state practices are not simply 
deviations from the ways in which states work, but are an intrinsic part of these apparatuses 
and of the ways in which states shape water provision. Another important characteristic of 
state practices in the context of water provision in Bafatá was the variety of motivations, 
agendas and approaches which were reflected in a multiplicity of modalities of the state: the 
state could be absent, benefactor, predatory, neoliberal, developmental, and incompetent all 
at once. As McFarlane and Desai’s (2015) showed in their study of everyday sanitation 
practices in Mumbai, these various modalities of the state could only be captured by adopting 
an ethnographic approach – they are at the core of everyday experiences of the state and 
service provision. And, I would add, they are inherent to the ways in which states work. These 
findings challenge understandings endowing state apparatuses with unitary, coherent agendas 
and modalities.  
Future Research 
This research used perspectives from a small African city to demonstrate the multiple and 
complex ways in which states shape water supply, and the ways these practices can inform 
broader understandings of states. In recent years, a number of urban researchers have adopted 
ethnographic approaches in their investigations of water and sanitation, focusing on everyday 
users’ practices but also everyday state practices (Anand, 2011b; McFarlane et al., 2014; 
McFarlane and Desai, 2015; Truelove, 2011). However, there are still few indications of how 
these investigations challenge current understandings of the role of the state in the production 
of water circulating in urban studies. Where researchers have explored the impacts of 
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everyday state practices on the ways people experience the urban, there have been fewer 
attempts to link these practices to broader conceptualisations of states and water provision. 
The aim should be to conceptualise these everyday practices as an intrinsic part of the state, 
rather than see them as deviations, or merely micropractices. Thus, more research focusing 
on different case studies of everyday state practices could inform and develop our 
understandings of states and water provision. Especially important would be to insist on the 
potential for contributing to wider theoretical insights based on these studies.  
In the context of small secondary African cities, often characterised by the presence of a 
multiplicity of institutions alongside looser and emerging social formations, there is still little 
research on the ways in which states carve their path in these institutional landscapes and the 
implications of this for service provision and processes of state formation. More case studies 
across different cities could create an engaging and important discussion with wide relevance 
for general understandings of states and urban service provision.  
Policy implications 
This thesis’ research findings suggest that policies targeting water provision in small secondary 
cities in Africa need to take into account the specificities and trajectories of states in these 
locations. This involves recognising the weakness of legal and regulatory frameworks as well 
as the multiple alternatives ways in which states shape water provision, particularly at the local 
level. It also requires an understanding of the role of the state in a context of institutional 
multiplicity, therefore recognising how the state works in relational ways. At the same time, 
the impacts of the competition between state and non-state organisations needs to be properly 
assessed. Policy-makers should focus on building synergies across different institutions and 
sectors, whilst seeking progressive combinations of forces to aid implementation. Working to 
enhance the role of the state, rather than undermine, particularly at the local level, within 
these collaborations is crucial and it could be better based on the actual roles of state actors, 
rather than informed by a pre-given view of expected bureaucratic institutional practices.  
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In Guinea-Bissau, initiatives such as the National Water and Sanitation Group should be 
assessed in terms of their impacts on different level state institutions, including the Department 
of Water Resources in Guinea-Bissau and its Regional Offices. The integration of different 
level state institutions – national and regional –, namely through the presence of Regional 
Representatives in the National Water and Sanitation Group could strengthen the role of the 
state supervising and monitoring the sector, informing relevant actors as well as supporting 
the capacity of these state officials to perform their roles at the local level. Yet, it could also 
complicate local experiments. Capacity-building and training so often mentioned in policy 
and government reports should not obfuscate the stark lack of financial resources, which is 
one of the main challenges faced by state institutions in the water sector. In the specific case 
of Guinea-Bissau, there is also a need to perhaps re-think how sanctions are applied, the 
impacts they have on different sectors as well as their wider impacts of political instability. It 
is unlikely that boycotting the working of departments like the Department of Natural 
Resources sanctions will have a positive effect on political instability. This might simply 
undermine remaining capacity and resistance within the state.  
9.2. Neoliberalisation, Assemblages and Creole modes of governance 
Inspired  by calls for postcolonial and post-neoliberal perspectives in urban studies (Baptista, 
2013b; Parnell and Robinson, 2012), I argued that the prevalence of critiques of neoliberalism 
is a key limitation of current analyses of water provision. This does not mean that 
neoliberalisation analytical frameworks should simply be discarded. In line with postcolonial 
critiques of urban infrastructure (Bakker, 2010; Kooy and Bakker, 2008a; McFarlane, 2008a; 
Zerah, 2008), this thesis invoked the notion of ‘variegated neoliberalisms’ (Brenner et al., 2010; 
Brenner and Theodore, 2002) as a way to engage with more nuanced understandings of 
processes entailing the neoliberalisation of water. This notion accounts for the variety of 
directions and trajectories of neoliberal policies and modes of governance, as well as the 
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different pathways these take as they are introduced in and shaped by diverse urban contexts. 
But, it was also argued that critiques of neoliberalism, which have emerged from analyses of 
core cities in the west, should not be taken for granted. And, the impacts of neoliberalisation 
should be turned into an object of empirical inquiry in investigations of small cities in Africa. 
Thus, inspired by the work of African urbanists (Lawhon et al., 2014; Myers, 2011), this thesis 
adopted an ethnographic approach as a way to find new registers to understand, explain and 
theorise policy innovations in African cities. It was argued that ethnographic approaches, 
coupled with the concept of assemblages and attention to everyday practices, can contribute 
to more complex understandings of the variety of agendas, factors, rationalities, motivations 
and ways of doing that come to be realised in the production and governing of water provision. 
Together those both encompass and transcend neoliberal logics. 
Relatedly, this thesis has argued that the governance model emerging in Bafatá is better 
described as a Creole mode of governance. The term Creole was used to refer to the intermixing 
of the multiplicity of motivations, practices and logics converging in water governance in 
Bafatá. In particular, this term conveys the ways in which various actors appropriated, re-invented, 
ignored and contested policy models circulating in the city. This was visible, for example, in the 
ways in which managerial and technical devices to improve cost-recovery and the legal 
concession contract were strategically embraced, and yet also endowed with new meanings 
and effects. For instance, the legal contract is used as a key tool to mobilise international 
donors, rather than as a legal tool governing social relations or as a way to strengthen 
regulatory frameworks. Also, it was shown that the adoption of cost-recovery principles, which 
in fact preceded circulating policy models, is based not on beliefs of the benefits of market rule, 
but on the desire to improve access to water in a context where resources are scarce. The ways 
in which tariff analyses were ignored, and therefore contested, are further examples of how 
policy models were transformed as they were adopted. Lastly, the term Creole captures the 
ways in which the everyday practices of, for example, standpipe operators, re-shaped the 
model and promoted its embedding in local social relations and institutions. 
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In this way, this research has shown that water provision in Bafatá has to be understood in 
relation to the complex intertwining of the logics, motivations and practices of various actors. 
It was also demonstrated that even as neoliberal models are adopted, they acquire new 
meanings and motivations that exceed a neoliberal ethos. In other words, it was argued that 
besides processes of ‘hybridisation’, researchers also need to take into consideration the 
processes through which neoliberal policies become something else. Related to this, it also 
demonstrated that apparently neoliberal models can be traced to alternative motivations and 
agendas rooted in the local context, reflecting distinctive priorities and attempts to extend 
possibilities within prescribed social, political and economic configurations. For instance, the 
case of Bafatá indicates that cost-recovery principles can be pre-determined as an outcome of 
neoliberal policies, but they also represent the pragmatic attempts of various actors to improve 
service delivery or are a necessary tool to finance water systems in contexts where financial 
resources are extremely scarce. This is not to say that these policies do not result in water 
systems that are dependent on the users’ capacity to pay, or the mobilisation of international 
donation, as is clearly the case in Bafatá.  Neither does it preclude the fact that payment for 
water can result in the exclusion of the poorest. However, at least in Bafatá, the adoption of 
cost-recovery principles was rarely associated with a neoliberal ethos focusing on the benefits 
of market rule.  
Another important finding concerning the governance model emerging in Bafatá relates to 
the role of development interventions, rather than the ‘cherry-picking’ strategies of the private 
sector, shaping water provision in this city. These included both planned interventions and 
unintended outcomes of development interventions. This thesis has argued that the creation 
of ASPAAB and the process of devolution of responsibilities for water management to this 
organisation, two vital events shaping the current condition of water provision in the city, were 
unintended outcomes of development interventions, which vitally shaped the motivations and 
practices of those actors involved. Thus, having in mind the role of both planned and 
unintended outcomes of development interventions, it was suggested that development 
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strategies and discourses, rather than private sector entities’ cherry-picking strategies, were 
key in shaping the models emerging in Bafatá. 
Future Research 
This research suggested that, rather than being the result of the cherry-picking strategies of 
private sector entities, formal infrastructure systems put in place in small cities are better 
understood as outcomes – both expected and unintended – of development interventions and 
discourses. Research in other small cities would be necessary to assess if this is the case 
elsewhere. In chapter seven, I suggested that ASPAAB and the Regional Director sought (and 
succeeded) to create possibilities for expanding the formal piped supply scheme within 
prescribed socio-political configurations. Research in a diversity of cities could enhance our 
understandings of the various factors and processes explaining why, and how, some ephemeral 
attempts become more permanent modes of service provision, while others simply disappear. 
This is in line with research seeking to build on urban multiplicities and the everyday practices 
through which residents secure their lives in the city.  
Where researchers have devoted considerable attention to the circulation of water policies, 
much less attention has been given to the multiplicity of ways in which these policies are 
transformed, adopted, appropriated, ignored and rejected as they are translated from policy 
documents into practice. These processes, which are beyond the focus on the travels of 
neoliberal policies, are essential to understandings of water provision in small cities. More 
research on different cities, including small cities frequently neglected by urban researchers, 
would provide an essential platform to develop understandings of water provision. 
The significant improvements in Bafatá’s piped supply scheme have, among other factors, 
relied on the inflow of resources throughout the duration of two development interventions. 
Where ASPAAB has improved its ability to collect revenues, it seems unlikely that water 
revenues will be sufficient to cover the costs of maintaining, repairing and expanding this 
infrastructure. This means that there is an uncertainty concerning the evolution of the piped 
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supply scheme of Bafatá now that these projects are finished. Will ASPAAB and the Regional 
Director mobilise more funding? Will they be able to maintain and improve the system with 
only water revenues, until they secure more funds? Further research is needed to secure policy 
implications of the study.  
Policy implications 
One of the key factors influencing the governance model adopted in Bafatá is the role of 
various actors re-inventing, appropriating, ignoring and contesting globally circulating 
models, ideas and policies. There are two key policy implications resulting from this argument. 
The first one relates to the ways in which best-practices have been circulated across cities. 
Policy-makers should consider balancing the focus between the models being circulated and 
processes of translation of policy into practices,  analysing the implications of these for models 
being devised. The second suggestion, which flows from this, is the importance of working 
with grounded organisations. What this means is the need to work with institutions that are 
not mere re-creations of abstract institutional forms  (or supposedly neutral) but that are 
carefully understood within local power configurations and therefore able to mobilise 
influence and resources.  
The development of the governance model adopted in Bafatá has taken place hand in hand 
with evolving processes of learning and capacity-building. Despite the fact that there have 
been considerable improvements, policy-makers need to be aware that processes of learning, 
training and capacity-building take much longer than the duration of projects.   
This research also demonstrated that the ways in which international donors are channelling 
funds to non-state organisations is not only promoting the devolution of urban services away 
from the state but also negatively affecting states’ ability to perform their supposed role as 
regulator of the sector. In this way,  international donors are undermining one of the stated 
goals of most interventions – to strengthen state institutions. This means that development 
interventions not only need to take into account the actual roles of the state, but also to 
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evaluate how the ways they channel funds through or beyond the state affects the governance 
of water provision. Creative ways to ensure these are well used to capacitate effective actors 
will benefit, too, from close attention to the actual practices of specific institutional actors, 
associations and users.  
9.3. Everyday water practices 
In line with what has been implied by Truelove (2011) and Anand (2011b), this thesis 
suggested that investigations of everyday practices can substantially enhance our 
understandings of patterns of access to water, and expand our comprehension of the social 
relations and factors shaping water inequalities in small secondary African cities. Crucially, 
looking into water practices relating to the use of the piped water scheme in Bafatá, it was 
shown that we are witnessing a process of ‘splintering from below’ (2010) in this city. What 
this means is that water users continue to opt for alternative sources and technologies. Related 
to this, it was also demonstrated that access – define in terms of ability to pay and distance – 
to an improved water source, such as a piped supply network, does not equate use. Instead, 
water practices entail a complex juggling of factors, including decisions concerning the use of 
scarce incomes, waiting times, reliability of sources, conflict, ease and comfort, and, perhaps 
most importantly, contradictory perceptions of quality of water. Although access was an 
important factor excluding poorer groups from using the piped water network, perceptions 
relating to the taste, colour and smell of water were also found to play a key role in people’s 
decisions to rely on alternative sources. Thus, this research suggests that there is the need to 
recognise that in contexts such as that of Bafatá, where multiple sources are available, people 
will continue to rely on these. Notably, alternative sources can also represent affordable and 
secure access to safe water; piped water might not be better quality water. Although urban 
researchers have tended to focus on piped water supply schemes as the only adequate form of 
water provision, alternative technologies and sources should be included in these analyses, 
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without a priori assumptions concerning its quality or inevitable substitution. Public health 
campaigns, alternative sources and technologies and piped supply schemes are all key in 
securing access to safe water in the context of Bafatá.  
This thesis also examined how explorations of everyday water practices can enhance 
understandings of the social relations emerging around the use and supply of water. In 
particular, it discussed the changes enacted by the introduction of a piped water network 
alongside the use of meters and the adoption of cost-recovery principles. It was suggested that 
wells and hand pumps produce what I called ‘private-collective modes of water supply’ in 
Bafatá. This mode of water provision entails the collective use of privately owned and 
maintained sources through ingrained norms dictating the sharing of water resources. Thus, 
the case of Bafatá showed that particularistic solutions, such as wells or home connections, 
can become collective infrastructure through ingrained sharing practices. This is in contrast 
to considerations of the fragmentation of the public realm in contexts of infrastructure 
breakdown (c.f. Anand, 2011b; Gandy, 2006) and suggests the need for more careful 
investigations between infrastructure breakdown and social fragmentation in these cities.  
The introduction of the ‘strict rule of the meter’ has provoked significant transformations in 
the ways the piped supply scheme is used and managed in Bafatá. This thesis discussed these 
changes in terms of a transition from ‘private-collective’ to ‘collective-individualising’ modes 
of water provision. The term ‘collective-individualising’ was used to describe the 
individualisation of users’ practices, through the disruption of sharing norms, when they use 
a collective system that adopts the ‘strict rule of the meter’. In line with what has been 
suggested by Von Schnitzler (2008), the introduction of meters has definitely changed 
interactions between water managers and users and initiated what could be seen as a process 
towards the production of calculative neoliberal subjectivities. However, on the one hand, this 
transition from private-collective to collective-individualised modes of water provision 
remains incipient suggesting the prevalence of sharing practices alongside the adoption of 
more individualistic approaches when it comes to water that is paid for. On the other hand, 
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these changes in the ways people relate to water, including the payment for water, are a 
necessary requirement if the piped water network is to operate in the context of a very poor 
city, like Bafatá. This suggests that changing subjectivities and practices around water user in 
Bafatá might not only entail the creation of calculative subjects but also amount to a necessary 
change related to the transition from alternative sources to a piped water network, where 
distribution happens not through established practices of sharing at the source but forms of 
collectivisation at a central level. 
Future Research 
Research carried out elsewhere has demonstrated the importance of other factors beyond 
access in patterns of use of water infrastructure  (Shaheed et al., 2014). Nevertheless, there is 
still little acknowledgement of the ways in which everyday water practices can be at the core 
of splintering infrastructure in urban studies literature. More research in other cities would be 
needed to verify if this tendency identified in Bafatá is common to other cities with similar 
population sizes and, maybe even slightly larger populations (Bakker, 2010). If this is the case, 
conceptualisations of infrastructure need to be expanded in order to take into account these 
dynamics. In addition, acknowledging the co-existence of multiple sources and technologies 
in cities, without assuming the inevitable (path dependent) substitution of those by a piped 
supply scheme, raises questions about the ways in which the production and governing of 
water is conceptualised. How are these alternatives governed? Are these governance practices 
sustainable at a larger scale and as the water system changes? In what ways do they relate to 
other forms of governance? How do processes of urbanisation influence access to these 
alternative sources and technologies? To what extent do these secure access to safe water? 
Who is affected, and how, as alternative sources become unavailable?  
Lastly, as suggested by Truelove (2011), Birkenholtz (2010), McFarlane and Desai (2015), a 
consistent attention to everyday practices can enhance our understandings of water 
inequalities and the multiple strategies through which residents access water in urban areas. 
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Related to this, this research suggested that Bafatá is undergoing an incipient transition from 
a mode of provision where distribution happens through established practices of sharing to 
one where these ingrained sharing practices are substituted by forms of collectivisation at the 
central level. The implications of a changing balance between these approaches requires 
further investigation, specially as piped supply schemes expand and the number of alternative 
sources diminishes.  
Policy Recommendations 
On the basis of the case of Bafatá, this research suggests that public health campaigns, focusing 
on the safe handling and treatment of water, need to be delivered side by side with investments 
in infrastructure. Public health campaigns for water safety in cities like Bafatá can have the 
most substantial impacts when it comes to public health. In addition, it was demonstrated that 
home connections meet important needs and should be considered in interventions in the 
sector. Despite the adoption of the ‘strict rule of the meter’ in efforts to achieve cost-recovery, 
in contexts like Bafatá it is unlikely that water revenues will be enough to cover the costs of all 
repairs, maintenance and expansion to the network. At the same time, the state will also not 
be in a position to invest in the sector in the short- to medium-term. This suggests that foreign 
aid will continue to play a key role subsidising and supporting these systems. This should be 
recognised by policy-makers, rather than remaining an ‘unintended outcome’ of wider 
development interventions – in Bafatá, this was evident in the motivations of actors to create 
NGOs and seek funding from international donors, instead of seeking to create private, and 
financially sustainable, companies. 
 
One of the key contributions of this thesis for debates on urban infrastructure is the concept 
of ‘creole urban infrastructure’. This concept explores urban infrastructure by combining 
critiques of neoliberalism with a focus on the everyday. In this way, it unveils the multiplicity 
of logics, motivations and practices converging in the production of forms of infrastructure 
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provision that cannot be easily associated with any one single agenda, even if shaped in 
circumscribed political and economic conditions. The term creole is used to refer to the 
“reciprocal activity, and the process of intermixture and enrichment” (Ashcroft et al. 2000, p. 
35) of different forces, logics, motivations and practices converging in the production of urban 
infrastructure. Recognising that in many parts of cities across the world the state and capitalist 
relations are not the key agents shaping urban processes, the aim is to allow for the 
consideration of neoliberalisation processes alongside alternative motivations and logics. In 
addition, this concept conveys that policies and procedures that appear to follow a neoliberal 
ethos can not only be appropriated in the context of local institutions but also contested and 
transformed in such ways that they acquire new motivations and meanings. They become 
creole, that is something else. 
Another key implication of the idea of ‘creole urbanism’ developed in this thesis is the ways in 
which we understand states in analyses of urban infrastructure. Challenging conventional 
approaches, I refused notions of the state as a coherent and autonomous entity and turned to 
conceptualisations focusing on the ways in which states are produced and experienced 
through a myriad of practices by state and non-state actors. Adopting such a perspective opens 
the analytical field to the lived geographies of states and the consideration of the multiplicity 
of ways in which a range of state actors shape infrastructure in cities. This involves the 
consideration of the multiple and often contradictory modalities of the state, enacted through 
policies and projects but also outside the formal channels of states institutions. It also involves 
allowing for the multiple and often contradictory agendas, modalities and practices of state 
actors. Crucially, the aggregate of these practices is not considered as a deviation of state’s 
norms and practices but as the ways in which states shape infrastructure. This has impacts on 
understandings of the ways in which states are perceived to influence infrastructure across 
cities, generating more nuanced analysis beyond exclusion/inclusion. 
Thus, the notion of creole urban infrastructure developed here constitutes a conceptualisation 
that seeks to both consider the important of broader forces and relations and the agency of a 
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multiplicity of actors and practices. The aim is to provide an analytical concept to explore 
arrangements in those places often merely described in terms of ‘neither market nor state’ and 
to trace possibilities emerging in these places.  
9.4. Conclusion 
This thesis suggested that small secondary cities in Africa matter. These cities matter because 
they house a significant share of the urban population in Africa, but also because they 
experience specific challenges related to their size as well as their subordinated political and 
economic positions. Like any other city, these urban areas should be taken as sites of ‘theory-
making’. Building on perspectives from one small city located in West Africa, this research 
argued that in order to understand water provision in small cities, scholars need to engage 
with the multiple motivations, logics and practices shaping these infrastructures, which were 
demonstrated to simultaneously contain, resemble and exceed neoliberal logics. It also showed 
that more nuanced theorisations of the state are required in order to move beyond western 
idealisations of states and make sense of the heterogeneous ways in which states (everywhere) 
shape water provision, and how these practices are related to processes of state formation.  
Nevertheless, this research can only be seen as a small contribution and much future research 
is needed. First, being based on only one case study, this thesis can only make tentative claims 
regarding the relevance of the research findings in the context of other small secondary cities 
in Africa. Research on a variety of case studies would be required in order to better understand 
the ways in which these cities’ specific positions and trajectories influence the forces, processes 
and outcomes shaping water provision, and therefore the challenges faced by those seeking to 
improve service delivery. In particular, comparative analyses involving a variety of case studies 
would be essential in finding new ways, beyond a neoliberal analytical framework, to think 
about processes and outcomes shaping water provision in small secondary cities. Such a line 
of work is essential if we are to understand water provision in small cities in poorer contexts 
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and to make contributions that can improve access to safe water in these urban areas. This is 
a particularly important contribution if we consider that a significant share of the urban 
population in Africa lives in small secondary cities.  
Inspired by the work of African urbanists, this thesis adopted an ethnographic approach in 
order to capture processes and practices that continue to escape current analytical registers. 
Nevertheless, throughout the research process, I constantly struggled to make sense of a range 
of practices and processes that seemed to be essential in shaping water provision but 
continuously exceeded existing analytical concepts. Urban researchers and geographers 
should insist on the task of finding ways to make sense of these empirical realities. The aim 
should be to develop conceptualisations responsive to the empirical realities of cities, and move 
beyond perceptions that frame pervasive processes, outcomes and practices as irrelevant or 
deviations from existing understandings of urbanisation. Likewise, policy makers and 
practitioners should turn their attention to the actual roles, practices and interactions of 
existing actors – including associations, states and users – and seek progressive alternatives 
and alignments that can build on these. This does not mean to build on the hidden 
entrepreneurial potential of the urban poor but to accept and value a broad range of 
rationales, motivations and practices currently sustaining service provision in urban areas.   
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Appendix I 
1. Complete List of Interviews 
 Type of Interview ‘Name’ Date 
1 Interview State *1 Malam  
2 Interview State *2 António  
3 Interview State *3 Domingos  
4 Interview State *4  12/02/2014 
5 Interview State *5 Manuel  
6 Interview State *6 Vasco  
7 Interview State *7 Cristovão 03/12/2013 
8 Interview State *8 Carlos 21/01/2014 
9 Interview International Organisation *1 Matilde  
10 Interview International Organisation *2 João  
11 Interview International Organisation *2a Teresa  
12 Interview International Organisation *3 Bioff  
13 Interview International Organisation *4 Michel  
14 Interview ASPAAB *1 Queba 12/03/2014 
15 Interview ASPAAB *2 Didier 17/03/2014 
16 Interview ASPAAB *3 Fatumata 17/07/2013 
17 Interview ASPAAB *4 Bacar  
18 Interview ASPAAB *5 Demba  
19 Interview ASPAAB *6 Maimuna  
20 Interview ASPAAB *7 Mariama 25/02/2014 
21 Interview ASPAAB *8 Mamadu 25/02/2014 
22 Interview ASPAAB *9 Aladje  
 
 Type of Interview ‘Name’ Date 
23 Neighbourhood Chief *1 Kumba 25/03/2014 
24 Neighbourhood Chief *2 Mamadu 24/03/2014 
25 Regolo   
 
 Type of Interview ‘Name’ Date 
26 Standpipe Operator*1   
27 Standpipe Operator*2   
28 Standpipe Operator*3   
29 Standpipe Operator*4   
30 Standpipe Operator*5   
31 Standpipe Operator*6   
32 Standpipe Operator*7   
33 Standpipe Operator*8   
34 Standpipe Operator*9   
35 Hand Pump Manager *1 Buba 17/03/2014 
36 Hand Pump Manager *2 Quemo 20/02/2014 
37 Hand Pump Manager *3 Sambel 17/03/2014 
38 Hand Pump Manager *4 Maimuna 26/02/2014 
39 Hand Pump Manager *5 Malam  
40 Hand Pump Manager *6 Mariama 24/02/2014 
41 Hand Pump Manager *7 Mussa 13/03/2014 
42 Hand Pump Manager *8 Iaia 21/02/2014 
43 Hand Pump Manager *9   
44 Hand Pump Manager *10   
45 Hand Pump Manager *11   
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 Type of Interview ‘Name’ Date 
46 Interview Water User *1 Aissatu 17/03/2014 
47 Interview Water User *2 Aminata 13/03/2014 
48 Interview Water User *3 Adja 26/02/2014 
49 Interview Water User *4 Fatumata 13/03/2014 
50 Interview Water User *5 Djenabu 14/03/2014 
51 Interview Water User *6 Aua 20/02/2014 
52 Interview Water User *7 Victoria 14/03/2014 
53 Interview Water User *8 Alimato 14/03/2014 
54 Interview Water User *9 Binta 20/02/2014 
55 Interview Water User *10 Djenabu 14/03/2014 
56 Interview Water User *11 Fatumata 23/01/2014 
57 Interview Water User *12 Aissatu 17/03/2014 
58 Interview Water User *13 Adama 17/03/2014 
59 Interview Water User *14 Iero 14/03/2014 
60 Interview Water User *15 Siratu 26/02/2014 
61 Interview Water User *16 Ramatu 26/02/2014 
62 Interview Water User *17 Sunka 21/02/2014 
63 Interview Water User *18 Aissatu 24/02/2014 
64 Interview Water User *19 Fatumata 20/02/2014 
65 Interview Water User *20 Sali 13/03/2014 
66 Interview Water User *21 Binta 15/03/2014 
67 Interview Water User *22 Maimuna 15/03/2014 
68 Interview Water User *23 Aua 13/03/2014 
69 Interview Water User *24 Marietto 15/03/2014 
70 Interview Water User *25 Carla 24/02/2014 
71 Interview Water User *26 Dina 26/02/2014 
72 Interview Water User *27 Cinco Kila 26/02/2014 
73 Interview Water User *28 Djau 14/03/2014 
74 Interview Water User *29 Fanta 21/02/2014 
75 Interview Water User *30 Aissatu 24/02/2014 
76 Interview Water User *31 Djenabu 13/03/2014 
77 Interview Water User *32 Iero 21/02/2014 
78 Interview Water User *33 Fatumata 26/02/2014 
79 Interview Water User *34 Leonor 13/03/2014 
80 Interview Water User *35 Mariama 14/03/2014 
81 Interview Water User *36 Domingo 21/02/2014 
82 Interview Water User *37 Celeste 21/02/2014 
83 Interview Water User *38 Mariama 17/03/2014 
84 Interview Water User *39 Olga 21/02/2014 
85 Interview Water User *40 Fatumata 10/10/2013 
86 Interview Water User *41 Salimatu 14/03/2014 
87 Interview Water User *42 Aminata  
88 Interview Water User *43 Aissatu  
89 Interview Water User *44 Maimuna 30/10/2013 
90 Interview Water User *45 Elizabete 29/01/2014 
91 Interview Water User *46 Indja 29/01/2014 
92 Interview Water User *47 Alzira 29/01/2014 
93 Interview Water User *48 Adama 27/01/2014 
94 Interview Water User *49 Mohammed 11/12/2013 
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2. List of GAS Meetings Attended 
 GAS Meetings Location Date 
1 Meeting 1 Unicef Offices Bissau 26/09/2013 
2 Meeting 2 Unicef Offices Bissau 31/10/2013 
3 Meeting 3 NGO PLAN International Offices Bissau 28/11/2014 
4 Meeting 4 Offices of the Department of Water Resources Bissau 30/10/2014 
5 Meeting 5 Offices of the Department of Water Resources Bissau 27/02/2014 
6 Meeting 6 Offices of NGO Raje Bissau 27/03/2014 
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APPENDIX II – Data analysis: Interviews with water users 
• The tables below illustrate how I organised data in order to produce the pictures and 
analysis included in chapter 8 of this thesis.  
• In order to identify the different factors affecting people’s choices of different water 
sources and technologies, I analysed interview texts using Nvivo. First, I went through 
all interview texts and coded them using the following codes: reliability, distance, 
payment, conflict, perceptions of quality of water (CHECK). The initial codes were 
generated during a first round of analysis, and then perfected during consecutive 
rounds. I then used Nvivo to analyse the frequency with which these factors were 
mentioned by interviewees. Nevertheless, the ways in which different users referred 
to the different factors was also considered in the analysis, rather than just the 
frequency with which they were mentioned. 
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   WATER SOURCES USED DURING ‘RAINY SEASON’ 
Water 
Users Neighbourhood 
Close to 
standpipe Well standpipe Hand pump Well 2 
Well  
LR  
Standpipe 
LR 
Standpipe 
 transport 
Home 
connection >1 
*1 Bilale 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*2 Tunturum 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*3 Palhota 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*4 Caibara 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
*5 Siberia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*6 Bairro 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*7 Bairro 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*8 Bairro 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*9 Bairro 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*10 Bairro 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*11 Bairro 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*12 Policia 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
*13 Policia 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
*14 Siberia 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
*15 Ponte Nova 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
*16 Ponte Nova 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*17 Iussi 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
*18 Coburnel 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
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Water Users Neighbourhood Close to standpipe Well standpipe Hand pump Well 2 
Well  
LR  
Standpipe 
LR 
Standpipe 
 transport 
Home 
connection >1 
*19 Bairro 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*20 Tunturum 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*21 Nema 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
*22 Binalu 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*23 Caibara 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*24 Nema 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*25 Rua Porto 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
*26 Ponte Nova 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*27 Ponte Nova 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*28 Siberia 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*29 Iussi 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
*30 Rua Porto 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
*31 Caibara 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
*32 Iussi 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*33 Ponte Nova 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*34 Caibara 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
*35 Siberia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*36 Iussi 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Water Users Neighbourhood Close to standpipe Well standpipe Hand pump Well 2 
Well  
LR  
Standpipe 
LR 
Standpipe 
 transport 
Home 
connection >1 
*37 Iussi 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*38 Bilale 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
*39 Rua Porto 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*40 Praca 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
*41 Bairro 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*42 Bairro 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
*43 Bairro 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
*44 Bairro 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*45 Rua Porto 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
*46 Rua Porto 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
*47 Rua Porto 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
*48 Bairro 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
*49 Bairro 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
TOTAL 18 41 4 11 2 2 1 1 6 19 
% 37 84 8 22 4 4 2 2 12 39 
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   WATER SOURCES USED DURING ‘DRY SEASON’  
WaterUsers N  CS 
Same 
sources spring 
Different 
well 
Wel
l standpipe  
Standpipe 
transport 
Hand 
Pump  
Hand 
Pump LR Mission 
Home 
connect 
*1 Bilale 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*2 Tunturum 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*3 Palhota 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
*4 Caibara 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*5 Siberia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*6 Bairro 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*7 Bairro 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*8 Bairro 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*9 Bairro 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
*10 Bairro 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
*11 Bairro 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*12 Policia 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*13 Policia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*14 Siberia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
*15 Ponte Nova 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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WaterUsers N  CS 
Same 
sources spring 
Different 
well 
Wel
l standpipe  
Standpipe 
transport 
Hand 
Pump  
Hand 
Pump LR Mission 
Home 
connect 
*16 Ponte Nova 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*17 Iussi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
*18 Coburnel 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*19 Bairro 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*20 Tunturum 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*21 Nema 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
*22 Binalu 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*23 Caibara 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*24 Nema 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
*25 Rua Porto 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*26 Ponte Nova 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*27 Ponte Nova 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*28 Siberia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*29 Iussi 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*30 Rua Porto 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*31 Caibara 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
*32 Iussi 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
*33 Ponte Nova 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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WaterUsers N  CS 
Same 
sources spring 
Different 
well 
Wel
l standpipe  
Standpipe 
transport 
Hand 
Pump  
Hand 
Pump LR Mission 
Home 
connect 
*34 Caibara 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*35 Siberia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*36 Iussi 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
*37 Iussi 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*38 Bilale 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*39 Rua Porto 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
*40 Praca 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
*41 Bairro 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*42 Bairro 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
*43 Bairro 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
*44 Bairro 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*45 Rua Porto 1           
*46 Rua Porto 1           
*47 Rua Porto 1           
*48 Bairro 3 1           
*49 Bairro 2 1           
TOTAL 18 25 3 13 1 4 2 6 2 0 1 
% 37 51 6 27 2 8 4 12 4 0 2 
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Appendix III – Interview Themes 
Below I list key themes explored in interviews with different informants. These are only 
illustrative since my interviews were mostly unstructured. This means that although I had 
themes I wanted to explore, I was also open to new topics introduced by interviewees. When 
possible I tried to explore the themes I was interested in by focusing on reflections upon 
specific events and interactions.   
State officials 
- The role of the department they worked in and their role within it; 
- Department’s key projects;  
- Major challenges of the department and how they affected water provision in the 
country; 
- Major changes since they had started working: changes in policies, civil war, political 
instability; 
- Participation in elaboration of policies and projects, description of specific projects 
and how they perceived the role of different actors involved; 
- Relations/ interactions with other state departments 
- Relations/ interactions between state and non-state organisations in different 
projects; 
- GAS (National Water and Sanitation Group); 
- major challenges related to water provision in urban areas; role of state, community 
and private sector 
- Evolution of water provision in Bafatá;  
- Participation in projects related to water provision in Bafatá; 
- Role/Involvement in water provision in Bafatá;  
International Organisations/ NGOs 
- Aims of the organisation  
- Projects of the organisation (related to water provision) 
- Interviewees role in the organisation 
- Participation in projects: description of project; relations with other non-state 
organisations, users and the state; achievements and short-comings 
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- Development sector in Guinea-Bissau: limitations and benefits 
- Political instability 
- Challenges related to interactions with the state; description of specific projects  
- GAS 
- Project funding 
ASPAAB 
- role in the organisation; description of duties/ activities  
- motivation to join/ be part of the organisation 
- benefits of being a member of the organisation 
- founding members: description of events leading to creation of ASPAAB, motivations, 
actors, reflections 
- members involved in the operation of the network: description of their roles, routines, 
major factors influencing operation, challenges; 
- Major challenges relating to water provision in Bafatá;  
- Development interventions: description of projects, role of ASPAAB, achievements, 
benefits and limitations, relation with other actors involved in the project 
- Relations/ interactions with different state organisations 
- Changes since 2006: human resources, organisation, water provision 
 
Water Users 
- Sources and technologies used 
- Water routines 
- Water treatment 
- Factors explaining choice of technologies and sources 
- Water provision/ piped supply scheme: role of ASPAAB, state, customary authorities 
- Water sharing practices, water gifts 
- Paying for water 
